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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is twofold: firstlyt to describe the views 
of Ramus on communicationg andy in particulart on the qualities of differ- 
ent kinds of discoursev and. 9 secondlyp to compare these views with those of 
the theorists of the PlSiade. In the first chapter we shall see something 
of the life and works of RAmiis (briefly, because this has been more than 
adequately treated by Walter Ong who bases himself on the contemporary bio- 
graphiesq especially that of Nancel)ll and then the points of contact bet- 
ween Ramus and the various members of the P14iade and some other associated 
writers and critics. The information we have on the subject of the rela- 
tions between Ramus and the Pldiade is not extensive, but this fact is Sig- 
nificant in itselfy and corrects the commonly accepted view that Ramus was 
a close friend and follower of the P14iade. The second chapter is devoted 
to a discussion of the main outlines of what has come to be knownp above 
all since the appearance of Grahame Castor's book which bears this titlep 
as P14iade Poetics. 
2 The subsequent chapters deal with the same questions 
of literary and artistic theory as did the theorists of the P14iade. They 
set out Ramus' views in great detailp and then make a brief comparison bet- 
ween them and those of the P14iade. The topics to be considered are: the 
relation of art to naturep imitation, clarity and obscurity, truth and fal- 
sity, invention and disposition, some general questions of stylep ando 
especially, plain and figurative writingg and finally the relation between 
1. Walter J. Ong, S. J. 9 Ramus, Method and the Decay of DialoAuej Cambridgey 
lassachusetts, 1958 (here referred to as MIDD). 
2. Grahame Castorp P14iade Poetics, Cambridge, 1964- 
ii 
logiop rhetoric and poetry. 
The literature on n=us and Ramism is vast. A glance at Walter Ong's 
other major book on Ramus 
1 
will showq in the first place, the very great 
number of editions of books by Ramus himself publiahod in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuriest 
"There are over 750 separately published editions 
(including some adaptations) of single or collected 
works by Ramus or his collaborator Omer Talon (Audo- 
marus Talaeusj_ca. 1510-1562) - close to 250 editions 
of the important Dialectic alone. Counting separately 
each of the works in these 750-odd volumesy some of 
which include more than one itemp one gets a total of 
around 1100 separate printings of individual works. 
All but a few of these fall in the century roughly 
between 1550 and 1650". 2 
In the second place, Ong's list will show the extent of the contro- 
versies surrounding Ramus and Ramismq and the scope of Ramist influence 
throughout Europe. 
Interest in Ramus continues to grow. Some more recent research has 
not always either acknowledgedp or sometimes even been aware ofp the vital 
and indispensable contribution which Ong's two books made. Clearlyy the 
twelve years which have elapsed since he published these works have added 
something to our knowledge of the subjectv but it is remarkable how little 
there has been found to criticize in his major contentions. Two broad ob- 
jections may be, and have been, mades that the rhetorical tradition is more 
important in Ramus' theories, and in the period after Ramus' death, than 
Ong allows, and that his stress on the Ispatialization' of knowledge is ex- 
cessivep but neither of these objections could be adequately substantiated 
1. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventoryl Cambridgep Massachusetts, 1958 
(here 
referred to as 
2. Ong, WARD, P-5. 
iii 
without an equally detailed documentation. There aret of coursep many addi- 
tional facts which have come to light concerning editions and copies of books 
which Ong had not come across. 
1 In generalp howeverp his theses remain un- 
assailed. 
There are two books directly concerned with parts of the subject of 
this thesis which have appeared since 1958. The first of these is Grahame 
Castor's book which I have already mentioned. I intend to treat this book 
more fully in chapter two. It will become obvious that I am indebted to it 
(though on most of the major points I had already formed basically the same 
opinions before the book was published); it is an excellent account of the 
linguistic and psychological problems connected with the critical terms of 
poetic theory, and of the philosophical bases of that theory. I mustt how- 
ever, at this stagep make one important reservation about it. One chapter 
(Invention and Reasony pp. 126-136) is devoted almost entirely to Ramusy yet 
Castor does not seem to have made any use of Ong whose name appears neither 
in the text nor the bibliography. Nor does Castor seem to have been aware 
of another earlierp but major, piece of work directly on his subjeotp Rose- 
mond Tuvels Elizabethan and IletRMMsical Imaa2M (Chicago, 1947). The effect 
of both omissions is that Castor misses some of the broader aspects of the 
problem. The second book suffers from the same defectp but in a way which 
deserves much stronger criticism. I refer to the edition of the Dialectique 
prepared by Ylichel Dassonville. 
2 
He is aware of Ong but seems able only to 
1.1 have communicated some of these to himo and he hopes to incorporate then 
in a supplement to the RTI. There are also some details of fact about 
Ramus' biography which need to be modified in the light of new evidencep 
but these are not relevant to the present study. 
2. Pierre de La Ramdev La Dialectique, edited by Michel Dassonvillev Travaux 
d'Humanisme et Renaissancet Genevaq 1964. 
iv 
refer to him slightingly or disparagingly. For exampler on p. 16j he claims 
in a footnote "Walter J. Ong n4glige d1analyser les phases do la rdvolte 
intellectuelle qui a men6 Ramus "a slopposer & l1enseignement sorbonnique", 
and refers us to MIDD. There is some truth in Dassonville's statement, but 
it gives a completely distorted picture, since Ong's weighty contributions 
to the understanding of other phases of Ramus' activity are not mentioned. 
There are scattered references to Ong in the footnotes, but not a single 
one in the chapter called 'Les D6marches de la Dialectique ramistet. This 
is impossible to account for. Furthermore, in a note on P-158f Dassonville 
has some very harsh things to say about Ongt 
I'llous sommes persuad6- que Walter J. Ongt Z,. MDp notaxa- 
ment P-183 ss. slest m4pris on refusant do reconnaltre 
la nouveaut6 et 11importance de la relation dans 114non- 
ciation ramiste. En n4gligeant dly voir une tentative 
logistiquel W. J. Ong a commis une grave injustice et a 
fauss6 la perspective propre h la dialectique de Ramus". 
While there is certainly room for discussion on the point at issuep 
the criticism is tendentious and itself unjust. ' 
1 
There have been many recent articles and short notes on Ramus and 
Ramism. I should like to draw attention to three of these. Frances Yatesy 
in The Art of rLemory (1966) has a chapter on Ramus which does acknowledge 
its debt to Ong, and shows how Ramus fits into the tradition of arts of me- 
mory; and R. Leake has published two articlesq one in 1968t entitled 'The 
Relationship of two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine 
j 
Fouquelin's Rhetorique Frangoise, an excellent articlev clear, detailed and 
1.1 do not wish to lapse into the same kind of carping criticism as Dasson- 
ville does; for an assessment of the value of thist I am afraid, uncritical 
edition, I must refer the reader to my review of it in The Modern Language 
Review, 1967, pp-13C-3. 
V 
well-expounded and which promises well for the forthcoming edition of the 
Rhatorique which the author announcesp 
1 
and one in 1970 called 'Antoine Fou- 
quelin and the P14iadol. 
2 Besides these works there have been some recent 
reprints of books by Ramus. 
I should like to thank many people for their helpq especially my 
supervisorl Mrs. Doris Delacourcellet for her kind encouragement. Father 
Ong, tool has always been generous with advice whenever I have written to 
him; any acknowledgement of debt to One, particularly in connection with 
the bibliographical part of his workl is bound to be an understatement. I 
should like to thank also James P. Thorne for letting me see the manuscript 
of his forthcoming book on medieval and Renaissance theories of languasev 
grammar and logic, which contains chapters on Ramus, and Aristotelian poet- 
ics in the Renaissance. 
1. Bibliothbque d'Humanisme et Renaissancep 1968y PP-85-108. 
2. Ibid. 9 19709 pp-379-94. 
CHAPTm aTE 
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF RAMUS AND HIS CONTACT WITH THE PLEIADE 
Part One - Ramust life and works. 
Petrus Ramus (otherwise called Pierre de la Ramde) was born in 1515 
into an impoverished noble familyp in the village of Cuts in Picardyq a few 
miles from Noyon where Calvin had been born six years earlier. At about the 
age of twelve he went from Cuts to Parist having already twice tried to 
establish himself there as a student. The third time he managed to secure 
a place in the Collbge de Navarre as the servant of a rich studentp the Siour 
de la Brosse. Among his companions were Charles do Bourbon and Charles de 
Lorraine, who were both later to become cardinals and his protectors. He had 
little time for the study of which he was passionately fondt and so applied 
himself with feverish diligence. Although presumably he had studied some 
grammar and rhetoric in Cutsq these would also form part of his syllabus at 
the university. 
"This arts course consisted of grammart rhetoric, and 
lphilosophylp the last being chiefly logic and IphysicsIt 
with a certain amount of othicst a tiny dash of metaphy- 
sicst and variable incidental items such as rudimentary 
geometry or other mathematics, or occasionally music. " 1 
Physicsp it should be noted, embraced most aspects of natural science 
studied at that timep and included some metaphysics and psychology; the scope 
and treatment of these subjects were much the same as they had been for cen- 
turies. 
1. Ong, MOD, p. 20. Most of the biographical details in this section comep 
through Ongg from the three contemporary biographies, of Johann Freige 
(1575)v Thdophile de Banos (1576)v and, especiallyl Nicolas de Nancel (1599)- 
I have used all these biographiess and also the many speeches and prefaces 
in which Ramus talks about himselft but it is not my present purpose to dis- 
cuss these questions at length. 
2 
"Rhetoric and dialectic or logic (the terms weret in praoticep 
synonymous) had not remained the same. The humanists were 
replacing the practical medieval rhetoric with a more elaborate 
art designed to teach perfect Latin expression as a literiry 
and stylistic instrument. " 
The change in the teaching of rhetoric was, however, largely one of 
stress. The change in the teaching of dialectic was more far-reaching; the 
formal (almost mathematical) logic of the Middle Ages was giving place to the 
topical logic 2 of Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485) introduced into Paris by Johann 
Sturm in 1529. 
After obtaining hie M. A. degree in 1536 Ramue began immediately, as was 
the custom, to teach, first in the Collbge du Mans in Parist and then in the 
Collbge de 11Ave Mariat where one of his colleagues was Omer Talon. While he 
was engaged in teaching he was also busy preparing for publication his first 
works on logic. In 1543 there appeared together two books; the first of thesev 
Dialecticae Partitiones (The Structure of Dialectio)3 was brought out again 
later in the same year in a second slightly amplified editiont under the title 
Dialecticae Institutiones (Training in Dialectic); the other work was called 
Aristotelicae Animadversiones (Remarks on Aristotle). Both books were inten- 
ded as an introduction to the reconstruction of philosophyt starting with tra- 
ditional logic; as such, they were calculated to undermine the authority of 
Aristotle and his followers andq in effect, of the whole university teaching 
body. Since Ramus must have realised what would be the reaction of those 
responsible for the curriculum he was presumably not unduly disturbed when two 
of the university staff took up the challenge. Antonio Gouveal a Portuguese 
1. Ong, op. cit., p. 21. 
2. The Iplaces' (loci, -rO710t ) will be discussed in chapter eight. 
3. For details of all Ramus' works see Ong, RTI; the English translations of 
the titles are mainly from Ong. 
3 
lawyer and teacher of logict and brother of the principal of the Collbge de 
Guyenne in Montaigne's timey brought out in the same yearp 1543, a defence of 
Aristotle and of his supporters: Pro Aristotelo responaio adversus P. Rarni 
calumnias (A Reply on behalf of Aristotle against the calumnies of Ramus). He 
was supported by a Benedictine theologiang Joachim do Pdriong who published a 
book called Pro Aristotele in Petrum Ramum orationes II (Two discourses on be- 
half of Aristotle against Ramus). Gouvea saw to it that Francis I heard 
about the dispute and a commission was appointed to look into and judge the 
matter. Since the attack had been directed at the very foundations of the 
university system the men chosen as adjudicators were drawn from all five facul- 
ties. Two were to be chosen by each party to the quarrel and a fifthp a neut- 
ral arbitratorp was to be chosen by the King. Ramus was to be represented by 
Jean Bomontl a physiciant who had twice been rector of the university, and Jean 
Quenting who was Dean of the Faculty of Law. 
1 Gouvea and the Aristotelian 
party were supported by Pierre Danbsp the first professor of Greek at the Col- 
lbge Royal, and Francesco Vicomercatop who had been chosen in 1542 to occupy 
the newly-established Chair of Philosophy at the same college; (he had studied 
and later taught at Padua and Pavia, joining the study of philosophy to that 
of medicineq and since 1530 he had been physician to Francis I, while at the 
same time he taught philosophy in the various Paris colleges; his aim was to 
restore the body of Aristotelian thought to its true state by ridding it of 
the inaccuracies introduced by the hordes of commentators on the text). The 
fifth member of the panel was to be the theologian Jean de Salignac. 
2 
After two days of discussion the judges could not reach agreement; 
1. Cf. Charles Waddington, Ramus, Sa Vie, Ses Ecrits et Ses Opinionst 
Parisp 1855, P-34. 
2. Waddington, OP-cit-p PP-47-48; of. Henri Bussong Le Rationalisme dans la 
littdrature frangaise de la Renaissance, Paris, 1957? pp-193-4. 
4 
Ramus' representatives withdrew and he had to admit defeat. A royal decree of 
March 12 1544p banned the sale or republication of the books in question and 
forbade Ramus to teach or write philosophy. The reason given for the twofold 
ban was the ignorance, stupidity and lack of integrity of the author; this is 
different from the reason given in the arret do Justice obtained by Pierre 
Gallandq rector of the university, when the books first appeared: that they 
were a danger to young minds, and were hostile to Aristotle and so against 
nature and truth. 
1 The king gave the necessary sanction to the decreep it 
was registered by parliament without difficultyt and was received eagerly by 
the university. 
Ramus next turned his attention to the teaching of mathematics and 
eloquence (that ist rhetoric, through the medium of classical authors). His 
first publication after the decree was a defence of mathematics, the earliest 
known science: Petri Rami Oratio de studiis mathematicis (Address on the 
study of mathematics). He followed this up with an edition of a Latin trans- 
2 lation of Euclid's Elements, (1545) . 
In this year he was invited by Nicolas Lesage, principal of the Col- 
1ýge de Preslesp to become a member of his teaching staff; Ramus was soon 
joined there by Omer Talon, who was to be his friend and literary partner 
for the next seventeen years. On December 1,15459 Ramus was installed as 
rector of the college in place of Lesage. 
The association with Talon was to prove particularly fortunate. It 
was not just that the two writers shared more or less the same interests; 
they complemented one anotherp since Ramus' main preoccupation was with the 
1. Charles Desmazep P. Ramus, Sa vie,, ses 4crits, sa mort, Paris, 1864P P-45. 
2. Of. my article, "La Ram6els Early Mathematical Teaching"p in Biblioth6que 
d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1966, pp. 605-614- 
5 
study of logic and Talon's with that of rhetoric. Talon's Institutiones Ora- 
toriae (Training in Oratoryp 1545) was intended as a close parallel to one of 
Ramus' banned booksp and we have it on the authority of Nancel (Ramus' secre- 
tary and biographer) that the work on rhetoric published under Talon's name 
was perhaps largely written by Ramus. Purthermorep after Talon's death in 
1562 Ramus undertook to revise a book called the Rhetorica which had grown out 
of the Institutiones Oratoriae. Finally, in 15469 Ramus evaded the ban on 
writing a philosophical work by publishingg under Talon's namet a third edi- 
tion of his own treatise on dialectics Dialectici commentarii tres authore 
Audomaro Talaeo editi (Three commentaries on dialectic by Omer Talon). I 
mention at some length this close literary collaboration between Ram= and 
Talon because it is essential to an understanding of my exposition of Ramus' 
views. It is often impossible to say whether a particular work is either by 
Ramus or by Talon or by both. On occasion I think we must assume joint author- 
ship. There is no doubt that Ramus was the principal author of almost all 
the works we are going to look atv though I venture to suggest, for stylistic 
reasonsp that the Institutiones Oratoriae of 1545 owes more to Talon himself 
than Nancel allows. 
1 
1. Cf. Ong, LTI, pp. 82-85# where this question is discussed at length. It seems 
to me, howeverp after a close examination of Nancel's own words (Nancely Petri 
Rami vitay 1599P PP-40-41)9 that Nancel is not quite so sure about the exact 
responsibility for authorship which each of the two writers had. Ong's view 
is that 'Nancel was convinced that "from its beginning"y the work on rhetoric 
was more Ramus' than Talon's, Ramus having done most of the work with the ma- 
terial and "reduced it to an art", and Talon having only given it his own 
style... I (p. 82). It is true that Nancel says thisp but he also saysp 'Hoe 
igitur Talaeo vita functo, cum Ramus artium instaurationem moliretur Rhetoricen 
illam eandem sub Talaei nomine diuulgatamp haud scio SLuo iurej sibi arrogauity 
et interpolatam in vulgus ediditz Suasi a se primum inuentam descri2tamqueg et 
a Talaeo commentarijs illustratam: sicuti primum de Dialectica factum constat: 
cuius verus author Ramus estf Talaeus commentator... I He goes on to say that 
because of Talon's stylistic improvementsy lideo illi gloriam. solidam inuenti- 
onis viuo concessissev quam a mortuo velut vsuram repoposcit: vt cuius operis 
dictator atque dux extiteratl_eiusdem nuno vere primarius author haberetur. 
Haec mea coniectura, si vera non estf nescio quid queas excogitaret cum certum 
sciamp P. Ramo satis solidae laudis proprio Marto quaesitum., nee vnquam plagio 
alterius inuentam sibi arro6asse aut vendicassel. It is clear from this that Nancel wants to rove that the work was larjejý written by Ramus, but realises the weakness of 
tis 
own argument. (I have t icised the passages which show Nancel's uncertainty). 
6 
One question which exercised Ramus very much at this time was the rela- 
tion of the different arts and sciences to one another. He is insistent that 
each art has a clearly defined scopep absolutely distinct from that of any 
other artp and yet the method to be used in the explanation of each art is 
identical. Furthermorep because of the unity of all thoughtp all the arts 
have a common ultimate purpose, the furtherance of human knowledge. It was on 
this subject that Ramus gave his first address of the new school yearp on Ooto- 
ber 129 1546; this was published three years later as Oratio de studiig__philo- 
sophiae et eloquentiae coniungendis (Address on combining philosophy and elo- 
quence). The union which he proposed was the classical one of philosophy and 
rhetoric, and sincep at this timep traditional philosophy was more or less 
just logic and physics, and since Ramus had as yet shown little interest in 
the latter, it seems fairly clear that he was equating philosophy and logic. 
The 1546 address appears to be a summary justification of the attitudes adop- 
ted in the various editions of Ramust dialectic and Talon's rhetoric. 
Ramus proposed, from now on, to revert to the Greek and Roman practice 
of teaching 'philosophy' in the morning (this was to be Talon's task) and 
rhetoric in the afternoon; the afternoon classes were to be directly related 
to those given earlier in the dayp since Ramus' procedure was to explain 
classical authors by showing the usage and application of the rules of logic. 
After the death of Francis I Olst Marcht 1547) the ban on the compo- 
sition and publication of books by Ramus was lifted by Henry Up under the 
influence of Diane de Poitiers, and Charles de Lorrainev Cardinal de Guise. 
Although Ramus was free now to write and teach philosophy, the concession did 
not make any real difference to him. He had in fact been teaching it already 
to some extento and he had been able to publish, as we have seeny under 
7 
Talon's name. He wasp howeverp now allowed to republish the two condemned 
books. The lifting of the ban would have made more difference had Ramus not 
been so interested at the time in another subject, rhetoric. No doubt his en- 
forced teaching of the subject had awakened his interest in it. In 1546 he 
had produced an explanation of the Dream of Scipio from Cicero's Republiop 
and the following year (before he was granted his freedom) he brought out a 
commentary on Cicero's Orator. The year 1548 saw the fifth edition of Talon's 
work on rhetoric under the title of Rhetorica; this book had clearly been 
adapted so that it fitted in with Ramus' views. In the course of the next 
year Ramus completed his commentary on Quintilian's Institutiones Oratoriaep 
which he later combined with his commentary on Cicero's Orator to form the 
Scholae Rhetoricae (Lectures on Rhetoric)' and in which the main contention 
against both Cicero and Quintilian is that they are illogical. These works 
were followed by other commentaries on Cicero. 
At this timel toop Ramus engaged in controversy with Pierre Galland on 
the subject of university reform; he was interested in the subject both from 
the practical angle (his own dissatisfaction with the way he had been taught 
had made him adopt, in his teaching at the Collbge de Presles a more humane 
and simpler attitude, free from the aridities of scholasticism and from the 
tyranny of authority reverenced for its own sake)v and from the theoretical 
anglep because for him the arts and sciences should be taught in a certain 
order and in a certain way. The discourse Pro Philosophica Parisiensis Aca- 
demiae disciplina (Plea for philosophy at the university of Parisq 1551) 
suggests that the arts-course could profitably be shortened. Ramus is anxious 
to show that his current practice at the Collbge de Presles is free from he- 
retical ideas. On the contraryl his quarrel with Aristotle is based on the 
1. Ongg RTI, P- 147- 
a 
observation that this doctrine is opposed to the truth of the Gospel. Galland 
replied in Contra novam academiam Petri Rami oratio (Address against the now 
academy of Ramus). Rabelaisp in the prologue to Book IV of Pantagruelp al- 
ludes to the quarrelpbut does not take sides. 
' 
In the same year (1551) Ramus was appointed to a chair at the Collbge 
Royal. This was an invitation to give public lectures but not technically 
within the university. His full title was Professor of Eloquence and Philo- 
sophy. 
2 He retained the headship of the Collbge do Preslest which led to an 
altercation with Jacques Charpentierp 
3 
who contended that his method of con- 
ducting the classes at Presles was unacceptable (that isp that he taught dis- 
cursively, and not progressing by a strict word-for-word analysis of a given 
text). At Charpentier's insistence the matter was eventually brought before 
a tribunal; because of his friendship with Cardinal de Lorraine Ramus was 
allowed to carry on teaching in his own way, but only at certain prescribed 
hours and on 'extraordinary' or feast days; since, however, there were about 
two hundred of these the restriction was not particularly harsh. 
4 
In 1555 there appeared Ramus' first major mathematical workr Arith- 
meticae libri tres (Three books on Arithmetic). In the same year Ramus also 
published what many would see as his most important work , the Dialectique. 
1- Ongt RTIP pp. 496-8; cf. 9 also, p. 156; for the Rabelais episode see below 
P. 20. 
2. After his deathl the chair of Eloquence and Philosophy was discontinued and 
in its place a new chair of mathematics was set up, according to provisions 
made in Ramus' will. Ramus' interest in mathematics is the result partly 
of his teaching the subject when he was under the interdicty partly of his 
doctrine of the interrelation of all the branches of learning and of his 
desire to embrace all knowledgep and partly of his inclination towards 
clarity and methodical procedure. 
3. Jacques Charpentier (1524-74)9 who engaged in controversy with Ramus on 
method and on the teaching of mathematics, was a teacher in the arts facultyp 
and later became a professor of mathematics at the Collbge Royal. 
4. Waddingtonp oP-cit-9 PP-73-8; for Ramus'defence of himself of. his manifesto 
on his instJlation as Regius professor (Ongt RTI9 p. 158)- 
9 
Apart from being the first work in French on the subject of logic (and among 
the earliest works in French dealing with any of the parts of philosophy) it 
is also important as the only exposition of Ramus' leading ideas to come from 
his pen in French. 
The Dialectique is important for two other reasons. Firstlyp it repre- 
sents a major step in the development of the presentation of Ramus' thought. 
From the vast number of eclitionag revisionsp and adaptations of the original 
form of his works on logiop the Dialecticae partitiones of 1543P we can pick 
out a few main stages. The first edition discusses three parts of dialectic: 
naturep art and exercise. The second main stage is reached with the 1546 
edition which Talon sponsored; this book is better arranged than any of the 
earlier ones and contains the first real treatment of method. The third 
stage is this Dialectique: 'exercise, has been discarded and the work has 
become an art or manual of dialectic made up of two partsp 'invention' and 
'Judgement' (disposition). In the following year the French version is re- 
adapted into Latin and expanded to include explanations by Talon: Dialecticae 
libri duoy Audomari Talaei Praelectionibus illustrati (Two books on dialectic 
illustrated with notes by Omer Talon). There are numerous other editions 
which need not concern us here. It isp however, interesting to note that the 
work was soon translated into various languagest there were three different 
English translations before 1600, in several separate issuest the first The 
Logike_of P. Ramus translated by Rolland M'Kilwein (1574)v and others by 
Dudley Penner and Abraham Praunce; the first Dutch translation came out in 
Leyden in 1585 and the first German one in Erfurt two years later. 
Secondlyp the Dialectique is of importance, not merely because it 
marks a stage in the progress of the French language as a vehicle for serious 
10 
technical discussiong but also because the author had asked several well-known 
men of letters to provide translations of the excerpts from the classical 
poets which he was including to illustrate his new technique of dialectic. 
(In briefp Ramus' idea was that small boys would better understand logical pro- 
cesses if they were given examples of their usage taken from recognised master- 
pieces of literaturep rather than if they were subjected to the meaningless 
scholastic mnemonics and jingle of barbaric terms). It is worth notingr how- 
everp that Jean Doratp who had taught Du Bellay, Ronsard and Belleau at the 
CoMge de Coquerett did not approve of his pupils' support of hie rival Ramust 
and with his doctrine that French was a suitable medium for the expression of 
profound ideas. 
1 
In the same year (1555) the Rhetorica was brought out in French as a 
counter-part to the Dialectique'; the translation was not by Talon but by 
Antoine Foclin (or Fouquelin) who was a pupill then later a fellow-teacher, 
of Ramus at the Collbge do Presles. The work is not an exact translation, but 
rather an adaptation, and Talon's examples from Latin authors have given place 
to French examples, mainly from Ronsard and Balf. The book was published by 
Andr6 Wechel who also brought out, in the course of the same yearg Ramus' Dia- 
lectique and Arithmetica. A revised edition of Fouqelin's Rhetorique, came out 
in 1557y but this was the last time it appeared in French. 
2 Dudley Fenner and 
Abraham Fraunce both translated Talon's Ramist Rhetoric into Englishy as they 
1. Cf. Alexandre Eckhardty R4my Belleau, sa vie - sa 'Bergerielv Budapestj 
1917P pp. 19-30. 
2. Cf. R. Leake, 'The Relationship of two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's 
Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique PranRoiselin BibliothýRue 
d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 19689 pp. 65-108.1 shouldq howeverp like to 
add here details of an apparently unnoticed reprint of the text of Fouquelin's 
Rhetoriaue, (though without the supporting quotations): Chrl-stofle de Savignyp 
Tableaux accomplis de tous les arts lib4raux, Paris, 1587- 
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had translated Ramus' Dialectiol and their versions went through several prin- 
tings before the end of the century. It is sufficient to look at Father Ong's 
list of the dozens of Latin editions of the Ramist Dialectic and Rhatoriop and 
then compare it with the handful of translations into French to realise why it 
was that Ramus preferred to stick to the international language. The sort of 
person in France who would be likely to read his works would read them just as 
readily in Latint and in many cases more readilyp since the technical terms of 
the Latin and Greek theorists had not yet filtered through into French. The 
number of editions which came from presses outside France is an indication of 
the public Ramus aimed at. I have treated at some length this French version 
of the Ramist Rhetoricy since I intend to make use of Fouquelin in the course 
of this present study. I do not wish to suggest that we can read Fouquelin as 
though we were reading Ramus# in the way that we can often be sure that a work 
which purports to be by Talon is in fact by Ramus; but it must be borne in 
mind that within the circle of Ramust acquaintances authorship is never easy 
to determine - there seems to be a kind of collective authorship - in much the 
same way as Ramus' own works become identified with their subject-matter and 
Ramus' logic becomes anonymously listed as logic. Purthermoret the Rhetorique 
does follow the, Rhetorica fairly closelyl and we have seen that the exact 
responsibility for the authorship of this is not easy to determine, and we 
must assume that at least Ramus was anxious to ensure that the Rhetorique 
appeared in a form which closely imitated the Dialectique,. 
The theme running through all the writings of Ramus at this time was 
the idea that everything should be studied and taught methodically - witness 
the small but important Quod sit unica doctrinae instituendae methodus (The 
one and only method for setting forth all subjects) which was published se- 
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parately in 1557, but which was from Book IX of one of the revisions of the 
Remarks on Aristo a (1556). It is method which is at the basis of Ramus' 
plans for university reformo a subject which attracted his attention at this 
time. In 1557 Ramus was appointed by the Faculty of Arts to a co=ission for 
university reform, 
1 
and he was also on the commission which appealed against 
some severe disciplinary measures taken by Henry II against some students who 
had fought with a group of religious about the right to make use of the Pr6- 
aux-Clercs. 
2 His, Oratio delepatione (Address concerning the deputation) was 
issued twice in a Latin version in 15579 and four times in French (Harangue 
de Pierre de la. Ram6ep touchant ce_quiont faict lea deputez de l'Universit6 
de Paris envers le Roy , all from the press of Andrd Wechel. The French 
version was apparently not by Ramus himselfp but seems to have had his sanc- 
tion. 
An indication that his thoughts were turning more and more to the 
value of writing in French is that his next book was translated into French 
within the year it appeared. (It is to be notedo howeverg that the transla- 
tion is not done by Ramus himself). This Liber de Moribus Veterum Gallormn 
(1559) was translated by his friend Michel de Castelnau as Traictd des facons 
et coustumes des anciens Gall2Zs; in spite of the wide appeal the subject 
3 
might have been expected to have in France, there were twice as many Latin 
editions as French. (The scholarly Liber de Caesaris militia came out from 
the house of Wechel in the same year, but in this case the translationg by 
Pierre Poisson (Traict4 de l1art militaire ou usance de guarre de Jules Cgsar), 
was not printed until 1583. )4 




3. This book is the nearest we have to the lost book on ethics which Ramus is 
supposed to have written (of. the preface by Johann Freige written in 1574). 
4. Ong, RTIq p. 308. 
13 
The period at the end of the 1550's and the beginning of the 1560's was 
a fruitful time for Ramus. It was then that he directed his energies to the 
study of grammarp and it is his works on grammar that most people seem to have 
heard of; this is strange in a way, since there was little of original or las- 
ting value in his various grammars, though they are currently receiving some 
attention from students of linguistics interested in attitudes to language in 
the years immediately prior to the appearance of Descartes' works. The Latin 
Grammar came out in 1559 and went through numerous editionsp including several 
in English. The following year saw his first Greek Grammar, which met with a 
similar success. Both works were supported by separate books explaining the 
rudiments of each grammar. The French Gramere, (which made use of Louis 
11eigret's revised spelling) came out in 1562 andl after appearing in several 
French editionsp was translated into Latin. 
It was in 1562 that Ramus seems to have made the final break with 
Catholicism; he had earlier been suspected of Lutheranism and his attacks on 
Aristotle could have been construed as undermining the authority of the Churchp 
but it was not until about 1562 that he ceased to practise as a Catholic. A 
Protestant influence is evident in a work which he wrote during this year on 
the subject of university reform: the Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis 
academiae (Notes on the Reform of the University of Paris)q 
1 
published anonym- 
ouslyp and addressed to Charles IX and Catherine de Medici. Andrd Wechel im- 
mediately published a translationt Advertissements sur la r4formation de 
l'Universit6 do Paris. The main points of the suggested reform are that the 
great number of teachers should be lessened and that poor students should not 
be at any disadvantage; scholasticism is contrasted with true classical human- 
isms Ramus stresses that it is essential to have recourse to the Hebrew version 
1. Ongg RTIv P. 350. 
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of the Old Testament and the Greek version of the New; there must be a free 
and sincere explanation of the pure truth of religion. 
' During the Wars of 
Religiong when Calvinists were banished from the city of Parisp Ramust taking 
advantage of a safe-conduct granted by the Queen Motherp escaped to Fontaine- 
bLIeau, where he remained until the Peace of Amboiseq March 19,1563; he then 
resumed his duties at the Coll6ge de Presles and the Collbge Royal. In the 
early autumn he made a speech setting out once more his theory of education 
and the interrelation of the arts: Oratio do professione liberali= artium 
(Address on the teaching of the liberal arts). In the early 1560's he de- 
voted himself to commentaries on Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, apply- 
ing to them his new-found logical principles. He continued also to develop 
his interest in mathematics. When Charpentier obtained the chair of mathe- 
matics in the College Royal (February, 1566) Ramus protested to the Privy 
Council on the grounds of Charpentier's ignorance of the subject. In the 
following year he wrote in French a Pr6face sur le Profte des llathdmatiquesp 
asking Catherine de Medici to provide a suitable building for the professors 
of the Coll6ge Royal; the Prooemium itself was written in Latin and was a 
history and defence of mathematics. Ramus' principal argument against Char- 
pentier was that he was combining the function of professor of philosophy 
and professor of mathematicsy and then was forgetting about the latter in 
order to concentrate on the former. 
After a second period away from Paris (a few months in 1567-8) Ramus 
seems to have decided that it would be advisable to profit from these enfor- 
ced spells of absence which he saw might well occur again and take the oppor- 
tunity of travelling abroad. From 1568 he travelled extensively in Switzer- 
1. Waddingtong OR-cit-v P- 148. 
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land and Germany# paying visits to many foreign academies. 
1 The result of 
these travelst if not the intentiont was the spread of his ideas throughout 
the Rhineland. He met Johann Sturm in Strasbourgp Henry Bullinger in Zdrichp 
and Th6odore do Bbze in Geneva. He went as far as Nuremburg to inspect mathe- 
matical and optical instruments. 
2 His journey was a fruitful one by reason of 
the contact he had with other scholarsp his opportunity to examine the running 
of other educational institutionsp and the experience it afforded him of 
living in strictly Protestant countries. When he returned to Paris in 1570 
he was debarred from the Collbge Royal and from the Collbge do Presles on 
account of his now open allegiance to the Protestant faith. On the 22nd Octo- 
berp 1570t he wrote to Cardinal de Lorraine that his only wish was to be able 
to devote the rest of his life to the study of Scripture; he asked the Cardi- 
nal to organize a new translation of the whole Bible; he asked, toop for a 
methodical table of religion which would contain all the principles and ex- 
amples (note the similarity of technique to that of the other arts Ramus had 
3 dealt with) of doctrine and discipline. Ramus did attempt something of the 
sort in his posthumous Commentariorum de religione Christiana Libri quatuor 
(Francofurtit A. Wechelus, 1576), (Four books of commentaries on the Christian 
religion). This book is generally considered to be uninspired theology (just 
a mild and superficial form of Zwinglianism) but its interest for us is that 
it shows Ramus applying his views on method to his latest enthusiasmt theology. 
He never regained his professorshipy though the title and the salary 
were restored to him. He did not seem to find full favour with his new associ- 
ates of the Reformed Religion. When he wrote to Bhe about the possibility 
1. Waddingtony op. cit. v p. 188. 
2. Ibid. ) pp. 197-215. 3. Ibid., p. 226. 
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of retiring to Geneva he was told that this would not be advisable since the 
Academy was short of money and was committed to teaching pure Aristotelianism. 
After the Synod of Nimes in 15729 B6ze claimed that Ramus' democratic atti- 
tude on the subject of Church government was subversive. 
1 
In his last few months he was engaged on a project for uniting all the 
liberal arts and for producing a work which would embrace all knowledget in 
Latin and French. He aimed to bring out further revised editions of his 
works on all the sciences; he published a new edition of the French Grammarl 
republished the Rhatoricap corrected the Latin version of the Dialectiop and 
prepared a new French edition of it. Ten days before his death he wrote to 
one of his former pupilsp Johann Freigep sending him books on the first three 
liberal artsy and promising to send books on the other four at a later date. 
On August 26,1572, Ramus was brutally murdered in mysterious circumstances 
on the third day of the massacre of St. Bartholomew. 
Thesey theng are the salient facts about the life and works of Ramus. 
In the second part of this chapter I shall discuss his relations with some 
of his contemporariesp and after that, in the main body of the thesis, I shall 
discuss the ideas contained in the works I have described here. 
1. Ibid., pp. 229-30i 246. 
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Part Two - Ramus and the Pldiade. 
I must stress at the outset what exactly my purpose is in this section 
and remind the reader of my overall purpose. My general aim is to discuss 
certain ideas of Ramus and then to contrast them briefly with views on the 
same or similar subjects which were hold by poets and literary theorists ofo 
or connected withp the Pldiade who were writing in the same place (Paris) at 
exactly the same time (1543-72). The basic justification for such a study 
is the undoubtedp but not always appreciated, importance of Ramus in the 
history of ideas and his far-reaching influence on European literary theory 
and practice. 
1 The brief comparison with the Pldiade is attempted because 
of the actual contact which took place between Ramus and the P16iadep and 
because Ramus representsp in spite of his passion for reforml the scholastic 
tradition against which the poets reacted. Furthermore, Ramus is at the 
centre of all the academic debates of the years between 1540 and 1570)many 
of which concerned the very problems which were the subject of the literary 
manifestoes. A study of Ramus will greatly elucidate the broader philo- 
sophical background and the rhetorico-logical tradition out of which the 
arts of Poetry grew. 
It is for these reasons that I have already dealt with the life and 
works of Ramus so that he can be seen in his literary and historical context. 
Cf. Tuvep op. cit. No study has as yet been done on the actual influence 
which Ramus may have had on French literature (as he certainly had on 
English literature); in his Ronsard, Poet of Naturet p. 901 D. B. Wilson 
suggests Iwith considerable hesitation' that round about 1555 Ronsard may 
have been influenced by Ramus in the matter of order or disposition. Be- 
cause this was the moment at which the contact took place I feell toot 
that there may be some influence, but so far I have not found any signifi- 
cant difference after 1555 which can be ascribed entirely or even princi- 
pally to contact with Ramus. 
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The important years for the formation of his theories are 1543 to 1555; the 
pa llel with the P16iade is obviousp and I append a table at the end of this 
chapter to show synoptically and chronologically the relation between Ramus' 
own publications and those of the P16iade. 
I have said that there was contact between Ramus and the Pldiade. 
From what follows it will emerge that this contact was limited and that in 
any case our knowledge of the facts is not extensive. I include the present 
sectiony not because my thesis rests on the assumption that there was direct 
influence either way (it will become clear that I think the opposite to be 
the case)p but for two other reasonst in the first place I wish to examine 
the commonly accepted opinion that there was close contact, and secondly to 
suggest some possible future lines of research. 
In his edition of the Dialectiquel which I have already talked about 
in the introduction, Michel Dassonville does not deal at all with the questi- 
on of the Pldiade's contribution to this book by Ramus (except for a few 
brief and unequal notes)p because he had already published an article on the 
subject. 
1 This article is a good factual analysis of the snippets from 
classical authors which the poets had translated at the request of Ramust 
but some of Dassonville's conclusions can be no more than tentatiVe, and it 
seems to me that he assumes far closer contact between Ramus and the PlSiade 
than the evidence warrants. When he claims 'A 2riori peu d1humanistes de 
ce temps dtaient mieux faits pour stentendrel (because Ronsard and the other 
poets were aiming at a renewal of poetry and Ramus at a renewal of teachingt 
and especially of logic)v I feel that he is quite wrong. In the first place 
1. "La collaboration de la Pldiade 5. la Dialectique de Pierre de la Ramde 
(1555)"P in Bibliothbclue d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1963P PP-337-348- 
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we can think of several humanists who were far more likely to get on well 
with Ronsardq and who in fact enjoyed his friendship for years (Doratp Murett 
Turnebe and Lambin, for example). Then there was little in common between 
the two aims Dassonville mentionsp and I am convinced that the Pldiade found 
that even Ramus' modernised teaching programme retained all the vices of 
traditional scholasticism; and when he adds. - 
'Il nlest pas jusqulau, moyen qulils pr4conisaient qui, 
ne lea rapprochgLti tout comme les gens do la Brigade 
et 2L la meme dpoquep La Ramde ddcida d'employer la 
langue vulgaire, de la ddfendre et de 11illustrer par 
son enseignement et par sea dorits'p 
it is clear that he wants to make Ramus into an apostle of the vernacular 
when he was no such thing. In both the articlep and the edition of the 
Dialectique he claims that after 1555P Ises publications en frangais se 
multipli6rent'. This assertion is surely unjustified. Apart from the Di- 
alectique itself there were the Gramere (three editions before 1572)p Ad_ver- 
tissements sur la r4formation de l'Universit6 de Paris,, Pr4face sur le 
Prodme des mathdmatiquesp and the Remonstrance au Conseil Privd (three editi- 
ons). But during these same years there were no fewer than thirty different 
Latin works in over sixty-five editions. Nine Latin editions of the, Dialec- 
tica were published between 1555 and 1572. If Ramus was as enthusiastic 
about French as Dassonville suggests why did he not write in it? The simple 
answer is that his Public felt more at home in Latin. 
Dassonville goes on to give three hypotheses to explain how these 
translations of the Latin quotations were prepared and appeared in the edi- 
tion. The first is that they were taken from already published translationst 
this is so in the case of a few quotationsv for examplep some by Marot: the 
secondq that they were school-exercises; the thirdp that they were directly 
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commissioned by Ramus. He commentst 'La seconde et la trois'ibme hypothboes... 
r6v6lent une collaboration plus intimeg une confiance et une admiration rdoi- 
proquet peut-6tre meAme une amitid que nous ignorions'. This presents too rosy 
a picture alt,., ogether as we shall see in a moment. The third hypothesis is 
the one which the author favours, and it does seem to be the most obvious and 
probable one. The names of the contributors will tell us something about the 
possible contact between Ramus and the poets. Ronsard is the principal contri- 
butor (thirty-five quotations in allf 168 lines). The others are Du Bellay 
(78 lines), Pasquier (57 lines), Peletier (47 lines)p Belleau (42 lines) 
Denisot (37 lines)p De Brubs (15 lines)p Des Masures (3 lines); there are also 
52 lines from Marot. It is almost impossible to know how this book was pre- 
paredg but I do not see that we can be certain that the collaboration was very 
close. What seems most likely is that it was Ronsard who organised the details 
of who should translate which passages. 
In spite of this edition of 1555 1 do not think that we can really con- 
elude that Ramus and the Pldiade were given to mutual admiration. In my view 
the relationship was an uneasy one to say the least; it is by no means cer- 
tain that the relations were either happy or prolonged. Ramus' biographer 
Nancel suggests that they were neithert 
'He rarely associated with the poetsp as if they did not 
have common interests. He did, howeverg from time to timep 
invite to dinner all those who were famous in Paris, with 
Ronsard at their headv like Apollo. But never afterwards. 
One of these peopleg the learned Du Bellay, mocked Ramus 
with a biting tauntp imitating the sarcastic insults of 
Rabelais'. 1 
Nancel: op. cit., p. 65; of.. Nolhac, Ronsard et 1'Humanismao Parist 1921 
(1966) Fp5--. 167-9; the attack by Rabelais appears in the Prologue to 
Pantagruel Book IV, and that by Du Bellay in the PAromachie (ed. Chamard, 
vol. Vj pp. 236-5l)- 
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It is not certain, of course, to what extent Du Bellay's criticisms 
were serious and lasting. It is possible that he may not even have been 
asked permission for the inclusion of his pieces in the Dialectique. There 
is nothing from him of a date later than 1552 (the date of the Pdtromachie)9 
but since he was absent from Paris from 1553 we can not be sure what his 
attitude was. Of the other contributors Ronsard is the most likely to have 
kept contact with Ramus (though temperamentally Ramus was much nearer to Du' 
Bellay than to Ronsard)t but he does not seem to have done so. Nolhao 
quotes a manuscript account of 1559 in which Ramus' name is linked with 
those of Doraty Du Bellayp Belleaup Peletiert Le Roy and Balf, but he points 
out that Ronsard never mentions Ramus in his printed works. 
1 Da Bellay also 
mentions him in 1559 and never again. 
2 
Estienne Pasquier, who was one of Ramus' first pupils at the Collýge 
de Preslesj does seem to have kept in touch with him. His presence in the 
1555 Dialectique is explained by the fact that he was closely linked with 
Ronsard in 1555. Ramust just before his deathp received a letter from Pas- 
quier commenting on the 1572 edition of the. Gramere. The tone of this 
letter is a little distant and coldv in spite of the fact that it is signed 
Iceluyt lequelp combien qulil ne condescende 9L vostre opiniont si vous res- 
pecte il et honore pour le vouloir qulil voit que vous portez aux bonnes 
lettres'03 
The contact with Peletiert toot can, at least in partt be explained 
by Peletier's relationship with Ronsard at the time. In many ways Peletier 
1. Nolhacq o cit. t p. 168 and p. 265- . 
2. Allusionesp 15 9, P-13; quoted in Nolhaov op. cit., p. 168. 
3. Cf. Estienne Pasquier, Choix de Lettres s-ur ýia Litt6rature, la Langue qt 
la Traduction, ed. D. Thickettq Genevat 1956t p. 109. 
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shared more of Ramus' interests than did any of the others in the group (soo 
especially his Arithmeticae practicae (1545)9 L'Arithmetique (1549)p Dialoguý 
di 110rtogEaf e Prononciation francoesý (1550)t I'Algebr_ (1554)v In Euc- 
lidis Elementa (1557) and Do uau Geomatriae, (1572). Peletiert howevert seems 
to have been absent from Paris so often that it seems unlikely that his actu- 
al contact with Ramus amounted to very much. 
1 
There is one strange omission from the list of poets who contributed 
to the Dialecti! juej that of Balf. We do know that Ramus had been in touch 
with the fathert Lazare de Balfv 
2 
and that Antoine was to remain his friend 
throughout his life. It is odd that he should not appear in 1555P GoPeciallY 
since the Amours de Francine were published in the same year as the Dialec- 
tique and also by Wechel. Apart from some unimportant reason for the omis- 
sion of his name, it is possible that he does not appear precisely because 
at this moment relations between Balf and Ronsard were rather strained. 
This would support my suggestion that it was Ronsard rather than Ramus who 
organised the work. We know that Balf and Ramus were friendsp from the 
letter of Pasquier to Ramus which I have just quoted, where he talks of 
'Jean Antoine do Baift amy co=un de nous deuxl; 
3 
we know also that Ramus 
was interested in Balf Is system of reformed spelling which was similar to 
his own, and that in the 1562 edition of the Gramere Ramus speaks favourably 
of 'measured verselt and in 1572 mentions Balf's experiments. 
4 
Cf. Andrd Boulanger's introduction to the edition of the Art PodtiquO 
(1555)p p. 25- 
2. Cf. SciDionis Somnium... Petri Rami T)raelectionibUs eXDliCatUM (1546). 
also contained in In Ciceronis orationes... praelectiones P-519. 
3. Vasquier, op. cit. p p. 98. 
4. For the RZu--s-Balf relationship see especially Thickett's edition of 
Pasquiery pp-70-74; cf. j also, Frances A. Yates, The French Academies of 
the Sixteenth Centyaq Londong 19479 p. 21 and P-52. 
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About Belleauý Alexandre Eckhardt wrotet 
II1 est fort probable quo Belleau suivit aussi lea cours 
de Ramus quo colui-ci faisait au. Collbge Royal. Les 
rapports du professeur at do 1'Slbve se changbrent an 
une aorta de collaboration qui aboXtit & un livre fait 
an commun. En 1555 Ramus fit paraitre sa, dialectique 
an frangais... 11 
I do not think that we should make too much of the probability (and it is no 
more than thatp in arq casep) that Belleau heard Ramus' lecturea. Ramus was 
a very famous teacher and public speakerp and we know that his lectures were 
a great attractionp but it is doubtful what influence or effect they would 
have had on Belleau. Furthermoret it will have become clear by now that the 
flivre fait en commun' is not an accurate description of Ramus' book. 
Jodelle, whop like Ba: ifp was interested in 'measured verselp seems to 
have had close contact with Remus. In the 1572 edition of the Gramere (but 
not in 1562) there appeared a laudatory poem by Jodelle. Balmas notes that 
the printer Andrd Wechel was a good friend of Jodelle. 
2 (1 think we may 
safely assume that he was a good friend also of Ramusp since he published, 
between 1555 and 15729 over sixty editions of his books. ) Balmas then goes 
on to make much of the connection between Ramus and Jodelle. He writes of 
Jodelle's contribution to the Gramere (1572): 
'Non 4 tuttavia impossibile che Jodelle avesse gih composto 
questi versi nel 15679 allIepoca del suo incontro con 
Meliss'. 
This refers to a visit which Paul Melissus made to Paris, in the 
course of which, according to Balmasp he came into contact with Ramus: 
1. A. Eckhardt, Rgmy Belleau, Sa Vie - Sa "Bergeri Il Budapestp 19179 
pp. 26-7- 
2. E. Balmas, Un poeta del Rinstacimento Francese, Etienne Jodellep 19629 




'Giunto a Parigi nel 1567t in compagnia di un amico, Joan 
Lobbetp chi viene a proseguirvi i suoi. studi di dirittol 
Meliss, che b munito di letters di raccomandazione for- 
nitegli. dal suo maestro viennesuSambucus per Henri do 
Mesmesp Denys Lambin e Pierre de la, Ram6e, fa tosto la 
conoscen2adei poeti e degli studiosi, parigini pitt noti. 
Ramus, con ogni probabilit? L, lo introduce presso Ronsard, 
e questo a sus. volta lo presents, a Dorats sempre a Ramus, 
invecof egli, deve di aver conosciuto Jodelleg come tra, 
poco diremo. Jean-Antoino do Bdif ot Jean Passerat ei. 
aggiungeranno a queste prime smiciziel. 1 
Much of this is speculative andq I am afraidg even rather doubtful. 
I suspect that either Henri de Mesmes or L=bin were far more likely to 
have introduced Melissus to Ronsard than was Ramus. We know that both of 
these two were in close contact with Ronsard. and with mutual friends (e., g. 9 
Michel de 11H0pital, Tu=bbes Lgger du Chesneg Dorat, Muretg Passerat)v 
2 
and we have no evidence that Ramus was in touch with Ronsard as late as 
this. He seems to have been forever on the eage of the circlep thought 
amdn, it is possible that Ramus was among the lecturers whom Melissus 
frequented at the Collbge Royal. 
3 Balmas wonders why Melissus should single 
out for translation Jodelle's poem on Ramust and concludesp 
'Meliss ... era di religione riformata 
(quanto meno si 
mostra intimamente legato a molti protestanti notori) e nella 
sua raccolta inserisce l1elogio di unIaltra illustre, vittima 
della notte di S. Bartol=eog il musicista Goudimel. Welogio 
di Ramus b anchlesso un elogio post-mortemt e prende il sapore 
di una riposta ai contemporanei attachi di Doratj alla memoria 
del celebre filosofo vittima dell'odio di parte'. 4 
1. E. Balmast Un poeta. _. _. _t 
pp. 643-4. 
d-L=bin 2. Cf. Edouard Fr6myt Henri de Ilesmest Parisq 1881; for the Ronsar 
contact it will be remembered that in this very year (1567) Lambin pub- 
lished his notes on the Ars Poetics, together with the unpublished text of 
part of the Franciade. 
3. Balmasy q cit., p. 644. 
4- Ibid. 9 p. 646; cf. j also, Nalhaeg Un polterhkan ami 
de la P14iade: Paul 
M41issust Paris, 1935- 
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A further source of biographical information about Ramus and his asso- 
ciates is the succession of controversies which surrounded his bOOks. 
1 In 
an age given to all kinds of polemical writing Ramus stands out as someone 
who needed controversy in order to be able to formulate his own ideas. The 
relevance of this is that some of his many adversaries had connections with 
the Pldiade. I shall restrict myself here to those discussions and arguments 
which directly concern people who were in Paris in the period 1540-70. The 
first of these is the quarrel in 1543 between Ramus and the Portuguese jurist 
Antonio Gouves, (1507-1565), about the nature of dialectic and the correct 
interpretation of Aristotle. From 1544 Gouvea left Paris for the south and 
there does not seem to have been further contact. 
2 Another important con- 
troversyp the one which took place in 1551 between Ramus and Pierre Galland 
(1510-59) was about the reform of the curriculump and is discussed by Rabe- 
lais in the 1552 Prologue to the Fourth Book. 3 
Then there is a lengthy exchange of views during the years 1564-7 bet- 
ween Jacques Charpentier (1524-1574) and Arnaud d'Ossat (1536-1604)t who 
undertook to defend Ramus on the question of method. Adrien Turnbbe (1512- 
1565)v well-known for his close contact with Ronsardq enters into this dis- 
cussiony mildly attacking Ramus in his De methodo libellus (first published 
1. Ongv RTIP PP-492-511; WDD, pp. 214-224- 
2. Cf. Martha Katherine Zeebp The Latin letters of Antonio de Gouvea, (Edi- 
tiong Introductiong Texti Commentary and Translation)p Philadelphia? 1932. 
In 3. N. N cel, op. cit., p. 60, gives a significant account of the part Galland 
played in alienating people from Ramust 1P. Galland was the one who raised 
the standard of warp and made many people hostile to Ramus: in the first 
place his own associates and colleaguesp Turnbbet Charpentierl Du Chesnev 
Vicomercatop and others who conspired with him in order to destroy Ramus, 
with a hatred greater than that inspired by Vatinianusy such as Gouveap 
Perionp Muret and many others, who had fiercely hit out at Ramus in various 
speechesp or, rather, diatribes, and had attacked him with bitter charges 
and tauntsp more bitter than those of women or the comic writers. ' 
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posthumously in 1600). Turnhe himself had also been involved in an earlier 
minor dispute with Ramus in 1550-1554 concerning Ramus' reduction of fate 
and predestination to logic rather than to ethics. R=us hides behind the 
name of Talon in some of the books in this exchange of views and Turnbbe 
sometimes hides behind the name of his friend Ldger Du Chesne. 
1 It seems 
that Ramus became friendly again with Turnbbe and Galland at a later date. 
2 
I feel that it would be most rewarding to make a further study of Turnbbe's 
relations both with Ramus and with the PAiade. We know of Turnhe's life- 
long friendship with Du Chesne, that he studied with him at Sainte-Barbe 
in 1538t and want to Toulouse with him and Lambin in 1545. They are still 
associated in 1561 when Turnbbe takes over Vicomercato's chair of Greek 
philosophy, Lambin takes over Greek literature and Du Chesne Latin litera- 
ture. 
3 Lambin himself does not seem to have had very much contact with 
Ramusp but then it must be remembered that he was teaching in Toulouse in 
1548 and from 1549-1560 he had two very long periods of absence in Italy. 
There is one further name we might add to this list of humanistst that of 
George Buchanan. I feel sure that there was some contact between Ramus 
and Buchanan, but at the moment all we can do is to point to a few scattered 
references. The only time that Ramus mentions Buchanan is in the Prooemium 
mathematicum (1567)p p. 609 asking him to encourage the study of mathematics 
at St. Andrews. Buchanan mentions Ramus in a letter to Daniel Rogers 
in 
1. Cf. Ongt RTIt p. 293. 
2. Nancel, op. c , pp. 
66-7. 
3. Of. L. Cldmentq De Adriani Turnebi regii-professoris praefationibus at 
Poematis, Pariso 18999 P*19- 
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1571.1 
A glance at the relevant pages in Nolhao's Ronsard et 1'Humanisme 
will show what was Ramus' position in the humanist milieu. Time after timey 
three of the four nsmesp Murett Doratv Turn6be and Lambin appear in the 
same contextp but hardly at all is Ramus ever included in these contemporary 
lists. There are several reasons for this fact. Dorat seems to have dis- 
approved of him almost entirely (perhaps because Dorat was the one of the 
four he most closely resembled); Turnbbep as we have seen, disagreed with 
him in public controversy on at least two occasions# and both Muret and Lam- 
bin were so often absent from Paris that contact was almost impossible. All 
the evidence we have points to the fact that Ramus was a difficult person to 
get on with. It is clear that he shared almost none of the interests of the 
members of the Pldiade, except the more academic interests of Balf and Jo- 
delle. He was sober, ascetic and withdrawnp totally apartp thereforej from 
the joyful social activities and epicurean aspirations of the poets. He 
seems to have had little poetic sensibility. 
2 On the other hand we might 
1. I. D. McFarlanep "George Buchanan's Latin Poems from Script to Prints A 
Preliminary Survey", in The LibEgi 29 December 1969, p. 293. This long 
article (pp. 277-332)t and another article by the same authort ("George 
Buchanan and France", in Studies in French literature presented to M. W. 
Lawton, Manchester and New Yorkq 1968, pp. 223-45)t are invaluable for an 
understanding of the humanist background in Paris at the time. I am 
grateful to Professor McFarlane for several important leads and references 
in this connectiony which he has given me, both in these articles and in 
private discussion. 
2. N. Nancel has several comments on thist op. cit., p. 229 'Porrb facto illo 
in oratoriis progressup animi recreandi; et lectoris oblectandi gratiat 
voluit ad poeticam diuertere: (ad quam, tamg minus natus aut propensus 
erat'); p-329 1poetas Graecos, quod sciamy non attigit'; IIam ver6 ut in 
eloquentia. primas tenebatp sic in poesi mir6 nouus eratt minimUque versa- 
tuss ut per annos totos viginti et plures, quibus ferl c=' illo egip ne 
totidLS quW carmina. scriptitarit'; p-33Y IScio tamen me vidisse versus 
complusculos ab eodem Ramo adhuc iuuene scriptos, neque illos inuita. Mine- 
rua. sed consequentium studiorum ratio diuersa, istum poetices igniculum 
facilb sopijt atque restinxit'; Nolhac, op-ci .9 pp. 81-82t talks of some 
French poetry by Ramus in Charles Toutain's La Tragddie d'Ag-amemnon, but 
I was unable to find this in the B. N. copy. 
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have expected that he would have shared the interests of people like Turnbbe. 
IU=usp however, had put all his faith in logic and methodology (and it was on 
precisely this point that Turnbbe attacked him), and this was of little in- 
terest to the pleasure-loving Pl6iade. Ramus' philosophy wasp in spite of 
his desire to rid it of the deficiencies of scholasticismt still the philo- 
sophy of books which Montaigne was later to attack. The fact that Ramus 
was a far better philosopher than any of the neo-platonists (he has often 
been hailed as an important precurser of Descartes) was of little concern 
to Ronsard. Even as a classical scholar the appeal of Ramus was limited. 
It is sufficient to look at a list of the authors he commented on to see 
the reasons Caesarp Cicerop Quintilian, Aristotle; his commentaries on 
Virgil are the only instance of his tackling a more acceptable textp and 
even there his comments show little awareness of the poetry. Had he turned 
his energies to Terencep Catullusp Anacreon, or even Platop then he would 
have aroused Ronsard's interest. Nor was he concerned with textual criti- 
cismp or the establishing of the correct text, so much as with a logical 
analysis of it. In simple terms Ronsard was not interested in the kind of 
literary criticism which Ramus advocated. A further point of the greatest 
importance is that Ronsard was a far better Greek scholar than Ramus. 
1 
I should like finally to mention some friends and associates of 
Ramus, in order to indicate possible lines of future research. The best 
starting-point ist as usual, Nancells biography. Nancel himself (1539-1610) 
1. Of. Nolhac, opteit t PP-141-29 for Ronsard's knowledge of Greek; 
for 
Ramus, cf., Ongp W-J-v 'A Ramist translation of Euripides' in Manuscriptay 
VIIII I. St. Louis, Marchy 1964P p. 23- 
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was a pupilt secretary and life-long friend of Ramus; they had first met in 
1548- He gives us two lists of n=es whioh are of interest for the informa- 
tion which they contain and also for the names which they omit. 
1 The first 
list contains the names Jean Magny (Magnienust a doctor and mathematician)v 
2 
Fr6d6ric Reisner (a Ge=an mathematician who was responsible for publishing 
Ramus' posth=ous work on opticst and who was a contestant for the chair of 
mathematics after Ramus' death), 
3 Forcade, 4 and Joan Pdna (whom Nancel 
calls his own fellow-pupil). 
5 The second list includes the following namess 
Omer Talon (whose close collaboration with Ramus has already been described)t 
Barthdlemy Alexandre, 
6 
Quintinus Heduusp Oronce Fin6j 7 Jean Magny, Simon 
Pietre (Petreius)vJacques Hollier (Hollerius)p Nicholas Charton (Cartonius)v 
8 
1. Nancels op. cit. 9 p. 26 and p. 65, 
2. Cf. his edition of Euclidis Elementorum libri xv Graece et Latinel Parisp 
Guillaume Cavellat, 1558; the prtface is by St. Gracilis and talks of 
Ivir doctissimus Jo. Magnienus Mathematicara artium in hac Parrhisiord 
Academia professor vere regius'. 
3. Cf. Ong, RTI, nos. 648-50. 
4. Pierre Forcadelp not Estienne Forcadel. 
5. Both Forcadel and Pdna were to become regius professors of mathematics. 
6. Alexandre was associated with Ramus in 1544 in the book3 Tres orationes 
a tribus liberalium disciplinarum j2rofessoribusp Petro Ramol Audomaro 
Talaeo, Bartholomaeo Alexandrop Lutetiae in Gymnasio Mariano habitae, 
-et 
ab eorum discipulis exceptaotParis 1544. 
7. Find (1494-1555) is one of the most important of these associates of 
Ramus. He hold a chair of mathematics at the Collbge Royal from 1530t 
and was a prolific writer of mathematical works; for his relations with 
Ramusp cf. my articlev 'La Ramde's Early Mathematical Teaching' in 
Bibliothktue d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1966, pp. 605-614. 
8. These three are all doctors or medical writers; there is a work 
Nicolai Chartonis Bellovacae Scholae Gymnasiarchi Oratiop Lutetiae in 
eodem gymnasio, principio praelectionum suarum habita, Anno 1551. Non. 
Octob., Paris. M. Davidp 1551- 
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D. Furnerius, Jean Sabollusp 1 Pasquierp Bergerong 
2 
Amariton 13 Loisel, 
4 
Dahurust Pdnaf Reisnerv osaatv Brietusp Martinust Gualterius. 
Ramus' principal associates seem to have been his own teachers (like 
Oronce Find) or his pupils (Pasquierg Bargerong Amaritong Loisel)t and 
especially pupils who were authors of mathematical treatises. 
I hope that I have sufficiently demonstrated that contrary to the 
generally accepted opinion the case for close friendship and collaboration 
between Ramus and the Pldiade is at least 'non-proven'. My own conclusions 
have the disadvantage of being negativel but they are based on a reading of 
the entire corpus of printed work by Ramust much relevant manuscript mater- 
ial and countless prefaces and liminary epistles. It remains possiblet cer- 
tain even, that more material will come to light. 
1. These two are theologians; the preface of the Praelectiones in Porphyrium 
(1547) is addressed to Sabellus. 
2. Nicholas Bergeron was one of the executors of Ramusp and in 1580 he pub- 
lished a Commendatio 2rofessionis mathematicae, a Petro Ramo institutaet 
in gratiam Academiae Parisiensis, cum interpretatione francica, Paris 
(Joarmes Borellus)p 1580. This key textt the only first hand account of 
the strange sequence of events surrounding the foundation of the chair of 
mathematics, has gone completely unnoticed by historians; I am preparing 
an article describing this book and the now light it throws on the question. 
3. This is Jean Amariton de Nonette who published a commentary on Horace in 
1553: Joannis Amaritonis Nonetani Commentariorum in epistolas R. _ 
Horatii 
Flacci. Liber 2rimus, Paris, 1553; (1 have been unable to find out if any 
more than the first volume was published); cf. Pierre-Frangois Fournierp 
Jean Amariton de Nonettet-Sa Viet Ses Ouvragesp-Sa Famillep Clermont 
Ferrandp 1933. 
4- Loisel (1536-1617)t the other executor of Ramus' willq is quite well-known 
from the life which was written by his grandson: Divers opuscules tirez 
des memoires de M. Antoine Loisel advocat en Parlement .... Le tout re_qýllý 
et mis nouvellement en lumibre par M. Claude Joly.... Parisq 1652. 
5- There are some names here for which I have been able to find next to 
nothingg and one or two which I have not yet been able to identify. For 
the rest, I have given some indication of who they were and am preparing 
a detailed article on all the friends and acquaintances of RAMI's which 
will contain much supplementary material. 
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It seems to me that it is of the first importance if we are to under- 
stand the place of Ramus in the eyes of people like Ronsard to realiee how 
different he was from the poets and theorists associated with the Pldiade. 
He was a logician and a teacher of philosophy above all and only inciden- 
tally someone who was interested in literature for its own sake. We shall 
see that he did not write an art of poetry although he wrote an art of al- 
most everything else. The justification for the present study is that in 
many ways Ramusp in spite of his desire for noveltyp and for a recasting 
of the whole body of knowledgep because of his encyclopedic approach, pro- 
vides a very complete picture of the intellectural climate of the Paris of 
the years from 1540 to 1572 which was where and when the theories and doc- 
trines were formulated which we have come to know as Pl6iade poetics and 
which represented such a major step forward in literary theory as well as 





1543 Dialecticae partitiones. 
Dialecticae institutiones. 11 Aristotelicao animddversionos. 
1544 Oratio do studiis mathema- 
ticis. 
1545 Euclides 
Oratio in Gymnasio Praelloorum 
habita. 
Institutiones oratoriae (Talon) i 
1546 Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis 
explicatum 
1547 Oratio do studiie philosophiae 
et eloquentiae coniungendis. 
Brutinae quaestiones. 
1548 Rhetorica (Talon). 
1549 Rhetoricae distinctiones in 
Quintilianum. 
1550 Ciceronis De Fato liber I 
explicatus. 
1551 Pro philosophica Parisiensis 
Academiae disciplina oratio. 







Virgilii Bucolica exposita. 
1556 Virgilii Georgica illustrata. 
Admonitio ad Turneb=. 
1557 Ciceronis De optimo genere I 
oratorum. 11 
Ciceronianus. Is 
Quod sit unica doctrinae It 
instituendae methodus. 
1558 
1559 Liber do moribus veterum I Gallorum. 
Liber do Caesaris militia. 
Grnmmatica Latina. 
Poletiert L'Art Podtique d'Horace. 
Peletiert L'Art Poidtique d'Horace(2nd. ed. ). 
Arithmeticae practicae mothodus 
facilis. 
Sebillet, Art Podtique Frangoys. 
Du Bellayg La Deffence et Illustration de 
la Langue FrangOY80- 
Sebillet, L'Iphig6no d'Euripide. 
Peletier, LtArithmetique. 
Peletiert Dialogý/ dý l'Ortograf/ et Pronon- 
ciation francoesp 
Barth6lemy Aneau, Quintil Horatian. 
Du Bellay, Preface to L'Olive. 
Ronsard, Preface to the Odes. 
Pontus do Tyardo Solitaire Premier. 
Peletierv L'Algebrj. 
Pontus de Tyardp Solitaire Second. 
Peletier, L'Art Pobtique. 
Fouqueling La Rh6torique frangoyse. 
Pontus de Tyardp Discours du Temps. 
Le Carong Dialogues. 
Peletierv In Euclidis Elementa geometrica. 
Pontus de Tyard, L'Univers. 






prooemium reformandae Pariai- 
ensis Academiae. 
1563 Oratio de sua professione. I 
1564 
1565 Scholae physicae. 
1566 Scholae metaphysicae. 
1567 Frooemium mathematicum. 




















Peletierv Do occulta parte numaror= quam 
Algebram vocant. 
Ronsardt Preface to Moslanges. 
Ronsardy Abbreg6 de l'Art Podtique. 
Peletiert Disquisitiones geometricae. 
Peletiert De usu Geometriae. 
Ronsardp Preface to La Franciade- 
Peletierp De llusage de Geometrie. 
Peletiert Oratio ... in 
mathematicas. 
Peletierv In Maurici'um 
praelectiones 
Bressium Apologia. 
Ronsardq Preface to La Franciade. 
NOTES. 
I have used extensively the material to be found in Ongo RTIP 
pp-37-40, and in Boulanger's edition of Peletier's Art Pobtiques pp-1-39 in 
the compilation of this table. I have omitted many of the less important 
works of Ramus (such as some of the co=entaries on Cicero)q and I have re- 
ferred only to the first edition of each worky by Ramus and the other writerso 
except in the case-of Peletier's translation of Horace's Ars Poetica, (because 
the second edition is the most important) and of Ronsard's prefaces to the 
Franciade (because they are significantly different from one another). In the 
case of the poets I have included only the theoretical writings (and not just 
on poetry - Peletier's mathematical studies form an interesting parallel to 
those of Ramus)j and not the different editions of the poemsp because this 
would have made the table too unwieldy. 
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CHAPTM TWO 
THE POETIC THEORIES OF THE PLEIADE 
The views which the various members of the Pldiade hold about poetry 
havey of course, often been discussed. The most complete and factual account 
is to be found in a book by W. F. Patterson, Three Centuries of French Poetic 
Theory, Ann Arbort 1935. Then there are two books which came out shortly 
afterwardst Henri Chamardle Histoire de la Pl&iade, Paris, 1939-409 a rather 
more general description, but one which does attempt to relate the theory to 
the poets and their poemst and R. J. Clements' Critical Theory and Practice 
of the Pldiade, Cambrideeq Massachussets, 1942v which treats the subject 
thematically. In 1956, in La Cr4ation Po4tique au Me sibole en Prancep 
Henri Weber published a brilliant synthesis of the theories and related 
them to the actual poetry of the time. There have also been several editions 
of the different Arts Po6tiques, the introductions of which add much to our 
knowledge of the fieldt especially in the matter of the sources in Italian 
writers like Speroni, and in classical rhetoricians like Cicero and Quin- 
tilian. I should mention particularly the edition of Du Bellay's Deffence 
et Illustration de-la Lanfue Fran2pyse by Chamardq (1904P 1948)t that of 
Peletier's Art Podtique by Andr4 Boulanger, 1930)v and that of Sebillet's 
Art Po4lique Frangoys, by Mix Gaiffe, (1932). 
Finally, in 1964 there appeared a book devoted entirely to the sub- 
jecty Grahame Castor's Pldiade Poetics. I propose to use this book as my 
starting-point, and to give a detailed account of the ideas which it con- 
tainsosince any treatment of PAiade Poetics must now depend greatly on 
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Castor's work. IV discussion of the book will do three thingst firatly, it 
will review what exactly the author contributes to our knowledge of Renais- 
sance critical theoryp sscondlyq it will serve as an exposition of the 
poetic theory of the group, andp thirdlyp it will show where Ramus fits 
into the scheme. I shall have some criticisms to make of the book. One 
general point must be made here. It is evident that I am accepting the 
basic assumption that there was such a thing as 'Pldiade Poetics'. What in 
fact seems to have been the case is that there was a group of peoplet who 
saw themselves as a groupt who madep individuallyt many pronouncements 
about poets and poetry. We are not entitled to forget their individuality. 
Castor, I feelp gives them a unity and an identity which they did not pos- 
oess. In so many ways the things which divided them were more important 
than the things which they had in common. I-do, howeverp accept his term 
as a convenient label. I see it rather as covering a number of people who 
were very closely connected with each other and who were interested in the 
same artistic problems. I would, neverthelessp prefer to think in terms 
of chronology, of the people who wrote about writing poetry between the 
years 1541 andp sa. Yp 1572. 
Castor's sub-titlep A studyin Sixteenth-Century Thought and Termi- 
nology sets out clearly how different his approach is from that of his pre- 
decessors. At the beginning of his introduction he writes, I 
"The most obvious problem confronting the co=entator of 
the Pldiade's theory of poetry is that no one member of 
the group produced a full and coherent theory of poetry 
as such'19 
noting that Pontus de Tyard is a possible exception but that he was not 
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primarily interested in poetry. 
1 Castor's criticism of Pattersonp Chamard 
and Clementsp that they list thp items in the poets' programme but do not 
evaluate them critically, is justified. 
2 He is much mora approciative of 
Weber's booky and in particular of its treatment of two contradictions$ 
firstly the one between imitation and inspirationp both of which were fa- 
vourite doctrines of the early humanistsy and eecondlyp the one between 
truth and fiction. He disagrees with Weber's restriction of 'fiction' to 
the use in poetry of Iles fables antiquestp and wishes to give the term a 
much broader reference. 
One of the most important ideas in the book is that we must beware 
of using the terminology of twentieth-century literary criticism when re- 
ferring to sixteenth-century theorizing. The two best examples of this are 
the words 'originality' and 'creativity' (usually used by co=entators to 
describe sixteenth-century theories) which do not come in until the seven- 
teenth and even eighteenth centuries. 
3 
He himself wishes to look closely 
at the language used by the theorists of the time, in order to see how they 
themselves thought of the nature of poetry, and of the r8le of the poet. 
Two of the most important of the concepts to be studied will be 'invention' 
and 'imagination'. It is only a study of these and related words which 
will enable us not to fall into the trap of equating the sixteenth-century 
use of 'invention' with our use of 'creative imagination'. 
I should like to make clear what I think is new in this approach, 
1. Castor, op. cit., p. l. 
2. 'While I feel sure that Castor is basically right herep he eeems to mini- 
mize the value and importance of these works of synthesis, with the result 
that he does not integrate into his own work as well as he might have 
done certain of the items discussed, and even omits some of them. 
3. Ibid. 9 P-5. 
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and show that although his aim seems at first sight to be broader than that 
of all his predecessorsp it nevertheless has important limitations to its 
scope. The greatest innovation and merit of the work is that it attempts to 
relate the poetic theories of the Pldiade to the broader philosophical con- 
text of the timep by means of a linguistic enquiry into their own critical 
vocabulary. In general this is excellently done. The limitations, as I 
see itp are partly the result of the obvious need to restrict one's acopel 
partlyp howeverp they amount to (perhaps unavoidable) distortion. It would 
be interesting to knowp for examplev how the vocabulary of the Pl6iade theo- 
rists compares with that of some of the earlier vernacular arts of poetryt 
and the relation between both of these and the neo-Latin critical writingsý 
of the Renaissance, and especially of the French Renaissance in the years 
we are studying. The philosophical backgroundp tool might have been dealt 
with in greater depth and detail. 
11 
shall, of coursol have a good deal 
more to say about Castor's chapter (Invention and Reason) of which pp. 128- 
132 are devoted to Ramus. I need simply say here that the reason for the 
inclusion of Ramus is not made at all clearp and that he is not dealt with 
adequately since the only work of his which is quoted is a late (1576) 
edition of one of the rare works he wrote in Frenchp and then a few lines 
(quoted from somebody else) of another earlier work. I hope to show that 
Ramus is indeed relevantpfar more so than Castor seems to allow. The best 
way to explain his relevance both to Pldiade poetic theory, and, especiallyl 
to a linguistic study of it, is that since he wrote so voluminously on most 
1. Picino, for examplep gets scanty treatmentv and the work of Henri Bussong 
Le Ra: tionalisme dans la litt6rature frangaise de la Renaissancep does 
not figure in the bibliography. 
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of the artst andt above allf on rhetoric and dialectiop he cannot be ignored. 
He represents the old tradition of education and at the came time stands out- 
side it because of his passion for reform. The reforms which he proposed 
were being implemented in exactly the same years as the Pldiade theories 
were being publishedt and in the same literary and educational milieux in 
Paris. His importance is that he can tell us much about how the vernacular 
grew out of the Latin and neo-Latin traditiong and how the theories of po- 
etry grew out of rhetoric and dialectic. I hope to show that although the 
actual connections between Ramus and the Pldiade are, as we have seen, less great 
than is often supposed, it is still true that a better understanding of 
Ramus adds to our understanding of the P16iade. Castor's sketchy account 
of Ramus contains another distortion: many of the other topics discussed 
(and not just 'invention and reason') were discussed also by R=usy so that 
his presence would have been justified in most of the other chapters as 
well. (I shall have reservations to make about his relevance to the dis- 
cussion of imagination). 
Castor's second chapter Poetry as the Art of Second Rhetoric (PP-14- 
23) tells how the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century arts of po- 
etry were considered as parts of rhetorict and were concerned with technique. 
There is an important footnotei(P-14)t on the different meaning art has now 
from its early Renaissance meaning: 
'Then the predominant meaning of the word "art" was not the 
essentially modern one of "skill displaying itself in per- 
fection of workmanship"t but rather "a body or system of 
rules serving to facilitate the carrying out of certain 
principles" (O. E. D., under aEjt .A typical Renaissance de- finition of the word is given by Abraham Frauncep The Laviers 
Logike (1588)9 19 it lb: "An art is a methodicall disposition 
of true and coherent preceptay for the more ea3ie perceiving 
and better remembering of the same. "Il 
1. It is worth pointing out that Abraham Fraunce was an ardent follower of 
Ramusp cf. Ongj ATI, Nos. 309-11. 
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This is perfectly truep butp as I shall show when talking of art and nature 
in Ramus in my next chapter, the connotations of the word are very much 
wider. 
Castor is concerned to show the technical nature of the early arts 
of poetry. He says of the Art Po6ticlue Frangoye of Thomas Sabilletp (1548)t 
"even though it marks a real advance over previous 
treatises in that it comes so much closer than they 
had done to a serious consideration of what poetry 
is and what poets are doing (the title itself of the 
work is probably significant from this point of view). 9 it still contains a very high proportion of narrowly 
technical material". 1 
Castor shows clearly that Sebillet carries on that tradition which made the 
art of poetry a mere part of rhetoriev and was devoted to a discussion of 
figures and other ornaments: 
"The verse form was simply one more rhetorical figure, 
or "colour". For poetry was considered to have exactly 
the same object as any other form of discourse, namely 
to persuade an audience either that something is sop or 
that it should act in a particular manner. tt2 
Sebillet sees invention as the 'premiere partie do PoSsiel, and this was 
traditionally the first part of rhetoric. There is a great similarity 
between the poet and the oratort, except that the poet test plus contraint 
3 de nombres que l1autrel . Castor points out that Du Bellay also equates 
the poet and the oratort Iles vertuz de 11un sont pour la plus grand' part 
communes A, llautrel. Jacques Peletier du Mans, in his Art Pobtique (1555)v 
in a chapter on the Idiferanci du Poetj e dý 110rateurl sees them as being 
essentially the samev except for the superficial difference that the orator 
1. Castor, a. cij.., p. 16. 
2. lbid. 9 p. 18. 
3. P-19. 
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must persuade briefly and immediately, while the poet's appeal is. eternal 
and universal. In this connection Castor stresses that the poet (like the 
orator) deals in, arin=ants; he sees this as primarily the terminology of 
rhetoric. He might have added here that it was absolutely central to Ramus' 
own theories of logicý- The chapter concludes with the statement that to 
see poetry as a branch of rhetoric was to give it an ethical purpose 
(its 
aim was to persuade or dissuade). Castor does notj howeverv go into the 
differences in the functions of the poet and the oratorl or the precise 
meaning of didacticism. I hope to show in my account of Ramus that the 
question was a good deal subtler than is suggested in the statement that 
the P16iade's view of poetry 'provides moral teaching by means of a pleading 
form., 1 The tension between teaching and pleasing was one which was often 
debated and carefully worked out; there ist furthert the vital question of 
clarity and obscurity in discourse which Castor seems to ignore. 
In the next four chapters the relations between inspirationy nature 
and art are examined. In this connection Castor studies the twofold imita- 
tion which the Renaissance propounded, that of nature and that of the clas- 
sical authors. His main concern is to "show that the Pldiade poets were 
indeed trying to introduce a new kind of poetry, and to give the poet a 
function proper to himself. 
"The P16iade sought to free poetry from the obligation of 
conforming to extra-poetical scales of value; poetry did 
not have to masquerade as ethicsv or as philosophy, or 
as history.,, 2 
The author brings out well here the delicate balance between poetry as 
1. Ibid. v p. 22. 
2. Ibid. 9 p. 24. 
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ethical teaching and poetry which could also moralizot but which was much 
more besides. He situates, too, the poet in the social and intellectual 
contexty thus explaining the Pldiade's feeling that they were a chosen and 
privileged intellectual aristocracy, and must live up to this ideal of 
1 
virtue. This will be of great significance when we come to see how dif- 
ferent Ramus' position was; Ramus was a popularizer with strong democratic 
feelingst and his aims were a far cry from the aristocratic aspirations of 
the poets. 
Castor links this feeling of aristocratic superiority with the be- 
lief in the divine origin of poetry. The first poets (especially Orpheus) 
were considered by the Pldiade to have been priests and interpreters of the 
godsp and they had helped to civilize primitive man. This ideal which Horace 
did much to perpetuatep was widely held, and was extended by some writers 
(Sebillet, for example) to include Mosesp Davidy Solomon and the Prophets. 
2 
Poetry isy in this theoryp the result of divine inspiration. 
I'Sebillet also stresses the origin of human knowledge 
in the divine perfection. All the artsl since they 
are 'conjoins avea ceste divine perfection que nous 
appelons Vertul, contain some spark of the divine 
firey for our minds are of kindred substance with the 
divine firej though of necessity incomparably less 
pure. Whenever a spark from the divine fire comes 
near to a human mind, light is generated in the latter 
and it is enabled to know the divine substance. This 
is especially true in the case of the poetic art... tv3 
Sebillet repeats the adage that poets are born not madev but then goes on 
to show the necessity and importance of the technical side of writing poetry. 
1.1 should like to add here that this Ivirtuet was much more than moral 
superiority; it was a general excellence or perfection(jeE'Tý). 
2. Ibid., p. 27- 
3.1-bid. 9 p. 27- 
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The theory that poetry is a kind of divine fury is at the basis of this doo- 
trine of poetic inspiration; it comes into French writing from Plato's Ion 
and Phaedrus, partioularly via the translation and commentaries of Fioino. 
It finds its fullest expression in the Solitaire Premier (1552) of Pontus do 
Tyard. Poetic fury is the first stop on the ascending ladder of perfection, 
the ascent from the senses to the world of spirit. Both Poletier and Ron- 
sard share Pontus de Tyard's "neoplatonic" enthusiasm. Ronsard stresses, 
especially in the Ode a Michel de I'Hospital, (1552). that divine inspiration 
can come only to a virtuous person. 
"Poetry, in Ronsard's viewl reaches up into the highest 
realms of man's intellectual and spiritual endeavour. 
It is the vehicle of all man's noblest aspirationst 
and to become a poet is to commit one's whole being 
to a most sacred purpose. 111 
It is only by thus seeing the Pldiade against the neoplatonist background 
of the time that we can understand the force of their theories. I suggest 
that this neoplatonism. itself must be further and more deeply studied if 
we are to appreciate how it itself fits into the broader intellectual back- 
ground of the time. 
The next part of Castor's treatment can be summarized fairly briefly 
because the subject of it has often been dealt with. The relation between 
'art' and tnaturel in literature is a topic which has exercised critics from 
earliest timest and which still continues to do so. Castor relates how Du 
Bellay and Ronsard both described the history of poetry as a process of dege- 
neration from divine to human, and that for them this was, at least in parto 
one of the results of the fall from original innocence. 
2 The evaluation 
1. Ibid., pp-35-6. 
2. Ibid. j P-391 This complicated question will be treated at length in 
chapter three, PP-55 ff. 
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of the relative importance of art and nature was first attempted in treati- 
ses on rhetoric. To them was almost always added a third termt lexercitatiol 
or practice. In the sixteenth century in Francef and especially in the years 
we are considering, the general feeling seems to have been that art and 
nature were almost equally importantp except that nature without art was 
better than art without nature. Castor distinguishes "the nalvetd which 
had been a characteristic of the 'divine' poets, and the nalvetd which could 
be achieved by merely human poets". 
I For the latter# nalvet6 was the re- 
sult of long and arduous labour. Nalvetd means also what is proper to an 
individual, and consequently it is closely linked with our sense of 'origi- 
nality'. "Indeed na1f was more or less equivalent to naturelo but with the 
added suggestions of genuineness and "rightness"# in the sense of partiou- 
lar appropriateness. 1,2 It was essential, if real naturalness was to be 
attainedp that a poet should write in his own language. This idea was re- 
peated time and again by all the theorists of the period. 'It was not 
enought writes Castorp 
"simply to follow others, certainly not to follow earlier 
writers in one's own languageg and it was not enough 
even to enrich one's language by following exactly (i. e. 
by translating) the best works written in other languages. 
Imitation had to be of such a kind that the poet could 
yet be nalf, true to his own natural language and true 
to his own natural self. 113 
The doctrine of imitation is certainly central to all Renaissance 
theories of literature. The word was used in two main ways, the imitation 
(representation) of naturep and the imitation of classical models. It seems 
1. lbid. PP. 77. 
2. lbid., P. 79. 
3. Lbid. op. 82. 
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to me that Castor is exceptionally perceptive and original in his treatment 
of the former topic. He distinguishes carefully between the Platonic theory 
of imitation at two removes from reality, and the theory of Aristotle who 
started by taking over Plato's idea, and then evolved a new theorys 
"Works of Art were still hold to copy "things" in some 
way, but in the Aristotelian scheme this implied 
nothing about their relative status on the scale of 
being. 111 
Aristotle saw poetic imitation as an instance of man's capacity for learning 
by imitation. He also saw imitation as the apprehension of what is univer- 
sal in what is particular. 
"The philosopher tries to achieve knowledge of the 
eternally enduring universals inherent in the 
particularsp which exist only at a certain moment 
in time. The artistp on the other handq tries to 
represent particulars in such a way that the uni- 
versals embodied in them are revealed more clearly 
than they are in 'real lifel. te2 
Castor shows that this theory of the universals was often misunder- 
stood, and that Aristotle was wrongly thought to have been saying that 
imitation meant merely vivid representation. It is a commonplace that 
Aristotle's De Poetical in spite of having been published in a Latin ver- 
sion in Paris in 1538P was virtually unknown in France until the appearance 
of Scaliger's Poetices libri septem. (1561), and of Ronsardis, AbbreK4 de 
l'Art Po4tique (1565)- 
3 Neither Sebillet nor Du Bellay saw art as an imita- 
tion of nature in the Aristotelian sense. Peletier seems to be feeling his 
1. Ibid. 9 P-53. 
2. f-bid. t P-54. 
3. There are, howevert several indications in the Latin writings of the 
time that the humanists were aware of the importance of Aristotle's 
theories on the subject. This still remains to be worked out in de- 
tail. 
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way towards such a viewl but is still much nearer to Plato. Sol toot is 
Pontus de Tyard with his view that the arts are concerned with deceitful 
images. 
It is not until Ronsard's AbbreR6 that we begin to find any awareness 
in French critiosp writing in French, of the Aristotelian concept of vrai- 
semblance. 
1 Castor shows clearly the progression in Ronsard's thoughtg 
until 1572 when Ronsard contrasts la vdritd, (the material of history) and 
le vraisemblable (the material of poetry). It is essential that we realize 
that Ronsard is not here equating poetry with lying. He defends himself 
explicitly against this charge. 
"Le vraisemblable", writes Castorpt1conforms to the true 
nature of things and depictsp or makes actual in imagest 
or represents, what things contain in potentiality. 
Thus le vraisemblable brings out the universals in par- 
ticulars. It ý; onforms to the actual truth of the par- 
ticulars and through this truth it expresses at the same 
time the potential truth of univerSals. oi2 
Castor is here making a very real contribution to our understanding of the 
Pldiade's views on the imitation of nature. I feel, however, that he does 
not do full justice to the theory of the vivid representation of nature 
(which he calls a Itrivialisation' of Aristotle's view)3 which was such a 
well-developed and frequently found attitude. 
The second kind of imitationy that of model authorsy is much more 
straightforward. The study and adaptation of classical models is not in- 
1. Peletier, of coursep writing in 1555p does discuss the question of Ila 
veritd historique', and says of something in Virgil that it is Ichosi 
mal croyablJ19 but he does not use Aristotle's terminology: Peletierp 
L'Art Podtique, ed. Boulanger, pp. 100,102. 
2. Castorp op-cit-v P-59. 
3. Ibid-9 P-55. 
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tended to be an alternative to writing directly in the vernacularp but an 
exercise which will both help the writer to be able, to write in his own 
language, and ensure that his mediump the vernacularp will improve and be- 
come capable of admitting a greater variety of writing. Imitation must go 
beyond servile translation (though this was not ruled out completely at the 
beginning; and was certainly practised by manyt Du Bellay himselff for ox- 
ample, in spite of all his strictures on it). Peletier seems to be the 
first to say that the poet should go beyond his models 
"Il nj faut pas pourtant qq 1ý Poet/ qui doet excelert 
soet imitateur jure ni perpetuel. Eins sj propooe non 
seul/mant de pouvoer ajouter du sient mes ancoris de 
pouvoer feri mieus an plusieurs poinz. 111 
Castor goes on to give a further justification for the imitation of 
classical models. The ideal should clearly be the imitation of nature in 
some form or other (though this was an idealt as we have seen# of which 
these theorists became aware only gradually), and since the classical poets 
had found such an excellent way to express or represent naturet later (and 
consequently slightly less divine) poets should accept their writing as 
natural, and so imitate it. Castor does not really tie this up with the 
previous chapter where Sebilletv Du Bellay and Peletier were shown not to 
have been interested in the imitation of nature itself. Perhaps the link 
is to be made in this wayp that at the beginning of the French Renaissance 
writers were so enthusiastic about the newly-discovered classics that they 
did not have time or energy to realise the extent to which direct imitation 
of the earlier models was desirable, and only gradually saw that there was 
1. Peletierp L'Art podtique, ed. Boulanger, Paris, 19309 p. 60; quoted in 
Castort op-cit-9 P-71. 
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no value in imitation for its own sake. Rather what was valuable was to do 
the same thing as the classical writers had donep that isp imitate nature 
in the vernacular. 
The second half of Castor's book deals with two main topicsy invention 
and imagination. Of thesep invention has a good deal more to do with my own 
study than has imaginationt since Ramus was interested in logic (and rheto- 
ric) rather than psychologyt but it is essential that I describe both of themt 
for the sake of completeness and to show Low Ramus differed from the Pldiade 
theorists. 
Castor's basic contention is that inventiong a term we use now only 
in a very limited sense in critical discussiont was extensively used from 
Cicero to the Romantic period. He sees a vital difference between the tradi- 
tional idea that invention is $finding', and the post-Voltairean idea that 
invention is a kind of 'making'. Both of these meanings are closely connec- 
ted to their respective psychological and epistemological contexts, and dif- 
fer in the same way as the sixteenth- and eighteenth-century theories of 
the imagination differ. 
In Chapter Nine (Invention, Rhetoric and Poetry) Castor describes 
briefly some of the points of contact between the arts of poetry and rheto- 
ric. He traces the development of the word 'invention' from classical to 
modern timesp explaining how it starts with a neutral sense (coming top upon)p 
becomes 'finding out' (which implies seeking to discover)p and is then used 
particularly for the orator's faculty of invention. 
1 As such it is the first 
and principal part of rhetoric. (The others were dispositiong elocutiong 
1. Castor, op. cit., p. 96. 
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memory and delivery). 
"Invenire is no longer something passivot no longer the 
event of happening upon a thing by accidentl now it in 
something activep something deliberate and intentional# 
not so much a simple finding as a finding by soaking. " 
Castor brings out very clearly how invention assumes the figurative connota- 
tions (of fabrication) that it often has today.. Since oratory's purpose is 
to persuadep invention will often be used on what resembles the trutht le 
vraisemblable. 
"As long as this view of invention is supported by an 
Aristotelian or pseudo Aristotelian theory of verisi- 
militude, no harm will be done. If it is not so 
supported, howeverv invention is in great dangor of 
. being accused of producing merely non-trutht that is to say lies.,, 2 
The hidden objects of invention will be readily found by recourse to the 
system of 'places'. The rest of Castor's chapter discusses rather summarily 
how the arts of poetry took over these rhetorical divisions (and specially 
invention$ disposition and elocution). 
The next chapter is a more general linguistic enquiry into some of 
the meanings of invention in the sixteenth century. The principal source 
is Montaigne. (In spite of Castor's justification of this I suspect that to 
rely so heavily on Montaigne is to run the risk of falsifying the picture. 
) 
Castor sees a beginning of a 'movement towards the implications of untruth 
and deception'. 
3 This forms the subject of the next chapter('Invention 
and PoetEX as Fiction). Poetry has been traditionally associated with 
lying (making up, rather than making), though poets had often repudiated 
1. Ibid., P-97. 
2. Ibid. p. 98. 
3. Yb--id. t p. 112. 
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the accusations. In the sixteenth century one of the most common words in 
critical writing was Ifiction1v very often in a pejorative sense of dissimu- 
lation and mensonges. 
"It did seem possiblep howevert to use the cognate verb 
feindre to describe the activity of the poett without 
necessarily condemning him out of hand as a liar. 
Feigning had not yet gone the way of fiotionp and was 
apparently still regarded as a fairly reputable activity. "' 
'Feindrel is to be distinguished from 'contrefairel which usually had a 
pejorative sense. (I feel that all this could be gone into still further; 
my own reading of sixteenth-century poems which dealt incidentally or 
otherwise, with the nature of poetry-writing has left me with the impression 
that it is the pejorative senses which predominate# and that many other 
clearly pejorative words are used in the same context and connection. ) 
The following chapter (Invention and Reason) is the one which touches 
most nearly the subject of my own study. The author's aim is to show that 
invention was a respectable word, which had nothing irrational about itp 
and so he turns to Ramus as an obvious support for his idea. Here is some 
onev an exact contemporary of the Pldiadep an acquaintance of theirst who 
is a fervent believer in the order in the universey who writes voluminously 
about inventiong and especially about the 'places of invention'. I must 
repeat that Castor's treatment of Ramus is (necessarily) superficialp and 
that it even has very serious defects. In the first place to appeal to 
Ramus for support is highly dangerous. Castor writes; 
"Invention was suspect only as far as reason itself was 
suspect; and providing always that it kept strictly to 
its own realm of secular knowledge and did not try to 
l. Ibid., P. 119. 
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"meddle too closely in matters of faithp reason was felt 
during a large part of the sixteenth century to bf all- 
powerful and (potentially at least) all-knowing. " 
Unfortunately Ramus himself was suspected of all sorts of heterodoxical 
opinions (some of which he actually held)t and above all his account of 
reason and invention was suspect. In the second placeg since Castor takes 
as his source for the ideas of Ramus the posthumous 1576 edition of the 
1555 DialectiQue he does not make clear the very evident evolution of Ramus, 
thought from 1543 onwards. It would have been interesting to see how Ramus 
developed at the same time as the other writersq such as Ronsard, developed. 
Castor goes on to point out that R=us reorganized rhetoric and 
dialectial shifting invention and disposition to dialeotict and restricting 
rhetoric to elocution. This much is truep but it is quite untrue to say 
that "Ramus' system of dialectics is based on a fully elaborated epistemo- 
logy and metaphysics". 
2 The very opposite is the case. One of the greatest 
merits of Ramus, system is its independence Of anything non-logical. 
Castor shows briefly that for Ramus 
"the method of dialectics could and indeed should be derived 
simultaneously from observation of the natural order of the 
universe and from observation of the natural processes of 
the human mind. These two elementsp the natural order of 
the universe and the natural processes of the mind, infallibly 
correspond, so he believed, which means that the dialectical 
method of reasoning is able to give immediate and true access 
to things as they actually are". 3 
I do not wish, at this stage, to go into the discussion of the 
'arguments' in Ramus, which Castor touches on here, because I shall deal 
with it at length in its place. Suffice it to say that the logician invents 
1. lbid. j P-128. 
2. lbid. 9 P-130. 
3. Ibid., P-130. 
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larguments' which correspond to the name of the mental conception of the 
thing. 
"The arg=ents, thent subsist in reality; the dialectician 
simply comes upon them. This is the key to Ramus, view 
of invention. Invention is carried out by following what, 
according to himt are the natural rules of thoughtp that 
isp by descending from universal penera to particular 
instances. 111 
In this chapter the close connection between invention and reason is stressed? 
but the views of Ramus on this subject are not fully explained. 
The greatest merit of this book on Pldiade poetics lies perhaps in 
the five short chapters it devotes to the analysis of sixteenth-century atti- 
tudes to imagination. These chapters are specially valuable in that they 
get to the very heart of the problem of mimesist and thus bring together 
all the different ideas Castor has been talking about. They are also the 
most original part of his work. If I treat them rather more summarily than 
I have treated the earlier chaptersy this is because they have less to do 
with my own subject: Ramus was not interested in psychology or metaphysics. 
The basic distinction which Castor makes is between the Platonic and 
the Aristotelian accounts of imagination. For the Platonist all artists 
produced limageslp which were somehow less real than the things they repre- 
sented. "Thus, in Plato's terms, the imagination dealt only with appearan- 
cesy with the ever-moving, ever-changing flux of particulars. " 
2 There is 
for him a clear distinction between the reason which deals with the ideal 
(i. e. real) world, and the imagination which deals with appearances. There 
is also, for the Platonistp a strong ethical concern which associates reason 
1. lbid. j P-131. 
2. lbid. j P-139. 
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with what is good, and imagination with what is bad. For the Ariatotelianp 
the theory of the imagination is descriptive (of how we come to know things) 
rather than prescriptive (of how we should come to possess true knowledge in 
contemplation). 
"Aristotle made two basic assumptions which were directly 
opposed to Plato's doctrine. First, he accorded reality 
not to the supra-sensible world of Ideasp but to the 
here-and-now, to the world of material things. Secondly (and this is simply an extension of the metaphysical 
assumption into the field of epistemology), he placed the 
origin of whatever knowledge human beings possess not in 
the intellectual apprehension of the universal ideast but 
in sensation, in the apprehension of particulars through 
the senses. " 
Castor adds that the sixteenth-century attitude to imagination was usu- 
ally an amalgam of these two systems of thought. 
I do not wish to discussp because it is not relevant to my purposev 
his account of the faculty psychologiest and the medical treatises on how 
the brain worked. Suffice it to say that he feels that from quite early in 
the sixteenth century people thought that the imagination dealt not just 
with images derived from sense-objects, but with abstract ideas and judgmentst 
"By and large for the sixteenth century the imagination 
was simply the image-making facultyl which pictures 
objects and events already experienced or perceivedp 
but no longer present to the senses. But it could 
also picture things which ýad never actually formed 
part of one's experience. " 
The imagination was midway between the sense-world and the world of reason. 
Castor goes on (in Chapter Sixteeng Imagination linked with Invention 
to demonstrate that imagination in the sixteenth century was often more or less 
synonymous with invention, or at the very least they worked together in such 
1. lbid 9 P-141. 
2. lbid. p P-153. 
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close harmony, that they became almost indistinguishable. In the next chapter 
(Imagination, invention and Poetry he repeats that both proscriptive and des- 
criptive elements were present in the sixteenth-century account of imaginationt 
and that there was a close link between imagination (which often had unfavour- 
able associations) and invention (which was usually considered favourably). 
Invention was useful because it was so closely associated with the rational 
process, but it needed imagination if it was to be able to form, pictures or 
images. Poetryg thent owes something to both imagination and invention. By 
the time of Ronsard it was becoming clear that any autonomy it might have 
would be the result of its growing concern with the vr-Aa=blable as its proper 
and peculiar scope. Castor stresses that even for Ronsard this view of poetry 
was not yet clearly formulated. 
Castor concludes by attempting to explain why the poets of the Pldiade 
did not go further than they did in formulating their doctrine about the true 
nature of the poet and of poetry. He has brought out very well the develop- 
ment that did take place between 1545 and 1572f and repeats that we must not 
judge the sixteenth century by twentieth-century criteria. We must not expect 
too much of these poets - for exampleg in their understanding of all the finer 
points and the full importance of Aristotle's theory of imitation and vraisem- 
blance. At the end of his book Castor seems to come round to the view that 
the true r8le of the poet is that he is divinely inspiredq that poetry is much 
more than a mere first step on the way up to the contemplation of the godhead. 
This book, then, is the best and most complete account of PlSiade 
poetic theory that has been written. It has some defectsq some major 
lacunaeq howeverp which must now be mentioned. There are some unaccountable 
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omissions in the treatment of the topics of poetic theorys there is almost 
no discussion of the central problem of clarity and obscurity in poetry (a 
theme which was of immediate concern to almost all the oixteenth-contury 
theorists)9 very little treatment of the nature of lorn=ent' and what in 
Renaissance terms is called 'copielt and not much about the funotion, of the 
poet (that isq the relation between the poet and the philosopherp and the 
orator). In generalg I feel that the rhetorical tradition in the theory of 
poetry has not been given sufficient importance, considering the part it 
plays in Sebillet, Du Bellay and especially in Peletier; (apart from inven- 
tion, the first part of rhetoriol the traditional divisions of rhetoric re- 
ceive little treatment). But this is not to minimize the real contribution 
that the author has made to our knowledge of the subject, by his careful 
analysis of many of the critical terms used by the theorists, and his plac- 
ing of them in their semantic context. (There arep of coursel many other 
terms which are frequently usedp and perhaps equally importantp but these 
would make necessary a further, complementary study. ) 
In these first two chapters I have treated Ramus' life and workst 
and mentioned the actual contact he had with the P14iade; I have also ana- 
lyzed the main elements of what is now called (with some justification) 
P14iade Poetics. I now come to the main body of my workq which is to set 
out Ramus' views on the topics discussed by these theorists of the P14iade. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ART AND NATURE 
One of the basic features of literary criticism in the sixteenth 
century wast as we have Been# the discussion of the r6les of art and 
nature in the composition of a work. It is evident that both terms had 
a very wide currency outside this contextq and that an analysis of some 
of the other ways in which they were used will help towards a fuller 
appreciation of their function in poetic theory. The writings of Ramus 
are particularly useful for this purpose because he wrote on almost all 
the branches of science then knowng attempting to define the difference 
between these brancheso andt in the course of his argumentp often touching 
on the problem of the relation of art to nature. 
Together with his contemporaries Rami, sometimes uses the word Oars' 
almost synonymously with Iscientiall Idisciplinalp Imethodus'l 'professiol 
and even lvirtus'. Other wordsq such as 'doctrinal and II are 
often associated with lars'; behind most of these terms is the idea that 
an art is a way of teaching. 
1 
In the Aristotelicae animadversiones(1556) he attempts a definition 
of an art. First of all he says that Icategorial is the 'arrangement of 
homogeneous things by means of what is most generalo subordinate, lowest' 
and then goes on to state: 
1. Ongy IMDD9 P-156. 
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"This definition of category is nothing else than a 
definition of an art and science arranged according 
to true principles of method - for art is the per- 
ception of homogeneous things by means of what is 
most generalp subordinatep most particular". 1 
In the Scholae Metaphysicae. Ramus stresses that art proceeds from the general 
to the particular. The difference between experience (or practice) and art 
is that experience deals with particulars and art with universals; arts deal 
with constant eternal things, which are not subject to the ravages of time, 
2 
The definition which Ramus gives ofgenus'will tell us something further 
about this univer3ality: 
"Genus is a multitude of similar essencest or the 
similar essence of many things. Now this is un- 
doubtedly the Platonic Ideap the discussion of 
which I have left until now so that once genus 
has been dealt with the Platonic Idea will be 
more easily understood. For the Platonic Idea 
is nothing other than genus as I have defined 
There is here a very close linking of the Aristotelian theory of forms and 
the Platonic theory of ideas. It is of the utmost significance that for Ramus 
here the basis of all arts is the Platonic Ideal and that they are all concer- 
ned with making known the universals. Ramus' view, not surprisinglyq is far 
more strictly Aristotelian than is that of Sebillett Du Bellay or Peletier. 
4 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556)t P-115; Of.. La Dialectiquet (1555)1 
p. 121. (In my quotations from La Dialectique I have used the original 
edition; the modern edition of it has the original page-numbers in brackets, 
so the reader will be able to refer to this also). 
2. Scholae metapMsicaet in Scholae in liberales artes, (referred to hereafter 
as ýSLLA)q Bile, 1569t col-831; it is important to notice that this is the 
edition I refer to by SLA9 and not the edition of 15781 it seems to me that 
the earlier edition is likely to be closer to Ramus' own revision of his 
works. 
3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556)0 P-94; cf. Brutinae quaestionesp 
Parisi M. Davidq 1549t p. 22. 
4. Of. Castort op-cit-i P-55o 
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Here we have a philosopher# at least vaguely assooiated with the P16iade# 
preaching a doctrine which is more or less purely Aristoteliang long before 
any of the group got round to accepting such a doctrine. 
1 
It is not obvious from these definitions which Ramus gives that taro' 
and Isciential may be synonymousp norv indeed, is it obvious from the fact 
that they are often found linked together. They arep howeverp equated on at 
least one ocoasiont in the Scholae metaphysicaep where a distinction between 
them is rejectedt 
"All these words have a common general meaning in true 
common usage, so that grammar may be called an artt a 
science# a skill or wisdomp although skill is more 
often used for actions and wisdom for plans and deliber- 
ation". 2 
'A: rs' and Isciential are here not distinguished in any way. Elsewherep 
3 toot tars' and Idisciplinal are often linkedp and on one occasion it is made 
clear that they are synonymous: 
"All rational teaching and learning stem from previous 
knowledge; this is obvious to anyone who takes a global 
view of the question. And indeed mathematics proceeds 
to its end in this wayp as does each of the other arts". 
A little laterp commenting further on the Posterior Analytics he claims that 
'doctrinal and Idisciplinal refer to Complete arts such as grammarp rhetoric 
and logic. 
5 Now, while these two words 'doctrinal and Idisciplinal are not 
usually synonymous but complementaryl they can both be equivalents of the 
1. Peletier is again perhaps something of an exception. In his phraseý 'Car 
lui qui parli a unj eternitel doýt seul/mant toucher lj neu, le sjgrPt et 
li fons d1un argumant... I (VArt fobtiqueg ed. Boulangert P-84)9 we have 
more than a theory of the immortality of the poetq somethingg in fact, 
very close to the Aristotelian theory of the universals. 
2. Scholae metapjjXsicaeq SLAq col-832. 
3. Of. La Dialectique, p. 86. 
4. Scholae dialecticaeg SLA9 col-315. 
5. Ibid. 9 col-317. 
58 
one word lars'. Ong has, of courset pointed out Ramus' error in restricting 
'doctrinal and Idisciplinal to formal arts. The Latin words had as wide a 
range of meanings as the words 
Stý*76'X2AI@2 
arid F. 2tOý LI(L which Ramus 
was commenting on. 
1 Finallyp it is interesting that Ramus should hold that 
all art is teaching, but not that all teaching is art. In the Dialectique 
(1555) he wrotep 'Or ceste methods nlest seullement appliqude en matiere des 
arts et doctrines, mais en toutes chosesp que nous deliberons enseigner 
facillement et clerementt Et partant elle est commune aux orateurs, poetes 
et tous escriuantzl* 
2 
One of Ramus' favourite ideas was that all the different arts or 
branches of learning are interrelated. There is one method common to them 
all, and while they each retain their special aimsq their ultimate purpose 
is identical: 
"The ends and teaching-procedures of all the arts are 
separate from one another; they are united, however, 
in their usefulness; we see the same thing in the 
possession of farms and fields - my field does not 
make inroads into yours nor yours into minep but when 
we buy, sell or exchange produce, they have a common 
usefulness. #13 
Elsewhereq in a justification of his own teaching-practice, in the Pro philo- 
sophica disciýlijavthe metaphor of utility is enriched by one of fruitfulness: 
"We teach the different arts at different timesp but as their individual fruits 
gradually ripen, we adapt them to our purposes for rhetoric and for action"; 
he joins the 'use' of one art to that of another until "we make finally one 
1. Ong, REDD, p. 163. 
2. La Dialectiquelp. 123. 
3. Scholae rhetoricae, ýjLAI col. 237; Brutinae quaestiones, (1549). p. 16. 
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common general practice of rhetoric and philosophy out of many special and 
particular practices. " He continues in an untypical departure from his nor- 
mal philosophical style to illustrate his point with a metaphor from farmingl 
"In agriculture there are cropsq treesq vinesp herds and 
cattle which all demand a particular kind of treatment: 
we leave the stubble in the fields and carry home the 
grain: we leave the beasts in the pasture and take home 
the milk and the fleeces: we give all of them a common 
usefulness in feedings nourishing and clothing the body. 
So it should be in the nourishment of the mindt its 
various parts should be catered for in different ways. "' 
Because of his insistence that all the branches of learning were closely con- 
nected Ramus laid himself open to the criticism that he was confusing them. 
He repeatedly professes that both in theory and practice he really keeps them 
quite separate; he writes1for example, 
"Have all my labours been useless and in vain? For so 
many years have I been publicly arguing about the 
distinction of the liberal artsp and have written and 
published so many books on the subjectV2 
His further jibe that anyone who denied this (and many did) could not have 
read his booksp was generally justified. He was clear in his own mind about 
two complementary aspects,, that all the arts had separate ends and should be 
taught quite distinctly from one another, but that at the same time the pro- 
cess of teaching and learning was similarly exemplified in eachl and that 
their ultimate aim was always 'the cultivation of minds'. 
It now remains to examine a little more closely the special aims of 
some of the individual arts and to see how they fit into the total scheme. 
There are many instances where Ramus lists the aims of different arts - gram- 
mar is the art of writing wellp rhetoric of speaking well, logic of reasoning 
1. Pro philosophicadisciplina, SLAO col. 1020. 
2. lbid?, Col. 1024- 
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wellp and so on, right up to theology which is the art of living well - "for 
the end of any art is not the knowledge of what is contained there, but use 
and practical'; 
1 in this context he shows how the practical aims of all other 
arts are only part of what is necessary, more steps towards the acquisition 
of wisdom: 
"So the human arts teach by means of their own precepts to 
speak, write, reason, count and measure wellt and so on 
according to their aims. Theologyq howeverv teaches how 
to live wellp that is, fittingly and in harmony with God 
who is the source of all good. " 
Pagan ethic philosophy fell far short of this ideal in situating man's happi- 
ness in his own natural human facultiesp 
"as though man could find happiness of life within himselfp 
and could acquire it naturally, by learning or by habitq 
so that either the habit or practice of human virtuep or 
pleasure or honour could make him happy. " 
Theologyp for Ramusp was God's revelation of himself contained in the canonical 
books of the two testaments. 
2 But this is Ramus writing at the end of his life- 
his only work of theology was published posthumously in 1576 - and after he had 
decided to devote all his energies to the study of Scripture. Earlier on he 
had indeed seen all arts as leading to Godv but he had been more interested in 
God's direct action on the human mind than His influence through Scripture. 
The natural light of logic becomes suffused with the divine lightp because logic 
is the image of God: 
"How many and how genuine are the images of divine wisdom 
which learning portrays to the philosophical mind! By 
what way do we come nearer, in this illusive mortality, 
to the condition of immortal nature? 1#3 
1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana libri quatuor, (1576), p. 6. 
2. Ibid., P-7. 
3. Dialecticae partitiones, Parisp 1543, P-54- 
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The answer is, by learning: Imathesis' (strictly, learningt sciencep 
and by extension mathematics) has a broadeningo liberatinet liberalizing in- 
fluence: 
"Learning frees man from his limitationso or rather it makes 
man greater than the whole universep so that he who can 
scarcely be called a millionth part of itp contemplates the 
whole with far superior eyes. Are wo to feel pity for man 
as one cast out from hie heavenly possessions into the re- 
motest parts of the world, and exiled from his own country? 
Learning reinstates him into the citizenship and inheritance 
of his heavenly country. 111 
Ramus proposes to healby means of his teaching, the diseased body of 
philosophyl which has become so afflicted by the disastrous state of its 
health that it has forgotten what it felt like to be well and scarcely even 
wants to be cured. 
Learning has also a sedative effect on man when he is troubled by un- 
ruly desires, restoring harmony in his soul under the rule of reason: "How 
heavenly and divine it ist when you are wandering blind in the darkp to be 
able to assess everything in the fullest possible lightV. 
3 The same thera- 
peutic qualities are ascribed to liudiciuml which is 'the greatest and noblest 
part of an artIt by it men realize their natural nobility; 'For although it 
is circumscribed by the minute prison of the body, it looses its bonds and 
frees itself by evaluating and judging'. 
4 The Platonic imagery is made even 
clearer in the Dialecticae partitiones than in the Dialecticae institutionest 
after a discussion of the allegory of the cave, when we are exhorted to "light 
the fire sent down from heavenly light, and free ourselves from our bondsli. 
5 
1. Ibid. j loc-cit. 
2. Ibid-s P-3. 
3. Ibid , P-55. 
4. Dialecticae institutiones, 1543, p. 19. 
5. Dialecticae partitiones, P-45; cf. Dialecticae institutiones. p P-42. 
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J)ialectic will free the mind from its sonoualityg and our thought-procesnes 
from shackling habits. Ramus goes even further. Learning becomes synonymous 
with wisdomg and shows us somethingt however ahadowyp of God's own wisdomf 
and that our own minds are 'struck out from some particle of His own being 
Moreoverp logic (which herep as elsewhere, is equated with learning and 
wisdom) 
2 
also finds ready-made images within itself 'when it comes to coun- 
sels and precepts about life and manners. ' 
Some principles are clear I& nostre premiere et naturelle raison sans 
observation ny experience de eens aucunp voyre sans doctrine aucune antece- 
3 
dente I. 
Precepts are, in fact, nothing other than formulated natural messages. 
4 
It is even possible for Ramus to talk about principles as $singular gifts of 
nature'. 
5 The most Outstanding natural gifts which have been accorded to man 
arep of coursep reason and speec but there are all sorts of other natural 
gifts. The first principles of arithmetic, for example, are inborn within us 
('divinely inbornt)7, and moral principles are 'written in our heart$ 
(animis)l 
From earliest childhood a boy has 'a natural bent towards using his reasonIj9 so 
that the only true method of teaching is that which performs an appraisal of 
1. Dialecticae Partitiones, P-55v; the soul is also described as "descended 
from the region of heavenllp Dialecticae partitionesp P-49v- 
2. Cf. Scholae metaphysicaep SLA, col. 633. 
3. La Dialectique, p-85. 
4. Dialecticae partitionesp p. 62. 
5- Scholae rhetoricaep SLAp col. 235. 
6. Lbid., col. 233. 
7. 
8. ýýýý9(1543), p. 65v; it 
seems to me that Ramus' view here is not unlike that of Pascalp who saw that 
first principles, even those of mathematicsp were known by the heart and not 
by the reason alone, or even primarily (cf. - Pens6esv ed. Brunschvicgpno. 
282). 
9. Dialýcticae institutiones, (1549)p P-II; cf-P (1554), P-5. 
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propositions by progressing from those which are most naturally evident to 
those which are less so. The whole process of dialectic is called 'that 
eternal reason which is inbom and divinely imprinted in individual men's 
minds'. 
1 As alwayst Ramus is here aware of a hierarchy within the artsf 
All arts are, indeed, called 'mental gifts and virtuesIq 
2 but they do not 
all have the same immediacy and importance. On one occasion Ramus asksq iff 
as Josephus assertat mathematics were given to the Hebrew peoplet almost with 
God teaching them directlyp is it likely that logic would not be divinely in- 
spired? 
3 And to go even one grade higher, the doctrine of theology is given 
by God to men. Since the knowledge of God is innatep this may seem rather ob- 
viousq but Ramus' expression is very emphatiop "divinely offered by God to 
4 
men", with the suggestion of religious sacrifice contained in the loblatal . 
Ramus explains that the reason for our veiled and imperfect knowledge of God 
is that we are suffering the effects of original sin. 
5 
The ultimate aim of life is to live according to nature (Inaturae-con- 
gruenter conuenienterque')v that isp with fortitudef justicep freedomp modera- 
tiono prudence and religion. 
6 
We realize that in order to do this we must obey 
the dictates of our conscience. 
7 We are aware that we are not merely sensual 
1. Aristotelicae animadversionesp (1543)p P-4v. 
2. Pro philosophies, disciplinap SLA, col. 1025. 
3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col-3; Ramus often returns to the idea that the 
art of mathematics was given by God to the Chaldeans; seep for examplep the 
preface to the Brutinae quaestionest(1549)9 P-4p (also in SLA, (1569)p p. 233); 
and M. T. Ciceronis de Fato liber, in Praelectiones in Ciceronis orationes 
octo consularesp(1575)9 P-302. 
4. Commentariorum de religione Christianap P-7. 
5. Ibid,, pp. 24-5. 
6. Dialecticae partitiones, PP-55v-56. 
7. Ibid., pp. 81v-82; of. Aristotelicae animadversionesp p. 65v. 
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beasts but have the gift of free will. Rsmus insists that he has always 
(this is 15431 in his first published work) praised the freedom of man's 
will (he calls it elevated, loveableg glorious) and considered slavery de- 
testable. 1 This may seem to be in contradiction to the Platonic theoryo 
which he adoptsp of man's imprisonment in the body# but the two notiona are 
not incompatible. Man is, indeedp limited by his body and by the worldo 
but this is the given situation in which he must work out his freedom. To 
deny the limitations of the body would mean that one was not living accor- 
ding to nature. 
The rational man knows that his share of the virtues is a more spark 
of God's total possession of themp and vhen he has mastered the explanations 
of all the different arts, he will perceive that philosophy is "the love of 
God$ Who is supreme goodnesso for He is all truth and wisdomq to which all 
the studies and thoughts of men are naturally referred". 
2 The aim of all 
arts or teachingg looked at from this rather different point of viewt is the 
love of God. This is well summed up in the Dialecticae partitioness 
"All arts and teaching have no other aim than the contem- 
plative admiration of the immense variety of naturep which 
has been established by the ineffable wisdom of the supremely 
good God. For this reason, all labourp industriousnessp emula- 
tion, fame and literary excellencer together with that of any 
other arty exhort us to embrace by our own praisev justice and 
piety, the majesty of this great good and eternal power. 9 
1. Dialecticae partitiones, P-83 cf. 
_ibid. 9 P-56v. 2. Ibid. 9 PP-70-70v. 
3. Ibid. p PP-41v-2; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, P-41P which adds that the 
aim is the contemplation of the Pythagorean spheres equally spread through 
all the parts of the world, whose centre is everywhere and circumference 
nowhere. In Dialecticae partitiones, (PP-47-47v) men's minds are called 
'glittering sparks' of the rays of divine light, and we read also (P-56v) 
of 'sparks ilivinely planted in our minds'. These seem to me partially to 
cover the divine activity in the person which is usually ascribed to grace. 
Some of these sparksy for example, make us patient, some generousp some 
are directed at the preservation of peaceful human relations within GocietY9 
and some are for mastering unruly passion. Only in the final place do we 
find those which are meant to help us in the study of all arts and sciences. 
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These are some of the most important of the various meanings of 'art' in 
Ramus. However, the term can rarely be properly understood on its owng since 
it was normally thought of as one polo# with nature as the other. The two pri- 
mary meanings of nature in this context are inseparable - origin and inherence. 
Ramus was well aware of the multiple other meanings 'nature' may have. 
1 He 
discusses, on more than one occasiong Aristotle's various partial definitions 
of naturet and finds them unsatisfactory. Nature, for example, according to 
Aristotle, is the principle and cause of movement and restp in which it prima- 
rily inheres, 'per sel and not 'per accidens'. Ramus criticizes this defini- 
tion on the grounds that the addition of the word 'rest' is unneccessary am- 
plification; the definition could apply to a certain extent to artefactst and 
above ally it does not apply to all nature, for example, matter and form. A 
second Aristotelian definition or description of nature which Ramus refers to 
is 'that which is primarily inherent in somethingp simple and 'per sel. ' Al- 
though this is the sense Ramus himself usually attributes to nature, he finds 
Aristotle's statement of it tautologous. Two other descriptions are giveng 
firstly, that nature is I the form and species which we use in defining what a 
thing isIp and secondlyp that it is 'genesis' or 'generation'. 
2 Elsewhere 
Ramus lists five modes of nature according to Aristotlet generationp matterp 
efficiency (the principle of movement)j subjectp and the essence of things 
3 
which are 'constant by nature' . These are not to be taken as synonyms of 
nature, but rather as ways in which Aristotle (and Ramus, toot in spite of 
himself) looked on nature. The 'nature of an art' has a special meaning. In 
1. Cf. D. B. Wilsong Ronsardq Poet of Nature. 
2. Scholae physicaep SLA, col. 663-7. 
3. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col. 896-7. 
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all arts except that of dialectic it is differentiated from the subject-matter 
(materia) of the art. In medicines for examples the nature of the art is the 
doctor's skills the matter is healthp medicines and anything which is contain- 
ed in the precepts. But in dialectic they are the same since it deals with 
skill in discourse. 
1 The nature of anything is contained in its causes and we 
can see, here againg the idea that nature is synonymous with origin. The na- 
ture of man (that is to sayq his substance) is contained in his body and soul 
since these (matter and form) are the principal causes in which his nature is 
contained. 
2 In the same way, the nature of the soul lies in its three-fold 
make-up, or the three causesp vegetative, sensitivep rationalp Idesquelles 
l'essence de nostre ame est compos691. 
Ramus repeats the dict= that art imitates nature. For himp art is an 
attempt to express (re-present) the naturalt that isp what is inborn in man 
before he has recourse to laboury study, practical exercise or industry. The 
science of logic, for instance, is an imitation of natural logic. The teach- 
ing process is a copy of the natural process, a reflection of the order in 
nature; that which is natural to us has been given to us by Godt and our in- 
nate ideas are proof of the natural origin of all arts; the practical aim of 
all the arts is that they should be either taught or studied in order to im- 
prove meng leading them back to God through an understanding of nature (the 
universe) and of man himself (in his nature). At times Ramus indulges in a 
neoplatonic lyricism about nature. In 1543 he-wrote about the singular beauty 
of the universep the symmetry of the worldq its flowersq watersq and infinite 
1. Dialecticae libri duop (1556), P-7- 
2. Scholae rhetoricaep SLA, col. 298. 
3. La Dialectiquev P-49- 
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variety of living beings, listing these beauties in some detail, and referring 
them all back to their source: 
"Now do not these principot components of the world show forth 
in the shadows the goodnesso prudence and wisdom of the most 
powerful Godl their author and begetter, and endow them with 
all possible meaning? "l 
Natural logic is seen as an image of Godp yet from man's point of view nature 
is the true exemplarp and art is the image; 
"The difference between nature and art is the same as 
that between a true exemplar and an imitated image. 4 
At the same time as art reflects the variety of nature and divine good- 
ness, from a different point of view art is imperfectq because the very diver- 
sity of nature is an imperfection. In its imitation of naturep art follows 
natural prudence: 
"This is the true observation of naturep from which learning 
should never depart, but should follow religiously as if 
it were a god. It will be seen to have fulfilled its func- 
tion with distinction if it is able to imitate the discretion 
of nature. ', 3 
This imitation has two stagess the teacher organizes his material by obser- 
ving (and then copying) naturey and later proposes his view of nature for 
imitation by the disciple. It is important to understand what is meant here 
by nature: it is whatever is inborn in manp and especially as exemplified in 
particularly gifted men. Thus art learns from nature and then teaches nature 
in that the teacher works upon the natural gifts of the pupils. One's natural 
character benefits greatly by being presented with a true description of itself 
and so achieves self-knowledge. Ramus altered this text in the course of 1543; 
1. Dialecticae partitionesp PP-48v-49- 
2. Aristotelicae animadversionesp p. 8. 
3. Dialecticae partitionesp PP-4-4v- 
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when the revised Dialecticae institutiones came out in the autumn the phrase 
"the natural signs inborn in men of outstanding character" was changed to 
"the signs inborn and inherent in human spirits". 
' This refinement of the 
idea of what is innate was the result of an inclination to democracy. All 
men are naturally logicians and the aristocracy of the intellect was irrole- 
vant. 
2 This change of text is corroborated by another very similar one in 
the two editions. In the earlier text Ramus invites the reader to choose 
out from all living men those who were outstanding exomples of natural shrewd- 
ness and disce=ent (but who had no knowledge of logic), such men as Homer's 
Nestor and'Ulysses had beeng 
3 
and he will find that they are quite at ease in 
any discussion of great momentq giving evidence of their natural qualities. 
The later text modifies this, omitting the reference to Homer and to outstan- 
ding men; it asks the reader to look rather at peasant people 
"and in order to form a proper idea of nature's liberality 
towards menp ask these unskilledy unlettered vine-growers, 
who have never even heard of the existence of an art of 
reasoningp about the prospects of the coming year's harvestr 
and what quantity of wine can be expected, then an image of 
nature will be reflected in their minds as in a mirror". 4 
This fits in with Ramus' general appeal to common sensýj and with his view 
that all dialectic is popularg natural and expressed primarily in popular 
and natural speech. The common people are the ultimate court of appeal for 
the correct use of language. 
6 
Ramus does not seem to have been particularly 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, p. 6. 
2. Pro hilosophica disciplinap SLA9 col. 1025- 
3. Of., Institutiones oratoriae, F1ý45), (Talon), where the unlettered 
rhetoric of Ulysses and Menelaus is discussed; cf. 9 alsog Pro-Ehilosophica 
disciplina, SLA, col. 1068, where rhetoric and philosophy are both called 
'to a large extent natural'. 
4. Dialecticae partitiones, p. 2; cf. Dialecticae institutionesy p. 6. 
5. DialTC-ticae partitionesy p. 12v; cf.. Prooemium reforlaandae Parisiensis 
Academiae, SLAp col-1097. 
6. Aristotelicae animadversioneag (1543)9 P-10. 
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happy about this questiong howevert because in 1548 he reverts to his former 
position, and adds an explanationo namely that we should not be surprised if 
unlettered people seem to achieve the same results as the learneclp because 
this is often indirectly the result of art in that they have followed the 
example and practice of others. 
1 In the Prooemium mathematicum, thero is a 
curious departure from Ramus' normal theory that all men are born logicians. 
He seems to except the American savages. 
2 
Art is also often referred to by Ramus as "the image and picture of 
nature". The art of dialectic imitates natural dialectic and indeed the 
truth (true content) of any art in to be found in nature before any princip- 
les are formulated. 
3 We caxmot, howeverg grasp or appreciate what is natu- 
ral without some sort of formulation of it. The creative originality of 
art is limited in so far as it must not contain anything which is not imita- 
ted from nature. 
4 Ramus stresses again and again that "the art of dialectic 
is an image of natural dialectict, 
5 
and finds fault with Aristotle for ignor- 
ing this principle. When Ramus says that logic is natural to all men he 
means that it is innatep God-given. This is a strange equation of 'natural' 
and 'divine' which is not without parallel in other fields of Renaissance 
thought. Art is similarly contrasted by the theorists of poetry with both 
nature and divine inspiration, so that the distinctions between the two 
latter are often blurred. On numerous occasions Ramus uses the expression 
'mother nature' or 'parent nature'. 
6 
This accords well with the view of 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), P-10. 
2. Prooemium mathematicump p. 270- 
3. Dialecticae institutionesp (1554)9 p. 6; cf. Origt WIDD9 pp. 181-2. 
4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, P-3v- 
5- Ibid , p. 4v. 
6. Of., for example, Dialecticae Eartitiones, p. 82. 
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nature as both origin and principle of generation. It is significant that 
in revising the 1543 Aristotelicae animadversionon in 1548 Ramus changed the 
phrase 'the dictates of our parent nature' into 'the dictates of almighty 
God. ' 1 God is nature. So it is that we find almost identical references 
to God as the author and parent of the universep 'God tho parent of all 
things'. 2 Natural logic is described as 'the eternal reason which is inborn 
and impressed by God upon individual human minds'. 
3 In a final summing-upt 
in the Scholae dialecticae, of the differences between Aristotle and himself 
in the question of logic, the first contrast Ramus makes is thisp that while 
he himself derives all logic from the imitation of nature, according to the 
practice of human prudence, Aristotle starts from an inadequate definition? 
and flounders in the idle sophistic wranglinga of the Schools. 
4 The theory 
that all men are born logicians finds its clearest expression in the Dialec- 
tique of 1555. In his discussion of the syllogism Ramus writes of reason, 
11certainement ceste partie en l1homme est image de quelque divinits"t pre- 
cisely because it is natural to man and distinguishes him from animals. 
5 This 
gift of God is often spoken of as a lights 
"Et partant (comme dict Socrate au lieu mesme) la lumiere de 
ceste methode est un don des Dieuxq conferd aux hommes par 6 
un Prometh4e auecques un feu reluysant et resplendissant". 
After stressing that practical experience is more desirable than artp Ramus 
goes on to sayt as a conclusion to his booko 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548)t P-470. 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, P-49v and P-55v- 
3. Aristotelicae animadversionesv P-4v- 
4- Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col-556. 
5. La Dialectiquep p. 119. 
ý. Lbid. v p. 127. 
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'lie priray (sic) le Dieu tout puissant, qui est le seul 
parfaict logicient et qui seulement en tout et par 
tout use parfaictement de raison, qulil vous continue 
le bon vouloir de maintenir et auancer ceste philosophiep 
et toutes honnestes et liberalles disciplines". 
Just as there is a natural logic so gra=ar and rhetoric are natural to 
men; logic because men are rational animals, grammar and rhetorio because they 
are endowed (praeditos )2 with a mother tongue 
"by which they may express not only what is in their 
minds, but they can show various feelings in different 
ways by exclamationp by turning awayp by communingf by 
imitating". 3 
Talon, in his Institutiones oratoriae (1545) published, as we have seen# in 
very close collaboration with Ramuso amplifies the point that rhetoric is 
naturals 
"For God has implanted in us quick mental processes which 
are fruitful and abundant for expressing all thoughts and 
judgements, and when these have been strengthened by a 
knowledge of the subject, hard work and meditationg then 
the gift of eloquence becomes outstanding and excellent". 4 
Talon comments on the imitative use of language in the child before he has 
had contact with any written arts. Since any speech is an example of natu- 
ral rhetorict the art of rhetoric is concerned with all thingsq "it can ex- 
ist ing and wander freely through the vast field of all things and all arts"P 
1. Ibid-Y pp-139-40; cf., jbid. 9 p. ii: Prometheus took heavenly fire from the 
lofficinel of Minervap 'pour esclaircir et enluminer 11esprit de 11hommel; 
it is interesting to note that in the preface to II. T. Ciceronis de Fato 
(contained in Praelectiones in Ciceronis orationes octo consularest (1575)t 
p. 284)gRamus writesp 'At bonet imO' etiam dialectice Deusy vtinam homines 
dialecticam artem aut veram nossent, aut omnino nullam nossent'. 
2. Men can also be seen as 'endowed with a liberal erudition' even though 
this must have been laboriously acquiredv Oratio de sua professioney §LAY 
col. 1108. 
3. Pro philosophica disciplinal SLAI col. 1025. 
4- Institutiones oratoriaep p. 6. 
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and whatever claim other arts may have to the "science and knowledge of 
things'19 rhetoric reserves to itself the task of 'embellishing and illumina- 
ting the praise of speech'. 
' In this activity the art of rhetoric imitates 
the natural processess "The parts of the art of rhetoric correspond to the 
parts of nature, one of which deals with the praise of single wordst the 
other with that of words joined together". 
2 
Neither Ramus nor Talon composed an art of poetryp but they were both 
aware that their principles applied to poetry as well, though with the ob- 
vious difference that while poets are dependent on their natural inspirationt 
not all men are poets. In the Prooemium mathematicum (1567)t Ramus quotes 
the adage, current at the timep that poets are born not made: 
"Popular opinion thinks that poets are born such, and are 
driven on by a fury of the mind to pour forth outstanding 
poems"; 
Ramus immediately refers this to his own theory of the arts in generalt 
"But this natural vigour is common to all virtues and 
to all learning, in which nobody will reach perfectiony 
unless he is impelled by his natural genius and goodnesst 
or rather unless he is carried off by force". 3 
(This. is a refinement on Ramus' earlier position; he seems uncertain whether 
perfection is attainable or not. God is the only perfect logician; men are 
imperfect logicians in varying degrees. The aim of all teaching is perfec- 
tion, [teaching itself is a Ivirtus'], and it is the perpetual search for 
1.1 shall deal with this question of the 'praise' of words when I come to 
talk about ornament. At this stage we may take it simply as synonymous 
with ornament. 
2. Ibid , p. 8. 
3. Prooemium mathematicump P-37; the phrase is very often found in the poetry 
and poetic theory of the time: cf. 9 for examplep Sebillety Art Po6tique 
Franýoysy ed. cit. 9 p. 25; Du Bellay, D ffence et Illustration, ed. Chamard 
(1948)9 P-1059 and Peletier,, LIArt_VoUtiquev ed. *9 P-73. 
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perfection that ensures that successive generations continue to search for the 
truth. Men Aristotle is styled the linventeur at perfecteurl 
1 
of a certain 
theorys we are not dealing with a final perfection but with a atage on the 
road. That perfection is relative (and means 'perfecting') is understood from 
a reference to Euclid's Elemental Idesquelz la methode eat estimde tres par- 
faicte 1). 2 The passage from the Prooemium mathematicum continuess 
"Grass grows spontaneously in the fieldsp but different kinds 
grow more profusely and more richly in different places. In 
the same way we are to think that the seeds of the arts are 
naturally inborn in men's mindsp bu I different kinds are 
more abundant in different people". 
Ramus concludes by saying that this explains how Hippocrates, a merchantp 
should have risen to be so great and original a mathematician. Talon makes 
it clear that rhetoricians, toog have differing gifts: 'those qualities of 
nature shine more brilliantly in some people than in others'. 
4 
Poets are among those whose writing attempts to be naturaly to follow 
the natural and spontaneous order of thought and speech. This is why the 
complete syllogism is so infrequently found. Ramus writes, 
"Car souvent et presques tousiours es poetes 9 orateurs p 
philosophes, et tous autheurs suyuantz llusage naturel, 
encore qulilz traictent questions syllogistiques, neant- 
moins quelque partie du syllogisme est delaissge" .5 
And in following the natural method which is common to all writers, 
they are imitating nature. 
Ramusý after QuixXtiliant divided up each art into three sections: naturep 
art and practice. 
6 
This is an important part of Ramus' teaching from his 
1. La Dialectigue, 9 p. vii. 
2. lbid. 9 P. 127. 
3. Prooemium mathematicumg P. 37. 
4. Institutiones oratoriaep p. 6. 
5 La Dialectiquep P-114. 
6: Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col. 242; 
Academiae, ýLA9 c01-1085. 
cf. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis 
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earliest writings onwards. In 1543 he writes: 
"For nature establishes in man the principle of reasoningt 
art instructs him with its suitable advicer and practice 
finishes the education of such a man. 111 
Here the texts of the Dialecticae partitiones and the Dialeoticae 
institutiones differ. The earlier one goes on to say that there is a pru- 
dence which is natural to menj and that 
"as soon as men are bornt one is siezed with a more 
obvious and more ardent personal zeal to make use 
of his reasong and another is duller and slower. ot2 
Similarlyq the sense of logic common to all men is possessed in greatly 
differing degrees. The whole art of rhetoric is based on the assumption that 
"the minds of the listeners have different capacities'19 
3 
and the same is ob- 
4 
served in other sciences. The arts# indeed, are not discovered and elabora- 
ted for the sake of excellent or perfect mindsp but in order to help the dull 
The revised text of the Dialecticae institutiones was amplified as 
follows: the three parts of an art are referred to as three books which are 
essentialq "for the fruitfulness and praise of every discipline". The first 
of the three, 
"the great and good God has imprinted in our souls with 
eternal characters; the second, a diligent observer of 
nature has fashioned with little imitated signs according 
to the exemplar of those divine signs; the third is em- 
braced by hand and tonguel as abundantly as is possible. " 
Nature and practical exercise are both from withing albeit in different 
ways; one is inbornt the other voluntary. Art alone relies on an extrinsic 
1. Dialecticae partitioneso p. lv; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, P-5v- 
2. lb-id. 9 p. 6. 
3. Oratio de studiis mathematicis, (1544)9 P. 9v- 
4. Prooemium mathematicump P-37. 
5. Aristotelicae animadversionesq P-4- 
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cause. Ramus speaks of "natural dialecticq that ist talentg reasong mind# 
the image of God the parent of all things. "I 
Apart from differences in natural ability which are with us from birthp 
there are differences which are the raualt of differing degrees of applica- 
tion i 
"Car combien. quUz soyent tous naturellement participans 
de la facult6 syllogistiquep neantmoins le nombre est 
bien petit de ceux qui slestudient dlen bien ucery ot do 
ce petit nombre encor est beaucoup moindre la quantitd 2 de ceux qui sqauent disposer par bonne methods et cinger". 
The Dialecticae institutiones goes on to say that the light of logio 
which is lemulous of that blessed and eternal light' is something proper to 
man. In spite of art's being the only one of the three which is not natural 
to us, it is sometimes seen as the simplest and most easily accessible. 
Ramus attacks the idea that art alone is sufficient. 
3 He was in agreement 
with those of his contemporaries who said that art and nature were equally 
indispensable to a writer. He asks whether anyone can be a perfect gramma- 
riany logician and so ong without these three 'virtues' and claims that any- 
one who wants to describe the excellence(perfection) of the grammarian etc. # 
4 
must include these three qualities. 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, 1543, pp-5v-6t Since man is made in the image 
of God (of.. Commentariorum de reliEftone Christianat P-142 etc. )q natural 
dialectic becomes synonymous with his nature or essences of. Scholae 
metaphysicae, SLA col. 836: "of all the powers and faculties of the soull 
none is more desirable than reasonj to which corresponds the art of logic; 
the other arts make a man a grannnariant an arithmaticiang a geometrician. 
Logic makes him a logical man, that is a man ... cf. palsog Dialecticae in- 
stitutiones, 1554Y pp. 273-4: "man's whole life should be nothing but medi- 
tation and the practice of reason". 
2. La Dialectique, P-135- 
3. Scholae dialecticael RLA col-434- 
4. Brutinae c[uaestionest 15499 P-85. 
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The method of any art is centered on the practical oxeroising of itj 
this is the only possible way it can achieve its purpose and be of use to 
man in his pursuit of self-perfection. This is well expressed in the, Aristo- 
telicm animadversiones, of 1548S 
"No instrumentp no art is used for its own sakei grammar 
is used for the explaining of poets and orators# and for 
speaking and writing properly. Geometry was not invented 
in order to measure itself or its preceptsp but to measure 
everything long, broad and high". 1 
This is partlyp of coursep an attack on the aridities of the Schoolsy 
but it is not simply destructive. It contains the basis of Remus' pedagogi- 
cal reform. In a later summing-up of this he sayst 'The end of the arts 
is not subtletyl but real and solid utilitý2. Wisdom is essentially prac- 
tical 
3_ here Ramus appeals to the example of Socrates. That usefulness is 
the aim is amply born out by the whole pattern of Ramust works his rearrange- 
ment of the curriculum and his pleas for university reform, as well as in hie 
repeated statement of his theory. He says, for instances 
"I made the true natural usefulness of true natural 
examples the basis of my Scholae dialecticaeg and 
the begetter not only of logiop but of all teaching. 
He delighted in his examples; it must, howeverl be admitted that he 
saw them as true only in so far as they were natural and in keeping with the 
subject. The force of the examples was twofoldt the teacher showed the pu- 
pil practical everyday illustrations of the theo#es he was propoundingl and 
so guaranteed the usefulness of the artq and at the same time he taught his 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p. 249. 
2. lbid-P P-348. 
3. Scholae grammaticaep LLA, col-5. 
4. Scholae dialecticaev SLAI col-420. 
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subject betterp because it became less and and more easily remembered. This 
is well brought out in the preface to the kristotelicae animadversionest 
(1548)t where the authort while discussing how to teach philosophy to young 
peopley suggests the twofold programme of usefulnoso and eýso of learningg 
"to increase the fruits of the pupils' industry, and to diminish the irk- 
someness of the long time spent in it". The art of dialectic is to be des- 
cribed according to the use of natural human reason, that is in accordance 
with natural inborn logiop by means of examples taken from poets and orators$ 
and by an examination of the saying of philosophers and even of other men. 
In this context, as often elsewhere, Idocerel and lexercerel are inseparably 
linked. The humanist approach is in great evidence in this celebrated union 
of philosophy and eloquence. 
1 Ramus appeals against a slavish and bookish 
following of Aristotle and advocates a return to the living methods of the 
true Aristotle. The logician is equated with man himself; "a man is not a 
logician simply because he teaches the rules of logic", and this for two 
reasons: firstlyp because true logic is synonymous with wisdomp which is 
practical ('for wisdom is universal knowledgel)p and secondly, be-cause he 
needs also to have seen how logic is related to all other disciplinesy how 
it is fundamental to everything else: 
"That man is a logician who produces an art of logic by 
explaining and unravelling the writings of poetsp orators 
and philosophers, using arg=ent, enunciationg syllogism 
and method; who observes and cultivates their logical vir- 
tues by long and assiduous meditationg writing and speaking; 
who has given himself to long and repeated practice in all 
kinds of labour and study". 2 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548)v P-58. 
2. Scholae dialecticaetaLA9 col. 68. 
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The contradiction between the wish to 'diminish the irksomeness' of 
study and the necessity for $long and repeated practice' is not a serious 
one. Ramus' constant desire was to lighten the burden of the studentl by 
improving his own teaching-methods in his classes and in his writings, but 
at the same time he was unwilling to state that the acquisition of truth was 
a simple and effortless quest. The very conception of the Iscientia in 
agendo' meant thatp initiallyp hard work was unavoidablet 
"this is the hard labour with which the immortal gods have 
surrounded virtue; this is the roughq difficultt arduous 
patht and when you have climbed to the top of ito every- 
thing will then become easy for you". 1 
Everything is capable of improvement by the application of art: 
"There is nothing which is beyond improvement either 
because it is too constant or too indifferent. 
Nothing which cannot be sharpened with the help of 
artio. 2 
But this sharpening process always entails much work. The process of 
inventiong for example, is fraught with difficulty (Idifficile et rare D, 
1)3 trouver' . Ramus was a great believer in the corporate effort of scholar- 
ship3 particular arts Iont estd reiglez par grand labeur de plusieurs 
ho=es, 4; he talks also of Itant de manoeuures, voire tant d1excellentz 
architectes et maistres d'oeuUres'. 
5 Dialectic itself will be advanced only 
by 'long (sic) estude et recherche du naturel usage et de la vraye practique 
6 
de raison' . Even if inborn precepts seem easy and natural, there is always 
hard work involved in applying them and in appreciating them-7 Study and 
1. lbid. p col. 69. 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, P-5- 
3. La Dialectiquev P-52. 
4 Ibid., p. ii. 
5: 1-bid. q p. x. 6. Ibid 
'pp. 
86. 
7. Animadversiones aristotelicae, (1548)t P-459- 
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hard work are necessaryt eveng if we are to profit from our powers of reminis- 
cence. (Ramus does notp of course, accept Plato's doctrine of reainiecence 
absolutelyp but some of his statements seom to assume it. On one occasion 
1 
he compares Plato with Aristotle on this point showing that for Plato men's 
immortal souls were "taken out of the fountain of the godhead" and so had 
some knowledge before they entered the bodyp whereas for Aristotle the soul 
was recently infused into the body and was like a clean tablet without any 
pre-knowledge; it had the potency of knowledge but that was all. Ramus' own 
view is a fusion of the tw4 Wisdom is exceedingly difficult to attaint 
according to Aristotle, because the most universal precepts (which are, as we 
have seen, the proper concern of art) are those which are furthest removed 
from the senses. Ramus accepts the statement about the difficulty of wisdomp 
but not the reasony because what is most removed from the senses enjoys the 
greatest natural clarity. 
2 In the study of logic, as of any other art or 
science, we must always use our energies of labourv vigilance and study. 
This is summed up in the word lindustrial. 
4 Practice, or usep (exercise) is 
often seen as the most important of the threep nature$ art and exercise. 
Art is perhapst from many points of viewq the least important: 
"Et vouldroit beaucoup mieux avoir llusage sans art quo llart 
sans usage car par llusage de raison sans art nous voyons en 
toutes pars de la R4publique maintz ho=es sages ot do bon 
jugementl clest & dire grands logiciens et dialecticien3. 
Et par llart de raison sans usagev nous cognoissons souvent 
en noz escholesy selon le dict dtAristotlep je ne sgay quelz 
Mercure de Passon". 5 
1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col-485-7- 
2. Scholae metaphysicaat SLA, col. 834- 
3. Pro philosophica disciplinag SLA9 coi. 1016. 
4. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensie Academiae, SLAp col. 1106. 
5. La Dialectique, P. 139. 
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You can often find practice in great minds without art being present. 
The whole merit of any art will be found in its practical application. 'La 
practique faict llartisant' sums up an idea which Ramus repeated over and 
over again. 
2 We read that the apprentice observes and considers fles mande- 
mens du maistrel and even more importantly, Iles exemplee et oeuures dlicel- 
3 luylp and by imitation Ifaict quelque chef dIoeuureI. Philosophy itself is 
seen rather as action than as knowledge. 
4 Ramus attacks$ toot the view which 
saw mathematics as a purely contemplative science, separated from the interest 
of the vulgar mob. 
5 
Every true logician must be analytiop that isp he must make use of 
the examples to be found in all kinds of writing. Fouquelin, Talon's trans- 
latorg makes a similar point concerning the orators 
"Pour le quel exercice de la vois [on] ne doit estre 
content de ces exemplesý ains doit 61ire des poOtes 
et orateurs les plus insignes exempleg qulil pourrat 
et exercer sa vois de toutes sortes. 11 
This was Ramus' own personal approach at exactly the same date. In the 
Dialectique he laments the difficulties entailed in the practical approach: 
"Car experimenter par usage, obseruer par lecture des 
pogtes, orateurs, philosophes, et bref de tous excellentz 
hommes, et non seulement approuver par leurs tesmoignages 
et exemples ce qui est conuenable: mais refuter le con- 
traire contre 11opinion si long temps publiquement receue, 
oultre ce que ie confesse estre chose laborieusey helas 7 (mon IIECENE) clest mettre les ventz orageux sur la mer... 
1. Institutiones oratoriaev P-73. 
2. La Dialectiquey p-136; cf. Prooemium mathematicum, p. 223- 
3. La Dialectiqueq p. 137- 
4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col-148-9- 
5- Prooemium mathematicum, pp. 224-8. 
6. Antoine FO-uquelint La Rhetorique frangoisey Parisp 1555P p. 124; this is 
the 1557 reading: in 1555 the text was lun enfant ne doit estre... 
7. La Dialectique, preface. 
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And indeed Ramus was accused of inconstancy because he tried by ro- 
peated revision to improve his own writings and those of others. 
There is a lengthy treatment in the Scholae dialecticae of the topic 
of practical exercises. No art is to be self-centredly concerned with $noise 
about precepts'; let the pupil exercise his art rather 'in serious matters 
and useful examples'. Those aspiring to the mastery of any art are required 
to pass a practical examinationt 
"they are not only questioned about the rules, but they are 
tried and tested in the most difficult kind of examplev 
explanation and formation to see how competent they are in 
the subject; nor are they judged worthy of the name of 
craftsman unless they are capable not only of reciting the 
precept by heartt but also of putting spontaneously into 
V1,11 practice the most difficult and important part of the ar 
So must we deal with logic. When Aristotle was alive he taught logic 
by analyzing Homer. He will be our example. 
Finally, the use Ramus makes of the word 'artifice' and some other 
related words needs clarification. 'Artlin Ramus is often associated with 
'artifice', which is perhaps an aspect of an art. It is used neutrally 
without any suggestion of deceit or contrivancep except what is inevitable 
in our approximate knowledge of reality. (This is striving rather than con- 
triving. The body of knowledge is so vast that no one has ever knowng or 
will ever know all that could be known, not even the thousandth part of it)ý 
'Artificiuml is synonymous with linstrumentum' (Dialectici for example, is 
the 'proper artifice and instrument for explaining all things'. 
3) 
Artifi_ 
ciuml is used to refer to man's technical skill. It is used in the plural 
1. Scholae dialecticaep SLAI col. 111. 
2. Scholae metaphysicapt SLAq col. 833. 
3. Dialecticae partitiones, q p. 25. 
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to describe the activities of filing (limare) and shaping (fin&rero). Any 
artist or craftsman (such as the orator) is called lartifexlo and God 
Himself is seen as the Ouniveraitatis artifext. 
1 (This sheds an interesting 
light on the idea of creative originality). 
2 'Artificial' for Ramus (apart 
from an importantly idiosyncratic technical usago which we shall see lator)3 
means 'made by man's skill' or Ireferring to an artafact'. 
4 'Instruments' 
are the tools of the trade (literally or figuratively). So the 101rot or 
places are the instruments of invention. 
5 Reason and speech are instruments 
for progress in the arts. 
6 
Namesp too, are seen as instruments of thingsp 
handy tools which help us to locate the things to which they correspond. 
7 
The points of contact between Ramus' attitude to art and naturet and 
that of the Pldiade theorists are numerous. We must again make the proviso 
that Ramus is not talking about poetic theory$ but about a general aesthetic 
theory and a theory of language and communication. But this perhaps is the 
most significant factor which comes out of his discussion of the problem: 
poetic theory is part of a much broader background. This fact gives deeper 
meaning to'the questions raised in all the arts of poetry about the relation 
1. Ibid., P-57; cf. P-53; cf., alsoOratio de studiis philosophiae et 
eloque tiae conjungendiso (1546), in Collectaneae Praefationest (1577)v 
P-306, where we read 'Deus ille parens ingenionim et artifexl. 
2. Cf. Castorv op. cit., p. 198. 
3. see belowý p. 173. 
4. La Dialectiqueg PP-5 and 8; cf. Commentariorum de relijýftono ChristianaL 
P-327. 
5- Animadversiones aristotelicael (1548), p. 2539 
6. Scholae rhetoricael SLAO col-322. 
7- La Dialectiqueg PP-4 and 7. 
83 
of inspiration to techniquep and about the relative need for talent and for 
craftsmanship. 
The divine origin of poetryp poetry as a kind of fury imparted by God 
or the gods# is something which fits very well into Ramus' view of the origin 
of all the arts. It ties in also with his occasional equation of the natural 
and the divine. There are clearly many neoplatonist elements in the work of 
all the theorists of the Pldiade and others who wrote about poetic theory at 
the same time. The two people who best illustrate thisq Sebillet and Pontus 
do Tyardy did not belong to the group, and were not even associated with it 
particularly closely, but, of coursev Du Bellay ancl Ronsard often wrote in 
the neoplatonist vein about the writing of poetry. Many critics have wondered 
how sincerely and profoundly the poets and theorists believed in their neo- 
platonism. This question is more important in the matter of the theoryp be- 
cause it is there of more immediate concern to the reader whether a particu- 
lar explanation is meant to be metaphorical or literally true. It seems to 
me that in this instance at least it is quite obvious that both Ramus and the 
other theorists approached the matter with the utmost seriousness. The neo- 
platonism, had become assimilated to Christian theology. This seriousness is 
in great evidence in the theological commentary which Ramus wrotep Commenta- 
riorum do religione Christiana, which takes over the general approach to 
theology of Ficino, and adds to it the more highly developed syncretist atti- 
tudes of the later French Renaissance and of Protestant writings. 
1 
1. In his article on Fouquelin's Rhetorique Frangoiser R. Leake draws attention 
to the fact that the author does not mention the divine inspiration of po- 
etry. I am not certain that this omission is significant. The book, in so 
far as it talks of poetry at allp is concerned with the mechanical tech- 
niques of the art and nothing more. What is clear is that since it is Ra- 
mist in conception and expression it fits into the whole Ramist doctrine of 
the origin of the arts; cf. 'The nelationship of Two Ramist Rhetoriost Omer 
Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Fran2oises in Biblio- 
thýctue d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1966, P-103. 
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Sebillet is perhaps of all the writers under discussion the nearest to 
Ramus. His book opens with a passage which is almost pure Ramus (not because 
it is in any way Ramist in the later sense of the word, but because it is 
within exactly the same neoplatonist tradition)l 
"Tous les ars sont tant conjoins aveo coste divine perfection 
qua nous appollons Vertup quo outre co qulilz ont assis lour 
fondement sus elle comme pierre quarr6e at fermop oncor ont ilz 
empruntS d'elle lour vertuouse appellation. Et pourtant couz 
qui, ont dit qua la vertu at l6s ars sourdoient d'une mosmo 
sourcep clest a diret do ce profond abyme celesta ou est la 
divinit6l ont bien entendu qua la folicit6 do cognoistre 16s 
choses, at la perfection do 16s bien fairs, avoient tout un 
at mesme eff6t. Aussi est-ce quo nous appollono science (mbro 
a vray dire at nourrice do l'oeuure vartuous) chose propre a la 
divinitd; at de caste science Vart est tant prochaing at do si 
pres frdref quo lds prenant un pour autreg on no serait do guere 
abusd. Et certes comme on tous 16s ars cesto estincelle du fou 
divin a l1approcher de llesprit son semblable, rand lumigrop par 
laqu6le ellIest 6videmment congnue; aussi, en Vart Po6tique (me 
soit permis de nommer art ce qua plus proprement J'apelleroie 
divine inspiration) reluyt elle an plus vive at plus apparente 
splendeur". 1 
I have quoted this passage at great length because it comes at the be- 
ginning of the first of the poetic manifestoes of the timeg and because it 
seems to me that it relates the poetic theory to the general theory of know- 
ledge current at the time in a way that none of the other writings (except 
those of Ramus) manage to do. It will be seen that it contains many of the 
ideas I have been dealing with in this chapter. The main points of contact 
here are: the linking of all the arts in the divine virtuel and the linking 
of knowledge with perfection; the equation of art with science, and the 
1. Sebillety Art Poetique Franq2ysj ed. Fdlix Gaiffet PP-7-9; for another 
general discussion of the relation between art and naturet cf. 9 especiallyp 
Peletierp L'Art Pobtique, ed. Andrd Boulangert PP-72-79p chapter entitled 
ID/ la Nat-u-r7 _edý l1Ex9ercicj1p and the accompanying notes. 
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account of the spark of divine inspiration. All the theorists of poetry 
share with Ramus the notion that this inspiration is a 'don divinlp and they 
ascribe to the poet the power to heal and to restore harmony to the soulp 
which Ramus had ascribed to art in generalq and above all to philosophy. 
Just as the poets had thought that poetry was a sacred science which brought 
man nearer to the godhead, so Ramus envisages a similar ascent which he des- 
cribes in moving, lyrical language; for himq howevert the medium is not 
poetry, but philosophy. 
In any Renaissance account of literary theory we find a discussion of 
the academic questions whether you can have art without nature, and which of 
the two is the more important. The answer seems obvious enoughq that you 
will achieve more when natural talent expresses itself in a disordered way, 
than when an ungifted person relies merely on precept and the tricks of the 
trade. But the Renaissance thought for the most part that the two were 
equally indispensablep though each of the writers seems at first sight to 
be laying emphasis on one or the other. Sabillet seems to be more interested 
in the divine inspiration of the poetv and yet his book is in large part a 
manual of verse-forms and metres. Du Bellay counteracts Sebillet's theory 
with a new onev summarized by the title of his chapterv $quo le natural West 
suffisant & celuy qui en Poesie vault faire oeuvre digne de llimmortalitdl. 
reletiery for his party seems to have a more balanced view; 
I'De toutes lea opinionsg celle de Poletierg qui slinspire 
surtout d'Horacep est la plus conciliante. Toute en recon- 
naissant 11importance pr4dominante des dons naturels, il 
estime qua la nature ne saurait so passer do l1art non plus 
qua l1art de la nature". ' 
Boulangerv ed. cit-9 P-72. 
86 
Peletier discusses two main meanings of natures the first of these is 
nature as the creative forces 
'Uqs cqrtjs qui voudroq't prandrý ici Natur ampliment, pour 
cet/ grand' ouurierj, qui ag1t uniuersql mant ous tout co 
qui kt au mondi, e sus tout ce qui tomb an la cogitacion t des hommist e qui, comprand memis lea c oses quý nous apilons 
contri naturip e ancoris les'supqrnat qljss lora il n1i 
auroht qui la Nat! ýrj au Podtýq quand il n1i auroibt qu/ la 
Natuý/ au Mondill 
In this sense nature includes what is normally considered to be the 
province of art. The second sense of nature which Peletier considers is 
a narrower onet 
I IIcj qui et imposb an nous, sans notri peinj et sano notr 
premierý intancion: si nous mitons pour cete heuri cpl/ 
opinion a ýart, qui cila qq nous sauons nlqt qulýnj remi- 
nisgancit'. 
Peletier goes on to show that there is nonetheless need for art be- 
cause these divine gifts are not present equally in everybodys 
"Car nous voyons es uns. prou/nir tout dj gre les dons et 3 
lea vertuz, qui lea autiýs nj gagnit qýj par grand labeurl. 6. 
Ramus' view is much the same as Peletier's. 11y own impression is 
that the side he would have stressed would be that of art. He does not 
minimize the importance of nature, but rather takes it for granted. All 
men, for him, are endowed with the natural gifts requisite for any art 
(though it must be admitted that the degree of endowment differs from per- 
son to person). Furthermore, Ramus was committedl from his earliest works 
onwards, to the value of art, art in the sense of teaching. His whole 
life-work was centered on re-organizing, representing in a more perfect 
1. lbidtv P-73. 
2. lbid., 100. cit. 
3. Ibid* pp-73-4. 
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way, correcting# the whole body of the arts, and in developing his own 
teaching skills. He was able to appreciate the balance between art and 
nature because in the end he saw them as being the came thing. In spite 
of his love of dichotomies and polarities what mattered for him in the 




The concept of imitation is perhaps the one which people associate most 
readily with Renaissance aestheticst for two very good reasonst firstlyt be- 
cause the men of the Renaissance themselvest as they rediscovered classical 
antiquity, devoted themselves enthusiastically to the practice of imitationt 
far more than at any other time, and defended this practice in their critical 
works, and secondly, because the theoretical basis itself of imitation came 
from some of the classical writers the Renaissance admired most. Cicero was 
perhaps the most influentialtthough Quintilian is respectedt toot as a con- 
tinuator of Cicero. In the early stages at least there is little reference 
to the doctrine of Plato or Aristotle except in so far as this was known to 
the Middle Ages. It is through the rhetorical traditionp which had been less 
corrupted, rather than through works of philosopbyv that the concept of 
imitation came to the Renaissance. 
Ramusq tool was deeply concerned with the idea of imitation. For him, 
(as for many others of his time) there were two basic ways in which a writer 
imitatest he imitates other authors and he imitates nature. In following 
another author he is said to imitate his virtues and so become like him. 
Ramus, in his early dispute with the Aristoteliansq reproaches his adversa- 
ries with not trying to understand fully their author, or indeed any others 
"They do not explain in their teaching the invention or 
disposition of any famous writer; and so they do not 
try to follow or imitate his virtues". 1 
1. Dialeoticae institutionest (1549)t P-8- 
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It is only by actual imitation of someone, and not by a repetition of 
his principles, that we will be able to understand him and to write anything 
of value ourselves. The process is not something reserved to those with 
great literary aspirationst RaMus Bees imitation as essential to all writingp 
and in fact claims that beginners will be able to write (Latin) only if they 
do imitate: 
I%fy Brutinae quaestiones have followed the same principle, 
since in this book I both praised without pretence 
Cicerots virtues, intending them to be copied by my 
pupilsp and at the same time pointed out 1 with disapproval 
the faults I thought should be avoided". 
At this level writing is not meant to be creativet and we are aware 
of our lack of originality: "Our gra=ar is based on an observation of Ci- 
cero and Virgilp and is directed towards understanding them, so that we may 
become like them. 112 Imitation is the easiest way of learning to write or to 
speakq 
3 
and progress will depend on the prudent choice of models. It is 
betterp as quintilian saidv to choose many models rather than just one. 
4 
This will help us to avoid mere copying and give us greater scope for origina- 
5 
lity. We must be careful whom we choose and "whom we wish to become like" 0 
This idea is repeated again and again; for instancep "We make things which 
are like the examples" 
6 
and "We become like those whose traces and examples 
we follow and imitate". 
7 Once we have appreciated an author's virtues by 
1. Platonis Epistolael P-3. 
2. Pro philosophica disciplinag SLA9 col. 1027- 
3. In the Institutiones o =atoria-eTp. 6) we read that young boys imitate and 
represent the speeches they have heard, by gesture and voice. 
4. Scholae rhetoricael SLA, col-390; cf. Ciceronianus, (1580)v P-35. 
5- Dialecticae institutlon6sp (1549)9 P-177- 
6. Scholae rhetoricael SLA9 col-388. 
7- Scholae dialecticae, SLA, 
_001-494; 
cf- col-599; cf., alsol Pro philoso- 
phica disciplinap SLA9 col. 1027- 
go 
an analytical examination of the way in which he writesp we are in a position 
to choose a similar subjeett and develop it "as truthfully and as accurately 
as possible. "' 
In this way we sharpen our own powers of invention and judgmentt since 
we 
"feel ourselves being coloured by other peoples' virtues , 
as men who walk in the sunshine are affeoted by the sun I. 
2 
The idea is taken up again in the Scholao in liborales artest which adds 
"although they are thinking aboutp and doing, other thingst 
yet they are coloured by the sun without wanting to be 
and without knowing it - the same applies to ust 
when we read eloquent and elegant authors# oven though 
our aim is to analyze the logical artificep yet unintenti- 
onally we assimilate the ornateness of the transitions". 3 
Once this stage has been reached, originality takes over; the writer discards 
imitationg and 
"chooses an open subjectt explains it by relying on its 
own devicesp and stimulates all the arts of invention". 
From the sun simile imitation would seem to be fairly superficialp and 
it is clear from the rest that the analogy is not to be pressed. A similar 
point is made in the Institutiones oratorine where it is said that Isuavitas' 
is achieved by observation of the style of the most eloquent meng not by 
5 learning principles 0 Ramus elsewhere makes it quite clear that it is 
possible to imitate and at the same time be original. His Do Caesaris mili- 
tiap for exampler is not meant to be a more theoretical treatise on the 
1. Dialecticae partitiones. 9 P-73. 
2. Ibid.; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549)p PP-177-8- 
3. Scholae dialecticaet SLA, col. 603. 
4- Dialecticae partitiones, P-73. 
5- Institutiones oratoriae, p. 24- 
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art of warv but one based on Caesar's own military practice. He admits that 
the question is one that has been brilliantly treated by Greeks and Latinst 
and also by modern Italian and French writerst but commentsp (in the preface 
to Cardinal Charles de Lorraine)p 
'Nobody whose writings I have read has yet proposed to 
imitate Caesar as a model; I mention this in case you 
despise my work on the grounds that it is derivative'. 
One important kind of imitation for the writers of the Renaissance was 
translation, and they usually discuss the two questions in the same context. 
Ramus does not seem to have had a very practical interest in translation. 
The only translations we have of his are his Latin version of Plato's letters 
(many of which are not, of courset by Platov though commonly ascribed to him) 
and of Aristot1d's Politics. 
2 Ramus' knowledge of Greek seems to have been in- 
adequatep at least until late in his life. He didl howevery translate into 
French (and partly rewrite) his own major work on logic, and there are French 
translations, which may or may not be by hirAt of some of his less important 
works. It is a measure of his desire for originality that he does not want to 
restrict himself to translation. He makes this quite explicit in a work which 
has been directly attributed to his colleague Talon (from the evidence of the 
title-page) but which is in reality the work of Ramus himself. 
3 
Here he comments 
1. The word used is Itralatitium's Estienney in his Dictionarium Latinogallicum, 
(1538), translated this word as 'Emprunt6 et prins d1ailleurs, Qui West 
pas nouueaul. 
2. PlatOnis epistolae a Petro Ramo latinae factaeg et dialecticis rerum summis 
breviter expositae, (1549 and 1552); Aristotelis Politica... (1601). 
3. The work is Audomari Talaei Dialecticae praelectiones i; Porphyriump (15479 
1550P and 1553). Ong discusses the question of authorship ( TI, pp-465-6) 
and suspects that the book may be by Ramus rather than Talon, but has no 
conclusive proof of this. I find the conclusive proof he was looking for 
in the Aristotelicae animadversiones (1556)t P-327: 'I have compared in the 
Porplxyry te industry of artisans h the inactivity of our philosophers'. 
Since the date is too early for the book to have been translated by Ramus 
(because of his inadequate Greek) we must conclude that the book was trans- 
lated by Talon and that the commentary is by Ramus. 
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that a translator is faced with the danger that he will not merely make the 
matter and words correspond in both languages but will try to add something 
of his own. There wouldt he says, be a real danger of trying to improve on 
Porphyry. 1 It might seem at first that R=us is hero being very inconsia- 
tentp in desiring originality and not allowing it in the matter of transla- 
tion; I suggest that he sees two different kinds of imitation# of which 
translation is the less interostingr precisely because originality can be 
present only to the extent that the translator leaves the text and adds some- 
thing of his own. 
In the Ciceronianus Ramus discusses at great length the question of 
imitation. He shows that imitation was often debated at the time in the 
context of Ciceronianisms 
'We read today an almost infinite number of books written 
by Italians, Frenchmeý and Cermans on the subject of the 
imitation of Cicero'. 
He goes on to show that most of these writers are interested rather iný 
the superficial aspect of Cicero's pure Latin style and hardly at all in his 
virtues. Ramusp for his parto proposes to describe Cicero's true qualitiesp 
and to give their causes rather than just their observable effects. 
3 On se- 
veral occasions throughout this book Ramus points to the value even of the 
use of the vernacular as training for someone who will later become an orator 
using the vernacular. The criterion is that as a young child he should learn 
pure speechp and the language is of secondary importance. There is some con- 
fusion in Ramus heret because he wants his budding 'Ciceronian' to imitate 
1. Dialecticae praelectionesin Porphyriumv P-5- 
2. Ciceronianus, (1580). P-3. 
3. DLld.. q P-4. 
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the master in everythingg but it is not always clear to him in what exactly 
this imitation should lie. Cicerop for examplop learned Greek gra=ar first 
and then Latin: 
'To Cicero Greek literature was foreign, whereas Latin 
literature was familiar and domestic; to French people 
both Greek and Latin literature are foreignt and French 
literature is popular and familiar. Therefore our 
Ciceronian should first be instructed in Greek and Latin 
literature'. 1 
But Ramus then goes on to give further reasons why the French pupil 
should learn Greek and Latins he should know Greek in order to be able to 
go back to the original sources of much religious writingg and Latin because 
it is the language of the schools and "the one common language of Christian 
Europe". 
2 When immediately afterwards he goes on to propose that French 
should be used in the schools and the law-courtat it becomes difficult to 
see how all these statements are to be reconciled. Perhaps the truth is that 
Ramus is well aware that he is living in an age of transitiont that he does 
really want the spread of the vernacular but sees the temporary need to train 
people in Latin. He raises the theoretical objection that there are no French 
texts for a young French student of oratory to become familiar with, and 
replies that there arep at leastq many good translations into French from 
Spanish, Italiang Greek and Latin. 
3 
He is confident that French writers will 
be able to 'enrich their country and make it illustrious, 14 
and 'just as Cicero imitated the Attic writers in Latin, so 
we are able to imitate the Greeks and Latins in French 
1. Ibid. v pp-13-14. 
2. Ibid. l P-14- 
3. Ibid. v P-17. 
4. Ibid. 9 p. 16. 
5. Lbid. 9 p. 63. 
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Many of the ideas which Ramus puts forward in this context remind us 
of Du Bellay's Deffence et Illustration. There is one passage in the Cicero- 
nianus which might have come from Da Bellayle book, except that in Ramus the 
stress is still on the value of the classical languagest 
... there is no language so poor and barbarous that it 
can not, with diligence, be enriched and cultivated. 
So our Ciceronianp whether he be Prencht Italianp Spanish 
or belonging to some other nationalityp will follow in 
Cicero's footstepst and never despair about tho richness 
and eloquence of his country; he will make his own country 
great and illustrious with the richer spoils of Greece and 
Italy; he will add now ornaments of his own. At the be- 
ginning he will speak more often in Latin and Greek9 be- 
cause these languages at the moment are richerg and provide 
more ornaments, which he will use for speaking in a similar 
way'. 1 
It will have become clear that the Ciceronianus is not just about the 
imitation of Cicero but is also about the imitation of other authors and# 
indeedf about imitation in general. The same principles therefore apply to 
the imitation of Aristotley and Ramus was engaged in controversy on this 
subject from his earliest writings onwards. He claims that the Aristotelian 
party which he is attacking are at fault in that not only do they not imitate 
their master's virtues, but imitate him where it is not lawful or desitablep 
and rely too much on his authority: 
'They consider themselves wise enough if they are able 
not just to follow in judgment and in practice the 
inventions of the man, but to admire them superstitiouslyl 
and to interpret them to us (poor rustic layfolk) as the 
oracles of some great God'. 2 
The basis of this clerical philosophy is the Pythagorean IlIpse dixitt 
ergo uerum". 
3 
Ramus, of course rejects thie utterly, and claims that we should 
1. Ibid. p P-78. 
2. Aristotelicae animadversionesp PP-76V-77- 
3. Dialecticae partitioneso pp. 12-3. Du Bellay and Tahureau both refer to 
Pythagoras as the source, quoted in Clementsp Critical Theory and Practice 
of the Pldiade pp-13-4. 
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always go beyond what we imitatep except when we are engaged on the work of 
translation. The first stage in imitation is copying. The second is that 
we should go on from there to excelling the people we have chosen to imitate. 
Imitation itself is a mere stage, part of the process of learning. It is 
perhaps as well to give a few examples of this ideap since there is always a 
great danger of minimizing the place of originalilZ in Renaissance theory 
and practice. Ramus writes, for instancep 'We strive not only to follow but 
in some places to conquer and overcome'. 
' On another occasion he says that 
in order to give logic the place it deservesp we must follow poets and 
orators, 
'fen consid6rant et examinant leurs vertus et vices, en 
imitant premierement par escripture et par voix leur 
bonne invention et dispositiong et puis en taschant 
les esgaller, voire surmonter en traictant et disputant 
de toutes choses par soy-2esmej et sans plus avoir 
esgard b. leurs disputes". 
The measure of originality comes out adequately in the words Isur- 
monterl and 'par soy-mesmel- Ramus agrees with Quintilian that "we must 
attempt something more than did those whom we are imitating" .3 Ile claimsp 
however, that there is a great difference between Quintilian's view and his. 
own, in that for Ramus not only could invention itself be imitated (which 
Quintilian denied) but it was the most easily imitable part of logic and 
rhetoric. 
Ong shows how this aspect of Ramus' idea of imitation fits in rather 
badly with his belief in natural gifts: 
1. Pro philosophica disCiplina, l SLA, col. 1016. 
2. La Dialectiquev P-138. 
3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col-339; cf. Rhetoricae distinctiones in 
Quintilianumt M5-49)-t4-99-100- 
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'In his Ciceronianus, Ramus will treat imitation as though 
it were reproduction of classical models. He does this 
also in the Training in Dialecti a when he discusses exercises 
saying that the boy should learn by imitating all the good 
classical writers, especially Cicero. This notion does not 
entirely accord with his insistence that art is more ropro- 
duotion of 'natural' preschool speech habits. Ramus never 
fully resolves the conflict herep although he seems else- 
where to indicate that the speech of the uneducated can be 
used as a point of departure for 'deducing' 1he art of 
dialectic rather than for direct imitation'. 
The second aspect of imitationg the imitation of naturep is rather 
more important to him. We have already seen something of how in hie view 
art imitates nature, how the way of teaching anything must be based on the 
most natural expression of it. (It may happen that one's chosen subject has 
been so well treated already by some other writert that by imitating what he 
wrote we are virtually imitating nature itselfg at one remove, certainlyt 
but still directly). The observation of nature is a god from whom we should 
never turn away; our observation imitates the prudence and economy of nature. 
The artist (teacher) will observe all the indicationawhich seem to be inborn 
in outstanding people 
"just as Apellesp intending to paint Alexanderp examined 
him and all his characteristics in detail". 2 
once these qualities have been noticed 
"he will draw up an order and a way similar to naturot 
and he will describe them and propose that they should 
be copied by orators". 3 
In the later text of the same year this is changed tot "he will draw 
up an image and picture similar to nature". Because of the more graphic and 
concrete 'imago' and 'tabula' the later text makes it more explicit that we 
1. On9v MMDq P-177. 
2. Dialecticae institutiones, P-7v- 
3. Dialecticae partitiones', P-4- 
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are here concerned with teaching-method. It is interesting that I imitating 
nature' is described as 'making an image of natural. All art is seen an a 
picture of nature and terms from painting abound in the works of Ramus. 
'Tabulalt toot may be seen not only as a synonym of 'via' or Imothodust but 
in its other meaning of picture or painting. 
1 The passage from the Dialeati- 
cae institutiones continuess 
"so that in this artificial mirrort as it worop nature 
is able to contemplate the dignity of its own formt 
and to wipe out and wash away any roughness or blemish 
there may bell. 
Both texts go on to assert that artp which was once the pupil of 
naturep becomes its teacher in improving upon it by industry. The later 
passage adds that in our painting of nature, "in order to make more sure 
progress, we should always keep the living exemplar before our eyes". And 
just as Apelles painted Alexander's head in the likeness of hit; real headp 
and so on for the other parts of his bodyt so we describe the different parts 
and qualities of natural logicy and try to imitate them in our painting. The 
difference between the natural and the artificial is further explainedt "on 
the one hand everything is livingg on the other merely painted and imitated". 
2 
The same idea is expressed succintly in the speech Pro philosophica disciplina 
"Art is practice". 
3 It has less realityt less immediacy or vividness than 
nature, it is at one remove from reality and from truth. The copy is doubly 
imperfectp because it is a mere attempt at representing something and also 
because of the basic imperfection of nature. In describing teaching in terms 
Of. Aristotelicae animadversionesq p-4v: 'arts which are, as it were, the 
pictures and images of things'. 
2. Dialecticae partitionesp P-4; of. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543)t 
p. 8vy and (1554), p. 6. 
Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col. 1027- 
98 
of painting, Ramus does more than give evidence of the interrelations bot- 
ween different disciplines# and he is not simply u3ing the first metaphor 
that comes to hand; he tells us a good deal about his own aesthetic theories. 
Painting re-presents reality as vividly as possible and with attention to 
realistic detail. The teaching process is similar in that it reproduces the 
vivid reality to be found in naturep and re-presents it in a less vivid but 
still living form. (The aimp of course, is to reproduce it as vividly as it 
is in reality, but it is not possible to achieve this). If it does not copy 
nature it will be fruitless. In this connection Ramus likens the acceptance 
of principles without practice to the dinner which Heliogabalus offered to 
his guests, where everything was painted and artificial; teachers of logic 
are like him if they lay before their students nothing but empty preceptst 
'For art, I repeaty however true and correct, or im- 
printed and fixed in the intelligence and the memory 
by endless repetition, still remains a picture of 
nature and practice'. 1 
There is no doubt, then, how far in Ramus' hierarchy of values nature 
was superior to art. 
There are some other uses of the word limitation' in Ramus and some 
related words which help us to understand his theory. He often talks, for 
example, about the imitation of examples or of an exemplar. 'Exemplal is 
sometimes linked with linstitutal; the difference is that the latter refers 
to the principles which are put into practice. 
2 When Ramus talks of imita- 
ting an exemplar he is often thinking of the imitation of another author. It 
was a fault in Aristotle, he claimsp often repeated, that he considered him- 
self to be the inventor of dialectic, and refused to propose for himself ex- 
1. Scholae dialecticaegSLA, col. 190. 
2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), P-458. 
I 
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emplars to be imitated. 
1 Otherwise it is natural human reason itself which 
is the exemplar: 'Whoever composes an art of dialectic should keep before his 
eyes in order to imitate it the exemplar of natural human reason'. 
2 
Ramus has yet another way of looking at this quoation of imitation and 
originality) seeing the process as a twofold one of analysis and genesis. 
Analysis of a work is the methodical examination of itj and genesis is the 
'bringing into being of a new work'; 
3 
they are applicable to both speaking 
and writingt and to all the arts. Analysis is not pure contemplation of the 
work; ity too, contains essentially an element of practice. Nor is analysis 
itself new. It is not a new artv but the art itself repeated in the same 
steps in which the work was composed. 
A teacher of grammar, writes Ranus, proposes to his raw pupils examples 
from Virgil or Cicerop "which he analyses or unravels retexit)p 
and resolves and weighs up according to the law of the arti. 
4 Grammtical 
analysis unravels, breaks downg a composition according to the rules of gram- 
mar. Rhetorical analysis examines the tropes and figurest and sees whether 
the pronunciationy gestures and elocution are fitting. Logical analysis is 
concerned with the origin of the argument or proof, and with the kinds of 
enunciation and so on. 
5 In commenting on logical analysis Ong remarks, 
1: Ibid. 9 p-33- 2 Y-bid., loc-cit. 
3. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549)p PP-175-7; Cf. Ong, R. IDDp pp. 263-7- In 
the Scholae dialecticae, SLA# col-304, 'Genesis' is use=oi 'the bringing 
into being similar or eve3'-better worksl as Aristotle showed'. 
4- Scholae dialecticaep SLA9 col. 191. 
5- Ibid., 100-cit. 
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'in protracted discourse, the thread on which the arguments 
are strung gets tangledy and the oyllogism servos the 
excellent purpose of enabling one to disentangle or lun- 
weave' (retexere the thread. Rotexere ... is R=usl trans- lation for . 3Yj%V'Ftv, r which is generally rendered 
resolvere in Latin and thus is equivalent to 'analyze'. 
Properly unwoundp any discourse is delightfully simple'. 
This unravellingp therefore, represents the firat stage in the inter- 
pretation of a work and in the writing of a now onet 'a co=entator unravels 
the entire work from the beginning and thus comprehends it. ' 
2 Logical analy- 
sis is, in fact, called 'an unravelled art' or 'the unravelling of an art 03 
R=us' corrections are always revealing. In 1543 the initial logical process 
is referred to as linterpretation, 
4 
and in 1549 this is corrected to lanaly- 
sis,; 
5 the 1549 textq 'Disputations of all kinds in orators and poets should 
be examined methodically' becomes in 1554 1 ... should be unravelled methodi- 
cally' .6 Ramus becomes very attached to the idea because he sees clarifica- 
tion and simplification as his life's work. He soon extends the notion of 
lunravelling' to the later stages of the logical process. In the Scholae 
dialecticae we read that 
"that man is a logician who produces an art of logic in 
explaining and unravelling the writings of poetev 
orators and philosophersp using argument, enunciation, 
syllogism and method". 7 
1. Ong, MIDD9 p. 191. 
2, Dialecticae Rartitiones, p. 81. 
3. Dialecticae partitiones, P-44. 
4. DLld-. t P-44v- 
5- Dialecticae institutiones, 1549)t P-146. 
6. Dialecticae institutiones, 
R554), 
p. 211. 
7. Scholae dialecticaet SLA9 col. 68. 
101 
Ramus' contention was that this particular ideal of imitation wac not 
achieved in his own day, precisely because the practical approach was inade- 
quate. In the second stepp or genesiet the pupil, having understood the 
model and what the experts make of the rulest imitates them by making some- 
thing similar, and thent "by himself and without the assistance of others he 
exerts his mind, and produces something which in differentt and his own"& 
1 
The originality of the new work is still perhaps limiteds but at least the 
writer has assimilated and appropriated the model. "We call this oxerciee 
2 'genesis' because it begets and produces a new work of art" . The novelty 
of the result is stressed: There are two kinds of practical logical exer- 
cisep one of which consists in the exploration of an already existing dispu- 
tationg the other in the bringing about and composition of a now one. 
rfVf'!, rL(' is sometimes called 'compositiot and sometimes equated with 
St.? L., r 61 and 
3 A06-L r is called and they are 
elsewhere styled lascensus' and Idescensus'. 
4 That we are here dealing with 
a general theory of imitation is abundantly clear. By analysis we know the 
merits and defects of a speecht and by genesis we imitate or shun them. 
Just as in the correct use of the grammatical process we transfer the purity 
1. Pro philosophica disciplinap, §LA, col, 1010. Ramus often reiterates that 
real learning can take place only by practice. Active participation was 
an essential part of his pedagogical approachp and this points at once to 
the necessity and to the limited usefulness of imitation. In the preface 
to his Euclides he sums this upt "I have greater praise for the pupil when 
he imitates on the counting-board or in the dust the figures demonstrated 
to himv than when he idly and uselessly gazes at other peoples' pictures" 
(P-4)- 
2. Pro p ilosophica disci_plinav SLA, col. 1010. 
3. Dialecticae institutionesq (1554)t p. 211. 
4. Aristotelicae animadversinneso (1548)v P-431; in Scholae dialecticaet SLAt 
-col. 192 analysis is called 'examen et probatiol. 
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of one speech to anothers so in all other arts there is a twofold proceast 
'to recognize the art in the examples we look atp and to imitate what we have 
recognized'. 
1 It is the art itself which we imitate; we should realizat 
howeverp that Ramus. is here using #art' in the sense of 'artifice' or lorafte- 
manship'. 
2 Analysis proceeds from the complex ("from what is moot doneo and 
most intricately composed")3 to the simpleg and genesis proceeds in the 
opposite way. 
This basically is Ramus' theory of the process of imitation. It will 
be appreciated that his primary concern was with teaching young boys to 
write Latin, but that the principles he enuntiates have a far more general 
application which he himself was well aware of. 
This conception of 'genesis' is the nearest approach that Ramus (or 
indeed any of his immediate contemporaries) seems to have been able to make 
to the idea of originality. Each time he discusses the question he insists 
that 'genesis' is the 'producing of a new work'. The novelty or originality 
lies in the disposition or composition of what we have discovered by analysis. 
4 
R=us' theory of imitation is an illustration of his overall attitude 
to the Renaissance ideals of humanism and the ingestion of classical atti- 
tudes. Any stucLv of his logic and his views an education will show that his 
aims were humanist in that he wanted to reinstate genuine classical learningt 
to teach in a more liberal and more accessible mannert to join poetry with 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554). p. 212. 
2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLAt col-1011-14- 
3. Aristotelicae animadversiones ' -C1548)p P-431. 
4- Seeg for examplep the Defensio pro Aristotele adversus jacobum Scheciump 
(1571)9 where linuentiol and liudicium' are given as equivalents of c' Ai 
and YIV16-t liudiciuml, as we shall see, is synonymous with Idisposi- 
tiol. 
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philosophy, and to link together all the differont disciplines in one body of 
knowledge. He did nott howeverp manage to give hie whole allegiance to the 
spirit of the Renaissance. For although it is true that he shared many of 
the ideals of the humanists, he was at the same time preeminently a acholastict 
and in spite of his strictures on the scholastic distortion of Aristotle# his 
manner and temperament owed much to the scholastic tradition. It is worth 
noting that most of his remarks about the Renaissance as a movement come in 
his later worksp particularly in the Prooemium mathematicum (1567). 
Except for his personal approach to the teaching of logict Ramua was 
not a trend-setter, and was sometimes even well behind the times. In the 
Pr6face sur le Probme des math6matiques, he talks at some length about the 
flourishing of Iles arts et bonnes lettres' at Florence and at Paris. His 
century has seen a greater abundance of learned men and works than the previ- 
ous fourteen: 
"Aussi les charrues parees de laurier des siours Coame 
et Laurent par l'Italie, les triomphants laboureursq 
le grand Francoysý Henryp Charles par la France ont 
redoubld ceste plante diesprits, cesto abondiice de 
doctrinesp ceste foison de muses quo lon a vaue". 
He evokes the richness and fertility which will be ensured I'si llesperance 
d'Italie et celle de la France sont une foys jointes ensemble"; (He cannot 
have been very widely read in the literature of the preceding fifty years). 
He is perhaps nearer the mark when he claims that his own mathematics brings 
'tune nouvelle et non acoustumee clert6 de leurs nombres et alignements". 
1 In 
the course of the text of the Prooemium he praises an astronomer in these 
words: 
1. Prýface sur le Pro&me des mathgmatiqueso pp-30-2. 
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"You writep most learned Leovitius, 
1 that you know from 
that great conjunction of the stars from which you 
prophesy the imminent return of the golden ago of a 
purer religiong that many arts will emerge which have 
been hidden up to nowp and that very soon some matters 
of great import will be brought to their final perfec- 
tion; you say this because there exist 2 in our times eo 
many brilliant and enlightened minds". 
Had Ramus realized that his own "discoveries" in logic were merely 
better ways of teaching the subjectp and that they had little direct heuristic 
value? Is his excitement about the future a partial disillusionment and a 
realization that he himself will not see the fruits of his methodology? The 
golden age is still in the future - the wars of religion were a sufficient 
indication that it had not yet come to pass in spite of Renaissance optimism 
that it would; we may note that its characteristics will be purity of religiong 
the discovery of new arts and the perfecting of all artst 
"May the great and good God bring it about that all 
this be offered to His own glory, and the safety of 
the church and the state". 3 
The same theme finds an obvious place in the posthumous Commentariorum 
de religione Christiana libri guatuor. The only solution to the dispute bet- 
ween Catholics and Protestants about many questions# about the value of the 
Eucharistp for example, will be a conscious return to the golden age of the 
Churche 
1. This person is Cyprian von Leowitzp astronomer and author of several workst 
includings Eclipsium ... descriptio et pictura (1556); De Conjunctionibus 
magnis insignioribus superiorum planetarun, (1564); and a work in which he 
gives evidence of an association with the English mathematician John Deep 
who himself was a correspondent of Ramust Brevis et perspicua ratio judi- 
candi genituras ex physicis causis... Adjectus est ... liballus de praestan- 
tioribus quibusdam naturae virtutibusq J. Dee... authore (1558). 
Prooemium mathematicump pp. 283-4- 
3- Ibid., 100. cit,. 
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"If we returned to the ago of the apostles tho Euchariet 
would be celebrated as it was by them and there would 
remain no cause for dissension; that was indood the 
golden age of religiont and we can ecarcely even call 
our own age the ago of iron". 1 
A distinguishing feature of the golden ago in the future will be the 
mark of religious unity (Ramus' attitude here resembles that of hie con- 
temporary Postel). 2 Another characteristic will be the presence of true 
learning as a civilizing force: 
'Wathematical science is to be understood as the com- 
panion and handmaid of peace as well as or waril. 3 
Although he has much to say about the fertility and fruitfulnei3a of 
his own periodp Ramus is more interested in the means by which these have 
been increasecl than in the richness of its literary or artistic productions. 
He showed some interest himself in the matter of textual oriticismg 
though it was not a subject to which he devoted his energies. 
4 He didp how- 
every realize that it was the key-note of the now learning: 
"And so it is that learned men have corrected and 
amended poets, historiansp oratorsp writers on 5 husbandryp lawyersp and even the sacred prophets". 
In this sphere he singles out for praise Rhenanus and Erasmus in Ger- 
many, Politianus and Victorius in Italyj and his colleagues Turnebus and 
Lambinus in France. Similar reforms have been made and now approaches dis- 
1. Commentariorum do religione Christiana, P-344; of. Scholne dialecticaep 
sup col. 66. 
2. Cf. Bouwsmay W. J. p Concordia mundi; the career and thought of Guillaume 
Postel, 1510-1581; Cambridge, Mass., 19579 Passim. 
3. Prooemium mathematicump p. 297- 
4- Ong lists (RTI passim) his commentaries on Cicerop Virgil# eto., but most 
of these are rhetorical or logical analyses of the text rather than 
critical editions. 
5. Prooemium pathematicump P-440. 
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covered in medicine and other disciplines. 
The doctrine of imitation is closely linked with the idoa of the Ro- 
naissancep in Ramus as in some of hie contemporaries. It is certain that he 
thought his own age had much to learn in general from the way of writing of 
the ancientsp and that all good writing in Latin or in French would imitate 
the old masters. We shall see later something of hie theory of the springs 
or sources (fontes) of invention. His feeling was that by his own day these 
natural springs had dried up. He laments the fact that the Druids who, he 
claims, were possessed of a good logical sensep did not soo fit to preserve 
their knowledge in writing. The spoken word is certainly more penetrating 
and persuasive than the written, but the written word guards against forgot- 
fulness. Had the Druids realized thisp we would not be dependent upon the 
merchandise of the Greeks, but would possess our own national goods in abun- 
dance. There would be no need to acquire knowledge by means of Greek and 
Latint and at the cost of much personal labourt "but we would imbibe it with 
pleasurable sweetness almost with the milk of our nurse". (The translation 
which Michel de Castelnau made in 1559 has I'mais auee un grand plaisir ot 
contentement dlesprit nous les humerions quasi quant et le lait do la nour- 
rice"). 
' The image is a variation on that of drawing water from the springs 
of inventiong and is very near to Du Bellay's "innutriton". Long years of 
study are necessary before we can hope to understand classical poetryp but 
our own national poets should be i=mediately accessible to us: 
"since the understanding of the meaning and the pronunciation 
of the hymns and poems of our own bards is given to us by 2 
nature, so we would sing them joyfully and without labour . 
1. De moribus veterum Gallorump P. 44v; Traict6 des fagons et coustumes des 
anciens Galloygi, p. 61; c Ciceronianus, (15ja), p. ii. 
2. De moribus veterum Gallorm, loc. eit. 
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As things were, because of the lack of enough modole in Fronchp ho and 
his contemporaries were obliged to have recourse to Latin and Greek. Tho 
imitation which then takes place must not be slavish, since its purposo is to 
produce new and original works. According to tho true principles of imitation 
a writer should always try to surpass his model. A philosophort for examplet 
should try to improve on Aristotle as Aristotle improved on Plato. 
1 
There is a lively account of imitation in the Institutiones oratorine. 
The author compares novice writers to young birds who "look to their mothers 
as an example, then make a trial of their strength and wander freely on their 
own throughout the heavens". We progress from the contemplation and imitation 
of excellent men to writing or speaking "with our own genius and judgment". 
2 
In this book originality is stressed more than it is in other works by Ramus 
or Talon. Any writer, the author tells us, follows those iho have devoted 
much time and energy to, the practice of writing and then striver, 
"to comment on the subject and polish it according to his 
own judgment; he brings in a way of writing which is 
peculiarly his own; and he so represents the style of his 
author , 
that although his own work is not entirSly similarp 
yet it merits praise because it is different". 
We should not leave the discussion of Ramus' account of imitation 
without showing how it fits into hie whole philosophical system. Although 
he does not himself explicitly draw out all the implications, it is quite 
evident that Ramus saw all imitation as part of the general process by which 
man must strive to make himself more like Godl to realize more and more that 
he is already made in the image of God. Purthermore, imitation, for R=ust 
1. Scholae dialecticae, 
-PLA, col. 
66; cf. col. 189. 
2. Institutiones oratoriae, p. 81. 
3. Ibid. r P-83. 
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as for Aristotlet is above all the principal method by which man learns any- 
thing at allt from the niceties of Latin gra=ar to the cost profound mathe- 
matical and metaphysical truths. Imitation is synonymous with the ascent to 
wisdom. It is impossible to disentangle all the different threads of Ramuo, 
thought on this subject. He is neither purely Platoniotp purely Ariatoteliant 
nor purely Christian. Basically# howevert he adopts the Christian synthesis 
of Neo-Platonism and the Gospell and so he is able to ignore the very real 
differences between Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines of imitation. In faotj 
he manages to combine the idea that reality as. we think we know it is at one 
remove from true realityq and art at two removest with the idea that art and 
phi*losopby somehow bring out the universals in nature. 
1 Then he suporimposoo 
an this amalgam the further idea of man in the image of God. The clearest 
expression of this last notion is to be foundt of course, in the Conmentari- 
orum de religione Christiana. I shall dwell on this at some length because 
I feel that it was at least as important to Ramus as was the classical idea 
of imitation, because it underlines his whole doctrine of imitation and of 
learning, and because (although this has as yet to be worked out in detail) 
I feel that the religious or theological suppositions of the treatment of imi- 
tation and of imagery could not have been unimportant during this vital first 
generation of Calvin's reformation. 
Ramus, following Zwinglij adopts an unoriginal Protestant attitude to 
1. In the Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col-848, Ramus makes an interesting 
equation between the Pythagorean theory of imitation ('The Pythagoreans 
are even said to have explained the whole of philosophy by the imitationt 
I-tL? j / Sft , of numbers') and the Platonic doctrine of participationt 
('He 
borrowedjk(hkLV from the Pythagoreansp but changed the namet they spoke 
about jA (ýtj i't Y in connection wi th numbers 9 and Plato used it, s'S ij tv- for 
the ideas'). 
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imagesy but his insistence on the subject is significant. Frances Yates has 
shown the connection between Ramus' sympathy with the iconoclastic movements 
and Protestant propaganda against Catholic images# with his rejection of par- 
ticular kinds of images as aids to memory. 
1 Ramus himself contrasts false 
images with the true image of God which we can find within ourselveat 
"God wants to be pleased by these giftaq propitiated 
by these sacrificesp served by this cultv adored by 
this kind of adorationg and in these we see the prin- 
cipal colour which can renew tho imago of tho first 
man, made in the likeness of God. 't2 
A little later in the same book he writest 
"For man (I keep repeating this) is created in the imago 
of Godq and he is ordered to restore it whenever he falls 
away from it by sini 3. Coloss. You have put on the now 
naturej which is being renewed in knowledpe after the 
image of its creator. To fall away from this image, there- 
fore, is to sin, if we are right to accept 3. %Oý 
To t Tertullian says that those people 
axe living in the image of God who have the came feelings 
and emotions as the lord: and some phi lou opharo think that 
sin means not living in accordance and harmony with per- 
fect nature. So as often as you go away from that perfect 
nature, you go away from the image of Godp and so you sin. 
Imitationy for Ramust almost always has moral overtones. However we imitater 
whether it be the imitation of nature or of classical modelst our aim is 
learningg wisdom and self-betterment. This ties in very well with the imita- 
tion of the virtues of our model. 
Ramus' remarks on imitation should be seen in the broader context of 
his attitude to the natural links and correspondences which he saw existing 
in the universe. There are many suggestions throughout his works that one 
1. Frances Yates, The Art of Memory, pp. 236-7. 
2. Commentariorum de religione Christianat P-142. 
3. Ibid I p. 188. 
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aspect of nature corresponds top is the imago of, or imitates another. Musiop 
for exsmplep by its imitation of changos and rovolutions in tInheavens "com- 
poses those human moods which are related to them"J 
Natural correspondence is at the basis of R=UG' view of the relation 
between art and nature. Art should imitate the 'forces of natUrOlo 
2 So Dia- 
lectio has nothing to do with anything 'of which there in not some image im- 
printed in natural discourse'. 3 'Image' can refer either to the exemplar 
(as here) or to the imitation of Its, ljo 'the Image must ta2lv with the exemp- 
larl , that is, reason 
is the exemplar of natural logic and art must conform 
to this. 4 Natural usage Is called 'the archetype of a true art'. 
5 The same 
idea is applied to rhetorict 
"The description of the art of rhetoric will be according 
to the idea and similitude of oratorical truýh and beauty 
and will be a pattern 
(specimen) of nature'Y' 
Ramus' theory of imitation is# in its broad outlinest very close to 
that of the Pldiadet except that he Was less interested than they were in the 
vernacular. It is true that many of the French writers of the time were 
champions of French and yet managed to write a good deal of their work in 
Latin; Du Bellay and Peletier spring to mind as the two most obvious examples. 
1. Dialecticae partitionesp P-53. 
2. Scholae rhetoricael SLA9 col. 284- 
3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543)tp. 61. 
4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548)tp. 12. 
5. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556)PP-53. 
6. Institutiones oratoriae, P-7. 
ill 
But their output in the vernacular was considerable too. Rnmusq on the other 
hand, as we have seent paid lip-service to the use of the vernacular but 
wrote very little in French. For this reason I am unable to accept without 
reserve the view of Gmeliny who claims that in the matter of writing in French 
and translating other languages into Frenchl 
"In diesen Punkten schliesat sich Ramus unmittalbar an das 
Programm der Plejade ant zu dem sein Rednorideal wio eine 
Ergdnzung erscheint". 1 
What is true is (as Gmelin goes on to show) that Ramus, on an important 
but isolated occasion in the Ciceronianus, 
2 
suggests that it is not incom- 
patible for the budding Ciceronian, to follow in the footsteps of the masterp 
and at the same time write in the vernaculart thus enriching his own language. 
Gmelin concludes in the following wordst 
"Neu ist dieses Programm prinzipiell nichts die Plejade 
hatte für die Dichtung schon einen Anfang gemachtg als 
Ramus seinen Traktat schriebt aber neu ist die Allge- 
meinheit und der weitet freie Sinnt mit dem ein über- 
zeugter Humanist hier das Französische den antiken 
Sprachen auch stiltheoretisch gleichstellt und die alte 
ciceronianische Tradition im Geiste dss Erasmus hindber- 
fährt in die moderne Prosaliteratur". 
. 
The only qualification I would make is to repeat that even though 
Ramus' theory has a broader basis than that of the members of the P14iades 
he remains in the realm of theory. In this at least he is very different 
from the Pldiade. 
Apartv thenp from the use of the vernacular and translation, Ramus 
shares the obsession of the Pldiado with imitation. In the writings of Ramus 
H. Gmeling tDas Prinzip der Imitatio in den romanischen Literaturen der 
Renaissancelg in Romanische Forschungeng 1932, P. 342. 
2. Ciceronianus_p (1560)3-9P-18. 
3. Gmelin, art. cit., P. 343. 
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the concept takes on further connotationat and is soon to be at the heart of 
the entire process of learning and teaching. It is for this reason that, in 
distinction from most of the P14iadet he attaches as much importance to the 
imitation of nature as he does to that of classical models. Furthermoret 
Ramus is closer to the Aristotelian doctrine of imitation than were most of 
his contemporaries. Grahame Castor has shown that the early theorists of 
the Pldiade rarely, if every discuss or give any importance to Aristotle'D 
theory largely because Aristotlelo, Poeties were not treated adequately until 
Scaliger and Ronsard wrote about themt although the earlier writers do adopt 
the view which arose out of Aristotle'st namely that art is a vivid repre- 
sentation of particulars. Apart from this last point they do not talk about 
the imitation of nature. Ramusy because of his close reading of Aristotle# 
and his interest in imitation as learning, has much to say about the expres- 
sion of the universals to be found in nature, and is n1so incidentally taken 
up with the idea of vivid representation. With regard to the other kind of 
imitationt that of classical modelso Ramus goes further than the literary 
theoristsy since his theory of 'genesis' allows for greater originality. In 
all thisy however, we must remember that he is talking about artistic imita- 
tion in generaly and not directly about poetic imitation. 
113 
CHAMR FIVE 
CLARITY AND LIGHT 
As we read through the works of Ramus and attempt to define his views 
on the characteristics of the different kinds of communication (which are 
the result of art's imitation of nature) we are struck by his obsession with 
the ideas of olarity and light. They are to be found repeatedly in his 
writing on many different topicso Rio own teaching (in spite of the possible 
obscurity presented, ironicallyt by some of his schemata) was directed to- 
wards a more lucid exposition of philosophy and the arts than obtained gone- 
rally in his dayq and his primary contention was always that clarity and 
order should be the aim of each individual discipline. 
I Clarity of dis- 
course was for him almost a synonym of logic, 
2 
and he felt that the oratorp 
if he was to succeed, must inform his fictions and selective handling of his 
material with clarity, both of arrangement and of phraseology. The poet, 
toot must pay some attention to clarity, though in this matter Ramus shared 
the hesitation of the critics who were his contemporaries. Some hold that 
the appeal of the poet should bag if not immediatet at least after a certain 
amount of rereading and meditation, others that he was entitledt if not ob- 
ligedl to foster a mystique of impenetrability. Ramus was well aware of the 
difficulty of avoiding ambiguity in communication. Ile saw that obscurity 
was different from ambiguity in that the result of the former is that nothing 
is understood, and that of the latter something different from what we expect 
is understoods 
1. Cf. Aristotelicae animadversionest (1548)9 p-3591 'The use of an art de- 
mands that-th-eprecepts be taUiTFt-clearly and succintly'. 
2. Aristotelicao animadversionesp (1543)9 p-35. 
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"I do not want it to be thought that all dieputation 
is defective: there is hardly any word which is not 
ambiguous". 1 
In accordance with his general theory that philosophy and eloquence 
should be clo3ely associated he shows that Lucretiunj Virgilt Ovidt Seneca 
and Pliny sometimes or always wrote works dealing with natural philosophyt 
and concludes: 
"There is no place in the treatment of the principles 
of physicst to which a quotation from a poet or an 
orator might not be added in order to gain some fruit 
by a more gracious and more human illustration", 2 
This word lillustratiol will be commented on later in this chapter. 
Here it is important as one of the ideals of the Renaissance (interestingly 
linked with another main aim of the Renaissancef humanitas). Poetry and 
rhetoric make philosophy more presentable and so more assimilable; they in- 
crease rather thandiminish its clarityt 
"Out of so great an abundance of distinguished authors 
we append those who are the clearest and who have 3 
the greatest affinity to the philosophy in question". 
Poetry, therefore, adds clarity to philosophical writing; if it is 
not always clear itselft this is because the ascent to truth# by whatever 
path we choose, is rather more difficult than people thinko and entails 
assiduous and arcluous labour. 
4 
In spite of some minor indications that clarity is not always possible 
or even desirablet it is abundantly evident that Ramus was devoted to the 
task of making all kinds of communication as easy as he could. In so far as 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549)p PP-150-1- 
2. Yro philosophica disciplina, 
_PLA9 
col. 1020. 
3. lbid. )loc. cit. 
4. Ibid., col-1014-5; cf. Scholao metaphysicaep STA, col-856. 
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it made use of rational diecoursey poetryp for Ramusp must implicitly aim at 
clarity of presentation. A corollary of his distinction between the natural 
and the artificial is the further distinction between what is naturally 
clear and what has been (unintentionally) obscured by the distancing effect 
of the contrivance. All teaching should try to emulate the clarity of the 
natural light of reason. It is a characteristic of Ramus' writing that 
reason is often compared to light. Godt as lightp is the exemplarp guarantor 
and source of man's own reason, 'which is the light of his body. One of the 
several hymns to the God of light and to the power of reason is to be found 
at the end of the Aristotelicae animadversionest (1543)t 
"0 holy heavenly fathert the prince and author of 
eternal and most blessed light, who have not only 
cast out from the universe chaos and its eternal 
darknessp but have also lit from perpetual fires 
that most clear lamp of the universe in the sung 
the moon and the other stars (who have even illu- 
minated in our minds the far clearer and more il- 
lustrious light of your face so that we may inventy 
judge and explain all things), we beg you not to 
allow any longer the minds of men to wander (in 
Aristotelian darkness) deprived of that divine 
light of yours. 111 
Men participate in God's creative light by virtue of their gift of 
reason. The 1548 text puffs up the rhetorical impact of the passage, and 
makes more explicit the relation between God and reason, showing the manner 
in which God's illuminative influence works. 
2 The light of reason is often 
described as an image of the divine light. At the beginning of the 1543 work 
just quoted Ramus had made another prayer for luciditys 
l.. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p. 80v; the phrases in brackets are added in 
the 1548 text. 
2. Ibid., loc-cit. 
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"I beg for peace and pardon, and I pray that you will 
permit that the image of the divine and heavenly 
liýht (which you have inspired and kindled in our 
souls) may be fread and snatched away from misery and 
darkness". ' 
One of Ramus' aims was, of coursep to prescind from metaphysics and 
natural theology in his logic; he simply does not find it a fault in method 
to presuppose God's existence and influence, and a well-ordered universe. 
Clarity is often appreciated only through orderv and so light and order are 
often mentioned in the same breath. 
2 In another passage reference is made 
to Platonic or Augustinian tcharacterslt there are threetbooks' of logict 
the first of which 
"the great and all-good God has imprinted by eternal 
characters in our souls; the second, a diligent 
observer of nature, by imitating these indicationsp 
will fashion according to the exemplar of those 
divine notes"; 
The third book is written or spoken practice. A little later Ramus 
adds; 
"Natural dialectiop that isp temperament, reasont mindo 
the image of God the parent of all thingst and finally 
the light which is emulous of that blessed eternal 
lightp is proper to man and born with him". 3 
By the light of reason we strive to be more like the God of light. 
The emotive value of the metaphor is not neglected; the obscurantism of his 
opponents and of the established tradition is always under firet 
110 wretched dialecticy into the hands of what robbers have 
you fallen? You were granted to men in order to investi- 
gate what is occulto to make clear what is obscurep and 
behold you hide what is manifest, and you obscure what is clear 
1. Ibid. 9 P-3v- 2. Cf-p for example I Pro philosophica disciplinag SLA9 col-1026. 3. Dialecticae instifu-tiones, k1543)v PP-5v-6- 
4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, P-35- 
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For Ramus this is not just vague general abusel he shares the excite- 
ment of the men of the Renaissanoe in their idea of their own enlightermont. 
Sometimes it is logic itself which is described in terms of lightt 'logicum 
lumen'; at other times the light of the mind is referred too Irationis lumen'. 
"In vain would we have been endowed by God with the 
light of reasong in vain would we interpret the strength 
and power of his light in precepts, if we did not prac- 
tise them ourselves"el 
That this light of the mind is inborn is well brought out in a passage 
from the 1556 revision of the Aristotelicae animadversioneal and its all- 
embracing scope is described: 
"This universalt generals integral light knows no boundso 
and all things which are capable of being known by mono 
are known and understood by the help of this light. 
This logical and dialectical light is innate and natural 
in man, and when I talk about natural logic I am talking 
about the naturalp innate light of manll. 
ý 
This light shines on rich and poor alike. 
3 
Apart from finding the origin of man's reasoning in God, Ramus is 
anxious to show that God is the ultimate and and object of this reasoning. 
Logic is the chief tool of metaphysics which is itself entirely directed to 
the contemplation of Godt 
"so that when we shall have seen in these universal 
examples some shadow of the divine sung and have 
contemplated in a logical mannerp and with reference 
to mathematics, the works of Godq and the ordert 
symmetry and description of these divine worksp then 
we shall be converted to a contemplation of that most 
brilliant sun, and to an imitation of it by the in- 
tegrity of our lives1#4 




Aristotelicae animadversionesg (1556)p P-50. 
ffsicaeg SLAI col. 968. 3. Scholae metaph 
4- Ibid., preface. 
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But theology had long been equated with metaphysicag particularly 
that of Aristotlet and Ramus contended that this union was far from happy. 
On several occasions he appeals for the separation of Christian theology from 
Aristotelianismp and a return to the truth and light of Scripture. He remarks 
that Aristotle's metaphysics was even more pagan than the physicsy even fur- 
ther from the divine light: 'Turning to the light', 'seeing the light, have 
all the overtones of evangelical proselytism. It is revealing that Ramus with 
all his practicality should see contemplation of the divine sun as the goal of 
all mental and moral activity. 
Sometimes the light of the sun stands for Godf sometimes for the power 
of reasoning 
1 
which is the image of God; (man in his entirety is made in the 
image of Godp but it is in his rationality that his humanity and his divinity 
2 
are best expressed). Sometimes it is the difference between the analogues 
which are brought out. Ramus is conscious of the inadequacy of his metaphor: 
"The light of reason is far more brilliant and illust- 
rious than the light of the sun. The light of the sun 
illuminates only this corporeal world; the light of 
reason roams also through the regions of supramundane 
infinityp and contemplates not only mortal bodies, but 
eternal and divine minds". 3 
He is clear in his own mind herev and aware of the danger of using such 
attractive metaphors as this one of light in as many different contexts as he 
does. In this present passage we are introduced to some of the Platonic ele- 
ments in his thought and teaching. He is ready enough to welcome the Platonic 
1. Dialectic is the sun of all disciplines and disputations: "not only do they 
shine and are illustrated by its light, but by its heat and movement they 
are excitedv live, are increased and flourishp and in the end they bring to 
man most pleasing and honourable fruits"v (Dialecticae partitionesp P-84v)- 
2. La Dialectique, P-135. 
3. Scholae dialecticae, SLAy col-34. 
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theory of ideas and the hierarchy of beingg though it must be admitted that 
this is not something which he develops at any great length. It was a handy 
alternative to the doctrine of Aristotle, and more congenial to someone who 
wanted to leave alone epistemology and psychology. It could be accepted as 
an easy parallel with one Christian way of looking at Cod, and one which 
appealed to the reformers more than did the theory of Aristotle. Its validi- 
ty ended there. Had Ramus examined the notions a little more closely he 
might have been tempted to declare them less clear and less useful than Aris- 
totle himself at his best. In spite of himself he was looking at Plato 
through the eyes of Aristotle. 
Not unconnected with Ramust distinction between natural and artificialp 
which we examined in chapter threep is his interpretation of Plato's contrast 
between the spiritual and the grossly material. This imagey too, resolves it- 
self for Ramus into one of light and darks 
"When therefore dialectic hasq in this wayp recalled the 
soul from these thick shadows of the senses, and has 
progressed through all the regions of philosophyl it 
will demonstrate in the things it describesp each in 
its own orderv the most clear ideas of that sempiternal 
truth (which are scarcely able to be glimpsed since 
they are hidden in the obicurity of the shadows, and 
enveloped in wrappings)II, 
'Umbra' is closely linked with 'imago'. An image is by definition a 
mere shadow of the exemplar# and bears an analogous relationship to the real 
object. Once more the shadows and images of a lower existence lead us up to 
Godt 
Dialecticae institutionest (1543)v P-42v; cf. Dialecticae partitionesp 
pp. 55-7. 
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"Hither all the arts are to be led and direotedt so 
that they may contemplate with the greatest possible 
ardour of piety the very brightness of truth, whose 
shadows and images they had been following". 
There is a fusion of light and heat in the intensity of the aspirant 
soul with God. To emphasize the insufficiency of his metaphort Ramue shows 
that in spite of all this logical light and this semi-mystical participation 
in the mind of Godq men are still shrouded in darkneses 
"the minds of men aret in the knowledge of universal 
forms# like owls groping about in the splendour of 
the sunlight". 2 
The image is as much one of vision and blindness as of light and 
darkness. Ramus was throughout his life deeply attracted to optical ques- 
tions, and was fascinated by problems of visual imageryl particularly with 
reference to colour. 
3 
On one occasion Ramus' obsession for clarityp and the distate he 
felt equally for the vague and the complicated leads him off into one of 
his rare excursions into picturesque language and the expression of lyrical 
feeling. He thoroughly enjoys the comparison he is making between a natural 
effect of light and shade and the processes of the mind. Autobiographical 
or personal comment of this kind is so rare in Ramus that we welcome it all 
the more when we come across itt 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543)9 PP-42v-43; cf-t (1554)y PP-5-6, and 
Dialecticae partitiones2 P-45. 
2. Dialecticae institutiones, P-43; but cf. La Dialectique, P-39 where 
'owls' becomes lbatsly and Scholae physicaef SLA9 953P where the vision 
of bats is compared to that of Imentes eruditael which are called eagles. 
3. Ramus' Optics was not published during his lifetimey but first appeared in 
in 1606 as-05ticae libri quatuor, ex voto Petri Rami novissimot per Frideri- 
cum Risnerum, eiusdem in mathematicis adiutorem, olim conscripti, nunc 
demum ... in usum et lucem publicam producti ; cf.. OngyRTIq Nos. 648-50- 
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"I remember once seeing when I was a boy, a wonderful 
sight in the high mountains of Auvergne. The sun and 
the day were completely serene. From my elevated posi- 
tion I looked with great delight of soul on the fields 
spread out far belowy on the green trees and the streams 
running between them. Suddenly a cloud appeared half way 
down the mountain, and obscured from view the fieldsp the 
trees and the atreamst although the sun was still shining 
brilliantly on the summit. Then I turned to look at the 
top of the mountaing whose summit was above the clouds and 
the storms, and I was greatly pleased with the speotaclo. 
Nowp as in that fieldp so in the work proposedt I want the 
same thing to take place in our mindsp so that all kinds 
of argumentst propositionst syllogisms and methods may be 
clear and visible by the sunlight of definitionsp divisi- 
ons, ex=ples (whicho we contendp exists in our logic as 
a result of the matter and form of Aristotle's philosophy). 
Then if there should intervene any cloud of obsourityp we 
would realize that the obscurity did not belong to logico 
just as it did not belong to the trees and the fields but 
to the clouds in between; and when they were taken away 
and the original light of the sun returnedp they were seen 
to be clear and illustrious. For the whole of logict which 
is contained in the Analyticsy is in itself most easy and 
clear, but is made cult and obscure by various clouds. 
Let us therefore bring in the sunlight and remain in it; 
let us remain on the topmost peak of clarity". 1 
The value of this image depends on the peculiar intensity of the light. 
The effect on Ramus of the peacefulness of the day was one of deep intellec- 
tual and sensual pleasure. Although the description of the countryside is 
generic enough it is made brighter by contrast with the drabness of the philo- 
sophical contextp and the passage is not lacking in perceptiveness. The 
imagery is entirely visual, and, in this instancep does not depend on colour. 
Ramus sums it up in the word Ispectaculolq another word connected with vision. 
He evidently enjoys describing the incident for its own sakel although the 
main purpose of the passage is comparison. One gets the impression that he 
had stored up this experience intending to use it in some worthwhile context. 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556)9 p. 208. 
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Once more we have returned to the notion that in itself logict even the logic 
of Aristotlep is pure# simple and natural; it is all lightp and is close to 
the divine mind. 
The strands in Ramus' comments an clarity and light are not always 
easy to disentangle. There is the idea that God is lighto that our minds are 
made in this imagal but fall far short. Light is also a symbol of the order 
of the universe. By the light in our own minds we arrive at some comprehen- 
sion of this ordered reality, and by a clear disposition of our material we 
are able to translate our natural awareness into an artificial scheme and 
present it in such a way that other men can share our experience. In so far 
as we are obscure we have either failed ourselves to appreciate our subject, 
or have been misled by some external factor. This idea is not without im- 
portance for literary theory in general. It is instructive to know why Ramus 
thought clarity was so necessary in communication and how he thought it could 
be achievedp while at the same time conceding that a poet's clarity was to be 
tempered with the fictitious. 
Por Ramusp the practical application of this idea of clarity lay 
largely in the proper disposition of the material. Our aim should always be 
to teach clearly and distinctly. Ramus tells usq in the preface to the Libor 
de Moribus veterum Gallorump that he intends to follow the testimony of earlier 
writers on the subjectý 
1 
and that 
1. In general Ramus dissociates himself from philosophers who rely on authorityl 
mystification and an esoteric cult of the master. He is against a priest- 
hood of the intellect and wants philosophy to be understood by the people. 
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"after removing all obscurity, we shall teach the e=e 
things distinctly and openlyll. 1 
Obviously all teaching entails clear arrangement of the material; Ramu3' 
contention is that this applies to discourse or co=unication of any kind i 
"in discourse and the use of reason there is nothing 
so involved that it mW not be made clear# nothing 
so obscure that it may not be declared oponly". 2 
We should notep once more, the images of light and vision (lillustroturl 
and Ideclaretur'). This is not the place to re-examine Ramus' notion of 
method; Ong has already dealt with it at great length, 
3 
and it is the one part 
of Ramus' thought which most co=entators discuss. It is sufficient to note 
that method4 ist for Ramusp a way of arranging material for the purposes Of 
teachingg that it is the basis of clarity, 
5 
and that it is synonymous with 
Ivialp which is quite literally 'a waylp a way through a wood which is dark 
and densely entangled. Perhaps the most useful tool for clearing a way through 
the undergrowth is the syllogismp in spite of all the humanists' strictures 
upon it, because it reduces our statements to their most elementalp and ex- 
presses their simplest and yet most exact relationships one to another. In 
talking of the simply syllogism he says-, 
"These primary lights both of the natural and the 
artificial judgment are clear in themselves and 
evidentt andp indeed, nature has not given anything 
to the human judgment more clear and open than the 6 
syllogism, by which they may themselves be tested". 
1. In the French translation Idistincte et apertel becomes Itres distinctement 
et clairement'. 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, p. 25v. 
3. Especially in RIDDI pp. 225-69. 
4. 'Method, which is the same as practice, is the light of that universal orderp 
and when matters are disposed according to itp they are taught more plainly, 
and more easily perceived', Scholae rhetoricaep SLAp 265- 
5. La Dialectiquey p. 120. 
6. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), pp. 21-21v. 
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The idea of light is applied by Ranus to the syllogismt and it is more 
certain than sunlight. 
' Men make use of the syllogistic technique# whether 
consciously or nott to the extent that their errors of reasoning are ascrib- 
able to its misuse, and their constant and true judgmentsare the result of 
the constant truth of the syllogism. 
2 It has the same natural and divinely 
inspired characters as men's reasoning powers in Coneralt 
"Lot us love and cherish this golden heavenly gift of 
almighty God; this light is far clearer than all the 
stars which shine in the heavensp and more divine; 
by this light the conclusions of learned and unlearned 
aliket of old and youngr of men and womenp of all ages 
and natural capacities are given confirmation". 3 
Technically speakingg in the language of mystical theologyt this is 
divine illuminationt just asthe activity of the Holy Spirit is inspiration; 
God enlightens the mind of all men. R=us resolvesp and incites his readers 
to resolvep that we should not squander this divine gift on sterile bickeringt 
'but use it in the cause of wisdom, h=anity and life, .4 Enlighterment is 
for him a concomitant of the feeling of humanity. 
We have already had one or two instances of Ramus' use of the word 
lillustris' and its cognates. It was one of his favourite words. We are not 
able to decide whether in a particular context the literal sense of 'bright, 
or 'lit up' has given place or not to the figurative 'clear', IdistinctIq 
'plain', nor how often this in turn has become 'illustrious'. 'Illustris' is 
1. Aristotelicae animadversionesp (1548)t PP-423-4- 
2. Scholae dialecticaev SLAP col-303; by the use of the syllogism 'a boy will 
most easily conceive phantasms in his mind, and by means of these he will 
so place in his mind images of abstract absent things that he will seem to 
see themy with his eyesp present before him'. (Dialecticae institutionest 
P-56v). 
3. Scholae dialecticae, SLAP col. 303. 
4- Ibid., loc. cit. 
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always used with approval. More often than not it is used in the set expres- 
cion tillustria argumentall or linked with 'clarus'l 
"He ought to say that wisdom is by its nature the 
most clear and illustrious of all the arts" 
is, for example, followed a few lines later by the words 'by a more illust- 
rious argument'. 
1 On one occasion it sums up his attitude to his own 'on- 
lightened philosophy': 
"there is almost no illustrious statement of philosophy 
which you will not find contradicted in some way in 
Aristotleti. 2 
In his treatment of the Eucharist in the course of his commentary on 
religion Ramus writest 
"Christ uses these illustrious arguments to illuminate 
the blind senses of men". 3 
In this last instance, at leastp it seems clear that the idea of light 
is the most prominent one. 
Another principal concomitant of the process of enlightenment is the 
gradual certainty and self-assurance it engenders. The syllogism typifies 
this: 
"The judgment thus Obtained will be so solidq stableg 
fixed, so utterly immutablep that I could more easily 
believe that the light of the sun be taken away from 
man than his affirmation of assent in it,,. 4 
Elsewhere he speaks of the 'light and evidence of speech and gesture 
1. Scholao metaphysicae, SLA, col-835- 
2. Scholae physicaq, preface. 
3. Commentariong de relimone Christisnat pp-302-3. 
4. Aristotelicae animadversion2. s, (1548)v PP-423-4- 
5. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis Academiae, SLA, 1082. 
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Since method is the keynote of all the writing of Ramus, I have treated 
at this great length his ideas on clarity and obscurity. Ramus streases that 
clarity must be present in every disciplinot 
"There is a difference between the obscurity of a doctrine 
and that of its teacher. For the nature of the subject 
which is being taught may be so occult and obscure that 
it is difficult to make it easier. On the other hand it 
may be the fault of the teachert either because he is not 
using a clear manner of speakingg or because he is not 
proceeding in a distinct and easy way. Some coloure are 
darker or lighter than otherst but in a certain situation 
and light they are equally visible". 1 
The clarity inherent in all the arts is to be found especially in the 
fields of mathematics and theology. Mathematicat as the art or discipline 
par excellencef owes its whole existence to the quest for absolute clarity. 
2 
This clarity is carried over into the other arts so that, as Plato saysp the 
man who is a natural mathematician is gifted in other arts. 
3 Mathematics 
brings light to subjects such as physics. This help is fundamental; it is 
not just that mathematics illustrates physics by examples. Againp mathemati- 
cal, clarity is an antidote to legalistic wrangling and confusion. 
4 The same 
can be said of theological clarity. Because of his great respect for sacred 
subjects Ramus wants the teaching of them to be 
"a teaching which is as little as possible stony or thorny 
with scholastic questions; on the contrary it should be 
popular, resplendent and illustrious thr9ughout the whole 
extent of the treatment and exposition".: ý 
But clarity in theology is not achieved simply by the barrenness and 
1. Prooemium mathematicump PP-326-7- 
2. Cf. Pr6'face sur le Prodme des mathematiclues, pp. 31-2. 
3. Prooemium mathematicum, p. 198. 
4. Lb-id-9 P-303. 
5. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p. l. 
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precision of mathematics. Theology will make use of poetic and rhetorical 
colour. 
1 In the course of a theological argument examples will be adduced 
first from the Old and New Testamentep and then from pagan authors in order 
to whet the appetites of the readerst 
"not so that any authority or proof of religion should 
be sought in that quartert but so that it may be plain 
that Christian theoloey is not so abstruse or removed 
from the senses of men that it may not shine forth to 
all peoples with a certain natural lightf and that 
humanity itself will invite and entice men to under- 
take the study of divine things". 2 
Once againg 'humanitas' is coupled with enlightement and with the 
excited joy of the refo=er: 
"And therefore I think that the new-found darkness 
should be cast far off and the ancient light should 
be su=oned back again". 
And once more clarity will be achieved by a right use of methods 
"Therefore the first man to carry over this method into 
theological exposition, will light an outstanding lamp 3 to illuminate clearly and brightly all parts of theoloey" . 
Presumably Ramus thought that Calvin's systematizing had not gone 
far enough, if, indeedp he was at all familiar with the work of Calvin. 
What he wanted was an application of logical tables and schemata to the 
truths of scripture, but the danger of this was that it was likely to in- 
troduce aridity 2 and to fall into exactly the same error as did the medie- 
val scholastic commentators. 
Ramus' interest in optics seems to have been more than just a desire 
1. Ibid.. loc. cit. 
2. lbid-9 P. 2. 
3. ih-id., loc-cit. 
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to include an account of all the known sciences in his encyclopedia. 
1 it 
seems likely that he came late to this subject as a result of hie study oft 
and enthusiasm for, mathematics. Indeed he makes the connection between the 
two subjects quite clears 
"For optics isp in the question of vision, nothing 
but the application of geometry to lightt shade and 
colourg to the nature and faculty of sight itselft 
its truth and hallucinationt taking account of posi- 
tion, movementp numbart quantityt figure, and the 
question whether sight is direct or by the reflection 
of mirrorsp or by the density or rarity of different 
bodiest or by the refraction of bodies in betweenp so 
that the painters have at their disposal not only 
light and shadet but a brightness which is between 
these two and is called tone". 2 
All these images of light are a pointer to Ramus' theory of illu- 
mination and inspiration. At the same time many of them reveal his dogma- 
tism, and the moral indignation he showed about what he thought was the 
culpable blindness of his adversaries, and of the establishment. 
Nevertheless, much of his light imagery is vague, and some of it is 
tendentious and highly emotive. Even the most involved of the scholastic 
commentators on Aristotle paid at least lip-service to clarityp and the 
whole aim of their wrangling was ultimate clarification. Ramus' theologi- 
cal rhapsodiesp toog managed to conceal the lack of original or even accu- 
rate thinking. The ideal of clarity, however, was worth establishing and 
pursuing. The reformer and humanist probably achieved more by falling short 
1. We learn from the Prooemium mathematicum, p. 1821 that he taught optics 
(i-e-p Euclid) for two years; we notice also that mW of his references 
to sight, colourt and so ong are technical in character, cf. La Dialec- 
tique, pp. 29-36. 
2. Opticae libri quatuor, preface. 
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of the ideal than attaiment would have brought. 
Although Ramus was prepared to make an exception for the non-mathema- 
tical comrnunication which wan poetryg he could not disoooiate himself from 
his addiction to clarity at all times. In any case he does not seem to have 
ever been whole-heartedly in favour of conscious obscurity in poetry. The 
lights of poetry were more like those of theology than of mathematics, or 
ratherp the analogical language of theology borrows some of the techniques 
of poetry and yet retains some of the precision of mathematics. 
As a logician Ramus was permanently engaged in the analysis of the 
'vices of discourse' and in the attempt at eradicating them. He lists these 
on many occasions and there is no need here to go into them in detail. For 
the most part they are different kinds of logical sophisms and fallaciest and 
he illustrates these with examples. They are to be avoided by the correct 
application of true logical method. We shall see in the next chapter that 
there are certain qualifications which Ramus adds to the question of clarity. 
No writer ever has the right to be obscurev but it is sometimes possible that 
his meaning will be made more, clear if he departs momentarily from what is 
strictly logically true. Sometimes, indeed, this process is very near to a 
conscious obscuring of the truth. Ramus calls the process 'Crypsel after the 
Greek word'Aet+ý' which means 'hiding' or 'concealment'. The ultimate 
aim of this, howevery is still clarity. 
Ramus' basic opinion is that all discourse must be clear, but, since 
it must also be persuasive, he fears that the requisite embellishments will 
alter the plainness of the expression. There will be varying degrees of do- 
viation from logical exactness; clarity itself, mustp indeedv never be losty 
butv in poetry especiallyv it ceases to be the only consideration. 
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The Pldiade theoristsl toot and their associates were doeply concer- 
nod with the problems of clarity and obsourityt though they were divided 
about the relative roles. Scýve and Pontus do Tyard were the two principal 
advocates and practitioners of obscurity. Pontus do Tyard makes the matter 
quite clear in the Solitaire Premiers when Pasithde asks 
"Mais quo respondrez vous & ce qulils dientp quo si par 
estranges fagons de parler vous taschez dlobscurcir at 
ensevelir dans voz vers voz conceptions tellement, qua 
les simples at les vulgaires, qui sont (jurent-ils) 
hommes de ce monde comme vousv nly peuvent recognoistre 
leur langue, pource quIelle est masquSo at dosguisdo do 
certains accoustremens estrangerag vous oussiez encor 
mieux fait, pour atteindre & ce but de non estre enten- 
dusp do rien nlescrire du tout? "l 
she receives the following answer: 
"Je lour respondray que llintention du bon Pobte nlest do 
non estre entendul ny aussi de se baisser et acco=oder 
& la viltd du vulgaire (duquel ils sont le chef) pour 
nlattendre autre jugement de ses oeuvres que celuy, qui 
naistroit dlune tant lourde cognoissance". 2 
In other words, without trying consciously to be incomprehensible the 
poet is allowed to use language which will be obscure to the co=on people. 
There are many other instances in the poetry of the time of poets who fol- 
lowed Horace's adage, 10di profanum uulgus et arceol. 
Sebilletv Du Bellay and Peletier all thought that Scbve was obscure. 
Sebillet shows his interest in the matter of clarity and obscurityp and his 
preference for clarityg especially in his chapter eleven of the second bookq 
De 1'Enime ; he defines 'Enigmel as followst 
1. Solitaire Premierp P-d. q1t., p. 67- 
2. Ibid. f loc. cit. 
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"Enten done qua VEnigme eat all4gorie obscure, vice 
d1oraison appell4 an Quintiliang a cause de son ob- 
scuritd. Et a la vdritd 1'Enigmeg soit eacrit an 
prose ou versv soit cach6 dessoubz pointuret semble 
inutile at superflu. Car ai on nly veut estro anton- 
du, il demeure du tout inutilet at si on y veut estre 
entendup nlest grand vice son obscuritd? "-L 
Peletierp howevert is the writer who has the most to say in favour of 
clarity in poetry and in the other artI3. He saysq for examplep at the be- 
ginning of the chapter entitled, Des Ornimans de Podsij (IjIX)j 
I'Lo primieri e plus dinj vqrtu du Po4mj 4t la Clýrtet e 
einsi mAmA qui lj parler co=un nous temoigný, quand 
on dIt par singularite d4 louangX, catj chosX ou cplila 
auo4t etb eclqrciý e ilustrej par un tel ou un tell ou 
an tal tans ou an tol. AU contrer/, par manieri dfaccu- 
sacion e desestim/9 auo6r et6 obscurcij e auilij, E 
cet/ci ýt la beauto uniu' selý, laquelX dott aparokr 
par tout le cors du Po acompagne/ d1unj eprteinX 
majeste: qui. nj randi point l'Euurj intretablXt e d1unj 
grauite qui nX lj fac/ point trouuer tro superbi. E 
a cetýci, les particuliers Om4ans doqu7ý obeirs ldquez 
siron't rarýs o antriluisans parmi I/ Po§ý/p co=X les 
fleurs an un pro, ou. co=j les anneaus es doqz. te2 
Peletier's following chapterv Des Vicjs de Pobsiip treats especially 
of obscurity: 
Itco donq nous auons dIt la clqrte 4tr l/ plus insiný 
ornX 
r mT 
nt du Po4mj: einsi 11obscurite s contj; a po -ma ur 
pr mier vicj. Car il n1i a point d/ diferane antri nX 
parler point, e nl4trj point antanda: Ancor pansjroýjX 
etr/ plus mal f4t dj parler obscur/mant, qui dj n/ parler 
point du tout: Car on tient 1ý tans d1un hommýj qui slamu- 
s/r+ alheurs". 3 
In this chapter Peletier then goes on to describe the different kinds 
of obscurityq basing himself on Quintilian's treatment of the topic: 
1. Art Pogtique Pranqoysp. ed. cit p P-175- 
2. Art Pobtique. ed. cit., p. 126. 
3. Ibid v P-139. 
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"Car si lo Poýitj nluaý point dj moz trop loin cherchez# 
ni trop afectez, ni impropr/st alil nl4t point trop brief: 
atil a suiul bon orctri (qui Gont lea poinz qui garanticit 
dlobsourite): alors alil nl4t antandul c aira la fautA du 
Lectourt e non pas dj l'Auteurl'. 1 
Peletier exhorts the poet: 
'Idt donq I/ Pofitj 1ý/rjmier soin dj donner lumier/ a 
son ouura6h e pans W l/ tans n1h plus dj cous 
qui. ýsdelectjt es chosýs obscurisg" pour prandrý ocasi- 
on dj glorifier d/ lea auoýr comprisist ou pour slan 
rejouir, non pas commj dý lea auoAr apricia, mes co=X 
dj lea auoAr inuanteis". 2 0 
The desire for clarity is in even greater evidence in the prefaces 
which Peletier wrote for his mathematical works. In the preface to Thdodore 
de Bbze, in l'Arithm6tique (Book Two) he debates the question at lengths 
'Inlest encorl le different vidbf lequel des doux est le 
plus proffitable pour l1entretenement des ars et dis- 
ciplines, quo les professeurs dlicolles, quant ilz les 
mettent par ecrit, les traittent clairement et au longt 
ou bien obscurement et brief". 3 
He gives the arguments for both sidest those who favour brevity say 
that since the readers or hearers have to do the work for themselves they 
understand and remember better. He makes the interesting comment here that 
the invention of printing has made men dissipate their energies and made 
them read many books on many different subjects quickly and badly: 
"qui est cause qulen se charglant llesprit do tant de 
choses, ilz sont contrains dlen laisser de chacune une 
grand' partie par les chemins, et so troment en fin 
frustrez do toutes". 4 
On the other hand those who favour clarityp 
1. Ibid. ) loo-cit- 
2. Ibidol P1,141. 
3. L'Arithm6tiquep (1552), p. 27v. 
4- Ibid. t p. 28. 
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I'disent quo la premiere vortu do lloraioon clest la 
perspicuit6i at quIentre lea ocriz clairs at lea 
ecriz obscurs ia tolle difference commo du iour 
a In. nuit". 
They go on to show thatt 
"a la verite nous voions qulauiourd'hui on a trouvb 
moien d'abbreger le temps aux disciplines par 
clairte et facile maniere dlenseigner. Comme on 
peut voir de la Grammairej Retoriquep Musiquep et 
autres professions". 1 
Peletier claims that he does not want to take sides in this debate, 
"aincois ai pris opinion do suiure un chemin motoient 
Car apres auoir bien examin6 le merite des deux con- 
traires, is trouue qulil nlest pas impossible dlestro 
facile et brief tout ensemble, pourueu quIon tiegne 
tousiours son addresse a la metodep qui eat cello qui 
donne maiestý aux ecriz et non 11obscuritb: laquelle 
no doit ni ne peut sucunement estre defendu contre la 
facilitV. 2 
It is nonetheless evident that he has come down on the side of clarity, 
that his aim is to make his writing as clear as he possibly can: 
"A ces causes me suis resolu de tenir en cette mienne 
Aritmetique, et en tous autres Traittez que pourrai 
faire desormaisp un train le plus clair et le plus 
ais6 quo pourrai imaginer". 3 
Peletier is the closest to Ramus of the writers we have been examining, 
perhaps because he was better able than the others to see how poetry fitted 
into a broader scheme of the arts. 
One final point in this connection is the matter of stylistic clarity. 
Although the writers of the Pldiade did not have much to say about this di- 
rectly they did by implication. Ramus was deeply interested in Quintilian's 
1. Ibid. 9 p. 28v. 
2. bid., loc. cit. 
3. Ibid i P. 29. 
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ideal of clarity centering round Oproprietasit and in the same way the 
Pldiade sought Inaivetdl which was closely related to it. On this point 
Grahame Castor sayso 
"Indeed naff was more or leso equivalent to naturelf 
but with the added suggestions of genuineness and 
'rightness' in the sense of particular appropriateness'. 
1. Castorl op. cit., P-79p quoted above P-43 - 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TRUTH AND FALSITY 
Since Ramus was not directly concerned with questions of opiatemoloMr 
and metaphysics, 
1 it is not surprising that we do not find anywhere in his 
work a profound and detailed analysis of the idea of truth. This is noto 
however# to say that he was not interesteds he shows throughout his work 
that his primary concern was furthering the cause of trutht with almost evan- 
gelical zeal. Truth is presupposed as the ultimate criterion. Everything in 
his system, as in the world of which this system was intended as a scheme and 
representationp has a clearly defined place. Truth wasp for Ramusp as for 
Elost philosophers of the Renaissancep the unifying principlet the universal 
formula or equation which would solve all problems. 
For Ramusp as for Descartes whom he foreshadowed in so many waysp God 
2 
was the guarantor of truth in the world. God is truth, 'consummate truth'. 
We are, as it were, sparks struck off from this truth. 
3 A further qualitY 
of this divine truth for Ramus is that it is certain. Ramus is not prepared 
to accept with Plato that the starting-point is doubtq for the reason that 
so many doubts are mere illusory sophisms. On the contraryp God is the be- 
ginning of wisdom as well as the end of it. Our final aim is the contempla- 
tion of the God whose shadows we have already glimpsed. 
4 
Because of this centering of truth in God it is easy to see that Ramus 
1. Cf., Ong, MOD9 pp. 180-2. 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, P-56, cf. P-70- 
3. Ibid 9 P-47v- 
4. Dialecticap institutionesp (1543)9 PP-42V-43. 
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believed in the certainty and objectivity of truth. It is as well to bear 
this in mind since it is something which Ramus himself took for granted. 
There would otherwise be a very great risk of paying too much attention to 
the other aspect of his thought on the subjectq the relativity and adapta- 
bility of truth. 
Truthl theng for Ramuep is something certain and fixedq and the ayl- 
logismv which is our tool for deciding what is true and what is falsep deals 
with twhat is doubtfulp matter which is inconstant andq as it woror in flux'. 
Truth itself can neither be disproved nor refuted. 
2 
Ramus often talks about the 'solidity of truth'. 
3 
He perceives it 
spatiallyq and in threog not two dimensi6ns, 
4 But in spite of all thisq by 
far the greater part of Ramus' remarks an truth show either that it is rela- 
tive (that isq that our attempts to grasp it or express it are feeble approxi- 
mations to the ideal - it is interesting to note in passing that Ramus followed 
Aristotlets suggestion that no thought is true unless it can be illustrated by 
a particular example), or that we must modify bare truth in some way if we 
wish to persuade our readers or listeners. 
Whatever the arts teach must not only be trueq according to Ramusq but 
must also bear the stamp of usefulnessq and be in accordance with nature. 
1. Dialecticae Partitionest P-7; cf. . Dialecticae institutiones, p. 27. 
2. Scholae rhetoricae,. §LAy 001-319. 
3. Scholae physicaeg SLkq col. 827- 
4- Ong makes repeated reference to 'logic in space', and insists on the impor- 
tant change that the ability to print schemata brought to our ways of 
thinking. The idea is stimulatingo but I feel that the case is overstated; 
cf. P. Yates, The Art of Memory: 'Where I would differ from Ong is in his 
insistence that this spatial visualisation for memorisation was a new de- 
velopment introduced by the printed book. Rather, it would seem to mep the 
printed Ramist epitones are a transfer to the printed book of the visually 
ordered and schematised lay-outs of manuscripts'. (pp. 233-4)- 
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Truthfulness is modified by expediency and by the need to communicate with 
a particular audience. The distortiong if distortion there bog must novert 
howeverp condone a direct faluehood. 
Together with his contemporariest Ramus seems to have bean reasonably 
confident that man could arrive at a perfect knowledge of everything by 
knowing the causes, but he was enough of a realist to have seen that man is 
perpetually distracted by the senses. By the time he wrote his more mature 
work the first flush of the Renaissance had died down. He had begun to 
appreciate that the promise which the ideal of rebirth hold out had not been 
fulfilled. This perhaps explains his insistence that the paeons of praise 
concerning reason in which he himself indulged are not sufficient without a 
laboriously accurate methodology. His contemporariesy and particularly the 
poetsp were perpetually being disillusioned about the nature of truth and 
knowledge. This fact goes a long way towards accounting for the stress laid 
by the poets on lyingg deceptive appearances and the unattainability of the 
ideals. 
Ramus asks the question# to what extent should a writer depart from a 
rigid adherence to truth? He finds that it depends very much on the purpose 
of the writerv the genre of writing he is employing and, above all, on the 
character and aptitude of the recipient. Poets and orators often change the 
legitimate order of writing (that is, the more normal order) in the interests 
of pleasurability or usefulness. Readers are looking for more than a series 
of terse definitions; they want a fullerv more splendid discourse, which con- 
tains poetical or rhetorical colouring. Ramus insists that the rejection of 
excessive brevity is simply for the sake of greater clarity. Whatever ampli- 
fication is necessaryp it must not interfere with this aim. 
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According to Ramus there are two main kinds of method which are used 
in discourse* 1 There is what he calls the method of teaching and the method 
of prudence. The method of teaching (whicht incidantallyp is not completely 
divorced from the use of prudence) is based on the correct arrangement of 
the materialp proceeding from the general to the particular. The method of 
prudence takes into account the nature of the audience, and all the attendant 
circumstances of time and placep and hardly depends on artp that isp teachingg 
at all. For greater persuasiveness logical clarity must sometimes be sacri- 
ficed. So a writer may place first truths or facts which are not necessarily 
better known than those which followp but which aret on the other hando 
"plus conuenables ZL caluy qulil fault onseignerp at 2 
plus probables & 11induire at amener ou nous pretendons". 
The aim of all 'fiction' in literature is IZL enseigner le bon auditeurt 
qui do soy ayme et demande la verit6l'. 
3 
A logiciany for examplep will not 
always be able to find the lartificiel et vray chemin' of teachingp and in 
such a case he will look for another by the way of prudencep or IcoustUMe et 
4 
usage'. The customary way of persuading people is by the use of figures of 
speech. 
It is necessary, if we are to understand the precise nature of the 
idea of ItruthfulneS3' expressed in Ramist, writingst to establish the relation- 
ship between figurative and 'truthful' writing. Typerbolelp for example, is 
Itraiectio veritatislo when we say more than the nature of truth allows either 
1. Of.. Ongy FCZDDj PP-245-7j and Dudley B. Wilsong Ronsard, Poet of Naturep 
Manchester, 1961, pp. 90-1. 
2. La Dialectique, p. 128. 
3. Ibid v P-131(quoting 'Ar. 3. Rhet"). 
4. La Dialectiquev P. 134. 
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by increasing or diminishing the oubject-mattor. 
1. The Institutionon orato- 
riae adds that 
"by amplification the thing itsolf exceeds the natural 
model but it does not want to deceive by a liep and 
so we can excuse this speooh". 
In all cases the craftsmanship must bo unobtrusivo: 
"Whenever in the matter of ornamention, attention 
to the words destroys our faith in the emotions 
describedt and whenever art is apparent, truth 
seems absent". 2 
The nearest Ramus gets to an epistemological discussion of truth is 
3 in his distinction between truth and opinion. Liberal-minded men, he sayal 
lovers of truth, should realize at once this distinction. They differ from 
contentious men in that they are not concerned with retailing the opinions 
of others, precisely because they cannot all be equally true. Humanists con- 
template simple unadorned truth and voluntarily embrace it. 
4 Ramus recalls 
the ancient debate whether knowledge alone was to be followed or whether 
there was not also a place for opinion. Plato had said that truth belonged 
to gods and to the children of godsv and tle vraysemblable aux ho=es'. 
5 
Yet Plato, too, exhorted us to follow truth wherever it might lead us. Ramus 
agreed with Plato that 111homme estoit capable do science$ and that Itoute 
doctrine est inuention de ueritdl. 
6 
Most often men have to reconcile them- 
selves to the fact that their knowledge is only probable, 'opinions which are 
so often deceptivel. 
7 Even morev their persuasive statements of their ideas 
1. Institutiones. oratoriae, P-54. 
2. Ibid-9 p. 80. 
3. Uf.. the long account in Pontus de Tyard's Solitaire Premier. 
4- Dialecticae institutiones, P. 32. 
5. La Dialectiquep P-3. 
6. Ibid*, P-4. 
7- Scholae rhetoricaep ýUq col. 281. 
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will also be merely probablei 'Popular speech has all the oplondour of dis- 
coursep and is satisfied with verisimilitude'. 
1 It is in the 'places of in- 
vention't we are told, that we will find 'certain and firm signs and an in- 
finite number of probable conjectures'. 
2 There are three difforent approaohas 
we may usep according to Ramusp when we are trying to persuade or prove any- 
thingg looking at reality on three different levelst firstlyp there is the 
level of knowledge and truth, secondly, if the two former are lackingg proba- 
bility and opinionp and thirdlyl if even these are lackingo we may resort to 
3 'some sophistic fallacy' . In logical termsq truth will be exhibited by the 
demonstrative syllogismg opinion by the dialectic syllogismt and captiousness 
by a sophistic syllogism. 
4 'Jugement do science' deals with what is neces- 
5 
saryl and 'Jugement dlopinion' with what is contingent. 
Again we are shown that truth is not something of easy access. One 
feels that Ramus would like it to have beeng to fit in with his views on man's 
natural inclination to logicv Ile vray et naturel usage de raison'. 
6 
But he 
was faced with the awkward fact thatt throughout the agesp men who were pre- 
sumably well-meaning had obscured the philcacphical heritage by making it more 
complexp and more difficult for their successors to arrive at the truthp and 
with the knowledge that all his own writing would have been superfluous if 
truth were easily attainable. He saw the need for eternal vigilance: 
1. Aristotelicae animadversionesv P-78v- 
2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548)t P-356. 
3. Ibid-v PP-431-2. 
4- Ibid; cf., (1556)p P-36. 
5. La Bialectiquep P-73. 
6. Ibid. j p. j. 
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"Est ordonn6 do Diou at do nature co=o uno mont6o 
diffioilo at glissantat par les marchoo do laquelle 
nous est dress6 at limit6 un soul chemin 4 la cog- 
noissanco do science at do dootrine". 1 
The tree which bears the golden apples is guarded by a dragon repre- 
senting the ferocity of conflicting opinions. 
2 
One further aspect of the question of truth in discourse is the prob- 
lem. of realism in writing. Ramus shared his contemporaries' preoccupation 
with the accurate representation of reality. This idea has yet to be ade- 
quately exploredp but it is at least clear that most Renaissance theorists 
and writers were dedicated to what they called a portrayal 'ad vivum' or 
tau vift. Painters and sculptorst it went without sayingp werey with a few 
exceptionsp utterly devoted to this ideall and sop toop were the poets* 
Basically the ideal was to describe something in such detailp and with such 
accuracy that the reader saw things as if he had been there or as if the 
things were present before his very eyes. The painter Apolles was the hero 
and ideal of Renaissance writers who spoke of his works as though they had 
seen them and of his books as though they had read them. His name was a 
sort of mythical token which immediately conjured up the idea of the perfect 
craftsman. Ramus is no exception to this idolisation of Apellesq and often 
refers to him in this way. On one occasion he mentions that Apolles strove 
to paint Alexander by a detailed representation of the different parts of 
his body. In the same way we should teach the parts of dialectic "according 
to the exemplar of that truth living in the man (not to go away from our 
1. Ibid., p. x; for a close parallel, cf. Pontus do Tyardp Solitaire Promiert 
ed. Silvio Baridon, P-3. 
2. Prophilosophica diaciplinap SLAq col-1014-5. 
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Apelles)". 1 The most important feature of his theory ooems to be that in 
nature 'everything is living, in art merely painted and imitated'. 
2 The 
truth of everythingp of all artap Iflourishea in naturo beforo any procopts 
are thought up,. 
3 The aim of an art is to make those things relive in a 
different wayg by an admission of the fact that ouch life as they will have 
will be a mere reflection of their real life. Sometimes Ramus is carried 
away by his own enthusiasm and confuses the degrees of vividness; he sayss 
for example, that-tho practice of an art might be compared to oomeone 
looking at paintings of animals and seeing them come to life. 
4 Since the 
paintings themselves are the result of practice in an art, we see at once 
that all Ramus is saying is that practice produces the vividness and origi- 
nality of an art. 
Whenever we intend to imitate any authort we must set before our- 
5 
selves the criteria of truthp and attempt 'the expression of similitude'. 
This is not the same as representationt where we are trying to re-presentp 
present in a different way the reality of nature. In rhetoriol for example, 
the presentation of the art should be 'according to the idea and similitude 
of rhetorical truth and beauty'. 
6 
Representation almost always has a visuall spatialp pictorial basis 
in the writings of Ramus. The mind goes from the ideas of things 'to their 
living and archetypal exemplarlp and sot by meditation on these shadows and 
images, catches sight of the infinite mind, which it then exhibits to those 
1. Dialecticae institutioneal p. 8. 
2. Ibid., loc. cit. 
3. Aristotalicae animadversionesp P-4- 
4. Dialecticae partitiones, P-58v- 
5- Ibid P P-72v. 
6. Institutiones oratoriae, p P-7v- 
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who cannot see it. 
1 The merit of good oyllogisms is that they bring things 
before our eyes. 
2 This is more than the fact that they set things out 
schematically. It expresses also the clarity of the reorganization and con- 
sequent artificial representation of natural ideas. In the same way# by the 
figure of speech called 'evidential the object is 'set up... before the 
eyest. 
3 Fouquelin makes all this even more explicit. For him the beat meta- 
phors are those Iqui tombent dessous lo sentimentp principalement des iouxt 
1equel est le plus vif do tous'. This explains Ila clartd do lour signifi- 
cation'. 
4 He even goes so far as to describe voice and gesture as the parts 
of rhetoric which correspond to hearing and sightq ('par losqualz doux senst 
toute conoissance viJont en 11 esprit 1 .5 It in possible that an adherence 
to 
this theory is an explanation of the preponderance of visual and auditive 
imagery in the poetry of the P16iade. Tho, Rhotorica gives examples of images 
from the other sensest but repeats that images of sight are more vivid "be- 
cause they place as it were within sight of the soul things which we are not 
able to discern and see". 
Ramus uses the word Irepresentarel very frequently. We representy for 
instancep the style of another writer by imitationp yet so as to retain our 
originality. 
7 Similarly, Fouquelin says that whenever we employ the figure 
called 'prosopopeial , by our own voice and gesturep Inous contrefaisons et 
1. Dialecticae institutionesp P-42v. 
2. Ibid., P-56v. 
3. Institutiones oratoriaep p. 29. 
4. La Rhetorique Frangoysel p. 26; (Ile plus viff 
similar passage in the Rhetoricap P-36). 
5. La Rh6torique Fran oysey P-113. 
6. Rhetoricat (1572)p pp-19-20. 
7. Institutiones oratoriae, P-83. 
translates lacerrimust in a 
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representons la voix at personnage, d'autruy'. 
1 Inopresentaral is often 
a synonym of limitare'; (limitare morestp for examplop used of drama, is 
equated with Irepresentarel ). 
2 The two words are closely linked in the 
following sentence from the Rhetoricas 
"Rhetoricians call it ý907COL*LfQY (deliniation of 
character) and ýLIxrj (tV (imitation) when we re- 
present someone eIsJIs words by imitating them". 3 
In the preface of the 1572 edition of the Rhatorica we read 
"our Apelles wants to represent for you here a certain 
living image of eloquence, to enable you both to under- 
stand the excellence of men's rhetorical virtues by 
speaking about them, and when you have understood them, 
to make them your own by imitation and commentary'. 4 
This almost pleonastic use of 'representarel is close to the use of 
lexprimerell another related wordq often found in the writings of R=ust 
"We ourselves imitate (fingimus) by our voice and 
gesture the exanples of voice and gesture which 
appear in a dead form in written works, and as far 
as is possible we express them". 5 
This brings us back to the starting-pointv which was the vividness 
and liveliness of representation. Pupils are encouraged to show forth their 
artj 'not only in Painted precepts, but in living examples'. 
It seems that portrayal 'ad viv-uml does not so much mean 'after' or 
'according to the life' as 'as vividly as possible'. Otherwise we would 
never be able to see something painted as a vivid representation of reality, 
1. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, p. 86. 
2. Rhetorica, (1572)t P-30. 
3. Ibid:, ý1562)j p. 112. 
4- Ibid-P (1572)t pp-3-4. 
5- Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col. 1012-3. 
6. Scholae rhetoricaep SLAj col-388; cf. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLAt 
-col. 1027. 
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the vividnesag truth and reality would be too dazzling. We must not lose 
sight of Ramus' belief in the degrees of reality. Art lives on a lower 
level from that of nature. 
1 In the same way when it is suggested that ethics 
should not be described with lifeless precepts but illustrated with living 
and $fully active' 
2 (actuosis) examples, we remember that it is still an 
artp and so of necessity is a more shadow of nature, and gives nothing more 
than a momentary stress to the living force of the principles. 
Wa have now seen something of what Ramus had to say about truth and 
truthful representation. It remains to consider the opposite qualitieso 
fiction and deception. If we examine some of the arts in turn we see that 
the logician, for his part, has no intention of deceivingy even though what 
he is dealing with is the probable, because his primary aim is to distin- 
guish what is true from what is false. The oratorp on the other hand, does 
deceive in that he more often plays on the emotions than on reason. A 
similar sort of deception is to be found in poetry and is inseparable from 
the poet's function of pleasing and moving his hearers or readers. It was 
taken for granted by Ramusp as it was by his contemporaries, that the truth 
with which the poet was concerned was not logical truth, except that inci- 
dentally he was obliged to make use of normal logical processes. ften a 
critic said that a poet was lying this was not usually a moral appreciation 
of his sincerityp but was more concerned with his particular way of communi- 
cating to people or to his method of conceiving or imagining before communi- 
cation. 
1. Dialecticae institutionesl p. Ov. 
2. Do moribus veterum Gallor=, (1574)t preface by J. T. Preigids. 
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R=us is quite adamant that the aim of poots is not truth but either 
pleasure (sweetness) or utilityt "since they (i-o-s poets and orators) act 
before themselves the task of writing pleasurably or usefully, and not that 
of unfolding the truth". 
1 Since the primary object of logical lexeroitatiot 
is the separation of what is true from what is falsey 
2 
we can assume that 
there is some objective and absolute truth from which poets and orators 
tum away. 
The word most frequently used to describe the activity of the poet 
is Ifingerel or one of its compounds or derivatives: we readp for examploo 
"Choose out of so many thousands of living men those 
who have a natural excellence in wisdom and judgment 
- men ouch as Homer often feigned Nestor and Ulysses 
to be", 
or again , 
"Plutop the god of riches, is feigned by the poets as 
reigning in Hell" .3 
The use of the word Ifingerel (which I have translated 'feign') 
corresponds generally to our 'imaginal or 'represent'. It is not easy to 
decide whether the word contains (as it seems to in these two instances) 
the idea of dissembling, or whether it has not progressed beyond the basic 
meaning of 'forming' or 'fashioning'. It wouldt however, be in order to 
suppose that because of the other words used to refer to the poet's acti- 
vityp the idea of deception is often at least implicit. In another contexty 
Ifingerel is branded by the bad company which it keepst Ramus is speaking 
1. Dialecticae partitionesq p. 68. 
2. jbid-9 pp. 63v-64; cf. - 
Scholap metaphysicae, SLA9 col. 920. 
3. Dialecticae partitiones, p. 2; cf.. Prooemium mathematicumlp. 266; ef. 9 
also, La Dialectique, p. 1221 Iceste mdthode artificielle me semble 
quelque longue chalne d1or, telle quo feint Hombre: 
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of the laudable procedure of aetting up natural logic as the exemplar when 
writing a book on logic; in this way tho corroot ordor and distribution of 
the parts will be observed: 
"he will express the small particles of all the sections 
which arc derived from one and the o=e natural source; 
he will contrive nothing of his own, will feign nothingg 
will dream up no lies about it". 1 
Good logical method is explicitly opposed to the allegedly spurious 
approach of Aristotlep andt indirectly to the very different technique of 
poetry. On another occasion# talking of the attempt to discover or describe 
the perfect oratory Ramus proposes the analoey of the painter who promises a 
picture painted with no common colourst and thent on being pressedg admits 
that it will be painted in green and blue. Sot says Cicorop (according to 
Ramus) 
"I shall imagine (fing=) and form (informabo) an idea 
of an orator, such as never existed" 
and then goes on to claim that this orator's perfection (virtus) lies in his 
invention. 2 'Effingeral is sometimes used in similar contexts, but means 
simply 'represent' or 'portray' with no suggestion of deoeits 
"Jokes are spread broadly throughout a speech# so that 
when the ways of men are ridiculed, and are represented 
in this way, they may be understood as they really are". 
Poets are not reprimanded by Ramus as they had been by Plato, and as 
they were by Calvin and the reformers. Allowances are to be made for them 
and they are to be accorded a special licence of their own. In the Scholae 
1. 'Nihil autem de suo comminiscaturp nihil fingatt nihil somniando mentiaturvo 
Aristotelicae animadver , 
siones, (1548)9 P-386. 
2. Brutinae quaestionesp (1549)9 P-70; cf- Scholae rhatoricae, ýLA, col. 275- 
3. 'Atque its, effinguntur, ut quales sint, intelliganturlp Institutiones 




for examplev Ramus makes the following Comparison between the 
philosophical approach to time and that of the pootoi 
"Time is imagined (fingitur) by the poets as a scytherp 
reaping all things with his acythes this is to be con- 
doned on the grounds of poatic metaphor, but it would 
not be permitted in a solid and sorious public lectur 
'Finearel here clearly contains the idea of 'imagine' q 'represent' 
and 'deceive (but without malice)'. Poetry is therefore neither weighty 
nor serious. Tie shall return to the question of metaphor. 
A further distinction between poetic and non-poetio style is made in 
the Scholae dialecticaef where 'poetic' is equated with 'populart. (As we 
have already seent Ramus shared his contemporaries' indecision about the 
clarity of poetic communicationj here he gives evidence of his sympathy with 
those who felt that poetry should appeal immediately to the peopler and that 
obscurity was a defect)s 
"Therefore orators and poets allow themselves in popular 
matters this licence to digress; moreover, since it is 
apt to reform the minds of their hearers or readersq 
they think it is praiseworthy or virtuous. And so, what 
would be blameworthy in an accurate style of teaching, 
would sometimes be praiseworthy in a popular style". 2 
But only sometimesp because although licence is allowed in the choice 
of subject, the actual treatment must make use of a plain and accurate mathe- 
matical style. The poets' licence is, in partf a result of their being ham- 
pered by their medium: 'since poets are more restricted by their metrep they 
3 freely and with licence make use of other ways of speaking' . We find the 
1. Sebolae Plxvsicae, SLA, col-735-6. 
2. Scbolae dialecticaep SLA, col-575; cf. Dialecticae institutionest (1554)pp. 230. 
3. Brutinae quaestiones, Z-1ý49)p p. 65- 
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same idea in the Rhotorique Prangoyool 
"D'autant plus qua la loy du carme est aeudre ot 
rigourousol d'autant plus est donn6 aus pootoo grando 
licence do changer et transferer los mots do leur 
propres eignificationa". 1 
The Inatitutiones oratoriae has much to aay about poetic liconce. 
One kind of licence is the invention of neologi=a, either by inventing com- 
posite words (eeg*j perpetuuo), by derivation (0.9-t nualitas)p or by Itrans- 
lation' from other languages (e. g., philosophia): 
"Our present day poets use far greater licence in this 
respeotp so that not only when native words are lackingg 
do they use neologisms, but even when they exist already". 2 
After listing some figures of speech he saysq 
"Of these some are more freely found by poetic licence 
than in prose ... some belong indifferently to either 
way of speaking". 3 
Poetic licence does not refer only to the fashioning of now words, but 
to the disposition of words within the sentence: 
"A poem has many phrases which prose repucliatesp so 
that poets use more daringly all orn=ents of single 
words and of words joined together, in order to give 
themselves in their writing the greatest possible 
pleasure of song and harmony". 4 
Licence itself is regarded as a figure: 
"Licence est une figure, laquelle montre quolque audace 
et hardiesse do dire ce qui sembloit estre dangeroux 
direll. 5 
Ramus repeats the dictum that poets are liarst Opoetsp as the proverb 
says, tell lies about many things'. 
6 
It is unlikely that he here sees this 
1. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, p. 10. 
2. Institutiones oratoriae, p. 10. 
3. Ibid. 9 p. 20. 
4 IM-P PP-71-2. 
5: -L"a-Metorique Frangoyse, p. 111. 
6. Scholae metaphysicaev ILA, col-837; of.. Dialecticae partitiones p. 68. 
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as an ethical question, but rather as aesthetic or critical. In tho common- 
tary on the Christian religion he distinguiahea different kinds of lying. 
The lie of David's wife, Michalf for examplet was mental ('ad mantem') rather 
than moral ('ad mores'), and the sin was academic and against logic. There 
follows an account of the origin of lyingg and of manle illogicalityl the 
blunting of his natural powers of logic is ascribed to the lie contained in 
his fall from the state of grace by his original aint 
"Scripture does not say that every man is an atheist or 
an idolator# a blasphemer against the name of Godp or 
a violator of the Sabbathp a despiser of his parents 
or a murdererp an adulterer or a thiefq or covetous of 
his neighbour's goods, but it does say openly (Ps. 1169II) 
that every man is a liart and man's lie was the window 
first opened by the serpent on to evory kind of iniquity. 
This enslavement of man is certainly naturalp and we have 
seen that philosophers have had some perception of it. 
And sop although the first man was created a true logician 
by Codo he has degenerated by hit) sin into a lying sophisty 
and has left to poyterity a sophistic inheritance instead 
of a logical one. " 
The injunction against lying was particularly necessary because of 
these disastrous inherited effects. Ramus is ready to admit that there may 
often be extenuating circumstances; for examplet as Plato says# in the case 
of leaders of the state, doctors and orators. The orator's eloquence is 
even equated with the gift of prophecy, and this is taken as an exoneration 
of any possible blame attachable to the idea of lying: 
"It is not true that the orator is a mere craftsman of 
lying, because in sacred scripture eloquence has the 
same honourable place as prophecy. 112 
1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, PP-184-6. 
2. Ibid., loc-cit- 
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The poet's duplicity is linked with his intention of toachingi 
III1 so propose dlenseigner le peuplet olest a dire bostoo 
de plusieurs testest et partant degoit par maintes maniereat 
Il commence au milieu ot lh aouuent comprend lo premiers 
finablement il conolud le dernier par quolque ca3 incertain 
et inoPin6 ... 411 
A few pages later Ramus gives examples of IfoincIrol in oratory* 
2 
A word which is often discussed by critics writing about Ramus is 
related to this question of 'fiction'. The word is loo=entitiust. It 
appears in the title of the spurious 11, Ao thesis which R=us is supposed to 
have presented in 1536t Quaecumque ab Aristotele dicta essentp commentitia 
esse. Ong rejects all the translations and interpretations of this title 
which suggests that the word means 'falselt 
"Comminiscor does not mean strictly to lie or to falsify 
... so much as to invent irresponsiblyv to lot the 
imagina- 
tion or storehouse of memory run riot". 3 
But the word, it seems to me, has very close links with words from 
the Ifeindrel group. Interesting confirmation of this is to be found in 
Robert Estienne's Dictionarium Latinogallicum (1538)t 
"Co=iniscor ... from loon' and Imentelo since things which 
do not exist are feigned in the mind. Controuuer quelQue 
chose en son espritp Faindre quelque chosep Confingere et 
comminisci aliquid... Co=entitiusy adjective, as lcc=enti- 
ti&-res, Chose controuu4e et fainte. Commentitium, Ce qulon 
a songr6 de nouveau, Hova et co=entitiaY 
Perhaps Estienne is right that the word 'commentitius' has more to 
do with the root Imens' than with memory, contrary to Ong's interpretation. 
Ong lists all the related meanings but finally decides that the best para- 
1. La Dialectiqueg p-129. 
2. Ibid. v PP-132-3: in oratory, writes R=usg often lil ne 
fault poinbt 
entrer par le vray chemin mais par quelque insinuation destourn6e'. 
3. Ongo MIDDY P-46. 
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phrase of the title of the thesis would be: 
"all things that Aristotle has said are inconsistent 
because they are poorly systematized and can be 
called to mind only by the use of arbitrary mnemonic 
devices". 1 
R=us was no doubt thinking of memory-reoallt but the word does not 
necessarily refer to this. I would prefer to note simply that Ifeindral is 
almost an equivalent of 'comminiscil. 
'Fingerel appears equally frequently in its other vorb-forms and in 
some compounds and derivatives. In the preface to Cardinal Charles do 
Lorraine in the Do Caosaris militial Ramus links 'confictam' with what io 
fanciful and arbitrary: 
"I am not professing an art of warfare which is 
arbitrarily and ingeniously fabricated, but I am 
relating, by definition and divisiont Caesar's art 
of warfare, extracted from his own exploits.. Ott2 
Part of the opprobri= attached to the word 'confictam' is that it 
means unrealistic as well as 'feigned' and 'contrived'. Elsewhere he talks 
of I fables of New World fabrication It mentioning in the same context mytholo- 
gical monsters. 
3 
The full force of ffictus, is well brought out in a passage of the 
Pro philosophica disciplina. Ramus says that he disapproves of Aristotle's 
excessively mathematical style in his writings on logiep and his use of sym- 
bols (eog. V Ilomne a est b"). Thiss he contends, is bad teaching-method and 
1. Ibid., PP-46-7. 
2. De Caesaris militiap preface. 
3. Pro philosophica disciplinal SLA9 col. 1025; of, Scholae rhetoricael 
col. 369. Iconfingere partitionesIq which is 'to fabricate divisions' 
(i. e., which are useless); cf. 9 alsojAristotelicae animadversiones (1556)9 
p-136: 'philosophers and orators who by the places and images have fabri- 
cated (confinxerunt) an art of memory'. 
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quite unnecessaryp since there is an abundant supply of good natural oxamploss 
"Therefore I shall rather use examples from Virgil and 
Ciceroq that ist human and popular examples which serve 
exactly the same purpose# instead of those alphabetical 
figments. "Why? " asks my accuser. "Will not the practice 
of the art of logioý which was, indeed, originally demon- 
strated by fictitious literary examplesq be better demon- 
strated in Aristotle's teaching on ethics and phyaics? "I'l 
The reasoning of the interlocutor is that the logic contained in 
Aristotle is subtlerpraoroaccuratep more perfected. Ramus points out that 
the pupil will not be in a position to understand the content of the physi- 
cal and the ethical teaching and will therefore be less ready to grasp hie 
subject. (We should not forget that, in spite of the fact that the examples, 
from poetry which Ramus gives are more immediatep they are nonetheless arti- 
ficial. The fiction. in literature corresponds to the author's contribution 
to, and cooperation with, his inspiration or natural gifts). Ramus further 
amplifies the usage of Ifictus' when he makes a distinction between natural 
(physica) and artificial (artificiosa). A physical body is one which is en- 
dowed with physical qualities such as colourp density, weight. An artificial 
body is 
"what is painted by Apelles, fashioned by Lysippusq built 
by Cyrusp or composed by any craftsmanp such as paintingsp 
sculpturesp buildingsp porticosp templesp arsenals". 2 
It must be noted that all these arts are non-literaryt but the principle 
of composition is the same. 'Fictum' is used here for the fashioning of 
(bronze) statues. It has reference to that art which is perhaps the most re- 
presentative and which seems to be the closest imitation of nature. 
1. Pro philosophica disciplinap SLAt col. 1028. 
2. Commentariorum de religione Christianap P-327, 
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A further example of the contrant between Ifictual and 'natural' or 
'true' it; to be found in the Prooemlum mathematioum whore Ramus says that 
the new astronomy is 'not based on feigned hypothosost but on the very truth 
and nature of the stars'. 
1 We are never far from the suggestion that fiction 
is more than fashioning; it is the contribution that man makes to realityp 
in the corruption of his naturet and so it can never be anything more than 
an approximate representation of reality. 
The distancing from reality becomes all the greater and all the more 
striking when the reality in question is supernatural. At one stage in his 
life. Ramus was interested in the different ways of representing God. As a 
good follower of Zwingli he is concerned to deny the value of idols or 
images of the deity. He adduces the support of Isaiah to show that when 
the fallible and earthly writer attempts to portray the invisible Godhead 
he achieves this only by 'an infamous and disgraceful fiction'. 
2 
Another word which appears repeatedly in these contexts is Ofabulat 
and its cognates. It is sometimes used in its perhaps more frequent classi- 
cal sense of dramatic poem or play (after its original meaning of 'talk' or 
'conversation'). Thus in the commentary on Cicero's Do optimp genere ora- 
torump we read that tragedy and comedy are both fabulao. 
3 But even hero 
there is the sense that a play is a fictitious narrative and on dozens of 
other occasions it is this aspect of deception which is emphasized. Ficti- 
tious writing is distinguished also from historical accounts which must 
bear the stamp of veracity and objectivity. In the Libor de moribus yeterum 
1. Prooemium mathematicum, p. 299. 
2. Co=entariorum de religione Christianap P-113. 
3. Ciceronis Do optimo genere orator= praefatio ... illustrata, (1557)t P-3. 
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Gallorup Ramus enuntiates this principle, and a further illustration of hia 
attitude is his statement that #the law of history forbids that there chould 
be in historical writing any suspicion of favouritiam or animosity", though 
it must be admitted that Ramus himself does not always write freo from an 
excessively strong national pride. 
Poetry and many other forms of writing are 'fictitious' and Ifabu- 
lous'. 'Rhetorical and poetic fables' says namuso 'will contain a greater 
fluency and delight'. 
2 This is a clear suggestion that poetry is to be 
equated with myth or the making of fictions. Once this stage has been reached 
the way is open for a debasing of the word to a more pejorative use. 
In the preface tola Rhetorique Frangoyse Fouquelin writest 
"Je desireroi fort (MADAME) qulau lieu de si grand 
nombre d'histoires fabuleusest nos deuanciers eussent 
employd une partie de leur loysir, b, traiter en leur 
langue les sciences et disciplines". 3 
The word 'fabuleuses' is here used pejoratively,, though the disap- 
proval is not great. It is cleart howeverl that the allthOr thinks the 
French romances are neither serious nor objectively accurate. Ramus is 
less critical of the poetic fablet when he shows what is the main purpose 
of poetry; wonder or admiration is at the basis of both philosophy and poetry: 
4 'the poetic fable, like philosophy, consists in an admiration of reality' . 
A glance at some of the examples given above will show that 'fabulal 
is often used quite pejoratively; seev for instancep the phrase 'confictas 
fabulas'. Other examples can readily be founds 
1. De moribus veterum Gallor=q p. 28. 
2. Pro hilosophica disciplinag SLA, col. 1029. 
3. La Rhetorique Frangoysey preface. 
4. Scholae metaphysicaeg SLAv col-837- 
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0, "Hence this fantastic ý74teiiftY (abstraction) has 
been described in a fabulous way by certain degenerate 
Pythagoreans and Platonietsllp 
and later on in the same contextp 
"You must understand that this is not the sophistical 
shadow of some fable or otherl but the logical action 
of the mindp by which the demonstration of truth is 
shown in a more pure and more accurate way". 1 
The force of the word is clarified between two editions of the 
Scholae dialecticao. In talking of a particular kind of syllogistic demon- 
stration the later edition adds 'it is a poetic fable - nov not even poetiol 
since there is nothing probable about it. 12 (The reference to Aristotle's 
poetic theory will be noticed). This demonstration, says Ramus, is the 
'chimerical dreaming of a fevered mindt without mattert form or examplel. 
3 
There are degrees of aberration from the truth and even poetic narrativet 
with all its uncertainty# is nearer to it than the groundless gropings of 
an unbalanced logician. A few lines further on this logical defeat of 
Aristotle is labelled 'that fanatical delirium'. 4 This is not pointless 
invective; Ramus was quite convinced that poetry was a form of madness. 
'Fabulatort and the cognate words didp however, soon become terms of 
abuse: 
"How many false and impious things did Aristotle relatep 
he who told the story that man's happiness begins and 
ends in man himself, and many other wicked impieties?,,. 5 
1. P: rooemi= mathematicumq PP-195-6. 
2. two editions are those of 1560 (p. 237)p and 1569 (SLAI col-467); the 
Latin phrase is 'cum verisimile nihil habeat'; it is very interesting to 
note that this reflects the increasing f=iliarity which the idea of 
Ivraisemblancel gained in the 15601s. 
3. Scholae dialecticaev SLAP col-467. 
4. Ibid., loc-cit- 
5. Scholae dialecticaeg SLAP col. 301. 
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Ramus notes that some ancient theologians had indulged in anthropo- 
morphic ( zT 
GC4JTEO It Sli<- ) writing which is 
I' I 
"fabulous and invented to persuade the mobv for legal 
purposes and the expediency of everyday human life. 
This is the philosophy behind Aristotle's theoloa 
on the number of the gods". 1 
He goes on to make the point that the Christian worship of images 
is even more impious. Later in this same book he comments on the Aristo- 
telian criticism of Plato and Zeno, by styling it 'fabulous and ohildioh't 
2 
andq in the preface to the Scholae phZsicaa he castigates the attitude of 
some Aristotelians who ensure that "Moses is laughed at as an Egyptian 
story-teller". 
3 
Ramus mentions Plato's 'fiction' of the reactions of a man risen 
from the deadl and adds the view of Colothes the Epicurean who saidg "a 
philosopher should not have imagined this fable (a philosopho fabul= non 
oportuisse confingi) because no kind of feigning is appropriate to those 
who profess the truth". 
4 
We findy then, in Ramus the same sort of semantic confusion about 
the truthfulness or otherwise of poetry as we find in most sixteenth-century 
theorists of poetry. Renaissance theorists sometimes use Ifingerel simply 
to mean 'fashion' but it often has the pejorative sense of 'feign'. Grahame 
1. Sabolae metaphysicaep aLAv col. 965. 
2. Ibid. v col. 969; cf. Lbid. p col-859- 
3. Scholae physicaev preface in SLA after col. 616; of. Co=entarior= de 
religione Christiana, p. 26. 
4. Ciceronis Somnium Sci2ionis--explicatumv (1546), P-15- 
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Castor sums this up in this ways 
"Suchy thong was the status of foigning - an equivocal 
concept which was always in dangor of being equated 
with lying and deceiving. The ondoavour of sixteenth- 
century theorists of poetry was to stabilioo the con- 
cept and firmly to set aside the disreputable aura of 
deceitp pretence and untruth which surrounded it". 1 
Ramus seems to share the Pldiade's opinion that although poets are 
given to 'lying' this is not usually to be considered from an ethical point 
of view. Poets are not allowed to lie in the traditionally accepted moral 
sense of the term. Clements says of the Pldiade: 
"It is within the poems themselves that one learns of 
the Pl4aide's belief that deliberate falsehood and 
insi rYty in literature are cardinal sins. One may 
feign - that isv conceal truth - but one may not lie. 
Feigningp as a matter of factv was an important part 
of the primitive relationship existing between poetry 
and truth. The function of the poet was to interpret 
and embroider truth. In Pldiade theory, the process 
of feigning was entirely dissociated from the vice of 
lying". 2 
This could be taken as a s=ming up of Ramus' attitude also. 
Ramus sharest toot the confusion between the two uses of "fingere 
(feindre)"p that of making or creating, and that of falsifying. (Clements' 
translations 'creative imagination' and 'creative falsification, for the 
two areas of meaning are not very accuratet though the latter is better 
than the former). Castor has shown very clearly the way in which 'fiction, 
and Ifeindrel change meaning in the sixteenth centuryt 
"Fiction, thenp was a dangerous word for sixteenth- 
century theorists of poetry to usep for it was in a 
way to concede the point at issue from the beginning, 
and to admit that poetry does indeed consist of 
mensonges. It did seem possiblep however, to use the 
1. Castor, op. cit-v P-122. 
2. Clementsv op-cit-i P-4- 
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cognate verb feindre to describe the activity of the 
poet, without necessarily condemning him out of hand 
as a liar. Feigning had not yet gone the way of fiction, and was apparently still rogardod aa a fairly 
reputable activity. 22iLndro still prooorved its con- 
noction with the realm of material objootsv which 
seems to have beeý the original home of its Latin 
parent j finpgre ". 
This analysis is equally true of R=us, use of these words. Castor 
shows also that finTere could still have the meaning of modelling in its 
sixteenth-century French form of feindret 
"In these cases quite simplyl feindre has the sense 
of "to make a 
Wterial) 
copy of". Butp as Huguot 
points outp feindre was also applied to the literary 
artsy to signify representation 'par la parole ou los dcrits,. tt2 
The word acquires derogatory overtones in the course of the six- 
teenth contury: 
"Something of these derogatory implications was cortainly 
present in the sixteenth-century French word feindrof 
though to a far lesser degree than in fiction". -i 
Castor lists and evaluates associated wordsq such as 'fantastiqual 
and leontrefaictlo and shows that poetic fictions are not 'contrefaits'. 
He refers to Ronsard's 1572 preface to the Franciade and sayst 
"Ronsard is making a deliberate contrastt I think, 
between faindre and contrefaire; contrefaire is the 
legitimate kinT, pro-per to poets and artists in 
general". 4 
For my party I am sure that Castor is right here in his analysis 
1. Castor, op. cit. y p. 119. 
2. Ibid. t- P. =. 
3. Ibid., p. 121. 
4-_Lbid., p. 123; (contrefaire, it should be pointed outp was not necessarily 
pejorative, and could mean simply 'imitate'). 
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of the uses of these words in sixteenth-century Latin and Proncht and have 
found many illustrations to support his views in the writinp of Ramuo. 
In more general terma the idea of lvraiaemblancel cooma to have 
been one that was more familiar to Ramus than it was to most of the Pldiado 
writers, except perhaps to Peletier and to the later Ronsard. 
1 Thia results 
from Ramus' greater familiarity with the ideas of AristOtlG- 
1. Pierre de Courcellest in his , 
Rhetorique (1557), already has a good deal 




'Invention, 19 which starts off its life as an integral part of rhetoric, 
is at the heart of all Renaissance poetio theoryp though not all its resonan- 
ces are made clear in the arts of poetry. Grahame Castor has traced the re- 
lation between invention and imaginationg and invention and reasonp and shown 
how the concept degenerated from meaning 'finding' to meaning 'fabricating'. 
His overall contention is that the sixteenth century did not either have in 
its critical vocabulary the word originality# nor possess our post-Romantio 
concept of creative imaginationp but that "invention" does become an activity 
in its own right. It is not to Castor's purpose to go very deeply into 
Ramus' concept of inventiong 
1 
and so it is important here to develop it more 
fullyt and to show the evolution of Ramus' thought. 
It is worth examining the different uses of the term in some detailt 
especially in the case of Ramus, for whom it established the common linkv andq 
at the same time, the differences between the disciplines. An understanding 
of invention is imperative if we are to understand Ramus' frequent and pecu- 
liar use of the term 'argument'. First of allp he uses 'invention' to refer 
to the whole of an individual art or to the various component parts of an art. 
Sol for example, he debates whether Aristotle can be considered the inventor 
of logic or not; he agrees that Aristotle did not lay claim to the invention 
or perfection of ethics or physicas 
1. Castort op. ci .9 pp. 128-35- 
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"but in his logical OrAnnon he does not quote anybody 
as his teacher in logic, and even styles himself by 
name as the author of the whole art which has boon 
invented or brought to porfaction". 1 
I should like to draw attention here to the conneotion. botwoon inven- 
tion and authorship: it is of significance for an understanding of the prob- 
lem of creativity. 
2 In this case the inventor of an art seems to be the first 
person who wrote it down. 
We read elsewhere: 
"Plato wonderfully embraced those things which the 
ancients had inventedt diligently practised themt 
and even taught them wisely and increased them 
copiously, 1.3 
The reference to the Icopia inventionist will be noticed. 
Dialectict Ramus continues, owes more to Plato than to his predeces- 
sors because of Plato's own innovations. Up to the time of Plato it had 
been easy to observe nature and was obvious how this was to be done. It was 
Aristotle who gave himself to continuously arduous work, and who was really 
the master-inventor, but even he cannot lay claim to absolute originalitp 
"Aristotle followed Platov and with unbelievable 
labourp daily study and wise observation he soaxched 
for (indagauit), drew outp and brought forth like 
precious veins of gold hidden in obscure caveop the 
arts of invention before they had been described and 
the arts of reasoning before they had been invented; 
but he merely produced the coint he did not strike it 
The process of invention, Ramus says elsewhere# is a cumulative and 
corporate effort: ISTany things were invented by our ancestors for the use and 
1. Scholae dialecticapy SLA, col. 22-3. 
2. Cf. also the dedication of the , 
Scholae rhetoricaef in which patrons of the 
arts are called their 'inventors and authors', SLA, 001-185- 
3. Dialecticae partitiones, p. 8. 
4- Ibid. iloc-cit. 
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dignity of human life and bequeathed to postority of 
1 
Ramus also uses the word 'invention' to refor to a particular part of 
an artp for examplev a particular theory or technique. Contrary to what 
Hippocrates thoughtp writes Ramus, he himself did notq according to Philopo- 
nusy "invent the squaring of the cirolep but when he had squared a lons he 
erroneously thought the circle was thereby squared". Proolus, howeverp ad- 
mits that "there are many thines in 900MOtTY discovered by Hippocrates". 
2 
Rsmus discusses at length what exactly Euclid could be said to have inventodi 
1117hat about Euclid? What did he invent in mathematics? 
Proclus says that he collected together the Elementst 
and in this book he arranged much of Eudoxusq perfected 
much of Theaetetusp and many things which had been 
negligently demonstrated by the ancients he himself 3 
affirmed in unshakeabley irrefutable demonstrations" . 
Ramus calls this arrangement 'Perfecting, strengtheningto and sums it 
up as 'the exposition and decoration of a work'. Proclust he claimsq aeas 
4 Euclid not as an inventor but as a compiler or demonstrator. 
Ramus' fullest treatment of invention comes in his logical works and 
not in his rhetorical workst since he had transplanted into logic the first 
two sections of traditional rhetoric, invention and disposition. 
5 For Ramusp 
invention, as a logical or rhetorical term, almost always rofers to finding 
something one was looking for. 
6 
There are, indeedq he saysl(and we must note 
that he is firmly within the Rhetorical tradition), certain places (locit 
-ro I 710t ) and certain sources of invention (fontes) in which one can expect to 
1. Oratio do sua professioneg SLA, col-1103. 
2. Prooemium mathematicump PP-32-3- 
3. Ibid. p P-95. 
4- Ibid. loo-cit. 
5. Of. g, RTADDI p. 275; cf. 9 Tuvey. op. cit., PP-339-42. 
6. Cf. Castor, op-cit-P PP-95-99 
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find the answer to one's query. The working out of this process can be aeon 
in Ramus' admission that his aim is "dleslire do tant do livros, voyro boaucoup 
plus do recheroher par moy-mosme tolz preceptes ot roiglost quo la matiore do 
l1art requiert". 
1 Invention is always paralleled with diSPOSition, so that 
the second stage of the process is always to disposo the precepts which have 
been inventedo according to an artificial method. Invention is the "doctrine 
of finding the argument'll and its counterpartv diapositionp is the "doctrine 
of arranging the argument". 
2 
In his attempt to find a universal formula, and to show the related- 
ness of all branches of knowledgev Ramus fastens oft to the unifying factor 
that there is one common doctrine of inventiony one method applicable to the 
resolution of all problems. kristotle had contended that thia was not so, andy 
even if it were, that it would be so difficult to discover it, and it would be 
so obscure and barbaric that it would not be worth paying attention too For 
Ramusy this fact in itself is sufficient explanation of Ariatotle'a tautology 
and other errors in the matter of invention. 
3 The unifying doctrine of inven- 
tion is compared to a river with its various uses: 
"There is one river at Romeo the Tiberq which is suited to 
several purposes, for drinking, washing, irrigationg 
cleansingo putting out fires, and transport; nor are there 
individual streams set aside for all these advantagesp but 
the whole river is of such a nature that it is useful for 
each and every one of them; similarly the doctrine of in- 
vention is universally applicable". 4 
Por Ramusy the theory of the places of invention was far from being a 
mere logical or rhetorical exercise. All discourse was founded on it and con- 
1. La Dialectique, p. v-iii. 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, P-5v; Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col. 246-7. 
3. Ibid v SLA, col-506. 
4. Brutinae qýLiAestionesj (1549), P-47; (elsewhere the Seine is usedo instead 
of the Tiberv in the same illustration). 
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sequently all teaching. This in itself would justify our looking for the 
logical bases in the imagery of Renaissance writeral oven if there wore no 
other indications that sixteenth-oantury poets wore alive to this sort of 
thing. In the P4roration de l'Invention of the Dialectigue we find an ox- 
planation of why we should study the places of invention,, 
I 
Because of its 
vital part in Ramus' philosophical system this passage is worth quoting at 
some lengths 
"or par telz lieux ainsi distinatz notis avons tous 
les moyens d1inventer toutes choses". 
Meno, says Ramus, had argued against Socrates that there was no point 
in inventiont 
I'Maisp dit-il, 08 Socrater par quelle voya chercheras-tu 
ce que tu ignores du tout? quoy? Comment chercheran-tu? 
Quells marque to proposeras-tu do la chose quo tu cognois? 
Ou bien si tu. tombes d1aventure, on icollev coinment 
cognoistras-tu la chose ignor6e estre calla quo tu chexohes? " 
Socrates' answer is based on a pythagorean doctrine of reminiscences 
"Car puisque la nature de toutes choses slentrotient et 
slentresuyt, et que llesprit l1auroit cogneu totallement 
il ne seroit pas hors de propos qulaprbs qulil se earoit. 
souvenu de quelqulune de tant de choses, qulil ne puisse 
parvenir semblablement a la souvenance de toutes les 
autres conjoinctes et connexdes, moyennant quIiI fut 
diligent & chercher et qulil no so fascha du labeur ot, 
fatigue do llinvention". 
Aristotle's solution is that Icelluj qui cherche acait Ondrallement 
ce qulil cherche mais qulil ne le scait pas spdcialement'. Ramus objects 
that this explanation is not applicable to the time when man did not even have 
general knowledge. It is at this stage that he introduces hio own belief in 
the perfectibility of knowledge, and in man's capacity for knowledge (which 
1. La Dialectiquel pp. 66-9. 
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both Socrates and Aristotle would admit). His conclusion is beautifully ox- 
pressed: 
"Et quand il aura devant BOB youx Vart d1inventer 
par ces genres universelzp comma quolquo mirouer luy 
repr6sentant lea images universelles at g6n6ralles 
de toutes cho3esp il luy sera beaucoup plus facilo 
par icelle recognoistre lea esp6ces singulibreep ot 
par cons6quence inventer ce qulil cherchora. Maia 
il faut par plusieurs exomples, par grand exoroicop 
par long usage forbir at polir ce mirouory avant 
qulil puisse reluire ny rendre, ces images ..... A 
caste cause comme g6n6rallement touto doctrinet ains 
principallement Logique an caste partial no baille, 
poinct sea biens b. crddit aux paresseuxt ains lea d6- 
partit seullement aux diligens at laborieux, voire 
par juste portion; tant gaign4p tant pay6l'. 1 
This describes very clearly the necessity of hard work in the perfecting 
of any art. The doctrine of the places may seem to us rather unrewarding be- 
cause it is so artificaly but to Ramus and his contemporaries this particular 
mirror was worth polishing. 
Ong's treatment of invention and of the places is carefully worked out 
and shows Ramus' dependence on the Dutchman, Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485). The 
question of the placesp he notes, arises in connection with the need for dis- 
covering middle terins for syllogisms: 
"By what regular technique can these middle terms be found 
or 'invented'? This will be the first part of dialectic. 
Like Agricolap Ramus now proposes a list of topics or 
places in which are stored all possible middle terms of 
'arguments'. Here in the Training in Dialectic he proposes 
it as a list of arguments without enlarging on this term. 
But in the concurrent Remarks on Aristotle he makes clear 
that he wishes to do away with all discussion of categories 
and of predication in dialectic and all logic in favour of 
this topical orientation. By the time of his Prench , 
Dialec- 
tique in 1555v he has elaborated a full explanation of his 
1. Ibid Iloc-cit- 
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rejection of the categories and of his own way of de3ig- 
nating simply as larCuments' the loci themselves, tradi- 
tionally conceived rather as the 'seats' of the argumenta. 
Ramus can designate the loci as arguments because he can 
think of them as arguments which are goneric and of which 
the other items more commonly styled larguments' are 
speciesy org in his way of putting it 'parts"'. 
1 
We might add to this that Ramus does even equate argument and middle 
terms "the doctrine of inventing an argument or (vel) middle term". 
2 His 
intention throughout is to substitute these places for the traditional cate- 
gories. In the 1543 text there are fourteen arguments or places whichp says 
Ongp 
"will undergo an indefinite number of rearrangements as 
Ramus licks into shape further editions of his Tra 
in Dialectic and of the Dialectic which succeeds this 
initial workII. -J 
I shall say something about them in a momentp after a general analysis 
of Ramust ideas on argument. Hiss Tuve has attempted a definition of it: 
It 'Argument' is a special, technical word in Ramist 
writings. The best I can do with it is to say that 
it seems to indicate the relatableness of a word or 
thing. It is that which has a fitness to argue some- 
thing; every several 'respect' (relationt reference) 
is an argument - as man referred to God is an effecto 
referred to sicknessr is a subject, referred to a 
place he dwells iny is an adjunct'. 4 
The clearest account of the relation of argument to place comes in the 
Brutinae quaestiones. "Placellp says Ramusp can be used loosely; you can, for 
example, talk about the places of etymologyp meaning 
the parts of etymology. 
But, more technically, Aristotlet followed by Cicero, called the 
different 
kinds of arguments 10710L or places: 
1. Ongo 1? ýJDD2 pp. 182-3. 
2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col. 246. 
3. (5iTg-, -RT-DDP P-163. 
4. Tuvey op. cit., p-344; of. Castory op. cit., P-130. 
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"This is the origin of the wranglings of idle and lazy 
men about the difference between place and argumentp 
as if place itself were not an argumontp and as if the 
words of an art did not sometimes signify the art it- 
selfp and sometimes the things proposed in the arts; 
just as Inoment sometimes signifies 'noun', the part 
of sPeechy sometimes the thing itself which is proposed 
in that part of speechy as 'Cicero' or 'Cato's so argu- 
ment indicates sometimes the art of the argumentp some- 
times the thing itself which argues or proves. But how 
much simpler it would be to define invention (if we may 
indeed so call the first part of logic) as the art of 
those things which may be said about a subject. And 
since they would all prove and argue a doubtful matterv 
they may be called argumentst and the kinds of argument 
could be described without the interposition of the 
proper name of any place". 1 
Castor comments on a similar passage in the Dialectique: 
"The 'argument' is that which proclaims the true nature 
of a thing, that is to say it is the name of the thing 
or the mental conception of the thing: 2 
The reason he gives for this statement is that 
"since the order of the universe and the way in which 
the human mind operates correspond so exactly, there 
is no possibility that any epistemological slip might 
occur, no possibility that there might be any gap or 
discrepancy between things as they are and things as 
they are perceived or thought by human minds. v13 
Now whereas I am sure that Castor is right in showing how close is 
this correspondence he mentionsq I feel that Ramus does not intend to say 
that the name (or sign or note) of a thing is the same as the thing itself. 
Let us see what Ramus himself says about argument. First of all 
there are occasions in his writing when the word does seem to have the ordi- 
4 
nary sense of Idisputell but this has nothing to do with the more frequent 
1. Brutinae quaestionesv (1549)t PP-50-1; cf. P-59. 
2. Castor, ý2R. c , P-130. 
3. Ibid. j pp-130-1. 
4. Cf., for examplet Scholae metaphysicae, RLA9 col-647, where Ramus is talking 
about the controversy between nominalists and realists: 'they fought not 
only with words and arguments, but with bloodo slaughterp and almost with 
civil riot and sedition'; cf., alsop La Rhetorique Frangoyse ,P 
p-83: len 
ditz et argumentzt quand nous concedons ce que celuy qui debat et dispute 
contre nous demande luy estre conced6l. 
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technical sense. In general, Ramus sees argL=ent as the leoull of a doubtful 
questiona 
"Invention provides the arg=entt that is the soul of a 
question as of a dying body. The syllogism joins the 
argument with the questiong that iog the soul with tho 
body. I'l 
His first full treatment of argument comes as early as the Dialecticae 
Institutiones of 15439 where he describes it as followas 
"That by which a question is treated and expounded is 
called an argumentt that which argues, orp in other 
words, proves and demonstrates somethingg as Virgil 
says, Fear lays bare (arguit) worthless souls. Now 
the same modes of invention must apply in art as in 
nature. Therefore, since in arguing the mind naturally 
happens upon the causesp effects, subjectsp adjunctop 
disagreeings and other things arising from themp of the 
matters under discussiony this part of the art will stay 
in the same tracks, and will order us to look at both 
parts of the question, the major and the minor, in order 
to bring out the causes, effects, and all those natural 
counsels". 2 
This first classification does not appear in the Dialecticae parti 
ones of the same yeary but Ramus does at this point in the book list the 
simple arguments: 
"The main parts of a simple argument are causesq effects, 
concurrent and disagreeing circumstances. But there are 
four kinds of causesy final, efficientp formall material; 
and disagreeing circumstances are divided into contrariesp 
repugants and disparateso and contraries are divided into 
opposites, privatives, relatives. These are the principal 
forms of the simple argument, and from them arise genus, 
speciesy notationg conjugates, similars, dissimilarst ante- 
cedents, consequents, comparatesp division, definition. 
Yor genus signifies the cause of the speciesp species the 
effect of the genus. The rest can be taken in turn from 
all the others. A composite argument is one contained in 
the testimonies of gods and men, and in the conflict of 
enunciations". 3 
I Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), P-187. 
2: T)i al Acticae in67tt-itutionesp (1543)p P-8v- 
3. Dialecticae pqaZtitiones, P-5v- 
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In the Dialecticae inatitutiones this classification is clarified and 
appears as "kinds (species) of arguments.. some of them primaryl and others 
arising from the primary ones". In the first group are causeal offootal sub- 
jectsp adjunctsp disagreeings (dissentanea), and in the second, genust specieso 
names, notationt conjugatesp witnessesy comparatesq diviaionj definition. 
Examples are given to illustrate and explain the different kinds of cause and 
other arguments. There is in particular a lengthy account of 'comparatealt 
'Comparates' are those things which are compared to- 
getherp and are of two kindss for the comparison 
(collatio) is either of quality or of quantity; qua- 
lity is the habit of the things which are comparedt 
the force and almost the power of quantity". 1 
Quality itself is further subdivided into similitude and dissimilitude, 
The former is the comparison of different things but with respect to the same 
quality; for example, just as dogs are born hunters and horses are born run- 
ners, so men are born for discourse and reasoning. The similitude may some- 
times be expressed in a shorter form; for exampley "like the angelsy men are 
created for the use of reason". Or it may be hinted at by a mere adverbial 
indicationy for exampley 'many as if armed with dialectic'. Ramus goes on to 
contrast with this dissimilitude, which he calls an overthrowing of simili- 
tude. It is a comparison of things of different quality. 
Comparison according to quantity may be of three kindsp greaterp equal 
or lesser. An example of the first kind would be, according to Ramusj 'a man 
is some sort of a godo what wonder if he is a logician? '; of the secondy 'a 
man is an orator, what wonder if he is a logician'; of the third, teven animals 
Dialecticae institutionesq p. 8v; cf. Ong, RVDD, P-183. We might note also 
that the list of the arguments undergoes several revisions; there are some 
changes in terminology (leffectal becomes Ifactal, for instance), in 1548p 
and Igenusly 'species' and Inotatiol are 0,113entp to reappear in 1556. 
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have some power of logical reasoning, how could it be lacking in man? ' The 
use of comparison, says Ramusp is by far the most important and most frequent 
of all the argL=entsj and is the basis of all metaphor and simile. We notice 
once again the close links there are between the different disciplines. 
In 1554 Ramus defines invention as "the thinking up of an arg=ent, 
that is of a suitable way of explaining the question". 
' He calls it localio) 
because it points out certain precepts or places from which, or in whichp ar- 
guments are to be sought. These placest he saysp are sometimes called 6-Tojýjlj 
(elements). In Aristotle's logical workst argument is sometimes termed A Olyo. ý- 
7[L'rl(ý- (ratio, fides) but in the more familiar. Rhetoric 'fides' in the moot 
common name given to it. 
2 Argument is also called Oprobatiol. It is useful 
for us to notice all the different names given to the word 'argument' because 
they are all partial explanations of its meaning. It is particularly inatruc- 
tive to see how many of the words have to do with testimony or witnessing* 
The arguments are closely bound up with the appeal to the authority of the an- 
cients and with the Renaissance conception of imitation. 
Quintilian had defined argument as "a reason providing proofq by which 
one thing is inferred through anotherp and which confirms what is doubtful by 
3 
what is not" . So too, Ramus often equates argument and proof. 
4 
1. Dialecticae institutionesv(1554)v PP-8-9. 
2. jbid; in Dialecticae partitioneav P-4v we read that the first motion of the 
mind is 'to find the confirmation of a doubtful thing' and we are told that 
this calls for a certain amount of subtlety and acuteness; and on P-339 
'the more simples constant, holy discourse is, the more persuasion and con- 
firmation it will have in teaching'. 
3. Rhetoricae distinctiones in quintilianum, (1549)9 P-80. 
4. Of. Dialecticae institutiones, p. 2; Scholae physicae, SLAq col. 827; 
'probatiol was also a technical rhetorical term for the third part of a 
speech (also called 'confirmatiol or 'fides') in which the orator enumer- 
ated his arguments* 
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There are many additional points which might be made about the inven- 
tion of arguments in the placosp since it is a mattor to which Ramus returns 
again and again. As a final note I should add that there is a very clooo link 
between the arguments and 'copial. It is by the arguments that we appreciate 
the great variety that exists in natures 
"hence the great supply (copia) and furnishing of 
things. Therefore since there is so much good here 
we must devote great labour and study so that we 
may draw on the most ample abundance of things and 
the faculty most ready for all dioputation". 1 
Elsewhere we read that in the fifth year of a achoolboyin coursop 
gra=ar, rhetoric and dialectic will be studied together; this will continue 
into the years of the philosophy coursel and "the practice will be more copi- 
ous and rich in proportion to the richness (uberta3) and wealth 
(copia) of 
2 
the questions spoken about and discussed" . We often read about the 
Icopia 
inventionis's the scope of the four books of the Analyticap for examplat is 
given as linventionis copia at abundantial. 
3 
By 1555, as Ong showsp Ramus has perfected his rejection of the cate- 
gories and of predication in favour of the placess the treatment of the 
places has become very extensive and invention now deals with the separate 
parts of every sentence. In the Scholae dialecticne Ramus amplifies further 
his rejection. of the Aristotelian categoriest showing that there are far 
more than the traditional ten. 
4 In the Dialectique he gives various words 
5 
for arg=ent: 'principes, elemensp te=esp moyensp raisonsp preues'l wrongly 
1. Dialecticae partitionesp P-78v- 
2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA9 col-1017- 
3. Scholae dialecticae, g SLA, col. 191. 
4. Ibid., col. 121. 
5. La Dialectiquep p. 6; cf. pp. 63-4. 
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claiming that they were all equivalentrl and announcosq 'Nous uoorona doo 
vocables de raison, preuvel argumentp commo estantz lea plus racouz at usitez 
en cast art'. 
2 He goes on to give two main kinds of argumentp lartificielp 
qui faict foy de soy et de sa natural, and linartificial ... qui do soy at do 
sa force ne faict foy'. Natural reasons are contrasted with artificial 
reasons based on the authority of men. Ramus writes elsewhere 
"I do not abuse the opinion or authority of Plato, 
Aristotlev Iaocratesp or any other man. I seek 
the ultimate and first causes of things in thoir 
deepest sources". 3 
For more than fifty pages in the Dialectique Ramus analyzes the 
different kinds of arguments and gives examples of them (and it is here that 
the Pldiade were most useful in translating his classical quotations). The 
first broad division is 'simple et non issu dlailleurs, 
4 
and has four speciesq 
'Causes et Effectzq Subjectzq et Adjoinatz, Opposezq ComparezI. When he turns 
to the second main kind of argument Ramus lists Iloyq tesmoignageq pactiont 
questiony sermentIt and concludes Isi est-ce toutefois que tous ces argumentz 
sont appelez comunement authoritez et tesmoignageso,. 
5 
A metaphor basic to Ramus' discussion of the topics is that of the 
sources, springs or fountains (fontes) of invention from which arg=ents were 
to be drawn. The frequency of its occurrence suggests that it was being used 
rather tritelyp and that the metaphor had lost most of its original force. 
Prometheus is seen as opening the fountains of wisdom: 
1. Dassonvillep edition of La Dialectiqual P-103, co=entst tR. confond i0i 
des te=es dont chaoun a un sons prdois' (of. Aristotet 114t., N)i il est 
vrai qulil pr4tend n4gliger leurs r4sonances mdtaphysiquest. 
2. La Dialectique, P-5- 
3. Scholae rhetoricael SLA9 col. 238. 
4. La Dialectiquey p. 6. 
5- ibid., p. 61. 
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"with a few brief precepts to have opened up tho wonderful 
fountains of wisdomt from which he is said to have stolen 
from heaven, together with firat the artificial wisdom of 
Vulcan". 1 
In another examplep after his treatment of the argumont of causoop in 
1555, Ramus concludes 
ut 11 "Voila donquea la premiere fontaino do lljnftw, +etion 
Logiciennet Fontaine (dict Aristote au premier do la 
Demonstration at au premier do la Philosophie) do 
toutes sciencest car lors nous agauons parfaictementv 
quand nous sgauons les causess fontaino par co philo- 
sophe expos6e an tant non seulement do passages at 
chapitres, mais do liures entiers, qua no pouuons doubtort 
qulil nlayt grandement ostim6 la doctrine do costo partial 
pour laquelle il a tant trauaill6l'. 2 
In the Dialecticae 
_partitiones 
Ramus had declared that logic should 
contemplate itself and see within itself the image of God; it would Deep toot 
that 
"the fountains of all things which were to be investi- 
gated were noted and described in clear divisionsp with 
the result that nothing could escape man's diligence# 
nor deceive his powers of judgaent". 3 
In another example we read that Plato thought that men's immortal 
souls were plucked or gathered (delibatos) from the fountain of the godhead 
4 
and so had some knowledge of things before they entered men'd bodies. 
Another good illustration is to be found in the preface to the Institutiones 
oratoriae where we read that the author's aim will be "to draw forth the 
teaching of the arts from the pure natural fountains rather than from the 
Dialecticae Partitionen, p. 8; cf. Aristotelicae animadversioneav (1543)1 
p. 2; in the Pr6face sur le Pro6me des Mathd'matiques, PP-15-; P Francis I 
is described as establishing the library at Fontainebleau, in these wordst 
fil ouvrit les fontaines des louables disciplines'. 
2. La Dialectique, pp. 19-20. 
3. Dialecticae partitiones, P-47. 
4. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col-486. 
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disturbed streams of opinions". 
' 
mate source is often stressed: 
That naturo (or somotimeo God) is tho ulti- 
"Theology teaches us to live wellp that isp harmoniouclyp 
and in a befitting mannor with God, the source of all 
good". 2 
Ramus also uses Ifontes' to refer to the Hebrew and Greek originals of 
the Bibley before they were sullied bY mistranalations and disturbed co=on- 
tmAes ,3 and Ifons' describes the unity of the Church in which thero are many 
streams but only one source. 
4 
One last important use of the word is worth mentioning. It appears 
especially in the writing on rhetorict where reference is often made to the 
'fountains of eloquence'. The author of the, lnstitutiones oratorinep talking 
of the three styles, co=ents that although there is a different atylep adap- 
ted to different subjectsp yet all styles have this in co=onp 
"that they draw the same thingo from the open fountains 
of eloquence almost indiscriminatelyp" 
though they make a different use of what they have drawn. Tropes, in generalf 
are seen as being drawn from a fountain. 
5 
Disposition, which is almost invariably for Ramus the counterpart of 
inventiong traditionally the second part of rhetoricq is transferred by him 
to logic. It is inseparable from invention because it teaches the way in which 
the argunents which have been discovered are to be arranged. It is usually de- 
fined as 'the apt a=angement of things inventedlp and is synonymous with judg- 
ment and lcollocatiol. 
6 
1. Institutiones oratoriaev P-3. 
2. Commentariorun_de religione Christiana, p. 6. 
3. Ibid., loc-cit. 
4. Ibid., p. 82- 
5- Institutiones oratoriael pp. 69-70. 
6. Dialecticae institutionesq (1549), P-89. 
176 
In 1548 Ramus shows a preference for the rhetorical torma 'invention' 
and 'disposition' rather than 'invention' and 'Judgmentlp because disposition 
is a broader term and can include method as well as judgment. He claims that 
method and judipent are very different from eaoh other, but blurs tho diatinc- 
tions between themp especially in the later texts. 
1 The second book of the 
Dialecti_Ve begins with a description of tjugement' as Ila douziesmo partie 
de Logique qui monstre les voyes et moyens do bien juger par cortainea 
reigles do dispositionIq which, says R=usp Aristotle in the Analytics calls 
'composition et resolution'. 
2 There is great confusion about the terms herep 
because at one moment composition is given as synonymous with syllogism 
(which is only a species of disposition) and at another we find that "the 
whole of logical disposition could be called composition"O and that composi- 
tion is the same as judgment. 
3 In the Scholae dialecticae linventiol is 
called 'fides', and Idispositiol is called lordol. 
4 According to Ramus there 
are three kinds of judgmentv that which proceeds syllogistically, that which 
proceeds by means of arguments linked togethery and that which proceeds in 
the manner of the Platonic ascent to truth. 
5 All three are directed to "the 
6 
same imitation of mother nature" . The first kind is called syllogiom, lrati- 
ocinatiol or "the firm and necessary collocation of the arg=ent with the 
question". 
7 Ramus also calls it enunciation. (Ong co=ents on thist 
1. Aristotelicae animadversionest(1548), p-33. 
2. La Dialectiouep, P. 71- 
3. Scholae dialecticael SLAv col-54. 
4. Ibid-v col-55. 
5. Cf. Ong, MMD, pp. 182-190. 
6. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), P-19v- 
7- Dialecticae partitiones, P-7. 
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"Undoubtedly the most telling and curious ovarsight 
in this threefold division - which is ovorythirg in 
discourse after the invontion, of individual torms - 
is Ramus' omission of the enunciation or proposition 
or 'Judgment' itself". 1 
Ramus does notp howeverv omit enunciationj in the Dinlecticae--parti- 
tiones, there is a lengthy account of it on page 8v. ) 
Ramus points to the varying degrees of clarity and simplicity in the 
syllogism - some are more in accordance with common sense than others. 
2 
The second kind of disposition has a more general applicationp giving 
"the order of many and varied arguments which stick together and are bound, 
as it weret by a perpetual chain". Since dialectic is the instrument for 
interpreting and explaining everything clearlyt then the setting out and 
arranging of the arguments is of the utmost importance. 
The third kind of disposition is an examination of the harmony of 
4 divine truth. 
It is the second kind which is of the greatest importance for an un- 
derstanding of Ramus' thought, because it is out of this that grows, from 
1546 onwardso the study of method which we have come to associate with his 
name. Ramus likens this artificial method to 
"quelque longue chaine, d1or, telle que feint Hombre, 
de laquelle les anneletz soyent ces degrez ainsi 
d4pendans l'un de l1autre, ot tous enchalnez si 
justement ensemble que rien no slen puisse ostor 
sans rompre 11ordre et continuation du tout". 5 
Methodl then, is closely associated with order and correct disposition; 
1. Ongp FOADD, P-184- 
2. Dialecticae partitionesq p. 12v. 
3. Lb 
-id p .7 4. Lbid-9 cf. Commentariorim" de religione ChristiRna, p. 224- 
5. La Dialectique, p. 122. 
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I in so far as it is the best way (via (yove), ýC301,0<' ) of teaching a sub- 
jectq it becomes connected with the short cut or compendium. Estienneto do- 
finition is instruotivet 
Vethodet Mothodus. Clest uno broue fagon dlenoeigner 
ou apprendre quolque chose, au moyen do laquello lea 
ho=es paruiennent tost & lour decir". 
In 1554 (Dialecticae institutiones the short cut is given as the 
primary significance of methods 
I%Iethod is the disposition of many and various things 
proposed, but all tending to one end. We have called 
this disposition methodq although method signifies 
all teaching and disputationg but properly signifies 
a short cut (compendium vine). 111 
In his co=entary on the Christian religion R=us says that he wants 
all the precepts of Scripture to be arranged methodically (not alphabeti- 
cally) and according to their relation to the main heads of Christian doo- 
trine i 
"Although the wood (silva) of so many and such great 
matters is very broad and dense, yet they may bo 
understood artificially by means of abbreviated 
signs of numbers". 2 
In the same way, Ramus expresses the hope in the Prooemium mathemati- 
cum that some doctor from his own college will come forward who will freely 
explore the medical opinions of all doctors by the fire of methodical judg- 
ment, and describe them more briefly and more accurately. 
3 Similarlyp when 
Ptolemy said to Euclid 'Surely there is no better short cut (via magis com- 
pendiaria) to Geometry than [his] Elements'? Euclid repliedy 'There is no 
royal path to Geometrylp seeming to imply that 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554). pp-193-4. 
2. Commentariorum de relipione Christianag P-5; cf- Ong, MIDD9 pp. 118-120. 
3. Prooemium mathematicum, P-443. 
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"the way of his own Elements 
, was 
broad, open# aimplep 
direct and almost militaryp and so was a royal wayi 
but a shorter way would be slippery and steep and so 
not a royal way". 1 
Ramus often returns to the idea that a way through the wood muzt be 
cleared. He refers repeatedly to the thorns of Aristotelian and scholastic 
philosophy which must be cleared from the path. 
2 'Way' is cynonymoue with 
reason and methodt 
"The beat teacher ought in his teachingp to follow 
a short and easy way". 3 
Why then, asks Ramust does Quintilian proceed with so many digressions 
and meanderingsp and along such a thorny and twisted path? 
4 In order to 
diminish the irksomeness of long hours spent in study* R=us propooest 'com- 
pendiaria quaed= via. 
5 He wants theology to be popular and clear instead of 
thorny; no matter how extensive or dense is the forest of theologyt it can be 
penetrated by artificial short cuts, 
6 
It might seem at first that Ramus' theory of invention fits easily into 
the theories propounded by the Pldiade. A closer examination of what Ramus 
says and what the members of the P14iade and their associates said, however# 
shows that the points of comparison are not as many and as close as expected. 
1. Ibid., P*98* 
2. Cf. Dialecticae Partitiones, 
, 
P-13. 
3. Ibid-v PP-3v-4v; Of-, La Dialectiquep p. 123- 
4- Scholao rhetoricae, SLAq col-335- 
5. Aristotelicae animadversiones (1548), preface. 
6. Co=entariorum de relimone Christiana, P-5- 
iso 
Castor's exposition of the Pldiadeto attitude shows that although they used 
the word 'invention' very frequently in writing about the art of poetryt 
nevertheless they were consciously transferring it from the art of rhetoriop 
and still gave to it most of the resonances it had had in that field. But 
they did not work out in any detail how exactly the rhetorical invention 
of places was to be used in poetryp presumably because training in rhetoric 
was traditional, and familiar to every schoolboy. In a more general sense# 
they used the wordp as Castor shows9 both with the meaning of 'finding what 
one was looking forlp andt laterp with the pejorative meaning of 'making 
something up't though without necessarily the admission that this was the 
equivalent of lying. Later still in the century, and especially in Montaignep 
the word was often used to refer to what one had invented. 
In Ramus' writings the word is very often used in the technical senses 
which have been described in this chapter. This time 'invention' has been 
transferred from rhetoric to loozict and here again it has retained all its 
rhetorical resonances. The main difference between Ramus' usage of the word 
and of the idea and that of the theorists of poetry, is that for Ramust be- 
cause of his interest in logiop it is more clearly connected with teaching 
rather than with persuadingy (though a glance at some of the synonyms of 
largumentlo words like Oprobatiol and IfidesIt will show that the two are al- 
most inextricably linked). In Ramus invention and fiction are not as directly 
linked as they come to be by the theorists of poetryt except in so far as 
these are both connected with art (both as artifice, and as teaching). Ramus 
makes disposition the equivalent of method; we today would see invention as 
being closer to method than was dispositiong and this reflects how the word 
'method' has changed its meaning radically since the sixteenth century. For 
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Ramus it was a wa of arranging what had been found outt not a not of prin- 
ciples or a procedure for finding things out. For him invention and diopoci- 
tion, meanto exactly as they did for Ronsardf tracing a way which was already 
in existence. 
When Sobillet says that invention is the 'promiere partie do Poesiolt 
(title of Bk. loch-3), he is, as Castor shows# thinking of that invention 
which is the first part of rhetoric. But what this means in poetry, how 
rhetorical invention works in poetry# is never made clear, neither by So- 
billett nor by Du Bellay nor Peletier who share Sobillet's opinion of its 
importance. It seems to me extremely unlikely that the Pldiade ever made 
any use at all of Ramus' division of the places of invention, or of his dis- 
position of the arg=ents once they had been found. His mechanistic treat- 
ment is one which was entirely foreign to the Pldiadets approach to poetry. 
A priori one feels that images would not be sought with reference to the 
schoolboy rhetoric which the poets would all have studied. They would nott 
it is true, have written in a way, which was completely uninfluenced by their 
study of rhetoric, but they surely did not c9rry over any accurate knowledge 
of methodical tables. 
It now remains to say something more about the R=ist rhetoriop to see 
what he has to say about style in generalf and metaphor in particularp before 





The question of style was one which interested Ramus throughout his 
lifel and not just during the years he devoted to the study and teaching of 
rhetoric. Not only was so much of his work concerned with types or commu- 
nication, (which meant that he was also concerned with the form)# but he 
himself wrote his maxq books in several differing stylea. 
A fairly basic initial distinction which R=us made was the one bet- 
ween the written and the spoken word. 
1 He was well aware of the different 
force each kind of communication hado and was also aware that the distinc- 
tion did not always apply, in practice. In some ways it was hypothetical, 
because a text (such as a speech or a lecture) was often written out be- 
forehandq delivered and then finally printed and published. The impact on 
the hearer or the reader would clearly be differentg firstly an the differ- 
ent occasions a person heard or read the same textj and secondly between 
someone who read it and someone who heard it. Ramus was fascinated by the 
relation between the written and the spoken wordt particularly from the 
point of view of their relative persuasiveness. 
In the Liber de Moribus he compares the Druids' theory that the 
written word was undesirable because it gave the people access to the mys- 
teries contained in the different disciplines and because it encouraged 
people to memorize without understanding, with Socrates' view that in spite 
of its insufficiencies the written word was a useful antidote against for- 
1. Cf. Scholae rhetoricae, SLAq col-388; cf., also, the preface to the 
Euclides. 
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getfulness. To R=us, the orator and voluminous writerp the whole quootion 
was rather unroall but he does agree that the attitudo of Sooratos is Mora 
h=ane. The intransigence of the Druids, he says, has brought it about 
that we now have to approach the arto through the medi= of a foreign lan- 
guage. He iq not so much concerned with the occasional advantage of com- 
mitting one's thoughts to paper instead of relying on oral communicationt 
as with the fact that by vernacular composition a tradition of writing and 
speech would have been established. 
' Thin difference between the writton 
and the spoken word is often mentioned, from his earliest works onwardat 
"We now come to the practice of writing and speakingo 
which are treated together; but writing comes first 
both naturally and chronologicallyp and there is no 
other way of practising eloquence besides that which 
the rhetoricians have handed down". 2 
In my view it is hard to see how writing is more natural than speak- 
ingg except that it may be more natural and spontaneous to write than to 
read from what one has written. The revised text (the Dialecticae insti- 
tutiones), addst 
"although the voice is much more powerful than 
writing for teaching purposes, and the tongue is 
more eloquent than the handp as Socrates wisely 
argues at the end of the Phaedrus". 3 
It is more eloquentt says Ramusq because it can accommodate itself 
4 
more easily to the ears of the listeners. 
Ramus has no illusions about the unsuitability of language to express 
1. Liber de I. Toribus vaterun, Gallorumv P-44v- 
2. Dialecticae partitionesq P-71v- 
3. Dialecticae institationes, (1543), P-52v. 
4- Cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), pp. 269-70; of, Scholae dialecticaet 
SLA, col. 602. 
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thoughtt especially as he considered that our thoughts aro more oparko or 
reflections of God's thoughtst 
"There is no power in speech which is so strong that 
it can outline even the slightest part of the divine 
mind". 1 
Speech is further imperfect, he cayst in that we rarely talk accor- 
ding to logical structures; we do not, for ex=ple, give all the stages in 
the syllogism when we are talking. 
2 
We now come to Ramus' remarks on style as ouch. Ong has noted that 
Ramus progresses from an orthodox commentary on the traditional three 
styles (low, middle and high)t to a theory of the plain style. 
3 It seems 
to mey however, that Ramus does always retain the three rhetorical divioi- 
onsp because he never entirely convinces himself that the plain style is 
universally desirable. His addiction to the use of illustrative examples, 
even in his more technical writingy precludes a bare straightforward style. 
The mathematical stylet he declares, may on occasion convince an attentive 
reader, but it rarely persuades anyone who approaches the subject with a 
vestige of prejudice. Ornamentation is essential for all but the strictest 
and most technical mathematical works, andp even therep diagrams may take 
the place of verbal illustrations. Figurative language mayt and even 
should, be present in philosophy and theologyp according to Ramus. So much 
for the plain mathematical style. We must emphasize that the allegiance 
Ramus professes to it is often theoretical. Ong comments on the Ramist 
plain style: 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543)p P-41. 
2. Scholae dialecticael LLAI col-554. 
3. Ong, R. MD, pp. 212-3. 
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"This style is certainly not the high or grand otylot 
nor is it the low or middle style. It is the phoenix 
which rises from the holocaust of all three otylost 
the verbal counterpart of the coming visualiat uni- 
verse of lobjeotalp voiceless and by that very fact 
depersonalizedp which would soon recoTimend to the 
Royal Societyp as Thomas Sprat records in his history, 
'a close, nakedv natural way of apeaking1l as near the 
'mathematical' no possiblo". 1 
Now, while it is true to say that "with the appearance of the Ramist 
'method' ... decorum. and the three styles will disappear from the corres- 
ponding Rhetoric for good"p 
21 do not think that it is true that they dia- 
appear completely from R=us' WV of envisaging style in general. R=us 
does not ever reject the embellishment of languagal and the adaptation of 
the language of a particular piece to the capacity of the audience. 
The classification of the three styles is not the only possible way 
in which different kinds of writing and speech can be described, though it 
is the most co=on one in classical and Renaissance theorists; otyle can 
be described according to other criteria. This is often seen in the writ- 
ings of Ranus. He was particularly interested in the different styles 
which were adapted to different subjects. There is, for examplev the his- 
torical stylep which is characterized not perhaps so much by a different 
use of wordso as by the author's approach to his subject, by his objectivef 
uncoloured treatment of it. Ramus calls the ideal historical style 'pure 
eloquence'. 
3 aistorical writing, he sayst must be graveg equable and 
true. 
4 Then there isy for examplep theological stylev which possesses a 
1. Ibid. 9 p. 213. 
2. Ibid., p. 212. 
3. Liber do Moribus vaterum Gallorumv p. 28 (with reference to Livy). 
4. Ibid ; of.. Scholae rhetoricaep SLA, col. 271, 
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different kind of truth. If it is to persuadet and roligious writingg ho 
sayst is totally devoid of purpose if it does not incite the reader to 
piety, it must be popular, and it will achieve this end if tho writer illuo- 
trates his text with rhetorical examples. What characterizes it# above allf 
is its varietyp since it makes use of prophecyt hiatory and poetryt which 
make it urbane and elegant without destroyir4,, its plainneas. Tho cood theo- 
logical writer will take the bare truths of Christianity ('the rough out- 
lines of Christian doctrine') and will file and polish them before axpres- 
sing them 'in living colours'. 
1 
Apart from thisp style embraces differences which do not belong no- 
cessarily to any particul&irkind of writingg but may be used by the same 
writer for different purposes within a particular context. Variety of Otylev 
for example, is usually advantageous in that it will make the text more per- 
suasive. According to Ramusq the three traditional styles are themselves 
an example of this variety: 
t1to express humble matters in a modest ways middle 
matters in a temperate ways and important matters 
in a serious way: by every method possible to leads 
conciliatep alienates pleases moves excites relaxi 
to take where you want and bring back from where 
you want the minds of your hearers". 2 
This fits in also with Ramus' idea that all arts reflect the variety 
of nature: 
"What do all arts and teaching contemplatep admire 
and follow, but the i=ense variety of things (which 
have been founded and brought into being b the great 
all-powerful God in His incredible wisdom? 
ý'1.3 
1. Co=entariorum da reMone Christianag P-4- 
2. Dialecticae partitionesq P-46v. 
3. Ibid Y P. 41v. 
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Poets and historians often use a great variety of figures of opoooh, 
andp in generall Ramus thought that thi4 variety was essential for sweet- 
ness. 
1A 
work will be all the more admirable if it refleots tho variety of 
nature in the variety of its expression by using difforant tropos, figuras 
and metres. 
2 
As is to be expected it is in the Institutionas oratorino that we 
find the clearest exposition of the Ramiat rhatorico and the fullest dio- 
cussion of stylistic questions. Variety of style is one ouch topic to 
which this book devotes considerable attention, and the reason given is 
that rhetoriop by definitionp must be capable of dealing with My subject: 
"Because this teaching has no def ined region inside 
the boundaries of which it may be restrained# but 
is able to wander and exist in the immense area of 
all fields and arts - whether it is dealing with 
divine matters or with humanp with heaven or earthp 
with any kind of naturej with human manners and in- 
stitutions, and whether it is talking to many or to 
a few - while it will concede to the rest of the 
arts knowledge and understanding of things, it will 
reserve to itself the praise of illuminating and 
ornamenting speech. 113 
A further good way of examining what Razus had to say about stylio- 
tic questions is to see what he considered worthy of praise or blame in 
1. Cf., Institutiones oratoriaeg p. 24; Cf- P-41, 'By means of this happy 
and elegant variety poets and historians often soothe the minds of 
their readers'. 
2. Dialecticae partitionesq P-46. 
3. Institutiones oratoriaev p. 8. In this and the following chapter I shall 
make extensive use of Talon and Fouqueling and remind the reader that I 
am doing this becauset in the case of Talon it is never clear exactly 
how much of the books published in his name is by himy and how much is in 
fact simply the work of Ramus, and that in any event hero we have the 
Ramist rhetorict and in the case of Fouquelin we have a pupil of Ramus, 
and someone who translated very closely this R=ist rhetoric. 
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different kinds of style; in all these writings about rhetoric it is appa- 
rent that some qualities are to be found in all good style and othorn are 
restricted to writing which has a particular purpose. We shall not be our- 
prised to see Ramus or Talon extolling the virtues of a style which in 
natural, even though they thought that any writing must also be artificial 
in the sense that it is at one remove from reality. Communication was for 
Ramusp by definitiont artificial, Yet it could approximate more or logo 
closely to the ideal and so be more or less natural. In this context the 
word 'natural' is usually coupled with 'proper' or 'apt'. The idea has an 
obvious philosophical basis in the category of the OpropriumIt the four 
kinds of which are summarized in the Aristotelicae animadversionen (1556)t 
"That which belongs to one class and not another - 
that a man be a doctor; that which belongs to allj 
not one alone - that a man should have two foot; 
that which belongs to individualn and to all on 
occasion - that a man should have white hair in 
old age; that which belongs to individuals and to 
all at all times - that a man should be born with 
a capacity for laughter". 1 
This description of what is 'proper, is the philosophical background 
to what is tnaturall. On one occasion Fouquelin uses it with reference to 
the meaning of words. In explaining that Enigma need not be metaphorical 
he quotes an example where Itous les motz sont propres et naifzl. 
2 They 
are proper and natural in the sense that they are not metaphorical. Not all 
writing is proper and natural. Proper style means either that the words are 
all used in their literal senset so that the head must mean a part of the 
bodyl and if used metaphorically is used improperly, ar simply that it is 
1. Aristotelicae animadversionesp 
f 
(1556) P. 100. 
2. La Rhetorique Franggser P-14., 1557 t xt)- 
log 
'apt'. Even though style will be only in certain vory limited eiroumstancou 
natural and proper in the first sense, it should always be olear (with tho 
reservations already made about poetic licence) and apt or suitable to its 
purpose. 
In discussing the Eucharist in his co=entary on religion Ramus con- 
trasts 'foreign (exoticis) words and words thought up by man't (he also 
refers to these latter as $profane 
Xc)yojAa, \L. 2r (disputations) and 
VO CfW Y L. 7 <- (vain talking))l with the words of Sacred Scripture and 
of the Holy Ghost 
"the most true teacher of wisdom the most clear apeaker 
of eloquence, who uses words which are cleart significant 
and suitable for what is necessary for our understanding". 
1 
This is a good explanation of what Ramus considers to be the ideal 
style for any subject, especially a technical one, when we are anxious to 
appreciate the exact sense. 
Perhaps for him this is the most desirable characteristic of good 
style, that it should be apt, suited to the subject-matter. 
2 Usually in 
classical and Renaissance rhetoric a discussion of aptness in style has 
reference to the three styles already mentioned. Decorum will moderate 
the three styles. 
3 An excellent account of the whole question is to be 
1. Comentariorum de religione Christiana, PP-340P 342-3. 
2. Cf.. Institutiones oratoriae, P-72; Style must be suitable for the par- 
ticular speechp for the principal part of an art (according to Cicero) 
is aptness (decere): the one thing which can scarcely be handed on by 
an art. (ibid. ) Propriety is associated with brevity: a definition is 
a proper and brief declaration of what a thing is (Dialecticae Institu- 
tionesp(1543)t P-17v; cf. La Dialectiqueg P-58)- 
3. Institutiones oratoriae, P-71; cf. Scholae rhetoricaer SLAvcol. 2331 and 
Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, C01- 1041- 
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found in the Institutiones oratoriaet 
"That is apt which is a conjunction of words in a 
style accommodated to the subject in hand. When 
the orator's subject-matter is humblet grave or 
intermediatap then he must conform with the three- 
fold variety which is available for the explanation 
of things; and although there is a differenoo accor- 
ding to the importance and the nature of the matterat 
yet this is something which is common to all kinds 
of speech, that they draw almost promiscuously from 
the fountain of eloquence when they have been made 
available, but they make use of the ornaments I 
mentioned above sometimes in a more formal and oplen- 
did way and sometimes more loosely". 1 
The author goes on to show that in matters which are not elevated the 
orator must proceed unobtrusively and with delicacy. The result of this 
procedure will be that he teaches all these matters "in a modoot way and 
plainly". This humble style admits of an infinite number of levels of "apt- 
ness". The author also uses the didactic criterion with reference to the 
grave style. It is Ivehementp fullp copioust and arranged for the purpose 
2 
of instructing minds' . The 'copia verborum' is in great evidence here as 
it had been in the discussion of invention. 
The touchstone of the aptness of style isq for Ramus as it had been 
for Cicero, 'decorum'. In a passage of the Brutinae quaestiones Ramus claims 
rather tendentiously that 'decorum' is proper to logical invention and dispo- 
sition rather than to rhetoriol but goes on to say that since logic is in- 
herent in all the other disciplines, decorum is found everywhere toop 
"in all that is said and done, in all the plans which 
are made about everyday things not included in any art 
but which are the result of human prudence. Decorum 
is contained in every precept of every art". 3 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, pp. 69-70. 
2. Ibid*, loc. cit. 
3. Brutinae quaestiones, v 
(1549)v P-71- 
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In general the 'full' or high style wa3 accorded more attention by 
the rhetoricians because of its elevated moral connotations; the hierarchy 
of styles implied a hierarchy of aesthetic and moral values. And the 'copia 
verboruml was of particular interest to the men of the Renaissance bacauce 
of their desire to increase the purchasing-power of words in their own lan- 
guages, and to savour to the full the resources of Latin and Greek. Ramus 
was dedicated to this theory because he wanted schoolboys to make use of 
the riches of Latin in their own compositionst and because he wanted Latin 
phrases and literary allusions to illustrate his plain and natural dialec- 
tic. 'Copial reflects an increasingly more widespread use of languaget with 
the purpose of persuading and convincing the reader more easily. It points 
to an attitude to imagery and ornamentation which is radically different 
from our own today. 
In the Ramist view much is made of the idea of ornamentation. For 
Ramus "rhetoric is content with the possessions which are its own orn=ents". 
'When we devote ourselves to the practice of an art# it is as though we went 
into "some rich (locupletem) and ornate house of eloquence" and laid bare 
"the magnificent hidden riches of its construction". 2 The idea of the 
"furniture of eloquence" is borrowed from Cicero and Quintilians we read, 
for example, 'Hence (i. e. 9 from practice) comes all abundance and store of 
thingsp all proof and guaranteet almost all movement and delight in the 
soull. 
3 Ramus talks also about 'laying bare (explicandum) all the riches 
of rhetorical furniture,. 
4 Another image is usedl in the Institutiones 
1. Dialecticae institutiones (1543)9 P-58- 
2. Institutiones oratoriaep P-74. 
3. tHinc omnis copia rerumt et supellex... I (Dialecticae institutionesp 
(1543 )P P-53vj 
4- Brutinae quaes ionest (1549), P-94. 
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oratoriaep with reference to 'copiall and that is the imago of clothing. 
There was clearly a very close parallel between ornamentation and adormInt, 
and the idea of clothing (since this is the basis of the metaphor)v and it 
had the further advantage that it could be contrasted with the plain bare 
style. 
1 We read about the 'covering of allegory'. Just as we wcar clothes 
because we are cold, says Ramus, and later make these more attraotivep so we 
use tropes because we need tot and then later ornament tham. 
2 
In the Institutuiones oratorine 'copial is used on one occasion as 
followst 
"Forensic oratory has not only sinews and stingsp but 
also an accurate and ornate store of words". 3 
Ramus ret =s to the idea of 'copial (which, it should be rememberedt 
does not just refer to wordst but also mirrors EL flourishing of all arts and 
sciences), in the Prdface sur le Proe"me des Math4matiqueS, whenp talking of 
himself and the men of his generationt he says, 
11[Nous] avons plus veu d'affluence d'ho=es et d'oeuvret3 
doctes en un seul aage, que noz ancestres nien auoient 
veu en tous les quatorze aages d'auparauant". 4 
He goes on to say that the Iledicist and the French kingst Francis, 
Henry and Charlesp 
"ont redoubld ceste plante dlespritst cesteabondanoe 
de doctrinest ceste foison de muses quo Ion a veuG..., t5 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, v p. 81. 
2. Rhetorica, (1572)v P-7- 
3. Institutiones oratoriaeg P-70; cf. Brutinao--quaestioneal (1549)v P-94. 
4. Pr4face sur le Protime des Math4matiques, PP-30-1- 
5- Ibid., loc-cit. 
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(Ramus then makes another of his belated pleas# this time for a cultu- 
ral union between France and Italy. There are many other instances of Ramus, 
being behind the times. His academic aloofness ensured that he supported 
causes long after they had ceased to be living issues. In this instance what 
he is hoping fort above allp is IfertilitSt. Philosophy and letters, he 
writes, have filled the minds of men with Oun fruict tresplantureuxl). 
The loopial of orators is notp howevert for Ramus, simp3, v exuberance 
and fertility of imagination (though this is, indeed, a large part of it). 
He contrasts it in fact with the garrulousness and aridity of the scholastics. 
He also compares Aristotle's sterility with the fecundity of natural logic. 
2 
What is more surprising is the way in which he contrasts the Attic style 
3 
with Cicero's 'empty verbal glibness' . 
We have already seen that for Ijamus loopial is cultivated by inven- 
tion and disposition. Ramus felt that his plan to unite all the sciences 
could not but result in greater richness. In uniting rhetoric and philoso- 
phy, great labour is necessary in order to 'draw out the most ample ab=dance 
of thingsp and a faculty most prompt for every disputation'. 
4 He says else- 
where that he wants pupils to take from the feast of learning not just 
Icopiam et abundantiam' but wants these things to be cut up and prepared in 
such a way that they will be able to digest them. 
5 
The opposite of Icopial is linopial. The ancients we are toldl brought 
in words which were new both in form and meaningo 
1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, P-7v- 
2. Ibid. y P-79 - 
3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col. 249- 
4- Scholae dialecticaeg SLA9 col. 605. 
5. Dialecticae praelectiones in Porphyriump PP-4-5. 
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"not only in order to do away with the vant (inopia) 
and poverty of their own speechp but also to make 
it richer and more dignified". 1 
Fouquelin is even more insistent about Ila pauurotd do n6tre langu61 
which is only just out of its infancy, and which needs the laccoutrementz 
et (slil faut ainsi. parler) les plumes d1autruy pour so farder et acout- 
rer'. 
2 He talks, toot of the 'indigence do noms ot appellationa propres'. 
It is this linopial which begets the need of tropes. 
3 The 1562 Rhetorica 
goes even further than Fouquelin had done when it says 
"We even use figurative words more frequently than 
proper wordsp and that partly because of a lack 
of proper words and partly because of the elegance 
and ornateness of the figurative words". 4 
Apart from aptness a further quality which Ramus was particularly 
interested in was that of familiarity. The familiar style hold an obvious 
attraction for him because of his theories about man's natural logical 
abilities. He felt that the language of the common people was less likely 
to be corrupt and riddled with sophistry. All writers should strive to 
present their thoughts with the economy of language usually to be found in 
the speech of the common people, and which represented their natural app- 
roach to life. Ramus mentions this ideal in the Brutinae quaestiones and 
shows that it is also an ideal which can be achieved by extreme artifice 
such as that of Thucydidesp whop according to Antoniusv 
"is So accurate and apt in his vocabulary that you 
do not know whether the matter is illustrated by the 
speech or the words by the meaning". 5 
1. Institutiones oratoriaev pp. 9-10. 
2. La Rhetorigue Frangoyse, preface and p. 20. 
3. Eh-etorica, 572 9 P-7 
4. Eh-etOri-c-a , 
ý11562jv 
PP-ý7-8- 
5. Brutinae quaestionest (1549)t P-34- 
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But Thucydidesq thought Ramusq was an exception. Most writoro do not 
manage to match exactly their thought and the way they express it. Nonetho- 
lessq because of its proximity to the idealt Ramus thought very highly of the 
familiar style. On occasion he refers to the common everyday use of words in 
contrast to the technical use they have in philosophy. 
1 Dialeotiot he Gaynt 
because it is popular and natural may above all be expressed in popular and 
natural speech. Ramus reprehends Aristotle for his use of a geometric style 
in the Analytics,; this language, he claimsq is not common, it is 
"odious to young boysp not understood by the peoplep 
removed from common sensep and most alien to the use 
of rhetoric (which we want to preserve) and to the 
use of humanity (which we desire to strengthen by 
Dialectic)tt. 2 
This common usage iso for Ramust that of all menj and is a constituent 
part of the ideal of humanity. One should notep howevert that Ramus was not, 
in this matter, in entire sympathy with his contemporaries, because for him 
3 the familiar tongue was not necessarily nor even primarily the vernacular 0 
It was possiblep indeedp to be either clear or obscure# natural or sophisti- 
catedq in either languageo and 11amus favoured the Latin with which he was so 
conversant. 'When the schoolboy has worked two or three times over a text in 
the pursuit of his studies in grammax and rhetorict when he then comes to 
apply his logical principles to the examples which they provide, he will 
realize that "the language of those masters is already domestic and familiar 
to him" .4 fSermo popularis' is the subject of grammar ;5 we have already seent 
1. Scholae dialecticaep SLAt col-440. 
2. Pro ilosophica disciplina, SLA9 col. 1028. 
3. Ibid., col-1014; cf. De Moribus veterum Gallom-av P-44v- 
4- Pro philosophica disciplinat SLA, col. 1029. 
5- Scholae gra=aticael SLA, col-5. 
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too, that Ramus thought that theology must be expounded in a popular way. 
Ramusp Talon and Fouquelin all see the disadvantage of the familiar 
language, or at least that it sometimes represents the barest form of commu- 
nication which must be worked on and polished up until it becomes acceptable. 
Ranus' apparent confusion in this matter is a result of his attempt at over- 
simplification. On the one hand he wants us to believe that the languago of 
the common people is to be imitated by all because it is natural and devoid 
of sophisms and other accretions. On the other hand he has the clear roali- 
zation that speech remains artificial. The learning of a language takes 
place in a way similar to that in which the natural innate logic of man is 
perfected and-clarified by good teachers. Man has a natural aptitude for 
clear speech and expressionj and a childy if taught well and supplied with 
good examples, will learn to speak without apparent artifice. Yet no matter 
how well the lesson is learned, thought Ramus, speech remains artificial. 
Ramus is confused because he does not know how far he should commit himself 
to the ideal of unlettered speech. What he really means by populaxv domestic, 
familiar and common is not so much the language of the uneducated, but rather 
the unpretentious speech of right-minded (that is Ramus-minded) anti-scholas- 
ties. 
His attitude to the vernacular is curiously ambivalent. He did write 
-two or three important books in French, and in theory he favoured writing in 
French, but his practice belies this almost completely. The Dialectique of 
1555 is addressed to his compatriots; the exercise, he tells us, has been a 
salutary one which has helped him towards his own understanding of his thought. 
it has made his familiar way of expressing himself even more familiar and 
natural: 
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"Et voicy soubdainement quand ie rotourne den escholou 
Grecques et Latinest et d6eire h, l'exemple et imitation 
des bons escholiers rendre ma legon L la patrieg en 
laquelle ilay est6 engendr6 et eslou6, ot luy ddolairer 
en sa langue et intelligence vulgaire le fruiot de mon 
estudep ilappercoy plusieurs choaes r6pugnanten h con 
principest lesquelles ie nlauoye peu appergeuoir en 
l'eschole par tant de dieputeall. 1 
Ramus gives his support to the vernacular version of the Biblel though 
at the date of writing the cause could hardly be said to 
The same is true of his proposal that the laws should be 
laws of France be inscribed in French on twelve tablets' 
3 
suggestion so many years after Villers-Cotterets . 
The common language was important to him, but ho 
need his support. 
2 
in Prencht 'Let the 
- not a very original 
did not think that it 
was self-sufficient; it was bound to have the disadvantage of being rough and 
inelegant. If it was to make co=unication easy (and Isermonis facilitas' 
was always a desirable quality in his eyes) then it must be improved by illus- 
tration and ornamentation. 'Copial is accordingly linked with Isuavitas' 
(douceur). Mat strikes Ramus so forciblyt and delights him so much about 
Cicero's eloquence is the bare suitability of his words and the elegance of 
the way they are joined togethers 
"There is such great proprietyv purity, elegance in the 
words on their owny such great decoration, and so many 
brilliantly figurative passages when they are Joined 
togetherp such great pleasantness in the voice, such 
great dignity of gesture ... 0#4 
'Suavitas' has particular reference to sound. It is the business of 
the rhetorician to examine the Ilaus' (praise) or Ilumen' (light) of indivi- 
dual phrases and to assess 'what great evenness they have in their ordert 
1. La Dialectiqueg p-ix. 
2. 
'Commentariorum 
de relieaone Christianat P-4- 
3. Prooemi= mathematicum (1567)9 P-308. 
4- Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col-318. 
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what sweetness in their rhythmt what beauty in their figurool, 
l Tho role- 
vance of the sound-element here is that 
"things which sound well (like the other 'lights') 
should have greater 'Praise' because, by the agree- 
ableness of the sound, our ears lot us know for 2 
whose judgment the speech must be aptly feigned". 
Ramus' search for elegance in style receives practical application in 
some of his own better passages. He has both the simpler phrases of familiar 
speech and the polished phrases of the orator. He is conscious that hie own 
Latin style reflects a humanist's return to true Ciceronian excollenoop from 
the ineptitudes of some medieval and Renaissance scholasticsq who were inele- 
gant almost by definition. In his preface to the Dialecticae institutiones 
of 1549 he defends his own practice against that of the Aristotelianal who 
refuse to illustrate their writing with examples from famous authorst 
"For almost three years they keep clamouring about 
nothing else but the thorny points of their silly 
little principles; they despise the poetsv do away 
with the oratorsp and reject all men of an elegant 
and ornate learning; they think their philosophy is 
being undermined by them". 3 
The whole tenor of Ramus' arg=ent was that good writing and teaching 
must be elegant and humane. It is the job of rhetoric to adorn and illumi- 
nate speech. 
4 When he finds it necessary to defend himself aguinst his 
calumniators in the Pro -philosophica 
disciplina he invites inspection of his 
method of teaching philosophy: 
"let there be an examination of our teaching, so that it 
will be agreed that the charge preferred against us is 
false, and if we have in any way offended against human- 
ity, then we will make amendsp not only not roluctantlyt 
but gladly". 5 
Institutiones oratoriaev p. 8; Ilaus' and Ilumen' were semi-technical terms 
for ornament'. For a full discussion see Ong MIDD, pp. 278-9 and P-370. 
2. Institutiones oratoriae. L p. 9; cf. La Dialectiquel P-139. 
3 DialectiFae partitiones, (1549)1 P. S. 
4: Institutiones oratoriaep p. B. 
5. Pro philosophica disciplinag SLAt col. 999. 
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Ramus doest of courser realize that there ic a danger that orn=enta- 
tion. can lead to abuse but does not feel that this is a sufficient reason for 
the horror in which it has been hold by some of his contemporaries, 
1 
Any question of physics (natural philosophy), he says# may be provided 
with a parallel from a poet or oratorg to make it more humane. Ramucl own aim 
was that this elegance should not be simply an addition from outsidap but 
should become part of the philosopher's own style. 1111=anitaall is not Gome- 
thing superimposed; it is the result of men't communicating normally with one 
anotherp though it can be enhanced by trainings 
"And so the fact that men converse clearly with meng 
that they express in an ornate and splendid way the 
meaning in their minds ... that they achieve confor- 
mity of manners by laws and rules, and that they 
respect among themselves the sanctity of social lifet 
is a beneficial result of noble and praiseworthy 
teaching". 2 
The idea of illustration is one we have already seen something of in 
the discussion of Ramus' preoccupation with light. Here we find its basis 
and why he was so interested in it. Furthermore, it is connected with some 
other words of similar meaning, but with a different metaphorical intentioni 
enrichingo illuminatingt ornamenting and amplifying. Since all these words 
are used so frequently by Ramus and in different combinations it will not be 
possible to separate them completely, but, firstly, illustration itself - 
there are two main uses of the word9 the illustration of the arts (bypoetic 
examples, and so on) and of speech and style in general. In the preface to 
the Dialecticae institutiones, (1549) Ramus is at pains to show that he differs 
1. Ibid., col-1013-4- 
2. Oratio de sua Professione, SLA9 col. 1102; cf.. Pro philoso-Phica disciplinny 
SLAp col-1013-4. 
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radically from Aristotle in the Idescriptiong illustration and usol of tho 
art of dialectic. He goes on to explain himselft 
"As to illustration, we for our partt posit no prin- 
ciple in teaching which we do not explain by the 
clear testimony and examples of famous man". 
Even the Aristotelians, he says, admit tho noed of examples 
"for teaching clearly; not obscure examples, such as 
we find in Chaerilus, but clear as they aro in Homer". 
He finds however that unfortunately the Arictotelians do not live up 
to this and do not even give examPles from Chaorilus. 
1 Thero is containad 
also in tillustrarel the idea of 'bringing honour to'. The words are close- 
ly associatedl for examplet in the Libor do Moribusi 
"I love my country as I oughtt and I have a great 
desire to illustrate and celebrate its outstanding 
praises". 2 
'Ornarel and its cognates are frequently found in his writing in the 
company of lillustrare's 
"When we have laid out the definitions and divisions 
of all our passages we illustrate and ornament them 
with outstanding examples, and in this way our teach- 
ing becomes easier and the applicaticn of our teaching 
more straightforward". 3 
Furthermore, the connection of oraamention with light is brought out 
in a long lyrical passage in the Pro philoso-rhica disciplinat 
"Almighty and eternal Godt we give You the great thanks 
which we owe You, since instead of the leaden streams 
of the old grammarians, You have poured out upon us the 
golden rivers of Cicerop Virgil, Demosthenes and Homer 
and have lit in our times the singular light of Your 
grace. Our elders and ancestors were striving in their 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), pp. 6-7. 
2. Liber de Moribus veter= Gallorum, preface to Cardinal Charles do Lorraine. 
3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), P-347; cf. Scholae dialecticaeg SLA, 
col. 310-1. 
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laws for what You have given us; they showed us in 
a dark oloud what You have made manifest in the 
clearest light; they wanted to make the use and 
fruit of philosophy more pure by joining to it the 
elegance of the grammarians; You have made it moot 
fruitful and complete by very weighty and ornate 
examples of poets and oratorsit. 1 
Ramusl- imagery here is highly intricate and confuaod - weightinooot 
fruitfulness$ ornamentationg clarity and light - but nonothelcas all the 
images express his enthusiasm for his cause of enriching humanity by clari- 
fying all problems of communication. It is here that Ramus' interest in the 
clarity of style is linked with his idea of orn=entation of style. We munt 
notice that the two ideas are found together so frequently. 
We find often, toot in the writings of Ramus the use of the word 
fornamentallparticularly in the works dealing with rhetorical subjects. The 
Institutiones oratoriae mentionst for exampleg "the reputaticn of countless 
men who talk seriously and ornately without any rhetorical precaptep and are 
2 
remarkably excellent in the ornaments of speech" . Ramus gives as one of 
his reasons for managing to pack the large lecture-halls with students the 
fact that he pressed into his service poetst historiansq orators and philo- 
sopherso who have supplied him with "wealth and richesp ornamento and lights 
of speech, discoursep and reasoning". 
3 These ornaments of speech are capable 
of imitation as well as of explanation. 
4 Poets make more adventurous use of 
them than do prose writers: 
1. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col-1036 0 
2. Institutiones oratoriaeg P-7; cf. Brutinse quaestionesp (1549), P-32- 
3. Oratio de sua professionel SLA, col-11041 lopes so divitiast orn=enta ac 
lumina sermonist orationist ratiocinationis'. 
4- Ibid. 9 col. 1106. 
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"They use more daringly all ornoments of sinelo words 
and words linked togetherg to Civo t omsolvos greater 
auditive pleasure in their writingIC 
Sometimes the word 'ornamental is coupled with 'pigmental. 
2 Thin 
tallies with Ramus' frequent use of terminology which seems moro appropriato 
ta the art of painting. Man's mind is not a 'tabula rasa' p "but naturally 
filled with certain colouring and outlineall. 
3 In the eamo way Ramus agoo. 
ciates poets with philosophers "in order to colour and strengthen eloquence". 
4 
Ornamentp like illustration, is connected with the idea of praise. 
5 Ile says 
explicitly, quoting Cicero, 
"the greatest praise... of eloquence is to amplify a 
thing by ornament; this is valid not only for adding 
to something by speaking in a lofty wayp but also for 
minimizing or degrading something,,. 6 
"Illuminare" is also linked with both "illustare" and "ornare". It is 
used especially in the phrase "illuminare mentes". 
7 "Amplificare", tcmp is 
used in similar contextss for exampley "in order to amplify and ornoment, tho 
disputation". a In his dedication to Madame (Maryp Queen of Scots)t Fouquelin 
refers to her as 
Ilune Princesse ndev et selon la co=une esperance 
diuinement predestinge, non seulement pour llampli- 
fication ot auancement do n6tre langue, mais ausai 
pour llillustration et honneur de touto science". 
The idea that a language could be so enhanced was clearly current coin 
1. Institutiones oratoriael P-72. 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, p. 8v. 
3. Prooemim mathematicump P-353. 
4. Pro philosophica disciplinay SlAt col. 1019; cf. Dialecticae institutioneop 
(1554)p p. 213- 
5- Institutiones oratoriae, p. 20. 
6. Ibid. v P-7; cf. La Rhetorique Pranq2Xse, p. 23; for this technical use of 'praise' of. above P-1989 n. l. 
7. Commentariorum de reliffione Christianap P-303 and P-348. 
8. Scholae dialecticael §LAI col-552. 
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at the time. Nevertheleasp the word (amplification) is comatimoo ucod pojo- 
ratively. In the preface of the Drutinne quaeationont addresood to Honryt 
Ramus writess 
"When I say that my dootrinea are not only froo-born 
but royals I a; n not exaggerating (amplificandi)t but 
exprG33ing their nobility in a true and simple mannor". 
There is here the suggestion that ornamentation is a doparture from 
the bare truth, and that it shares the label of prevarication for persua- 
sive purposes. The same idea lies behind the passage from Fouqualin which 
talks of the laccoufrementz' with which the poor French lariguago is obliged 
to Ise farder et. acoutrerl, Behind this we may perhaps perceive tho Crook 
S' )2. counterpart of lornatal ('XVXOe[kýý 9 Fouquelin returns to tho 
idea a few pages further ong acknowledges his debt to Du Bellayp and makea 
the link with lornementz' expliciti 
"Et par mgme moien nous ont laissd n6tre langue si 
pauure et nuep quIelle a besoing des ornementz ot 
(slil faut ainsi parler) des plumes dlautruy". 
ý 
On the one hand we see poverty and nakedness, on the other riches and 
fine apparel. It was so easy for ornament and decoration to become excesGival 
"When the lights of a Speech (which the Greekscall 
dX, 11142V ) are too beautifully or too pleasantly 
expressed they are often repudiated as childish and 
unfitting.... And the repetitions of words which we 
have described... often go off into T. IV-joAoytaVp 
(tautolo, gy) or (affectation)p when 
they are sought immoderately or inopportunelyp and 
they not only take away the seriousness of what is 
being saidl but even rob the words of their ornateness 
and beauty: forl just as some women are said to be 
1. La Rhetorique Frangoyset preface; (in the 1557 revision, P-3v. 9 #accoutre- 
I ýe s sliftuetignI, (1554). p. 222. 2. tKtBia ecUilceae'Tnes 
3. La Rhetorique Frangoyseg. p. 20. 
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unadornedp because their hair it; too well groomod and 
curledv so in a speech which io too wall polished and 
painted with figureal there arise somewhat vaxatious 
and painted vicest'. 1 
The theorists of poetry whom we have been looking at# weret of coursop 
preeminently concerned with stylet even naking it synonymoun with 'elocution' 
as Ranus does. Sebillet, for exa=plep has a chapter entitled IDU atylo, du 
Poetet du chois et ordre d4s Vocablest appolld on Latin# Elocutioniq 
2 
and 
Ronsard begins his section 'Do VElocution' in these wordot 'Elocution West 
autre chose qulune propriAd et splendeur do paroles bion choicies ot orn4ea 
de graves et courtes sentences... 
3 
In spite of the fact that all the theorists were concerned with style 
from a practical rather than a theoretical point of view, there emerges none- 
theless from their treatises a clear attitude to style. In general termst 
as we saw in chapter twot poetry during our period becomes an activity in its 
own right, self-authenticatingy and distinct from rhotoriop history and 
ethicsp with the result that it develops a style of its own. 
Predictably enough, the plaint bareq mathematical style was far from 
being congenial to the poets. Du Bellay even talks of 'figures et ornemenst 
sans les quelz tout oraison et poeme sont nudzt manques et dabiles. 
4 Naked- 
ness in a poem is quite inappropriate. Yet the poem must still be cloar. 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, pp, 80-1. 
2. Sebillet, Art Po6tique frangoys, ed. cit. p p. 29. 
3. Ronsard, Abbreg6 de l'Art Po6tique frangois, ed. Laumonierv XIVt P-15- 
4. Du Bellayp Deffense, ed. Chamardt pp-35-6. 
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Poletior writes, (and this is at the beginning of a chaptor ontitlodg 'Dos 
Orn/mans de Po6si/')9 ILa pr/mier/ e plus dinj vortu du roopi ot la Clartoll Lk1.4. 
and Ronsardq in the Abbre4 shows his concern for clarity and moaningrulneas 
in a poemi on three occasions in this short work he makon thin pointj that 
words must be taignificatifzl. He says, for in3tancol 'too opithotou noront 
recherchez pour signifier ot non pour remplir ton carmo ou pour etro oycoux 
en ton vers'. 
2 
On the other handq what also comes out very clearly indood from the 
arts of poetry is a particular theory of ornamentation which is aimilar to 
that of Ramus. We find there the same attitude to ornament as a f; armentt 
rather than as mere decoration. I feelt however, that both in Ramus and in 
the sixteenth-century writers in general, thia theory of ornamentation is 
nearer to the modern idea of ornsment as decoration than either Ong or Ition 
Tuve would allow. 
3 It does not take long for the gnrmonta which wore necos- 
sary for the covering of nakedness to become finery and covered with pretty 
jewels. In the chapter from Peletier which I have just referred to he makes 
this quite cleart 
11E a cetýci [i. e. la Clýrte]j lea particuliers Orn/mans 
doe4t obeTrt l6quez spront rarXs e antriluisans parmi 
lj Pojmjq commi lea fleurs an un pro, ou comm/ lea 
anneaus es doqz" ... 
4 
Ronsard, toot in the passage from 'Do VElocution' already quotedt 
says; 
1. Peletier, L'Art Podtiquej ed. cit., p. 126. 
2. Ronsard, op-cit-P P-17- 
3. Ongg 1UTDDy pp*277-9 and Tuvej Elizabethan and Metaphysical ImqEerY-O Chicagot 
19479 pp. 61ff, which Ong discusses here. 
4- Peletiery loc-cit. 
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orn4es do graves at courtes sentoncoaq qui font 
reluyre les vers co=o los pierroo prociousoo bion 
enchass4es les doigto do quolquo grand Seignour". 1 
This ideal will be achievedt according to all tho thooricto wo hava 
been looking at, if attontion in paid to 'copialt which wan such a common- 
place in the Renaissance outlookq and the very banis of tho 'illustration 
do la longue frangoiael. Sobillet, for examPlot talks of Illillustration 
et augmentation de notre longue frangoisof and of the Icopio du futur 
Po,... A, tel. 2 The idea of 'copiel is perhaps the koy-note of the Daffenso. 
The chapter 'Pourquoy la Longue Frangoyso West ai riche quo la Grequo at 
Latinel begins in this ways 
"Et si nostre Langue niost si copieuso ot richo quo 
la Greque ou Latinep cola no doit estro imput6 au 
default dlicellep comme si Valle mosmo ollo no pou- 
voit jamais ostre si non pauure ot aterilos main bien 
on le doit attribuor & llignorance do notz majours". 3 
In the following chapter I shall show how this 'copie'was to be 
achieved, by the use of the rhetorical 'colours' of figures. 
1. Ronsardt op-cit. P-15- 
2. Sebillety-E-p-ci -9 pp. 31-2. 
3. Du Bellay, Up-.: c7it. 9 pp. 22-3- 
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CIWTER NINE 
PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE YMITING 
One of the principal tensions in Ramus' mind when he writes of the 
theory of style is the one between plain and figurative writing. As wo have 
seent for Ong there is a gradual progre3sion in the writing of Ramuo towards 
a doctrine of the bare mathematical style; it must nott howevert bo forgotten 
that for Ramus ornamentation was not incompatible with clarity. In spite of 
his interest ing and his reputation fort logical precision and brovityp it in 
his theory of disposing material according to the 'method of prudenceto which 
takes into account all the circumstances of any situation# which eventually 
wins the day. To put the matter at its simplest, for Ramus, if writing 
is to 
have any purpose at all, one of its main characteristics must be that it is 
persuasivel and in order to persuade it must be enhanced by ornament. 
Figurative language is usually artificial# removed from the natural 
speech of the uneduated. 'Figurelp writes Fouquelinv 
Ilest unlespece d1elocutiont par laquelle le langage 
est chang6 de la simple et vulgaire manidre do 
dire.... " 
He goes on to say that it is 
"un peu changde de la vulgaire et acoutumee mani6ro 
de dire, qui sloffre premierement, quand nous 
voulons deuiser et parler de quolque chose: non pas 
que le vulgaire n1use quelquefois do ces ornements 
do Rhatoriquep mais pource quo ces lumieros no re- 
luisent pas si souvent, au langage ot parler des 
indoctes". 1 
The language of the unlettered is neither as varied nor as rich as 
that of the educated. Figurative language calls for a conscious use of the 
La Rhetorique FranQoyse, P. 34. 
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fornements do Rhatoriquolt which are very carefully analyzed and lictod both 
by Ramust Talon and by Fouquelin. There is nothing haphazard about the Ra- 
mist theory and technique of ornamentation. 
Renaissance arts of poetry usually relegate any serious and detailed 
study of ornamentation to rhetoric. I propose to act out in come detail the 
Ramist classification of ornaments because it is complementary to the the- 
ories of the PlSiade. In its main linesp and even in most of its dotailst 
Ramist rhetoric is traditional rhetoric. It is the rhetoric with which the 
members of the Pldiade would have been familiar, not because of any direct 
influence on them of the work of Ramus, Talon or Fouquelint but because this 
was the rhetoric$ (at least in so far as ornamention was concerned) which 
they had studied at school and university. 
In general terms, for Ramus style (elocutio) is 'the alteration of 
speech from the practice of common men to some more elegant manner' and it 
is to be divided into trope and figurep (trope being the alteration of 
single words, and figure that of words joined together). 
' There is some con- 
fusion in Ramus' mind whether or not trope is synonymous with metaphor. In 
the Brutinae 
_quaestiones 
he complains that Cicero has wrongly equated trope 
with metaphor; he should rather have defined it as. elocutio in single words 
in which the meaning is changed from its own place into anothorg and he 
should have divided it into metonymyq irony, metaphor and synecdoche. 
2 In 
his commentary on Quintilianp Ramus gives Quintilian's definition of tropet 
"the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to an- 
other", and takes him to task for the reference to a phrnset since trope 
1. Brutinae quaestiones (1549)t P-95. 
2. Ibid., loo. cit. 
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should be restricted to single words. 
1 He goo3 on to dioagroo with Quinti- 
lian's twelve-fold division of tropes (metaphor, synecdoche, motonymyt anto- 
nomasiap onomatopoeiap catachresist metalepaist opithatont allogoriat pori- 
phrasis, hyperbatont hyperbole), and reverts to the four-fold division advo- 
cated above. Ramus is carping here; what he finds fault with above all in 
the logical invalidityt as he saw itt of Quintilisn's divisions. The dofi- 
nition of metonymyt for example, 
2 is one which is applicable to all tropeat 
and onomatopoeiap metalepsis and hyporbaton do not involve any change of 
meaning. Allegory is defined as an 'inversion which shows one thing in words 
and another in the meaningt sometimes even the opposite'. Ramus' comment in 
that the first part of this definition applies to all tropes and the second 
is a definition of irony, and is not a new tropep even if it in continuous. 
In the, Institutiones oratoriae it is defined in this ways 'Allegory is the 
inversion of a speech when one thing is said and another understood'. Accor- 
ding to this work there are two kinds, allegory proper# where by means of a 
comparison some related meaning is takent and irony (dissimulatio). The 
first kind is often 'brought into being as a result of continued metaphors'. 
]Proverbs contain the same sort of figure. 
3 When Fouquelin adapts this pas- 
sage of the Institutiones oratoriae he considers allegory as 'metaphors mul- 
tiplide et conliniido). The reason he gives why it should not be separated from 
metaphor is that Illornement West point changdq ains seullement multiplid'4 
1. Scholae rhetoricae, §LAy col-366; Quintiliang Institutio, oratoria, VIII#Viq 
I, translated by H. E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library# Londong 1922. 
2. Slominis pro nomine positiol. 
3. Institutiones oratoriaeo PP-42-4- 
4. La Rhetorique Franqoyseq p. 21. 
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To return to Ramus, commentary on Quintilian - Ranu3 addo that laodgmal 
which is not in Quintilianle list Jag according to Quintiliant a kind or ai- 
legoryt but for Ramus many aenigmata are not tropes. Fouquolint toot wao 
aware of this. He notes that the ancient writera on rhotorio called allo- 
gories which were obscure lenigmeal, but says that somo of theoe are not 
really tropes because the words are used in a proper and natural cence. Ifin 
conclusion is that 'Amigme West point tropei maia ni quolquefois lIA*ni%7-1Q 
se fait de motz tranafergs, il le faudra referor & la Motaphorol. 
1 
R=us aims to prove syllogistically that there can be only' four kinds 
of tropes. Whenever there is an alteration of the proper meaning# ho doo- 
laresp it must be from causes to effects (metcnymy)t from subjects to ad- 
juncts (also metonymy)p from opposites to opposites (irony)q from thingo com- 
pared to things compared (metaphor), from the whole to the part (ay-necdocho) 
or vice versa, then this must be either metonymy, ironyp metaphor or eynec- 
doche. But every trope, he continueop is an alteration of the proper meaning 
of a word from causes to effects... and so on. 
2 
Perhaps the clearest discussion of trope comes in the Rhetorique 
Frangoyse; and the position adopted in this work is exactly that of Ramus in 
the commentary on Quintiliant 
"Elocution nlest autre choset quo llornemZt ot enrichis- 
sement de la parolle ot oraison: la-luelle a deux eap6coo, 
loune est appell4e Tropet l1autre Figure. Trope est une 
1. Ibid! t p. 23; for a lengthy discussion of En1me, cf. Sebillet, op. cit. # 
pp-175-7, where it is defined as lalldgorie obscure, vice d1oraison 
appelld en Qaintilianj a cause do son obscurit4l. (It seems to be better 
to mention the few figures treated by the theorists of poetry at the came 
time as they are described in the Ramist rhetoric so that a comparison can 
be made). 
2. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col-373; cf. Peletier, op. cit., P-135 Uroniis) 
and p-137 (Ifetonimij). 
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elocution par laquelle la propre ot naturollo aignification 
du mot est chang6o an uno autre: co quo declare oo mot 
(Trope)p qui signifie en frangois, mutation". 1 
The four kinds of trope he gives are identical with those mentioned by 
Ramus. 
Fouquelin lists several examples from contenporary French pooto to 
illustrate the different kinds and subdivisions of tropes. As R=us had caidt 
the first kind of trope is metonymys (a) metonymy is present when the word 
which properly signifies the cause of s=ething is used for the offootl (b) 
when the effect stands for the cause; (a) when the name which properly Digni- 
fies the subject is used for the circumstances; (d) when the subject is under- 
stood in the circumstances. These four kinds of metonymy are distinct and so- 
parate from one another, but they may be found joined together in practice. 
The criterion to be followed in using these tropes is discriminationt and 
Illusage de ceus qui parlent bien et elegamments lequal nous deuts principa- 
lement suiure et imitert. This will often be possible in verse where it would 
not be acceptable in prose. 
Irony, the second kind of trope is erplained by Fouquelin in these 
words: 
"quand par le contraire le contraire est entendut cleat 
a dire quand on usurpe que1que mot le contraire du qual 
nous voulons signifier. Les Frangois la peuuent appeller 
simulation et dissimulation, laquelle se pout entendre, 
tant par la pronuntiation, que par la nature do la ch6se 
de la quelle on parle. 11 
Fouquelin lists also 'Preterition' which is a kind of dissimulation 
lquand nous faisons semblant de ne vouloir diret ce quo toutefois noun disons'. 
The third kind of trope is metaphor. Because of the confused relation- 
1. Ibid., p. 1; cf. Institutiones oratoriael P-14- 
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ship between trope and metaphor in Ramist writing I fool that this point do- 
mands closer attention. It is also important bocauso of tho froquont rofor- 
ences to metaphor throughout Ramist writingst and becauso thin rainoo tho 
broader question of the nature of figurative language. To start with Fouque- 
lin's description3 he defines metaphor as 
"quand par le semblablet le eemblable est entendu; 
clest & dire quand un mot propre h signifier quolquo 
chosep est usurpd pour un' autra somblable ?L icollo: 
comme (lumi4re) est proprement attribudo au soloilt 
quand on dit la lumi6re do llesprit, clest une mota- 
phorep 1 quo 
nous pouuons appoller en Frangoiap tranala- 
tion". 
The first kind of metaphor is described by Fouquelin in these tomal 
'Ice qui est propre aus choses divinesq souuentefois 
aveq grace est acommod6 aus choses humaineall. 
Metaphor is also often taken from the elements. Fouquelin illustrates 
this with a quotation from Du Bellay's translation of Aeneid IV: 
"Elle qui ia de la mort est certainel 
Dtorrible et grand ie ne s9ay quoy demaine 
En son courage, et son ire enfla;, -mee 
Fait refloter sa poitrine allumeellp 
and comments 
"Floter est propre en lleaue, en un ho=9 douteus et 
incertain, il est transferd et metaphorique". 2 
Further, metaphor may also be derived from animalsy plants and treest 
and from farts et metiers'. There are some scattered remarks on different 
aspects of metaphor: the assertion for example that Catachrese 
('tout trope 
un peu plus hardiment pris') is permissiblep even though it is 
tabusifl; ift 
howeverp it seems too hard on the ear it should be toned down by tpremuni- 
3 
tions' such as 'par maniere de, dire' or Islil faut ainsi parlert . These 
1. La Rhetorique Franýojseq P-15. 
2. lbid. 9 P-17. 
3. Ibid. 9 p. 20. 
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qualifying phrasest of courset, notes Fouquoling are moro frequent in prooo 
than in poetry* Fouquelin is ready to admit hyperbolo as part of mataphort, 
calling it tun exces et superlaticnde signification' t because he foola that 
the presence of similitude means that it should not bo too rigorously Gopa- 
rated from metaphor. It may be used either to amplify or to attenuate. 
Fouquelints conclusion to the section on metaphor is thiet 
"quelque diction ou mot quo ce soito loqual sera trana- 
fer6 de sa propre signification, en uw autrep par 
quelque similitude, sOit singulier et uniquet ou 
oontinu6 ou excessif, ou diminutift ou transfer& par 
quelque autre manierev sera apelld metaphoriquallel 
The appeal of metaphort he adds, is due to its great capaoity for 
delighting the mind. 
2 
At this stage it is necessary to say something about Ramuel attitude 
to metaphor in general. He quotes in Greek Aristotle's definition of it in 
the Art of Poetry: 
I'lletaphor is the application of an alien name by 
transference either from genus to specios, or from 
species to genusp or from species to species, or by 
analogy, that isp proportion". 3 
I 
Ramus turns ET<PqvC-2 I by Itranslatiolt and points out that 
Cicero was right to draw attention to the fact that Aristotle includes all 
1. La Rhetorique Franqoyse, p. 25; for Hiperbolis, cf. Peletierl op. cit. v 
P. 135. 
2. Cf.. Rhetoricaq (1562)v P-25; (1572), p. 19. 
3. The Art of Poetryo 1457 b 4, translated by S. H. Butcher, 4th editiont 
London 1911; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554). p. 219-20; Peletier 
has a good-deal to say about metaphor and comparison 
ýop. 
cit., pp. 128-130)1 
Iles Metaforis e Alegorijs: 14quelis sj pemijt toutis deus comprandri 
sous cj mot dj Tranlacion.... I He goes into a lon description of the need 
a 
2U, 
lea Ketaforis a/ font for apprqýpri te metaphors, and concludes, 'An so 
sus chosps connuis e generalis: Commj aussi lea Comparisons: lAquelfis con- 
sist/t an l1aco=odacion des fjz lea uns aus autris'. He also'talks of 
Ila Compartsony qui 4t dlecl%rcir, exprimer e ripresanter las chosis c0mmi 
si on lea santokt; lcf. Ronsard, Abbreq6j ed. Laumonnier, p. 10. 
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kinds of trope under metaphor I since in all of them another none in ascumed 
But Aristotle's divisiong he claims, is inaccurate. Aristotloon firat two 
classes are in fact synecdochep and his fourth class is metaphor. The third 
can embrace irony and allegory. Buto according to Ramun, this in not that 
Aristotle saysp "nor does he give the special name of any trope, aince the 
art of tropes does not seem to have been known in his day". Ramus adda that 
in five instances in the Organon Aristotle rejects cetaphorog that in tropear 
from logical disputation, for the reason that metaphors lack precision and 
are often ambiguous. 
' At the same time, says Ramust Aristotle would admit 
that 
"metaphor is often very neoessary, when we lack the 
proper words, and any metaphor which is a true one 
in some way makes known by a comparison what is 
signified. Aristotle, in his Rhetoric celebrated 
metaphors especially which were pleasant, signifi- 
cant and taken from near at hand, and subjected to 
them the imagey fullness of speechs witticisms, 
built-in answersy proverbs and hyperboles". 1 
Yetp says Ramus, Aristotle is not consistent and has some harsh 
things to say about metaphor. According to Ramus this attack on metaphor 
is a result of Aristotlets dissatisfaction with Plato's style which he finds 
'redundant, verbosep excessive and affected'. 
2 Since clarity is his own cri- 
terion Ramus lets us know that 'metaphor is often clearer than the proper 
meaning'. 
3 In the Institutiones oratoriae we read that just as the author 
had been against excessive ornamentation in generalp so he feels that meta- 
phor must flow naturally and smoothly.: 
1. Dialecticae__institutionesp(1554), p. 221; cf. Scholae dialecticao, SLA, 
col-568-9. 
2., Ibid., SLA, col-570. 
3. Ibid., col-543. 
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"I now come to the elegance of metaphorl when it is 
so aptly done that it does not seem to rush headlong 
into a different placet but to come into its own". 1 
He agrees that for the purposes of teaching it is convenient to list 
all the remaining tropes under this headt and goes on to explain Itranalatiol 
more fully: 
"I call those things transferred which are changed 
from a place in which they were proper to one in 
which they are not". 
He follows this with a comparison between the light of the sun and 
the light of the mind. On this point he says that tho variety of such tropes 
is as great as the variety of nature itselft and there is nothing which has a 
certain and proper word corresponding to it which may not be transferred else- 
where for the sake of comparison. 
In the Institutiones oratoriae the next division of metaphor is into 
simple and composite: simple is based on the four elementsp and composite is 
a mixture of other things. Composite metaphors are partly inanimatet 
"such as the cloudsp things which the earth produces, 
things which are produced by the labour and artifice 
of men, and partly animatep such as plantsq beasts, 
men; in both kinds we should look to the ornateness 
of the metaphor. For Cicero mocked Piso by talking 
of the dark cloud on his forehead. And countryfolk 
talk about vines putting forth gems or eyesit. 2 
There follow examples from the five senses and the parts of the bodyt 
and then from artistic processesp "such as filingg fashioning, painting# 
shaping, dyeing, polishingt patchingg unstitching. Prom these, we have the 
most agreeable and ornate metaphorsl 'to file the truth of disputation'# 'to 
fashion a crimeIq 'to paint with all the colours of one's art' .... 11 and so on. 
Institutiones oratoriae, P-14; for the following account of motaphorg cf. 
ibideq PP-14-20. 
2. Ibid-9 P-19- 
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This type of metaphor is one to which Ramus took eanilyt ao did his contem- 
poraries. Many other examples are possible 
"which are so ready to hand that they scarcely have need 
of art or principles; their excellence is ouch that they 
shed a most clear light on the speech. Therefore it io 
evident that there is nothing in the whole of nature the 
name of which may not be used to refer to other thinGo. *. * 
The second kind of metaphor is of those things "where the comparicon 
does not indicate why they are put in the place of other thingst ouch as 
sacrilege instead of a sacrilegious personp temerity instead of a rash per- 
son. " There are five types: (i) when causes stand for their effectat such 
as (a) the efficient cause, e. g. t Cares for cornp (b) the part of the whole$ 
e. g. 9 the roof for the houser 
(c) the genus for the species, e. g. # the poet 
for Homer, (d) the material for what is made out of itt e. g., the pine, for 
the ship. (ii) when effects stand for their causes, such as 'pale death, or 
Rome instead of the capitol (whole for the part); (iii) when subjects stand 
for their adjunctso such as saying that a man is eaten up when you mean that 
his inheritance is; (iv) when adjuncts stand for subjects# such as a crime 
for a criminal; (v) when things stand for their oppositest such as calling a 
man good when you mean bad. Some of these cases axe found only in poetry, 
others are found both in poetry and prosei 
"Wherefore the honour of single words is due especially 
to four things3 if there seems to be anything pleasant 
in the euphony-p flowery in what is new; serious and ve- 
nerable in what is old; if finally what is transferred, 
whether by reason of comparison or some other way in 2 the speecho should be resplendent like sparkling gems". 
1. Lbid. 9 p. 19. 
2. Ibid. p p. 21. 
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This last phrase is very like Ramun' lg=a of tropoul; 
I both phrases 
point to the same kind of ornamentation-theory. 
The last kind of trope in Fouquelin's olansification in cynecdocho, 
"quo nous pouuons dire on Frangois# concoption ot intolli- 
gence, quand par le nom do la partio, le tout eat entandut 
ou. au contrairot quand par lo nom du tout il faut entundre 
la partie,,, 2 
After giving a list of exsmples Fouquolin notoo that 'Antonomaniet 
isp in factp synecdochop giving the general for the opeoial. lie addo that 
tropes may be joined togethert and given the reason: 
"Et nly a rien simple on la nature dos chosos outre cop 
en quoy se puisse changer la sienification du mot. 
Toutes lesquelles sortes et zanidres de Tropes# sont 
bien souuent plus distinotes par raison quo par la 
nature des chosesl veu quo couuont on un m6mo moto 
plusieurs Tropes do divorses oorten slentrerencontrent" . 
Sol with reference to the example from Ronsard which he quotest 
"Gouttant le miel de mes chansq 
Elle me guide par lea ch=s", 
he co=ents 
Se mial des chantsq pour la suauitd douce coc=e mielt 
clest une Metaphoret le mial pour la doucaurt oleat 
une Synecdoche de llespece pour le genre. 114 
Fouquelin goes an to show that one trope may be longendr6 do llautrol; 
so when Ronsard writes to Du Bellay, 
"Je chanteray ta louange, 
Et l1enuoiray do Loire h Ganget 
Dessus les aisles do m6s vers"t 
Fouquelin's co=ent is 
1. Oratio de-sua professionet SLAq col. 1106. 
2. La Rhetorigue Frangoyse, P. 28. 
3. Ibid-9 P-31. 
A MOO p-32. 
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''Loyrep pour le pals d'Aniout at Gango# pour lo3 Indeup 
clest un Trope, mais la Bignification va plua outrov at 
par le pals d'Aniou at lea Indos, cont entandus lea 
manans at habitans on coz dow regionst co=o alil vouloit 
direp qulil foroit conoitro aus pouples qui habitont proc du fleuue do Gange (qui diuiso lea Indoa) lea vertun at loatnes do Joachin W Bollay, auquol il derit". 1 
The later versions of the Rhotorica which grow out of tho Tnatitution- 
es oratoriae do not seem to add anything important to this account of tropot 
though the wording of the definitions varies slightly. In 1572 Ramuo com- 
ments that Aristotle thought trope was sometimes foreign to accurate teach- 
ing because of the possibility of ambiguity or obscurityp while admitting 
the necessity of its existence. 
2 
We have seen the word 'analogy' used in the definition by Lristotle 
which Ramus quotes. In a more general way he uses it as a synonym of faimi- 
litudel and this meaning is perhaps never far away. It is a method of under- 
standing a matter according to a comparison - as bronze is to a statue# and 
wood to a littert so matter is to form. 
3 On one occasion it seems to be 
used in a scholastic sense (cf. 'the analogy of faithI)s 
"If the exact form of the words be followed rather than 
the analogy of the meaning". 4 
More technically still it is found in religious contaxtsg especially 
throughout the commentary on the Christian religion. In the chapter entitled 
'What is the Eucharist? ' we read; 
1. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, P-33; for Antonomazie of. Du Bellayt op. cit. 9 
p. 1619 and Feletierp pp. cit., p-135- 
2. Rhetorical (1672)p P-7- 
3. Scholae physicaep SLA, (1578)t col-801; for lanalogiel cf. Sebilletp op-citot 
pp. 67P 709 112, il7p 140s Du Bellayl 02-cit-v P-140P and Ronsardv Abbrep, 41 
ed. Laumonierp P-33. 
4- Prooemium mathematicumt p. 233; cf. Co=entariorum do religione Chrietianat 
p-317- 
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"Who then is the author?... Chriat alone... What in the 
matterl of the Eucharist? Obviously the broad and wine# 
by means of which the analogy of the sacred mystery is 
above all underatoodi for just as our bodies prouorvo 
their mortal life by eating the broad by bodily organs 
and drinking the wine and thus recovering their otrongthp 
so our souls attain eternal life when they are frood by 
a living faith from the hall of eternal doathý because of 
the crucifying of the body and the shedding of the blood 
of Christ". 2 
Ramus makes the further point that broad and wine were chosen to oym- 
bolize the food of the soulp because "bread and wine are the nourishment 
most familiar to all mortal men, so that the similitude of the metaphor will 
be all the clearer". His contention here is simple enough# that the terms 
of the Eucharist are nothing more than metaphoricalt and that the metaphor 
is a very ordinary one. The words are indeed being used in a sense which is 
not proper to themp yet they remain clear to all ordinary men. He adds that 
in the words of consecration "the trope is twofold, being both metaphor and 
metonymy". He then introduces another elementp that of sign or symbol: 
"Therefore by the signs of bread and wine there is im- 
pressed on the souls of those who approach the eacred 
table Christ's crucified body and the blood which he 
shed, for the remission of our sins and the liberation 
and eternal salvation of those who truly beliove and 
repent". 
Ramus was against multiplying siens where they do not exist. The 
breaking of bread does not signify the breaking of Christs bodyp as Bede 
thought. He adduces in support of his objection some other obviously ceta- 
phorical statements which all man are agreed in taking, "not in a proper but 
a modified way"t - member of Christ, the Church as the spouse of Christ and 
1. This fits in with the traditional theological discussion about the matter 
and form of each of the sacraments. 
2. Ibid. p p. 286. 
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so on.... "wherefore we realizo that the ontire mystory of tho Euchariat in 
packed with tropes". To the Jews and early Christiana thene woro I'most oloar 
tropes"; why then should modern Christians argue co violently about them? 
"It is all the more remarkable that those tropes seem so 
excessive to the now theologians since if you were to 
gather together into one place all the pooto and orators 
of all nations, they are not comparable to Moaca and the 
prophets, to Christ and the Apootleal, not just because of 
the divine majesty of the tropes they usot but by the fro- 
quency with which they use them. But it is true that many 
of the fathers were rather too zealous in adding further 
tropes to the tropes of the gospels# since they took the 
signs for what was being signified - saying that Christ in 
the Eucharist could be seen by the eyes of the bodyt could 
be handled and brokeng could be eaten by the mouth and the 
teeth .... Ill 
The word Ramus uses in his definition of a aacr=ent is the toohnical 
theological word 'sign': 
"A sacrament is a public act of faith by a sensible sign 
and a solemn rite of His Church instituted by God to 
commemorate the death of Christ and give participation 
in its fruit". 
The sign is more than a mere memorial token; it is a testimonv to 
authority. Sacrament and sign, howeverg both have a non-technical application 
for Ramus: 
"The name sacrament is sometimes used to refer to all 
ceremonies and rites concerned with the exercise of 
piety, or any notes of something sacred and spiritual". 
The illustration Ramus gives of this is Hoah's rainbow. R=us stresses 
that sacraments properly so called can only be instituted by Cod. Ile attempts 
another definition: 'the visible sign of a sacred thingIj and says that it 
is essential that the sign should be a similitudoi 
l.. Ibid., pp. 286-8; cf. P-310 and pp-317-20. 
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"The matter itself is earthly and what is put boforo 
our eyes is divine and heavenly. If sacraments (a a 
Augustinel taking sacrament for that earthly matterl 
did not bear some resemblance to those thinSu of which 
they are sacraments, then they would not bo oaaramonto. 
In them (he continues) one thing is aeon and another is 
understood". 1 
There is no need to go any further into Ramust idoa of eacrament. It 
is sufficient to say that he was very much alive to the different ways in 
which material signs could be used to express the spiritual. In this reopoot 
he is nearer to Plato's than to Aristotle's view of imitation. 
I have included this long account of Ramus' idea of sacrament to show 
that his views an trope and metaphor form a part of his vhole philosophical 
attitude. We have already seen that 'comparison' has its place in among the 
logical arguments. If comparison is expressed according to quality it is 
either Isimilitudol or Idissimilitudol. If it is expressed according to 
quantityp then it is threefold: it may be greaterp equal or less. Comparison 
is the most frequently used of all the argumentst "in quality there is much 
more light for the purpose of illustrationp in quantity there is more strength 
for the purpose of persuasion". We note the pairing of illustration and cor- 
roborationo which almost typify, sum up or stand forp dialectic and rhatorict 
"Comparisons have an important place for philosophers 
and all those who want to teach in a popular and 
familiar way. " 
Good examples of this are Aesop, Hippocrates (who thought Isimilitudo, 
was sufficient for all explanation), Plato and above all Christ; "and sot I 
think I am right in saying that, as the eyes do in the body# so comparisons 
in a speech bring light to all the parts". 
2 (It should be noted that Isimi- 
litudo, is not metaphor; it is a logical rather than a rhetorical device. ) 
1. JýLid., pp. 257-287. 
2. Dialecticae Institutionesq (1543)q PP-13-15; cf. La Dialectique, P-42- 
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Orators use especially comparisons of quantity because thoy find thom moot 
persuasive, and poetsp too, it oeemst make great uso of comparicon by loccor 
thinkp s 
"These are excellent amplificationsp when we go by 
degrees from what is greater to what is leaser. ess rrom this kind of comparison there are come excop- 
tional amplifications in poets and oratorall . 
1 
We may add a few concluding remarka about metaphor. According to the 
Institutiones oratoriae it is imperative that metaphors be aptp cince all 
writing must be apt. There must be some obvious point of similarity 
"lest the comparison be drawn from afar, lest the 
metaphor appear to be out of shape... it must be 
neither too great nor too small... nor too narrow 
.... and if it seems rather too hard it must be 
softened by some preliminary warning. t92 
Toe have seen that for Aristotle metaphor did not have a place in 
logic because of its imprecision. So R=us, in spite of his desire to adorn 
all writing with metaphor, realizes how far it can mislead in philosophy. 
When Aristotley the natural philo3opherp says that in the course of time all 
things decay, grow old and are obliteratedt and nothing now or beautiful is 
brought into being, he is using a metaphort says R=us. In Ramus' eyeat 
Aristotle never had any intention of suggesting time as a principle of cor- 
ruption and so he would have done better to leave such images to the poets. 
How pejorative this is may be judged from another passage where Aristotle is 
quoted as saying that to affirm exemplary ideas is tantamount to I iejIvoAo1- 11tv : (. 21 
ýU IT dz TOCCIC 
VYSIV 
IIOLYIt9C2r to talk trifles and to speak 
in poetic metaphors 
3, 
and laterp 'Exemplary ideas are but rfer-rc I i-P. 7 f. 7 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549)p PP-53-4; cf. La Dialectiaue, P-55. 
2. Institutiones oratoriaev P-77. 
3. Scholae metaphysicaet Si-At col. 854. 
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(twittering)and fabrications of pootic metaphors'. 
The second main division of lelocutiol in the Ilamiat rhatorio, aftor 
tropep is that of figure. After taking Cicero to task for his faulty d0fi- 
nition and division of trope, R=us has similar things to oay about figuro. 
I propose to treat this important question by using as a basio the Tnatitu- 
tiones oratoriae and the, Rhetorique_Frang2, Xse9 reminding the reader once 
again that although these works are not published under Ramus' ntmq they 
axe both to a large extent his responsibilityl and the rhetoric which they 
set out is very much the rhetoric of Ramus. 
The Institutiones oratoriao explain that tho figurea u=otimes go 
under the name of 'schemata' of discourse; all discourse has themp (they 
are also called the 'habitus' or clothing of speech), but they aro not so 
evident in vulgar speech. 
2 There are two broad divisions of figurest 
figures of sentences and figures of words. Those are then distinguished in 
the traditional wayp in that each of the former is an ornament whose 
beauty is independent of whatever words you care to use# whereas the latter 
has 'concinnitas' (which is described in the Latin dictionary of Lewis and 
Short as 'beauty of stylet produced by a skilful connection of words and 
clauses') and 'condecential (what is becomingf seemly) in the manner and 
kind of words, which often disappear if you change the words. 
Fouquelin deals first with the figure of words and defines it as 
1. Ibid-P 985. 
2. Inst tutiones oratoriaev p. 28. 
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"une figure qui rend 11oraison douce ot armoniouse, 
par une resonance do dictionsp apellOO'des ancieno 
Nombre, la quelle stappergoit aveq plaicir ot 
delectation. Parquoy si ie dis du nombre, io dirV 
de la figure de diction"; l 
and goes on to define the other kind thuss 
'Ila figure de sentencet eat une figure mise ot 6tenduo 
en la continuation do toute la sentence do 11craison, 
et pour-tant elle pout estre rotenue on icollot voyro 
mgmes les motz changezp ce qui ne so pout faire on la 
figure de diction: on laquelle si la diction eat 
changde ou transportdet 11ornement eat pordull. 2 
He makes a comparison between the two kinds of figurest 
IrMais si les figures de la sentence sont confordes 
avecq celles de la dictiong en colles lap vous direz 
estre ie ne s9ay quelle grauitd ot dignit6t on c6tes 
cyp une beaut4 et farts Celles U ont plus do nerfz et 
de force: cdtes cyp plus do swig ot do couleur. Los- 
quelles co=e iointes a bonnes sentences aportent 
grand ornement B. 11oraison, ainsi quand le suiet nly 
convienty il nly a rien plus laid quo ses pointurea 
farddes". 3 
The Latin text begins with the figures of sentence. The reason for 
thisq as Leake shows in his article4 is that it follows quintilianto sug- 
gestion thaty since ideas come before the expression of them, then figures 
of thought should come first. For the sake of completeness I propose now 
to list the different figurest first of all according to the Inatitutiones 
oratoriae and then according to the Rhetorique Fran2oyse. The first figure 
is "euidentiap U%2eyft4 which is the figure by which things are 
vividly presented to the eyes of the mind: 
1. La Rhetorique FrnMoyse, P. 35. 
2. Ibid-t P-72. 
3. Ibid., pp. 112-3. 
4. R. E. Leakep "The Relationship of Two Ramist Rhatoriesp Omer Talon's 
Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Franqoisell, in Biblio- 
theaue d'Humanisme et Renaissancel 1968, P. 92. 
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"It sets up the object before the oyest and it often 
arises from an accumulation of effects or adjunctat 
or from the comparison of things which are similar, 
equal, lesser or greater". 1 
It is worth looking a little closer at thin figure bocauno it is ono 
which was very familiar to the membors of the Pldiado and bacauso it ic at 
the heart of the most common Renaissance attitude to realiatic deacription. 
Castor 2 quotes Du Bellay's lljtestimeroy llArt pouvoir exprimer la vivo 
energie de la Nature" in the context of vivid represontation. Du Ballay hao 
another reference to lenergiel in the Deffense, thin time an a figure of 
speech. There is a note in Person's edition of the2offenne which nayat 
"Il slagit ici de catte figure de otyle qu'Aristote 
(Rhet. IIi. xi) appelle lveeyf t. ý , et qui con- 
siste non seulement I animer les choses, maia & 
les montrer agissantes. On confond souvont catte 
figure aveo celle de Quintilian (VII19 Uit 89) 
appelle (SiC) &j'tyjt. 2 t avidentiat rq2raosen 
tatiov et qui consiste dans une vto representation L-1 
des objets: res clareq atque ut cerni videanturt 
enuntiarell. 3- 
This distinction is made very clear in Puttenham's Arte of English 
Poesieg (1589) in which he says that there are two kinds of ornament 
Poeticall v 
"one to satisfie and delight thleare onoly by a goodly 
outward shew set upon the matter with wordest and 
speaches smothly and tunably running: another by cer- 
taine intendments or sense of such wordes and speaches 
inwardly working a stirre to the mynde: that first 
qualitie the Greeks called Enqrffiav of this word argost 
because it geuth a glorious lustre and light. This latter 
they called Bnerjýfta of erm_, n, because it wrourht with a 
strong and vertuous operation"A 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, p. 28. 
2. Castorv P P-55; Bu Bellay Deffense, ed. Ch=ardp p. 80; cf 9, alool 
Deffense,, PP-35 and 40; Sebillett OD-Cit-t pp-33t 116,190; and Pelotiort 
.t op. clt. v p-133. 
3- MeTe-nsej ed. Persons Paris, 1892t p. 64- 
4. Geo ýe RLttenhamy The Axte of English Poesiet Engliah Reprintsl London# 
1869, P-155- 
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The Institutiones oratoriae goes on to list the following figurost 
addubitatio 1,9 X0Cf or 
AR 
7C 0 which is a sort of protonded 
doubt; cormnunicatiot . 2VAVJtV4) SL a consulting or deliberating 
Cf 
with other people; licentiaj2UýC 9 41,4 9 self-assurance and froodom of 
speechy freely expressing one's state of minds Fouquolin dofinan this im- 
portant figure as; 
Ilune figuret laquelle montre quolquo audace ot 
hardiesse de dire ce qui sembloit estre dangereux % 
a dir e 
and adds, 
OIC6te figure est fort rare at infrequente aus liurQ3 
des autheurs Frangois, si esse toutesfoia quIalle 
n1a moins de grace, quo cellos qui ont estd cy douant 
expliquges". 2 
The next figure listed is -praesumptLp I 
lCeOý I) 
flý 
f the antici- 
pation of something; it is twofold, either of objection or of defence (that 
iso giving the opponent's argument and therefore weakening it); exclamatio 
is a vehement heightening of the speech, and includes, acclsLnationes and 
epiphonemata: Fouquelin defines exclamation as tun cri et eleuement de 
vois, inuent6 pour augraenter et amplifier'. For him exclmnatimpaustutation 
and Lierce are all kinds of amplification; d2precatio, suj2plicatio. inuoca- 
: Llop means asking something of the gods, of men or of other 
things. The next figure listed in the Institutiones oratorine is the very 
important one of prosopopeia; it is "the feigned introduction of persons by 
means of which anything at all may take on 'voice and speech", that is, it 
sometimes means personification and sometimes dramatising. It is further 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, P-32. 
2. La Rhetorique Frang2yse, p. 111; cf. Peletier, op. cit., pp. 212 sq. 
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subdivided into 'full' and 'mute' s It 'full' when the whole fiction or the 
person and the speech is represented, Imutol when indirect apeochQ3 are in- 
troduced". The first kind is itself divided into 'continuoual and linter- 
ruptedl: 
"By means of this happy and elegant variety, poetu 
and historians often soothe the minds of their 
readers; their work has the added dignity of placoct 
times and all the attendant circumstances"pl 
with the result that all who read it think that the matter is faot not fIC- 
tion. Interrupted prosopopeia is called dialoiýftsmusq (which Fouquolin 
calls lune feinte collocation de certains personnages ensemble'). 
2 Leaka 
commentsp concerning Talon's description of prosopo2oiat that it has nothing 
to do with our modern idea of 'Personification'$ but finds that Fouquoling 
in 15579 has one example of fictio rei which *e would consider 'personifica- 
tion,. 3 Fouquelin himself defines-prosopo]2eia in these tormss 
tiprosopopeie ou sermocinationg est une figure do 
sentence, par laquelle nous de n6tre voix ot 
actionp contrefaisons, ot representons la voix 
et personnage dlautruy". 4 
For him the most important consideration about this figure is that it 
should be aptt 
"Mais comme la Prosopopoie est un grand ornement 
dleloquencef quand nous representons la, personne 
par voix et parolle decante et conuenantet Ainsi 
est ce un grand vice; quand la parolle repugne & 
la nature de la personne feinte et represent6all. 5 
The next figure in the Institutiones oratorine is allegoryg which we 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, P-41. 
2. La Rhetorique Frangoyseq p. 90. 
3. Leakeg art. cit. 9 PP-97-8- 
4. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, p. 86. 
5. Ibid., P-93; cf. Sebillet, OP-cit-i PP-157 and 160; Feletierg op. cit. 9 
p-135- $ 
228 
have already seen something of under tropo. It io of two kindat cimilitudo 
and irony. 
1 There follows a discussion of 'concoasion' which has clooo 
connections with irony: it is distinguished from 'permission' in thatp in 
Fouquelin's wordsp it deals with Iditz ot arg=ontz' wheroan 'pormiooion' 
deals with facts. 
2 The next kinds of figures are incromenti-im and diminutio. 
Amplification, it will be seen from this, is not just for lincroaoing some- 
thing by speaking in a more elevated mannerv but also for attonuating and 
degrading it,. 
3 Particular attention is accorded here to intorrogntiog 
"which not only looks for doubtful mattort but is 
turned to hatred, OnvYi mOrcyt joy# hopet annoyance 
and all the emotions: for there is nOthinC Go flexible, 
nor which follows so easily, wherever you lead itt as 
interrogatiol. 4 
Subjectio is the next figure givent it is a discussion of possible 
objections together with a rep3, v to them; Praeteritiog ,-t 
is a if-) eb Iýt 
pretended reluctance to mention something; corroctiol e9, -urdeOWA, ý' t can 
be either of a thought or of a word, 
5 
Fouquelin describes this figuro as 
"une reprehension et amendement do n6tre direv 
laquelle a grace comme les autres, quand ce qui 
auoit est6 au parauant ditq est subtilement et 
ingenieusement repris"; 6 
Significatiop means something which it dooe not actually 
7 -'Ira say; aue=o 
8 
is the turning away of the speech from its right and natural 
ýFý 
- 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, PP-43-4- 
2. La Rhetorique Frangoysep p. 82. 
3. Institutiones oratoriaev P-47. 
4. Ibid-t PP-48-9- 
5- Ibid. v P-52. 
6. La Rhetorique Frangoysey P-102. 
7. This is one of quintilian's meanings of emphasis; the other is that which 
'means more than it says', cf. Sonninol A Handbook to Sixteenth Cent 
Rhetorict p. 200; cf. Peletierv OP-cit-v P-135. 
6. Cf. Sebillety OP-cit-9 P-41; Peletiert. op. cit. 9 P-135- 
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course to something elsep to men or to Godt Fouquelin adds that it mmy be to 
an indefinite person or even to ourselves; 
' 
superlatiog is an 
exaggeration of the truth, when we say more than the nature of the truth 
allows - 
Before leaving this account of the figures of sentence, the Inntitutt- 
ones oratoriae has something to say about the matter of lcolouring truth' e 
"This is the justification for counterfeiting trutht 
a joke is pleasant and often useful, for making the 
speech both agreeable and beautifult by moans of which 
the ugliness of something io laughed at, but not basely 
or tastelessly. There are two kindsp witticisms and 
banter. Witticisms are more deeply embedded in the 
speechp as when men's manners are describodv and so 
portrayed that they will be understood as they really 
are. Banter is shorter and more pointed". 2 
To turn now to the I figures of words 19 the second main division of 
figuresp which are introduced here as Ilumina verborum'. It should be said 
at the outset that Fouquelin treats this subject in a way which is basically 
different from that set out in the Institutiones oratoriae; the principal 
difference is centered on the attitude to 'n=ber's 
"Fouquelin's concept of Nombre is quite different from 
Talon's Numerus. If for the latter it was only one 
of the categories of the word figurev for the former 
it becomes such a broad and important concept as to 
be synonymous with them". 3 
So Fouquelin begins his account with the definition already quotedt 
"La Figure de la diction est une figure qui read 
11oraison douce et armonieusep par une resonance do 
dictionsv appellee des anciens Nombre, la quelle 
stappergoit aveq plaisir et delectation. Parquoy si 
ie dis du nombreq ie diray de la fiE; ure do diction"A 
1. La Rhetorique Frangoyseg p. 101. 
2. Institutiones oratoriaeg P. 56. 
3. Leakeg art. cit. 9 p. 101. 
4. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, P. 35. 
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In the Institutiones oratoriae number is said to include both rhythm 
and metrep and to be 'a harmony invented for the sake of sweetness from the 
apt modulation of the feet'. 
1 It has its place both in prone and verse. 
(Leake suggests that Talon differs from Fouquelin in this respect# butt in 
factP the Institutiones makes it quite clear that number is also found in 
prosep though it is true that the examples are taken from poetry). 
2 Fou- 
quelin even says 
I'Llobseruation des syllabes on lloraisong est touto 
poetiquev car en notre prose frangoise nous auons bien 
peu dlegart au nombre des syllabes, ny par quells 
diction, et do combien do syllabes est fermde la 
clausule et periode". 3 
He notes that French verse is very much freer than Lating but that 
it does need rhyme (similitude of sound). There is some rhymoleso verse in 
French, but it sounds stranget just as it would to write in Greek or Latin 
disregarding the long and short syllablest 
"Clest & dire sans la quantit6 des temps, qui soutient 4 la modulation et musique du carme en ces dous langues". 
In French, he continuesp there in an infinite number of possibili- 
tiest Iselon la difference du nombre et do la quantitd des syllabes (comme 
dit un certain autheur de l1art poetiquet lequel en c4tte partie J'ay Bujuip. 
5 
At this point pouquelin does, indeedy follow closely Sebillet's chapter five 
on the nine principal sorts of French verse, even using Sebillet's examples- 
1. Institutiones oratoriaep p. 24- 
2. Leakey loo-cit. 
3. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, P-35. 
4- Ibid., P-37. 
5- Institutiones oratoriae, p. 26, where the same point is made about Latin 
verse. 
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He then lists seven different kinds of n=bero Epizouxol Anaphoret Epiat- 
rophey Epanalepse, Epanode, Anadiploseq Gradation. 
He then goes on to define and illustrate these difforant Inumbors's 
IlEpizeuxe est un nombret par 1equal un m6mo son aot 
subseque=ent repetd", 
and to illustrate this from BaTfIs lines, 
"Car helasp helas Moline p Plus, plus ie ne suis ýL moy". 
It isp he says, to be compared with the French Iryme couronn6at quand 
le dernier mot du carme est une partie de la dietion procedentet, 
' Epizeuxe 
can occur either in a single word or in severalt 
"car les motz de semblable son$ deleotent fort# 
pour une armonieuse et melodieuse similitude 
de son". 2 
'Anaphorel or 'relation' is when the s=e sound in repeated at the 
beginning of a sectionp for example Batfis 
"Mon oeillet, mon coeur, mon amellp 
where the result is also lune douce et melodieuse armonie'. 
3 
lEpistrophel occurs at the end of periodst for ex=plet Tahureauls 
refrain to Jodellep 116, le Delien eat ndIq which Fouquelin also calls an 
lanagranmatismel of Estienne Jodelle. Epistrophe is to be found as well in 
different wordsp but 
"de semblable sOn et te=inaison.... et dIautant plus 
gra. nde est cdtte amoniet que le nombre est plus plai- 
sant et melodieus aus clausules qu'aus co=encementz 
... A laquelle mani6re d'Epistrophe toute la ryme 
frangoyse doit estre referde, clest bL direg c6tte melodie 
de laquelle usent les poetes en la £in des vers frangois, 
1. La Rhetorique Frangoyse, P-44. 
2. Ibid., P-46. 
3. Ibid., P-49. 
232 
par une similitude de song tombant an la fin at 
liziere du vers: Laquelle ilz appellent ryme platto 
ou croisde. La Ryme platte est, quand lea vors 
symbolisans et do m6me termination slentresuyuent 
sans moyen". 1 
An example is given from Ronsardt 
"Le potier hait le potier 
Le feburev le charpentier: 
Le podte tout ainsil 
Hait celuy qui Vest aussill. 
Fouquelin warns against rhyming tho iiame word unlean thare ara two 
different, meaningsp or two different parts of speech are being used. 
Anaphore and E2istrophe may be joined togather# and will then be 
"pour c6tte m6me cause plus gratieuses et plaisantes 
aus oreilles". 2 
'Epanalepselp says Fouqueling 'eat un nombret par laqual le mdme son 
est repet4 au co=encement et h la fin do la clausule', and it may occur in 
one or in several words. 
3 
'Epanodel is defined as, lun nombre resonnant par semblables conog 
repetez ou au commencement et meilleul ou au meilleup et & la fin de la 
clausulel I and 'Anadiplosel as lun nombre par 1equel un m6me eon eat repetd 
a la fin du precedent vers, et au commencement du suivant'. 
4 Finally, 
'Gradation' is defined as; 
'tun nombret quand l'oraison marche de telle sortet 
que l'antecedent est repet6 deuant que ce qui 
slensuit prochainement soit profer611.5 
Fouquelin sums up this discussion by saying that apart from Ila simi- 
litude de la vois et du son' there is also the question of order and disposi- 
1. Ibid-9 P-58; of. Sebilleti. op. cit., P-155. 
2. La Rhetoriqwe Frangoyseq p. 61. 
3. Ibid. 9 p. 63- 
4. Ibid., pp. 63-4. 
5- Ibid., p. 66. 
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tion. at the beginning and end of sections. He adds a comment on 'Parono- 
masiel in which, Ile nombre est engendrd par la soulo consonance ot accord 
des vois semblables'. It is also defined as 'allusion au notp ou reeemb- 
lance d1un mot a l1autrel. If it is of the whole word it is called by tho 
French poetsp he says, laequivoquet: 
I'laquelle il (sic) font espece de Rymet quand lo non 
du mot, mis en la fin du carme, est repetS & la fin 
du vers simbolissant en un ou Plusiours motz do diueroo 
signification". 1 
It may also occur at the beginning and end of wordst for examplop Du 
Bellay's Itraditeurs/traducteurs' or in the first two syllablest for examplop 
Du Bellay's Terobt aux vers heroiques'; if it occurs in the middle and last 
syllables it is called Iryme riche' and is much used by the French poota. 
Another kind of this figure is 'Polyptotel which Fouquelin defines as 111ombre 
par lequel souuentesfois le cas eat chang6, et ce neantmoins quelque simili- 
tude entre lea dictions eat retenuel (Fouquelin is aware here that he is 
using the word Icas' in a broader sense than that of the grammariansl he 
means by it any possible word-ending, including alteration of numbert gender# 
tense, mood: his illustration is from Baif, 
I'Mais moy bien plus heureux, 
que cet heureux lien si heureusement liep 
1ý2 Dans 11heureuse prisong des heureus amoureus' 
Of the French writers we have been looking atq Sebillet has the most 
to say about this last figure. For him it is not so much a rhetorical 
figure as one of the five kinds of rhymes 
1. Ibid. 9 p. 68. 
2. Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
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I'La premi4re stappolle, Equivoquo# ot co fait quant 
lps deus, lea trois ou lea quatres Dyllabos d1uno 
seule diction assise en la fin d1un vers, aont 
r4pet6es au carme symbolisant, mais on plusioura 
mos r6pet4es dv-je ou simplement do mo=e son ou 
seulement de mesme orthographe? ou do meamo aon et 
de mesme orthographe onsemble". 1 
Sebillet considers that it is the most difficult kind of rhymo and 
therefore is the leaatfrequentf 
'let ne laisse pourtant a estre la plus dlogante, 
co=e celle qui fait cest unison etre cemblance 
plus 4gale et, de ce plus poignante ltouyuv. 2 
Sebillet seems also to be Fouquelin's immediate sourco for his 
warning about rhyming a word with itself: 
'%Iais aussy regaxde bien que tu ne tombes do 1h en 
une fautel qui es de mettre un mot rymant contre 
soy mesmet si dladventure nlestoit diversifid par 
signification, ou partie dloraison, comme si llun 
fut nomp llautre verbe ou adverbel toutesfois soubs 
une mesme voisit. 3 
In his edition of the Art Poetique Frangolso Gaiffe notes that So- 
billet's admiration for this kind of rhyme is traditional in the Arts do 
2e Rheto ; he notes also that Du Bellay is not enthusiastic about it 
though the Le Quintil defends it. The Pldiade seems to follow Sobillat's and 
Du Bellay's advice to use rich rhyme. 
4 
--S-S-S-S-SS"-S"-S-SS-SS-S-S-S- 
As we saw in the last chapter the Pldiade were obviously more in- 
terested in figurative than in plain writing. I have dwelt at s=o lengtb 
1. Sebillett at PoStique Frangoys, ed. cit.. '. 62. P 
2. jb_id-9 p. 63. 
3. Ibid. P-71- 
4- Ibid.: p. 63; I reserve for the next chapter a fuller discussion of rhythm 
and number. 
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on the enumeration of the figures in the Ramist rhotorict becausot in apito 
of what I have said about the lack of actual contact and influonco botwoon 
Ramus and the P16iadej it seems to me thatp apart from the few unequal 
comments which they made about individual figures, there ia no Pldindo 
rhetoric. The theorists of poetry were aware that they wore breaking now 
ground in separating poetry from rhetoric; awaret toot that there were many 
points of similarity between the poet and the oratort and that come arean 
of their arts of poetry were very much influenced by rhetorical theory - 
the transference, for examplet of the first three parts of rhotorict inven- 
tiont disposition and elocution into the art of poetry. Du Bollayt in faott 
closes the first book of his Deffense with the statementi 
"En quoy (Lecteur) no tlebahis, si je no parle do 
11orateur co=e du poete. Car outre que les vertuz 
do 11un sont pour la plus grand' part co=unes h 
l1autrey je nlignore point qu'EticnneDolet, ho=o 
do bon jugement on notre vulgairep a form4 110rateur 
Franco , que quelqu'un (Peut estre) amy do la memoire 
de J'aucteur et de la Francep mettra do bref ot fidele- 
ment en lumiere". 1 
Dolet himself tells us that he did compose this work, but did not 
publish it. 
2 In the absence of Dolet's treatise this Ramist rhetoric which 
we have been looking at is perhaps the nearest we can get to a Pldiade rhe- 
toric. It is all too easy to forget the importance of the rhetorical back- 
ground of the Pldiade; they make little mention of itq but this is because 
they took it so much for granted. Du Bellay says on this point: 
"Quand aux vertuz et vices du poeme, si diligemment traitds 
par les anciens, comme Aristotep Horacep et apres aux 
Hieronyme Vide: quand aux figures des sentences ot des motzp 
et toutes les autres parties do l1eloquution, les lieux do 
1. Deffensel- ed-cit-i PP-85-6. 
2. the address "au peuple Prancoys" in his book on translation (1540)9 
quoted in Deffense, ed. cit.. p. 86. 
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commiserationy de joye, de tristesse, d1irej d'admiration, 
et toutes autres commotions de l1amot je Won parle point 
apres si grand nombre d1excellens phylosophoo at oratoura 
qui en ont traitSv qua je veux avoir otd bien leuz at 
releuz de nostre poetep premier qulil entreprenno quolquo 
hault et excellent ouvraige". 1 
Sebillety toog had insisted on this close similarity between the poet 
and the orator: 
"Car la Rh6torique est autant bien espanduo par tout 
le po4me, comme par toute 11oraieOn". 2 
The principal manifestation of this is to be found in the uso both 
the poet and the orator make of the ornaments we have boon discussing. It 
seems to me to be highly improbable, howevert that the poets should have 
made any greater use of the Ramist classification of figures than they had 
made of the Ramist classification of arguments. Works on rhetoric have two 
very different aims: on the one hand they are useful in the training of the 
oratory and incidentally as part of the general education of any pupilt and 
on the other they present a theoretical classification of the material in 
an academic fashion. The second of these aims (which was the one which 
often seems to have been the main interest of the compiler) was of no in- 
terest at all to the poets as poets, and of little interest to them# evenj 
as theorists of poetry. The first was of greater interest to them, but it 
does not seem to have had much direct and immediate bearing on the actual 
writing of the poetry. 
The poettl early rhetorical training was not without influence on 
their later writing of poetry. The best summing up of this is to be found 
1. Ibid. 2pp. 159,60. 
2. Sebilletypp-2ý1t-i p. 21. 
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in the passage in which Peletier relates the whole quastion to the roopoo- 
tive roles of art and nature in the composition of the poomt 
, %Iqs quj dirb j/ plus des Orn mans dý Po(7ni/? ldquez 
sont si diuqrso qulil les m/laut par nocescito re- 
mqtrý an la. felicite du Po6tý; pour n1excedor Ij 
dýuojr d, ansei /manto qui 4t d'Itri brief. Car 
c2rtes il ný s7petLt dissimuler, q4 l'ourous/ 
njssanc/ du Podt/ ný sokt cql/ qui plus lui eid/ a 
gagner 11honneur: voqr an cas d'anrichicimanot 
l4quez samblirodt ýtrýdiiz a llartificý. ToIj foli- 
cite ký naturq1j: mqs en partij aquinitiuj. Now 
ranuoyýrons donq tousjours a la, lectiýrj dos Podtic 
Cjlui qui prom§t dý soq la, Flý o , irj e 
lj pris, ljo do- 
couurira, an lisants e an rNura ocult/mant les 
sji; ancýsý dont il fecond#a, tout lj champ d/ son 
Po4me. f/ra. par etudp e eureus exqrcicj, qup 
toutis les richqcjs sj presantont a lui tout dj 
grep quand il an aura bp'soin". 
1. Peletier, op. git., P-137. 
238 
CHAPTER TEN 
LOGICt RHETORIC AND POETRY 
, _It 
is surprising that Ramus hadt in factt as little to eay directly 
about poetry as he didy considering how extensive were his viritingo on logic 
and rhetoric. This must strike us as curious given his obvious lovo of 
classical literature and especially of Virgil. His lectures on Virgil do 
notq howeverp seem to have been a great successt 
"The great Latin orator wrote no poetry (in Latin)v 
Nancel informs usy because he was not sure of 
syllabic count. His commentaries on poetry could 
hardly be called successful. His lectures on the 
Bucolics and Georgics of Virgil drew so much laughter 
that he seemed not to have the heart to continue with 
the. Aeneid, as he had originally intended". 1 
The annotated editions of the Bucolics appeared in 1555# and of the 
Georg-Ics in 1556p at exactly the same time as his contact with the P16iade 
was at its closest (though we have seen that this contact did not amount to 
very much). Ramus seems to have had next to no interest in contemporary 
literature. 
We mazy wonder why he did not write an art of poetry. He did admit 
that poetry was an arts 
"Art est genre. Poetique et Eloquence sont especes"; 
2 
but he never actually composed an art of poetry. 
3 His successorst those 
1. Ong, RMDDt p-33. 
2. La Dialectique, P-54; cf. Dialecticae institutionesq (1556), p. 112. 
3. Fonsaxdv at the beginning of the Abbreg6p writest 'Combien quo l'art de 
poesie ne se puisse par preceptes comprendre ny enseignerv pour estre 
plus mental que traditift toutesfoist d'autant quo l'artifice humain, ex- 
perience et labeur le peuvent permettre, j'ai bien voulu tien donner quol- 
ques reigles icy... ' Perhaps Ramus is making a similar distinction bet- 
ween poetry and the other arts. 
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who amplified his encyclopedia of the arts r did see the need for the art of 
poetry in order to complete his systemt but they restricted poetry to the 
art of versifying. 
1 Ramus himself does not seem to have boon aware of the 
lacuna. Poetics does not figure in his proposed scheme for revising and 
bringing to completion the encyclopedia which he proposed in 1572, junt be- 
fore his death. 
2 
I do not think that the reason for his apparent lack of interest is 
that he despised poet3rj, or thought it subversive and immorall nor is it 
that imagination and technical skill are lacking in him; some of his better 
writing evinces a perceptiveness not unrelated to that of the poet. Yet it 
seems that he did not find it a serious enough pursuit to fit into his 
life's work of the reorganization of all the arts and sciences. Ong does 
not find much to say about Ramus' attitude to poetryt 
"The Ramist notion of poetry is highly quantitative 
and diagrammatic; it was built up in terms of tnumbert 
or counting. Although Ramus elsewhere expresses the 
opinion that poetry is a separate artj like medicinag 
from the earliest editions of Talon's Rhetoric poetryl 
in the Ramist traditionp is really treated as a part 
of rhetoric. The reasons for this are obviouss like 
rhetorical speecho it is speech which is out of the 
ordinary in that# as sound, it attracts attention. 
Poetry is differentiated from the rest of rhatorio in 
terms of Inumberl (numerus)p which of course is the 
Latin term for rhythm or musical count". 3 
Now while Ong is certainly right in stressing the quantitative aspect 
herej it should be pointed out that Ramus is completely within the tradition 
1. ongt MIDDp P-3711 note 581 'Quid est poetioa? Est facultas beno scribandi 
versus', Freigius, Paedagogus 
( 1582), P-131; 'Poetica est ars beno vercifi- 
candilq Bilstent Syntagma Phili o-Ramaeum, 
(1596, p. 271. 
2. Cf. Waddingtong Ramus: sa vieg ses dcrits et ses opinions, Paris, 1855, 
p. 233 and p. 248- 
3. Ongg RNIDDI p&282. 
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I 
which runs from Cicero through Quintilian to the medieval and Ronaianuco 
arts of rhetoric and poetry. Ong continues; 
"By the time of the later editions of the Rhotortog poetry has migrated to a somewhat different position witýin the 
artq and is given an even more frankly quantitative treat- 
ment. It is now part of tonal 'dimension' (tononim dimonalo) 
for which numerus is only a second-best synonym. Tonal di- 
mension has become dichotomized into poetic and oratorical 
dimensiong and poetic dimension into rhythm (length of linen) 
and meter (kind of feet). This is the sum and sub3tanco of Ramist view on poetryp which echo the M03t mechanistio 
'poetic' of the medieval dictamen". 
It seems to me that Ramus and Talon have much more to cay about poetry 
than this; and especiallyl much more to say about number. Nor do they under- 
stand it in a purely mechanistic way. 
' In the Rhetorica (1562) we read that 
number in discourse of any kind works partly by apt structure and disposition 
of the feet, partly by the sweet and measured similarity of words. What is 
important is not the number of syllables but their relative length. 
2 This 
'sweetness' is to be judged by "a certain inborn sense of hearing. 
0 In the 
same work we read that metrep which is one of the aspects of number in poetry# 
4 
calls for a much more rigorous disposition of the feet. Prose must have some 
numberp but not metre: 
"So rhetorical prose steals from the poem a certain 
numbered voluptuousness". 5 
Prose manifests this 'voluptuousness' or 'pleasurabilityl by the 
1. In his comparison of Talon's and Fouquelin's books on rhetoric Leake dis- 
cusses number at length and shows that both these writers w-are concerned 
with sounds as much as with spatial arrangement; 'The Relationship of Two 
Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhatorique 
Franqoi 19 in Bibliothýgue d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1968t pp. 99-102. 
2. Rhetoric-a (Talon)p (1562)p PP-49-50. 
3. Ibid. 9 p. 65. 
4- Ibid. y P-56- 
5- Ibid. v p. 60. 
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variety and aptness of the sounds. The difference between rhythm and metro 
is that rhythm is poetic number containing a certain number of syllablos and 
ending in a particular way, whereas metro is poetic number containing a 
fixed number of feet in a fixed order. 
' There are natural, spontaneous 
rhythms in every nation's popular speecht as in pre-Homeric poetryp without 
any measurement of long or short syllables. 'There is nothing1v says the 
Rhetorica of 15729 tmore natural to our minds than number'. 
2 It goes on to 
say that this is what poetry was like in its infancy; it readily gave way to 
a maturer type of poetryl which is based on feetv and is discernible even in 
popular speech and primitive poetry if you look carefully .3 Ramus contendsp 
in the Scholae rhetoricae that the whole style or expression (Glocutio of 
prose is different from that of poetry, though he feels that both the trainee 
orator and poet have much to learn from a study of the other's discipline. 
In generalp says Talon in the 1562 Rhetorica, prose imitates the beauties of 
poetryp though prose-writers should normally shun the techniques and effects 
of verse. 
4 It is quite clearly stated in the Institutiones oratoriae that 
the basic difference between poetry and prose is that poetry uses number and 
prose does not: 
"Number (by which name we mean rhythms and metres) is the 
harmony which is achieved by the apt measure of the feet 
in the interests of sweetness. The foot is the division 
of numbery and its length is defined by fixed intervals 
of time.... There are two forms of the rhythmical periodp 5 
song and a freer speech which Quintilian called 'bound' .... I 
1. Rhe_toricaq (1572), p. 32: the 1572 revision after Talon's death, isq of 
course, by Ramus. 
2. Ibid. 9 p. 29. 
3. IbI-d-q p-31. 
4- RhJor 9 
(1562)p P-87. 
5- Institutiones oratoriae, pp. 25-6. 
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After quoting the opening words of the Aeneidg "Arma virumquo cano 
the author co=ents that Icarment takes its name from singing bocausc it io 
easier to set it to music than to set the freer kind of Opeoeb. Ho adds that 
there is an almost infinite variety of the kinds of verse. 
1 
So much for the more technical side of poetryl concerned with number# 
metre and rhythm. More basically and generallyq we may remind curBelves that 
Ramus was quite familiar with the notion of poetio fury. He describeat for 
example, Cicerols quest for the perfect orator in these termst 
"That fury of yours is indeed poetic, Marcuo Tullius, 
by which I see that you are rather thrown forward 
into that idea than led on by firm reasons". 2 
This indeed seems to stress rather the inherent irrationality than the 
divine origins of poetry. The same is true of a statement later in the camo 
book (Brutinae quaestiones) with reference to the discovering of the perfect 
orator: 
'Thy then do you boast that you have got hold of some- 
thing that he (Antonius) did not? What way do you 
Jay open to us in praise of that perfect orator that 
he did not lay open? You are relapsing into that 
poetic fury of Yours, for you object that there has 
never ever been such an orator as you describe". 3 
ibid. 9 LOO _-C: 
Lt; cf Rhetorical(1562), PP-49-50; cf. al8op Ciceronis De 
umv where the different poetic genres are listed 
in detail. It is worth noting in parenthesis that the theorists had a 
good deal to say about the nature of rhythm, metre and number; cf. Se- 
billetv op. ci ., pp. 16-209 chapter entitleds 'QuIest ce quo le Francois 
doit appeller Ryme? '; Du Bellay, op-cit. v two chapterst 'Do I& rythme 
et des vers sans rythmelp and 'De ce mot rythme, de 11invention des 
vers rymez, et de quelques autres antiquitez usitdes en notre Languel; 
Peletier, op-cit-9 PP-147-150t IDJ la Rimý Poetiq4l; Ronsardo opecit., 
p. 18, section 'De la Rymel; most of the discussion in these chapters 
centres round the relation between Orythmel and 'rime'. 
2. Brutinae quaestioneso p. 27; cf. Scholae rhetoricaep LLAI col-245. 
3. BrutLnae quaestioneso P-76. 
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Here it is the madness implied in the poetic fury which comes to the 
fore. Againg in the Prooemitra mathematicum Ramus links the idea of poetic 
fury with the idea that poets are born not made. In the couri3a of this long 
history of mathematics and in a section in praise of Rippocratest he says; 
"Logic was natural to this merchant, and of the kind 
which Proclus later noted in Cratistusl who art- 
lessly and readily came to a judgment about any 
problem, relying uniquely on his natural powers. 
Popular opinion thinks that poets are born sucho 
and are driven on by a fury of the mind to pour 
forth outstanding poems". 1 
Ramus' main emphasis here is on the idea that fury in poets exemplifies 
f-i-ee what happens in the other arts as well 9 and that we coo here in the 
right proportions technique and natural ability: 
"But this natural vigour is common to all virtues 
and to all learningf in which nobody will reach 
perfectiony unless he is impelled by his natur, -A 
genius and goodness, or rather unless he is 
carried off by force". 2 
On another occasion Ramus explains this word 'carried offIq when he 
talks of Caesar as Icomme ravy et mis hors du sens'. 
3 This fury is some- 
thing supernatural which drives a man out of his mind and makes him utterly 
unconcerned about the ordinary processes of truthful discourse. On the sub- 
ject of Cicero's verbal juggling Ramus writes. 
"Those poetic miracles of yours, I sayy are full of 
childish wondery but devoid of prudence and truth". 
4 
The epithet 'poetic' is significant. In such circumstances the 
hearers do not realize the persuasive forces which are working on thems 
1. Prooemiun mathematicumg P. 37. 
2. Ibi-d.. 100--cit. 
3. La Di aetiquet P. 7. 
4. oratoriae, P-74. 
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"When unlearned people hear thiov they are moved by 
great pleasure and joyfulness, but they do not know 
what it is, so singular and divinep which moves them". 
Ramus applies this word 'fury' also to the abuse of philosophy which 
takes Place when it departs from the pure use of reason; he talks of 'that 
2 
philosophical fury' . In the same sense he refers to Aristotlela madness 
(deliratio) 
.3 He mentions also Cicero's reputation of 'being out of his 
mind and raving' (furere et bacchari because his style was so elevated and 
glowing, 
4 His reputation was largely due to his opponent Brutus who thought 
that the aim of oratory should not be to move, but to teach and please the 
hearer. 
5 Ramus attacks this 'Asiaticism, of Cicoro and contrasts it with 
the attitude of the Attic philosophers who 
"prefer to teach their hearers truly and calm3, Y9 
rather than to be driven on and disturbed by any 
powerfully inflamed speech. vt6 
Furious possession, whether poetic or philosophicalp has religious 
overtones, according to Ramus. Those same people, for examplet who see 
Moses as an Egyptian story-teller consider Christians as 'wicked and fren- 
zied backbiters' (, ri x, - v.. 7ý- - 
The idea that poets are born not made is expressed in a different 
form in the Dialecticae institutiones (1543)o 
"By their reason men know the gods themselves, and 
everything elsep and by reason they excite their 
individual inborn talents for praying, n=bering, 
1. Institutiones oratoriae, P-74- 
2. Scholae dialecticaeg SLA, col-466. 
3. Aristotelicae animadversionesl (1543)p P-79v. 
4. Rhetoricav (1572)p P-56. 
5- Scholae rhetoricaev SLA9 preface. 
6. Ibid., col. 275- 
7- Scholae physicae, SLAv preface; this passage is contained verbatim in 
Commentariorim de religione Christiana, p. 27- 
245 
measuringy singing and extolling the virtuoa of the 
rest of the arts"J 
Now if singing is a particular inborn gift which some men have and 
others do not, then poetry must be the came since poetry was synonymous with 
song. Furthermore, poetry is also natural in that poets (and orators) 
attempt to follow the natural usage. This may sound strange to us# given 
the obvious artificiality of poetry, but the meaning is that their statomento 
are not usually intentionally obscure, and that what they are expressing is 
simple and sincere. 
2 Poets and oratorav according to Ramusq toach 'facille- 
ment et olerement'. 
3 It is nature itself which is responsible for the in- 
troduction of the fury. Poets and orators are excited naturallyt excite 
themselves in a sensey because 
"the knowledge of causes is so natural to men that 
nature does not seem so much to be opening the way 
to knowledge of themp as to be providing a certain 
violent impulse"4 0 
We now come to the vexing question of the relation between logiot 
rhetoric and poetry in Ramus. Nelson has shown clearly the difficulty there 
is in distinguishing with any accuracy the function which Ramus assigned to 
5 these three arts. It seems to me that Ramus is saying that they all use 
the same language more or less, and that logic is what is common to all of 
them; -that they are all endowed with the same common prudencet that is, in- 
stinctivep spontaneous judgment; and, moreover, that they are all trying to 
persuade their readers in one way or another. Ramus did notindeedg see them 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), P-10. 
2. La Dialectique, p P-114- 
3. Ibid. p p. 123. 
4. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543)9 P-10. 
5- N. E. Nelsont Peter Ramus and tho Confusion of Loriov__Rhotoric and Poetryq 
(Ann Arbor), 1947. 
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as essentially different; any diatinotiomho made were made for the purpose 
of teaching. He expected the practitioners of each art to be well-vorsed in 
the others, and in many more besides. If they were to participate in tho 
handing on of any part of knowledge they must be men of sufficient breadth 
of vision to see the relevance of this part to the whole. A knowledgo of 
music or mathematiesp he thoughtl will not make a man a better grammariang 
but it should make him a fuller man and consequently a better teacher of 
grammar. 
There is considerable confusion among writers of the French Renais- 
sance arising from the fact that they often use 'poet' and 'orator' almost 
interchangeably, as they were used in the Arts do RhStorique. We are, how- 
everp able to see certain distinctions in the writings of Ramus. The main 
distinction for him between the-poet and the orator on the one handt and 
the logician on the other is that the latter's teaching is more formal and 
professional: 'For dialectic is artifice and a proper instrument for ex- 
plaining all things'. 
1 Yet, as we have seen, for Ramust the logician will 
be wasting his time completely if he has not learnt to dress this explana- 
tion in attractive language. This is the reason for Ramus' repeated use of 
examples to alleviate an otherwise burdensome text. 
We must remember (when we are looking at the difference between 
logicq rhetoric and poetry in Ramus) that for him logic is not restricted 
to manuals on the subject or to classes devoted to its study. It is to be 
found in every use of language: 
1. Dialecticaepartitiones, p. 26. 
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"Although dialectiog that io the art of natural reason, 
is put into practice only briefly and for a few years 
in school, we meditate on it and praotiso it in every- 
thing throughout our liveo". 1 
Since then every writer has an interest in the correct use of logict 
and since for Ramus one of its main purposes was distinguishing the true from 
the falsep thent however pleasurable writing may be, it io usually also didac- 
tic. The poet's teaching function is put above that of the orator# and Ramus 
stresses that he uses natural prudence. It is significant that it is by 
logical method that the poet moves his audience. 
Whenever poets and orators depart from strict logical method it is for 
the sake of providing pleasing entertainment. In discussing method in writ- 
ing 9 Ramus s ays 
"Anybody who wants to teach must follow this way. It is 
true that poets and orators turn aside from it, but they 
do so for the sake of pleasingp sometimes even for the 
sake of deceivingt and not in order to teach". 2 
In the later version of this same textv published later in 1543t the 
stress is shiftedi Firstlyp 'perspicue, is added to Idocerelt this suggests 
that even when they are pleasing they are to a certain extent teaching, but 
without precision and clarity- also in the later text the use of definition 
and distribution is described in far greater detail. Secondlyq their depar- 
ture from logic is seen as poetic licencet 'they allow themselves many 
things for the sake of utility and pleasure'. It is clear at least that 
Ramus saw poets as teacherst and at the same time as poople who were engaged 
in pleasurable communication. 
3 
1. Dialecticae institutionesp (1554)9 p. 274- 
2. Dialecticae partitiones, pp-34-34v; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, 
(1543), 
P-30. 
3. La Dialectique, p-129. 
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For Ramus it is clear that all discourse must teachi 
"Logic is the art of discourse, and therefore also the 
art of teaching... For if a grammarians a rhetoricians 
or a mathematician teaches anything, it is by meano of 
logical artifices and not by one belonging to his own 
art, that he doe a it". 1 
The pleasurable nature of poetic discourse will be beat achieved, he 
thoughtt by exploiting the connections poetry has with music. One kind of 
poetryp perhaps even all poetryt was very close to song - this was a com- 
monly accepted view at the time of the Renaissance. Sot in the Institutionan 
oratoriaep we read that poets 
"have found versest and harmonies of speech of 
delightful sweetness, almost infinite in numberp 
varying in the disposition of the measures". 2 
Furthermore, just as the poet must pay attention to the sound of what 
he is writing so the good orator is distinguished from the bad by his ability 
to appeal to the ear: the bad orator has no sense of rhythmical sweetness 
whereas the good orator is capable of subtle and joyful haxmonies. 
3 
Fou_ 
quelin shows that the poetic element in all kinds of writing (because in the 
Ramist view poetry and rhetoric were present in all discourse toov in varying 
degrees) is characterised by its harmony and capacity to delight. The orator 
borrows techniques from the poet: 
I'Llorateur et celuy qui parle en prose a usurpd et 
derobd c4te suauit4 et modulationaus muses v comm' il 
a emprunt4 la mesure et le nombre des poetest lea 
marques et enseignementzen sont 6tez# toutesfoia la 
delectation m6me demeure". 4 
What unites the two functions (teaching and pleasing) is the third 
1. Scholao meta sicae, SLA col-836; cf. 0 Institutiones oratorinot P-70. 
2. Institutiones oratoriaep p. 26. 
3. Ibid., PP-79-80- 
4. La Rhetorinue Frangoyseq P-117- 
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function of oratory which namus also borrows from Cicoro, and Quintiliant the 
notion that one of the purposes of discourse is to persuade. Ramus quotes 
Cicero's statement about the three functions of the oratorp to toacht to move 
and to pleasep 
1 
and comments that Brutus and others thought that the orator 
should not try to move people forciblyp and that those whose speech was 
elevated were given to raving. Ramus agrees with Cicero's definition that 
the true orator was he 'whose speech was ouch that he proved thingot pleased 
and persuaded people' and who made a correct use of the traditional three 
styles. 
2A little later in this context R=us quibbles on this point when 
he claims that persuasion is not "the end and highest and most perfect 
honour (laus) of the orator"t because a successful result depends on circum- 
stances which are fortuitousp and not dependent on the art. The aim should 
3 
simply be "to speak well" . 
(Besidesq Ramus notes that the threefold Cicer- 
onian definition 'to teachp to please, to move' is common to many arts and 
not proper to rhetoric). In a similar way it is made clear that the end of 
logic is not to demonstrate but to discourse (disserendi); success is not 
4 important. 
In a sense, for Ramusp it is impossible to separate the respective 
functions of teaching and persuading: 
"Ce que nous appellons enseignert West pas bailler 
la sapiencep ains seulement tourner et dirieer 
llesprit a contempler ce quo de soy mesme il eut peu 
aperceuoirs slil se fut la tourn6 et dirig411.5 
1. Scholae rhetoricae, SLAj preface. 
2. Ibid., in SLA, col. 273, -probo 
is given as the equivalent of, doceo. 
3. Ibid., col. 275- 
4. Aris otelicae animadversionesp (1543), P-56. 
5. La Dialectique, p. 2. 
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This is most clearly exemplified in the cane of the orator. In the 
Dialecticae institutiones (1543)v Ramus writes that comparisons are most use- 
ful for those 
"who wish to move and impel the minds of their listeners 
by the force of their speech. Just as nature impels usp 
so we impel others when we attempt to persuade them. 
Orators especially are given to this since they aim to 
capture and take away by force the minds of their liste- 
nersv if this does not seem possible by quiet and clear 
teachin, g". 1 
The orator, Ramus writes elsewhere, trios to gain the 'grace at atton- 
tion de llauditeur, .2 In the Rhatorica, of 1572 he says of figures of son- 
tence and figures of diction that the former are more useful for moving and 
convincingp and the latter for teaching and pleasing. Their co=on purpose 
lies in their use for teachinlz 
One corollary of the widely-held Renaissance theory that the "univer- 
sal" man was the only one who could be called truly educated was that anyone 
who wished to practise any art at all was expected to be well-versed in all 
the othersp for the reason that this would make him a better man and there- 
fore a better practitioner of the art in question. So R=us insists that 
orators should be absolutely familiar with the encyclopedia of all the arts, 
but, he addsp (and here he is attacking Cicero) these should all be oubser- 
vient to rhetoric. 
4 According to Cicerop he writes, the perfect orator 
'shares in all the arts, 
51 but R=us contends that what Cicero is describing 
is the perfect citizent who, in the time of Cicero, had to be an accomplished 
1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543). p. 16v. 
2. La Dialecti2ue, P-13. 
3. Rhetorica, (1572)9 P-56. 
4- Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col. 236; cf. col. 279. 
5- Ibid. 9 col. 242-3. 
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public speaker if he was to play his propor role in the affairs of the 
state. Mat Cicero is talking about is "a politician who is absolutely 
accomplished", andp adds Ramus, there is all the difference in the world 
between defining the perfect citizen and defining the perfect orator. 
1 
One wonders why Ramus was so interested in oratory. His reputation 
as one of France's greatest orators may be justified but there in little 
evidence to prove it. 
2 He was not himself concerned with intervening in 
public affairst except in matters which concerned the university, and most 
of his own speeches must have been made within the university. He want of 
course, anxious that his pupils should become all-round universal men and 
he was particularly convinced of the power of the spoken word. But above 
all he was interested in oratory because of his familiarity with Cicero and 
desired to reproduce classical education with its diatinctly rhetorical bias. 
He did, on the other hand, feel that the quest for the perfect orator 
was an impossible one: 
"No man's nature can be perfectp no art, since it 
imitates natUrey can be perfect: no practice can 
be so perfect that nothing could be added to it, 
since man's life is so short and uncertainIO 
Ramus ridicules Cicerots quest for the perfect orator by saying that 
all he would have to do would be to attribute a knowledge of all disciplines 
to anyone -a poet, a doctort a grammarian, a cook - in order to dream up a 
perfect poet, doctorl gTammarian or cook. 
4 (Cicero is reported as having 
1. Ibid., loc. c 
' 
it. 
2. In the Ciceronianus, more than in any other book, Ramus mentions French 
oratory in his own dayl cf. pp-13,17, and 61. 
3. Scholae rhetoricael SU, col. 244. 
4.2lid., col. 246. 
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thought that it would be easier to find a perfect grammariant logiciant 
doctor and so on because their aims and functions wore necessarily Moro re- 
stricted than those of the orator). It is not absolutely clear how far away 
from Cicero Ramus is hereq since they are in agreement that the orator should 
possess all these accomplishments. When Quintilian adds that the orator must 
have the virtues of prudence, Justicat fortitude and temperance, and a know- 
ledge of philosophy, law, history and so ont Ramus thinks that this is too 
far-reaching. What Ramus is saying is that the orator should have all these 
qualities, but that they should not be discussed in an art of rhetoric. 
1 In 
fact, for Ramusp the perfect philosopher and perfect historian have more 
need of eloquence than the orator has need of a knowledge of philosophy or 
history* 
2 
Ramus finds that Quintilian seems to have thought that the good ora- 
tor must be virtuousp and he suggests that the virtue of rhetoric is not a 
moral virtue of such a kind that "a man who was endowed with it could not 
3 
help being good" . He sees it rather as a mental or intellectual virtuet 
it 
is possible to be a good orator and yet at the s=e time a wicked man. In 
all this the primary concern of Ramus is to keep the different arts separate. 
quintilian should realize, he notes, that a man who in explaining the poets 
teaches other arts in not doing it as a grammarian but as an exponent of the 
4 
other arts. 
--. _. -S-S-- SS -S- SS SS-S- SS -S- 
1. Ibid., col-320. 
2. Ib , col. 279- 
3. lbid. 9 col-322. 
4. Ibid. v col-330. 
253 
If we turn to the PlSiade and the related thooricts we ceo that they 
had a good deal to say about the relation betwoon poetry and oratory, and 
not much to say about 10gict though they do often imply that the poet has a 
teaching function. 
We have already seen that they were aware of the relation between 
the r8le of the orator and that of the poet. Sebilleto for exaMP109 writes 
"Et sont 110rateur et le Pogte tant proches et conjoinzt 
qua semblables et dgauz en plusieurs choses, diffdrent 
principalement en cot quo Itun est plus contraint do 
ndmbres que ltautre"41 
This is very like Du Bellay's statement that Ile poOte ot 11oratour 
sont co=e les deuz piliers qui soutierment lledifice do chac=e Languel. 
2 
Sebilletp for his part, is concerned with the interrelation of the two dis- 
ciplines and with the help which they can give to each athnr 
"Et tout ainsy que le futur Orateur profite en la legon 
du Po6tes aussy le futur Po6te peut enrichir son stylet 
et faire son champ autrement et6rile, fertil# de la 
legon des Ilistoriens et Orateurs francois". 3 
Sebillet is very near to the medieval idea of pootry as rhetoric. 
Du Bellay, toop in his "Art of Poetry" has much to say about the function 
of the orator: 
"Lloffice donques de llorateur eat de chacune chose 
proposde elega=ent et copieusement parler. Or 
ceste facult4 de parler ainsi de toutes chosea ne se 
peut acquerir que par llintelligence parfaite des 
Sciences". 4 
In many ways this idea of the orator is like Du Bellay's own idea of 
the poet - the need for encyclopedic knowledge# for exampleg is co=on to 
1. Sebillet, op. eit. v pp. 21-2. 
2. Du Bellay, op-cit. 9 PP-87-8- 
3. Sebillety op-eit. 9 pp. 30-1. 
4. Du Bellav, -ýo----t. 9 P. 33. E... ci 
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both of themp as we shall see. In Du Bellay there is, in faotp no clear dif- 
ferentiation between the poet and the orator. Whon he insists that he is not 
attempting the definition of a non-oxistent poet he uses exactly the same 
terms that Cicerop and then Ramuel had used about the ideal oratort 
"Or ne veux-je en ce faiaant foindre co=e une cortaine 
figure de pobtel quton no puysso ny des youxt ny dba 
oreilleav ny d1aucun sons apercovoirp main comprandre 
soulement de la cogitation ot do la ponsdot co=o Cos 
Iddes que Platon constituoit en toutes ohosest aux 
queles, ainsi quIa une cortaine espece imaginativeg no 
refere tout ce quIon pout voir". 1 
Du Bellay in the end gives very practical advice about what the poet 
should be like. In the celebrated passage in which he shows what the true 
function of the poet should be, once more he is using the words in which 
Cicero describes the function of the orator: 
"Pour conclure ce propos, saichosp Lecteurp quo coluy 
aera veritablement le pobte quo jo cherche en nostre 
Langue, qui me fera indigner, apayserg ejoyrt douloirp 
aymert hayrp admirerv etonner, bref, qui tiendra la 
bride do mes affectionsg me tournant ga ot la a son 
plaisir". 2 
It seems to me to be fairly clear that Sobillet and Du Bellay were 
very close to Ramus on this point and that they did not in fact distinguish 
to any appreciable extent between the poet and the orator. This emphasizes 
therefore the importance of the study of rhetoric for an understanding of 
PlSiade poetic theory. 
Peletierp on the other hand, marks an important stage in the develop- 
ment of the idea of the poet, because, while he does show the similarities 
between the poet and the oratorv he is careful to point out that there are 
1. Ibid. 0 p. 890 and of. Chamard's references there to Cicero's Do Oratore. 
2. Ibid. 9 P-179- 
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also great differences. He devotes a whole chapter to thin topict IDU Sueqt 
do Podsij: E dj la difforenci du Po5tj o dý 110ratour'. 
1 The main difference 
is explained as follows: 
"Einsi voqla, l'un/ des pý 
t týoipaljs 
diferancis qulil iL 
antre 110rateur e li Poe p qiý cituici poh alobatri 
an tous glanris d'argumans, c7tuila §t astreint aus 
chosis partioulieris. Car ltOrateur nj pourr as 
chqrcher llocasion d/ feri parlor lea Dieus, 
_ 
trutor 
l'Amourp lea Ieus festiz, lea Anfqrs, lea Astris, lea 
regiBst lea chansl lea rezy lea fontoinja a tol/a_1 
beautez d'Eorizi Up s/tiendra didans lea cauaps ap 
sea clians: mouura lea af zt deduira sea rqsono, refu- 
t/ra, cqljs dý son auqrsorý 4E an ces deus derniere 
poinz le Po6tj i antri aussit mqs il lea trotj succintj 
ment'. 'i 
It is worth noting here that Peletier sVe that the poet shares with 
the orator the function of reasoning rather than that of persuadingp but that 
he is less larg=entativel than the orator. The passage goes on i 
"Car lui qui parl/ a unj etqrnite, doýt aeul/mant toucher 
li neu, li sýgrjt ot li fona d1un argumento 
2e 
parlor plus 
resolumant, lqssant les mýn4s narracions". 
showing the inappropriateness of historical detail in good poetry. 
Peletier goes even further than Du Bellay had done in describing the 
true function of the poett 
"Llofic/ dlun Po8t4p q't dý dormer nouueaute aus chosis 
vielhAst autorite aus nouuglis, beaute aus rudýst 
lumierý aus obacurýs, fog aus douteusý99 ea toutis 
leur naturZ1 ea leur naturql toutis". 3 
This new conception of the poet is radically different from the idea 
which Sebillet had. It is also a long way away from anything Ramus had to 
say about the function Of the poet. By the time Ronsard wrote the Abbregd 
1. Ibid. 9 pp-83-4. 
2. Ibid. 9 P-84. 
3. lbid. p P-97. 
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the difference between the two views is taken for granteds 
"Car tout ainsi qua le but do lloratour oat do persuador, 
ainsi coluy du Po6te oat dlimiterp inventerp at repre- 
senter lea choses qui sontp qui peuvent eytrop ou quo 
les anciens ont estimd co=o veritableall,, 
It is not easy to establish the extent to which aixteenth-century 
theorists thought that the poet should be didactic. Ono thing is cortainj 
that they were all in favour of the Horatian injunction to mix what waa 
useful with what was sweet. 
2 The only difficulty for us is to decide the 
meaning of the word 'useful' in this context. In spite of the attempt to 
free poetry from all the moral implications which it had had through the 
11iddle Ages, there was still a belief in the value of poetry as a means to 
bettezment. Peletierv for example, writes, 
eiji vAn a l'exc21anc/ di la Poe*sij. Los Po4t/a ont 
etb jadis les metres e refo=ateurs d/ la vip.... 
La Pogsij hý congregl les ho=Jsp qui etoý-t Sauu 89 
brutaus e epäuýsz e dt=/ horre= dý vii les ar tirbz 
s 
a la ciuiliteg polici e societe. 3 
Because of this civilizing mission it was important that the poet 
should himself be an accomplished man; here we come back to the question 
which exercised Ramus with reference to the orator and the logician. Du 
Bellay makes his own view clear in the chapter 'Du long poeme Francoys' 
(Bk. ii. ch-5): 
1. Ronsardp Abbre&41 ed. cit P p-13. 
2. Cf. p on this topict R. J. Clements, Critical Theory and Practice of the 
Plhadep Cambridget Mass., 1942, especially chapter four, 'Poetic Sweet- 
ness and Utilityly pp. 122-186, in which he discusses among other things 
the use the French writers made of Horace's 10mne tulit punctum qui miB- 
cuit utile dulcil Lectorem delectando pariterque monendolp Ad Pisonest, 
vv. 343-4. 
3. Peletier, op. cit. v p. 67. 
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"Donquesp 6 toyt qui douS d'uno excellente felicitS do 
nature, instruict do tous bons Ara at Sciences, princi- 
palement naturelles at mathematiquesp vers6 en tous 
genres de bons 
' aucteurs 
Grocz at Latinst non ignorant 
des parties at offices de la vie humaineq non do trop 
haulte conditiong ou appell6 au regime publiql .... 6 toy (d, y-je) ornd do tant de graces at perfections.. ooll 
Peletier makes even clearer the acoompliahmente which the poet must 
have: 
"Ie n1b donq pas ici grand bisoin d/ dirip quia notri 
Po9tj it necesser/ la connoqssancA d'Astrologi/t 
Cosmografijo Geometriý, Phisiquý, brief d/ toutý la 
Filosofij". 2 
Finally Ronsard (who in the preface to the Prancinde will repeat 
this idea of the learning necessary to the poet) makes the point in the 
Abbreg4 that the poet himself must be virtuoust 
"Or, pour ce que les Muses ne vaulent loger en une amep 
si elle nlest bonnep saincteg et vertueuset tu seras 
de bonne nature, non meschant, renfrongn6t ne chagrin: 
mais anim6 d1un gentil esprity ne laisseras rien entrer 
en ton entendement qui ne soit sur-humain et divin". 3 
We have seen that Ramus was anxious to establish whether it was 
possible or not to decide on the characteristics of the perfect oratorv 
and so onj and was careful to make the distinction between the perfect 
practitioner of any art and the perfect citizen or perfect man. This was 
clearly a co=onplace in Renaissance writing because we find the theorists 
of poetry also debating the question with reference to poetry. Pel6tiOr 
makes the comment: 
"Song/ qui 1ý Ciel petLt fkr/ un Podtj parftts mp qulil 
nlan h. point ancoris fýtll. 4 
1. Du Bellay, op. city pp. 127-8. 
2. Peletiert. U. cit., pp. 216-7. 
3. Ronsardl op-cit-p P-5- 
4. Peletier, .9p. 96. 
258 
He is more ready than were the others to describe an imaginary pooti 
I'liquel, possiblý, nous fqsons ici n6 tol qulil & ancor 
et6: mts tel qulil aj petLt imaginor" .1 
Yet in spite of what Peletier says here one has the impression that 
he felt his ideal was realizable. By Itel qulil sl pout imaginert he does 
not wish to suggest the hypothetical nature of such a poet but the possi- 
bility of his existence. The same could be said of Ramus. Many of his 
contemporaries considered him to be academic and theoretical in his out- 
lookq but he did really believe that his aims were capable of realization. 
1. Ibid. 9 P-113. 
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CaICLVSI(zl 
Abraham Frauncep in his Lawiers Log gives a neat definition - 
ike (1583). 
of Renaissance didacticisma 
"Hoe teachathp whosoever maketh any other man know thatt 
whereof he was ignorant". 1 
Praunce was writing a work of logic, and logic was certainly in his 
mind when he wrote these words, but he is using 'know' in a very general 
sense. His book was an adaptation of the Ramist Dialectiop and his state- 
ment can be taken as a summary of Ramus' own views on discourse and co==: L- 
cation in general. It seems clear to me that Iteaohingt (in its broad eenno) 
can be taken as the key-note of Ramus' workl just as it can of Calvinto (we 
may remember the importance for Calvin of the idea of linstitutiol in its 
sense of tteaching'). Furthermorer it seems to me that we must place the 
Renaissance idea of poetry in its educational context if we are to under- 
stand it fullyp both because Renaissance writers were consciously didactic 
in everything that they wrotep and because French Renaissance poetics grow 
out of a clearly-defined educational milieu. They reflect the importance 
attached to educational problems by humanists, reformersp and reactionaries 
alike. 
The subject of the relation between the ideas of Ramus and those of 
the French poetio theorists is a vast onet in particular from the point of 
view of Ramus because of the sheer volume of his works. I have attempted 
to show some of the similarities and differences between his views and those 
1. Frauncep Lawiers Log*e (1588)9 fol. 3vp quoted in Rosemond Tuvels 
Elizabethan and I'letaphysical Thagery (Chicagot 1947)t P-384; cf- Ongt 
R"I'DD, P-347p n-33. 
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of the PlSiade. We have seen that he did not write a specific art of poetry, 
but that nonetheless his attitudes to logic and rhetoric can help to eluci- 
date the attitudes of the P16iade to poetryp by placing them in their broader 
philosophical context. He touches on most of the problems in nonaiesance 
critical theory (though not of course on the more technical questions of 
verse-forms and metres), and analyzes carefully and precisely many of the 
tensions which existed there. namus is famous for his dichotomies and this 
approach of his is evident in the way he treats the relation between art and 
naturey analysis and genesis and so on. We have seen that he manages to 
amalgamate successfully the Aristotelian theory of universalo with the Plato- 
nic system of ideas, that the basis of all arts is for him in one sense the 
Platonic ideaq and yet that all the arts are devoted to making known the uni- 
versals in nature. He combines the Platonic outlook of Sebillet and Pontus 
de Tyard with the Aristotelianism of the later Ronsard. 
Por Ramusq, art means teaching and conversely it often means learning 
(doctrina and disciplina); it is interesting that he should equate teaching 
and learning on so many occasionsp interesting for what it tells us about 
his own pedagogic attitude. For him art is never entirely devoid of an ethi- 
cal and even a religious significancet much more so than it was for the mem- 
bers of the P16iadet though even they found it difficult to shake off the 
moral obligations of the poet. Just as Rnmus had felt that inathesis had a 
broadeningy liberalizing influence so the poets drew attention to the civili- 
zing effects of their craft. Just as for Ramus all learning (and especially 
logic) frees man from sensuality and guides him on the path which ascends to 
God and wisdom, so for the poets and the theorists of poetryp poetry had a 
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similar purpose. Poetry helped man to appreciate the great variety of nature 
which Rsmus had said all arts should contemplate. It is of course the poets 
who approach more nearly to the realization of the ideal; Ramus was far more 
interested in the day-to-day procese of teaching and writing (because that 
was another way of teaching) than in the attempt to enjoy eternal ecstasy,, 
He was neither mystio nor theologian: his one work of theology ist for the 
most party very prosaic, and oven his Platonio lyrioiemp though sometimes 
moving, is often not very convincing. 
We have seenp too, that Ramus shares and amplifies the PlSiade's 
view of the way in which art imitates nature. He shows that all art is an 
attempt to express (re-present) the natural# that ist what is inborn in man 
before he has recourse to labourp studyt practical exercise or industry. 
The teaching-process is for him a copy of a natural processl a reflection 
of the order which exists in nature. Yet it shares the imperfection which 
is inherent in nature. Logic and rhetoric are natural to all men even if 
not in the same degree. Ramus is not familiar enough with the work of poets 
to be able to say with any conviction that poetry is natural. He certainly 
could not have said that it was natural to all men. He was in agreement 
with those of his contemporaries who said that art and nature were equally 
indispensable to any writer, and insisted on a third pointj that art is 
valueless unless it gives rise to practical exercise and activity. The di- 
vine origin of poetryt poetry as a kind of fury imparted by the Eods or by 
God fits in very well into Ramus' view of the origin of all the arts. 
In the matter of imitation Ramus provides a parallel to the views of 
the theorists of poetry, develops the idea much more profo=dly and places 
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it in the total philosophical context. Like the Pldiade theorists he did 
not use the words 'creativity' and toriginalityt in their modern sonsest but 
'he had a theory of originality which was even better developed than that of 
the PlRade. He sees imitation as a more stagop as part of the process of 
learningp and his theory of lea=ing was based on the idea of the personal 
contribution and participation of the pupil. Ramus stresses, in fact, ori- 
ginality rather than imitation. His description of &enesia in a very modern 
theory of originality. 
Norman Nelson has written that "Ramust logic in not a logic at all, 
but a rhetoric or technique of persuasion". 
1 This is of course an oversim- 
plification of what Ramus says about the persuasiveness of logiop and takes 
no account of the precise and technical content of the Ramist Dialectict 
but it does contain a certain amount of truth. Nelson reminds us that for 
Ramus poets are natural born logicians who share with the orator a three- 
fold functiont 
"to teach, to move and to delightt and of these the 
delight and the moving were means to the end of 
poetry, which was to teach". 2 
It is quite true that Ramus was an advocate of the interrelation of 
all the different disciplines, because, while for him they each retained 
their special aims, there was one method co=on to them all and their ulti- 
mate purpose was identical. He sensed the perpetual tension which must 
exist between the clarity which all discourse has to have and the embellish- 
ment it takes on in order to please and persuade. The Pldiade poets were 
1. Nelson, op. P-14- 
2. Ibid 9 p. 22. 
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less interested in the clarity than in the embellishments for them there 
was a definite distinction between the plain writing of history or of logic 
and the figured language with which they were more familiar. In this con- 
nection Ramus debatesp in almost the same terms as did the other thooristsp 
how far a writer may depart from a strict adherence to logical truth. His 
answer is that MZ writer (even, on occasion, the logician) may write in a 
way which is persuasive rather than truthfull in line with the distinction 
made by all critics at the time this is not to condone lying. One fools 
that Ramus wanted the logician to be exempt from the need to persuade by 
these meansy andq indeed, some of his writing suggests that the logician is 
concerned only with distinguishing what is true from what is false and can 
therefore never depart from absolute truth. But he does allow it in his 
'method of prudence' in discourse (even logical discourse) by means of which 
the character of the audience is allowed for in the disposition of the materi- 
al, and truthfulness gives way to persuasiveness. 
In the matter of inventiong something which lies at the heart of 
Renaissance critical theoryv Ramus echoes in broad outline what the theo- 
rists of poetry say, but for him 'invention' is part of logic, and related 
to a particulat 'topical' theory which was originally part of rhetoric. The 
P14iadej too# took over invention from rhatoriep but they were very vague in- 
deed about how it was to be understood and how it was to be practiced. Ex- 
cept in a very general sense I do not believe that they took any notice of 
the Ramistv or indeed anyp topical theory of tha invention of arguments in 
the places, or ever used it schematically. This was too far removed from 
the spontaneous, 'inspired' character of their poetry. Nor did Ranus' acade- 
mic presentation of the rhetorical figures influence their poetry. On the 
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other hand they had benefitod from a similar sort of rhetorical trainingg in 
the common school tradition# in their early yearst and there are many points 
of contact. We should remember that for Ramus the doctrine of invention was 
not something peculiar to logict it wan universally applicable to all the 
arts and was based on a theory of the perfectibility of knowledga. 
In the course of this study we have seen the points of contact bet- 
ween the philosophical and general aesthetic theories of R=us and the po- 
etic theories of the Pldiade. Although Ramus is rarely talking specifically 
about poetic theory# his works do show how poetic theory is part of the 
broader philosophical tradition. Uy first contention has been that the ac- 
tual personal or literary contact between Rsmus and the Pldiade was negli- 
geable and unsatisfactory (though this is contrary to the co=only and in- 
creasingly more widely accepted view)' and my second that a study of Ramus 
is nonetheless fruitful and illuminating if we wish to go more deeply into 
the issues behind Pldiade poetic theory. One other point emerges clearly. 
R=usl Platonismp much talked about, is superficial. He is much less of a 
Platonistq for example, than Pontus de Tyardt Du Bellay or Ronsard; his 
Aristotelianism, in spite of his repeated rejection of it and his captious 
vituperation of Aristotle is profound and well-developed. It seems to me 
that in many ways Ramus shows as early as 1540 familiarity with the Aristote- 
lian views which did not erupt into French poetic theory until the publica- 
tion of Scaliger's Poetices libri septem in 1561p and Ronsardto Abbreg4 
in 1565. 
Since Ramus# in the 1540's and 1550'st was preaching an Aristoteli- 
1. cf. R. E. Leaket "Antoine Fouquelin and the Pldiadellq in Bibliothbque 
d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1970, P-383. 
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anism which Ronsard was to accept in the 1560'al it might seem reasonable 
to suppose that Ronsard took over the ideas of namust that there wan, in 
fact, a literary contact. Except in a very general consot howovert I do 
not believe that this is what happened. 11y contention-is that in the for- 
mative years of Pl6iade theory (sayp 1547-60) there is no evidence for any 
contact except for the superficial collaboration in the Dialectique. Nor 
is there any necessity to conclude that Ronsard's later Aristotelianism 
owes anything to Ramus. It seems to me far more likely that Ronsard was 
influenced by Italian Aristotelianism (through Scaliger's book), andt more 




(1) Works k Ramus, Talon and Fouquelin 
Any bibliography on this subject must rely heavily on Ong's Rnmus, and 
and Talon Inventory (19589 558 pp. ). Iýy principle has been to extract from this detailed bibliography and check-list the books which have boon of moot 
use to me in my study. I have not attempted to list all the different edi- tions which I have used, beoauset in many caaesp the differences are not 
significant. I omit also most of the posthumous editions and adaptations, 
many of which I have consulted, because they are not central to my study. 
I have refrained from listing the location of books since Onglo list doea 
this for so many European librarieu. The copies I consulted are mainly those 
of the Biblioth6que Nationale (Paris). I have not mentioned here the editions 
I have discovered which Cng had not come across because they are relatively 
unimportant. 
Once again the problem of authorship arises. In general I follow 
Ongy pointing out the occasions when I think his attribution is doubtful 
or even wrong. 
Unless otherwise stated the work is by Ramus, and the place of publi- 
cation is Paris. An asterisk indicates that the work is also to be found in 
SLA (Scholae in liberales artesy B91ep 1569). 
Dialeoticae partitiones, J. Bogwdt 1543. 
Dialecticae institutionesp J. Bogardp (Sept. ) 15431 other editions by 
Lt. David, 1549P and L. Grandin, 1554- 
Aristotelicae animadversiones, J. Bogardo (Sept-) 1543; also it. Davido 
1548v and A. Wechelt 1556. 
Oratio de studiis mathematicis: this is contained in Tres orationes a tribus 
liberalium disciplinarum profossoribus, Petro 
Ramop Audomaro Talaeo, Bartholomaeo Alexandrop 
J. Bogardp 1544- 
Oratio de studiis rhetoricis (Talon)v also in Tres orationes. oo 
Euclidesq L. Grandin, 1545; also by Thomas Richardt 1549 and 1558. The trans- 
lation is not by Ramust as Ong believedt though the prefacet of 
coursep is. 
Audomari Talaei Institutiones oratoriaet J. Bogard, 1545. Thin is one of the 
most difficult texts to attribute. 
Ong includes it under the works of 
R=us and not under those of Talon, 
but in his comments (RTI, pp. 82-5) he 
shows how uncertain the whole matter 
is. I am inclined to agree with him 
that the work is largely Ramus' ownp 
and that Talon had some hand in it. 
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Scipionis somnium explicatum, T. Bogard, 15461 (the edition I uned 'Wan that 
of 11. David, 1550). 
de studiis philosophiao et aloguentivie coniungendic, J. Bogardt 15461 
(the edition I used was that of I-Tartinuo 
luvenis, 1549)- 
Brutinae quaestiones in Oratorem Ciceronis, J. Bogard, 1547- 
Dialecticae praelectiones in Porphyrium, 14. David, 1547- (Ong gives Talon 
more credit for this work than is his due. 
This work ist in faotv by Ramusp 'Vida -SUra. p-91j note 3. ) 
Audomari Talaei Rhetoricap U. Davidt 1548; here again there is difficulty 
of attribution. Ong rightly$ I think, in- 
cludes it under the works of Romust and lists 
one hundred and twenty-four different editionst 
adaptations and translations of it. I have 
used especially those of A. Wechelt 1562 and 
1572. 
Rhetoricae distinctiones in Qj; Intilianump 11. David, 1549- 
Platonis epistolaep TL Davidp 1549- 
Ciceronis Do fato liber, It. Vascosany 1550. 
Pro philosophica Parisiensis Acadepiae disciplina oratio, H. Davidp 1551- 
Oratio initio suae professionis habita, 11. Davidj 1551- 
In omnes M. T. Ciceronis orationes.... doctissimorum virorum enarrationesy 
Bale, Joannes Oporinusp 1553. (I used the 
edition of Jean do Tournesp Lyon, 15541 
In Auli Persii Placci Satyras commentarius ad Petrum Ramum, 1555 (By Fouquelin). 
Arithmeticae libri tres, A. Wechelt 1555- (From this point onwards in the 
bibliography the publisher is riechol unless 
otherwise stated). 
Dialectiquey 1555-j also 1556, Avignonv Barthelemy Bonhomme; 1576 and 15779 
G. Auvray. There is also the modern edition 
by Michel Dassonvillet in Travaux d'Humanisme 
et Renaissancep Genevaý 1§-64. As with the Rho- 
torica there are numerous editions of the Dia- 
lectica (Ong lists two hundred and thirty 
Five). 
I used especially those of 1560 and 1566. 
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La Rhetorigue fý-angoyset 1555 and 1557- This is Fouqualinla (or Foolin'sq 
as the first edition has it) translation- 
adaptation of the Rhotorica. The work in 
only indirectly by Ramusp but he certainly 
had a largo share in its authorship. 
P. Virgilii Maronis Bucolicap 1555. 
P. Virgiliijlaronis Goorgical 1556. 
Audomari Talaci Admonitio ad Adrianum, Turnebumt 1556. As often happened in 
the course of the numerous Romiat controver- 
siesq much of the polemic appeared pseudonym- 
ously. This book is by Ramus, not Talon, and 
Turn4be replies under the n=o of Ldgor Ducheane ftooder, -nri a Ouercu Ronponsio ad Audonari-Talaol 
). I. T. Ciceronis De optino genereoratonn praefatiog 1557- 
Ciceronianus, 1557- 
* Oratio de legationet 1557. 
Haranizue de Pierre de la Ramee 2 touchant ce qu# it faict les d0'PutGz de 
l'Universitd de Paris envers le Roy, 1557- This is a translation (not by 
Ramus) of the preceding work. 
Quod sit unica, doctrinne instituendae methodus. p 1557. This is extracted 
from Books IX and X of the Aristotelicae ani- 
madversiones of 1556 (vide su ra , and here 
published separately. 
Liber de moribus veterun Gallorum, 1559. 
TraictS des fagons et coustumes des anciens Galloys, 1559. This transla- 
tion is by Michel de Caste1nau. 
Liber de Caesaris militiap 1559. There is a French translationt TrqAct4 de 
l'art militaire, ou usance de , 7uerre de Jule: 3 
C4sar, by Pierre Foissong published by Robert 
le 11angnierg 1583. 
Grammaticae libri quatuor, 1559. 
Ruclimenta gra-=aticae, 1559. 
* Scholae rra=maticae, 1559- 
Grammatica graer-a 1560 (1 used the 1562 edition). 
Liber de syntaxi graecal 1560 (1 used tle 1562 edition). 
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Ruddimenta rrarnmatieae ffrAecaa, 1560. 
Gramere, 1562. 
Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis academLae, a. 1., 1562. 
Advertissements sur la r6formation de l'Universitd de Paris, 1562. 
Oratio do 2rofessione liberalium artiump 1563. 
* Scholarum physicamm libri octot 1565- 
* Scholarum metaphysicarin libri quatuordecimg 1566. 
* Actiones duae habitae in Senatut_pro regia mathematicao-. 2rofessionis 
cathedra, 1566. 
Pr4face sur I& Proeme des mathdmati2ues, 1567- 
Prooemium mathernaticumf 1567. 
La Remonstrance faite au Conseil priv4,1568. 
Scholae in liberales artes, Ba5les E. Episcopius et Hicolai fratris haeredest 
1569; also 1578. The first of these editions 
is the one I have frequently*referred top 
as SLA. 
Scholarum mathematicarum libri unus et trigintap Balet E, Episcopius et 
Nicolai fratris haeredest 1569. 
Defensio pro Aristotele adversus Jacobum Schocitriv Lausannov Joannes Probustl571. 
Basileav Lausanne: Joannes Probus, 1571. 
Praelectiones in Ciceronis orationes octo consulareso Basileaet Petrus 
Perna, 1575- 
Professio regiap hoc est septem artes liberales I Basileae: Sebastianus 
Henricpetrip 1576: (edited by Johann Thomas 
FA29ge) 
Testamentupt Joannes Richerius, 1576. 
Co=entariorum de relitrione Christian& libri quatuory 1576. 
Rami et Audc aei Colleota tiones, epistolae, orationes Tedited by Nicolas Bergeroný. Denis Du Valf 15779 
In Cicaronis orationes et-scripta nonnulla omnes 92! ae hactenus haberi potu 
grunt 2raelectiones, Francofurti: haeredes A. I-Vecheli, 1582: (editod by 
Joannes Obsopoeus). 
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Arithmaticae libri duo, 
--geometriae septem et vigintip 
Francofurtis A. 17ocheli 
heredes Cl. Marnius et I. Aubrius, 1599, 
(edited by Lazzarus Schonerus). This book also 
contains Ramus' Algebrae libri duo in spite of 
its absence from the title-page. 
Aristotelis Politicav Francofurtit typis Wecholianis apud CI. Ilarnium ot 
heredes I. Aubriiq 1601. 
Opticae libri Quatuor, Cassollist Wilhelmo Irvessolius, 1606. (This purports 
to be Ramus' 2ptical but it remains uncertain 
how much of it is directly by Ramust and how 
much is the work- of his pupil Reinner). 
(2) Other works consulted. 
Aneaug Barth6lemy. Le-RaIntil, Horatieng contained in the editiona of Du 
Bellay's Deffense et Illustration listed below. 
Aristotle. The Rhetoric of Aristotlev translated by J. E. C. "v, 'elldong Londont 1806. 
The Poetics of Aristotle, edited and translated by S. H. Butchert 
4th edition, Londonv 1911. 
Aristotle's Art of PoetrYq translated by W. Hamilton Pyfat Oxford, 
1966 (first edition 1940)- 
Amstrongg Elizabeth. Ronsard and the Age of Gold, Cambridgep 1968. 
Ascham, Roger. The Scholemaster, edited by Edward Arberp Londong 1870 
(Englis Reprints). 
Balmas, Enea. Un poota del Rinascimento Francesep Etienne Jodellep 
Florencep 1962. 
Banos ius I Theophilus . Petri Rami vita,, 1576: 
(Contained in Ramus' Commen- 
tariorum de reliKione Christianap Francofurtip A. 'Veche- 
lus , 1576. ) 
Barroux, Robert. tPierre de la R=do et son influence philosophique: essai 
sur 11histoire do ifidde de la m6thode & 116poque de la 
Renaissance'. Ecole nationale des--Chartest Positions des 
thhes, Paris, 1922. 
Bergeron, Nicolas. Co=endatio professionis mathematicaet a Petro Ramo in- 
stitutael Paris, 1580- 
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, gintilianum, 
Hildosheimt 1962. Bonnelluso Eduardus. (od. ) Lexicon 0 
Bouiysmal "William J. Concordia Mundi: The Career and_ThouRht of Guillaume 
Postel, 151C-1ý31, Cambri(16el Mwss- 1957. 0 
Brooke-Rose, Christine, A Granwiar of Metahorg Londonp 1958- 
Buisson, Ferdinand. (ed. ) R. 6. L)ertoire des ouvrarea _i, 
4daqoeftques au Me 
si4ole, Paris, 1886. 
Bussong Henri. Le Rationalisme dans la Littdraturo Frangaine do la 
Ranaissancel_1513.: ý1601, Paris, 1957 (first published 1920). 
CassireriErnest. The Renaissance Philosophy of-14ant Chicagot 1948- 
Castor, Grahame. P14iade Poetics, A-StuL in Sixteenth-Century Thoup: ht 
and TerminoloEaq Cambridge, 1964- 
'i Cha, gnardp Benjamin. 
(thbse) Ramus et ses opinions relir_euses, Strasbourgole6g. 
Chamardt Henri. Histoire do la P14indet (4 vols-)t Parisi 1939-40- 
Charton, Nicolas. Oratio..... principio praelectionin suarum habitat Pario#1551- 
Cicero. Rhetorical edited by A. S. Wilkinoon, Oxfordy 1960 (the first 
edition is 1903). 
De Inventione, Do Optimo Genere Oratorgn, 
_Topica, 
edited and trans- 
lated by H.: J. Hubbell, Londong 1949- 
Clarke, IM. L. Rhetoric at Rome, London, 1953. 
C16menty Louis. (thIse) De Adriani Turnebi regii professoris praefationibus. 
et poematis, Paris, 1899. 
Clements, Robert J. Critical Theory and Practice of the P14iadet Cambridgel 
Harvard University Press, 1942. 
Courcelles, Pierre de. Rhetorique, Paris, 1557. 
Craiel Hardin. The Enchanted Glassi The Elizabethanl4ind in Literaturep 
New Yorkt 1936. 
Dassonville, Michel. 'La collaboration de la P14iade h la Dialeatique, 
de Pierre de la Ram4e (1555)'t in Biblioth4qua d'Humn- 
nisme et Renaissance, 1963Y pp-337-348- 
'Do 11unitdo do la Deffence et Illustration de la 
-, 
in Bibliothýque WHUManisme et Langue FranqqZse' 
Renaissancog 19651 pp. 96-107- 
272 
Desmazet Charles. P. Ramus, Sa via, se8 4crit8j_sa mort, (1515-1572)p Paris, 
1864. This is an amended reprint from the Bulletin do 
la SociA4 ncad4miquo de Lnon,, Floury, 1853. 
Du Bellayt Joachim. La Deffenso ot Illustration dola Langnie Frnngoyeop 
ed. Ihile Person, Pariag 1392; od. Henri Chamardp 
Parisy 1904P 1948 (reprinted 1966). 
"ekhardtl Alexandre. Rdmy Belleau, Sa Vie - Sa "Beraerie'll Etude Ifintorifluo 
et Critique, Budapestv 1917. 
Fabrip Pierre. Le Grand at VrV art_de pleinerhatori-quop (3 vols. )y 
ed. A. Mronp houenp 1889-90. 
Feugere, Ldon. Les Penimes Poýtes au XVI sibele; (PP-375-391 contain a study 
on lb=us), Paris, 1860. 
Fournierp P. P. Jean Amariton do Nonette, Sa Vie, Ses- 0uyrFL_x, 1ýtq_j Sa Famillet 
CleiTaont Forrandp 1933. 
Frame, Donald M. 110ntaiLmels DiscoyeEX of Man, New York, 1955- 
Fr4my, Edouard. Henri de I.. es-mesq Parisp 1831. 
Freigiusp Johann. Petri Rami vita, contained in Praoleotiones in Ciceronis 
orationes octo consulares, Btiloq Petrus Perna, 1575- 
Gilbert, Neal W. Renaissance Conce2ts of 1,! ethodp New Yorkj 1960. 
Gmelin, E. 'Das Prinzip der Imitatio in den romanischen Literaturen der 
Renaissance', in Rom,, mische Forschungen, 1932. 
Graves, Frank P. Peter Rarmus and the Educational Reformation of the Six- 
teenth Centuryv New Yorky 1912. 
Hooykaas, R. Humanisme, Science et R6formet P. de la R=de, Leydent 1950. 
Joly, Claude. (ed). Divers-opuscul es tirez des memoires de IT. Antoine Loisel, 
Paris, 1652. 
Langlois, E. Do Artibus Rhetoricao rhythmicae, Parist 1890. 
Lapp, J. C. The Universe of Pontus de Tyard. (A critical edition of L'Univers). 
New York, 1950. 
Launoy (Launoius), Jean de. Do varia Aristotelis in Academia Parisiensi 
fortuna (3rd ed--it. -T Parist 1662. 
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Leake, R. E. 'The Relationship of Two R=-Jst Rhetoricst Omer Talonle 
I Rhetorica and Antoine Fouqualinls, Rhetori(lue Frangoiso v 
in Bibliothýque dtliumanisme et Renaissancey 1968, pp-05-108- 
'Antoine Fouquelin and the PAiadel in BibliothbVe-d'Himanisme 
et Renaissance, 1970t PP-379-94- 
Lefranog Abel. Histoire du CoMgv de Franceo Parisp 1893. 
Maofarlaney I. D. 'George Buchanan and France', in Studies in French litera- 
ture presented to 11.17. Lawton, Manchester and Now York, 
1968, pp. 223-45. 
'George Buchanan's Latin Poems from Script to Prints A 
I Preliminary Survey, in The Libraryp 1969, pp. 277-332. 
McKeonp R. 'Rhetoric in the Middle Agest, in Speculump Jan. 1942. 
Maurat-Ballange, A. Rimus et Dorat (Extrait du Bulletin de la Soci6t6 
archgologique et historique du Limousin), Limogest 1913. 
Miller, Perry. The New England I-Ilindt The Seventeenth Century, New Yorlct 
1939 (Cambrijgep Mass. 1954)- 
Nancel, Nicolas de. Petri RamA vita. Claudius Yorellusp Parist 1599 and 1600. 
Nelson, No=an E. Peter Ramus and the Confusion of Logict-Rhotoric and PoetEXt 
Uni. of Michigan. Contributions in Mode= 
Philology. No. 2. Aprilp 1947- 
Nolhacy Pierre de. Ronsard et 1'Humanismej Paris, 1921, (1966). 
Un pobte rhgnan ami de la P16iadet paul Ifglissust Paria, 1923. 
Ong, Walter J. 'Fouquelin's French Rhetoric and the Ramist Vernacular 
Tradition1v in Studies in PhiloloMr, 1954, pp. 127-142. 
Ramust Ilethod and the Decay of -Dialoque v 
Cambridgep 11ass. 9 
1958 (here referred to as MJDD). 
Ramus and Talon Inventoryp Cambridgev Mass. 9 1958 
(here re- 
ferred to as RTI. ) 
1964. 'A Ramist translation of Euripides', in YanuscripLa 
Owen, John. The Skeptics of the French Renaissancep Londong 1893. 
Pasquier, Estienne. Choix do Lettres sur la Littdrature, la Ln 
n, ed. D. Thickett, Geneva, 
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Pattersonp W. F. Three Centuries of Pranch Poetic Theorv, Ann Arborp 1935- 
Peletier du Mansy Jacques. L'Aritmeptiquo, Poitiers, 15499 1552; Lyon, 1554. 
L'Art Podtigue (15ý5 p ed. Andr6 Boulangory 
Paris, 1930; contains also the Preface to the 
Art Po; itique dtHorace (1541)t und the poem 'A un 
poete qui nlescrivoit quIen Latin', (1547). 
In Euclidis Elementa Geometricay Lyong 1557- 
Pellisierp G. De Sexti decimi saeculi in Francis, Atribus Poeticist Paris, 1883. 
Puttenham, George. The Arte of English Poesiev edited by Edward Arbert London, 
1869 (English Reprints). 
Quintilian. Institutio oratoring (4 volo. )t edited and translated by 
H. E. Butler, London, 1921-2. 
Rhetorica ad Herennitun. edited and translated by Harry Caplant Londonp 1954- 
Ronsard, Pierre de. Oeuvres complýtes, ed. Cohen, Parisy 1938. 
Saissetv Emile. Prdourseurs et Discij2les do Descartes, Paris# 1862. 
Savio3y, Christofle de. Tableaux accomplis do tous les arts lib6raux, 
Paris, 1587- 
, oyq, ed. Fdlix Gaiffe, Parisý 1910 
(1931)- Sebillet, Thomas. Art Podtique Prang 
Sonninop Lee A. A Handbook to Sixteenth-Centuný Rhetorict Londonp 1968. 
Spingarn, J. E. Literary 
-Criticism 
in the Renaissancep New York, 19638 
(the first edition is 1899). 
Stackelbergv JUrgen v. 'Ronsard und Aristoteles. Z= Aufkommen der Wahr- 
scheinlichkeitslehre in der franzdsischen Dichtungs- 
theorie der Renaissancelq in Biblio 
- 
thbgue d'Hurianisme 
et Renaissance, 1963Y pp-349-361. 
Stephanus, R. Dictionarium Latinopallicum, Parisp 1538. 
Tuve, Rosemond. Elizabethan and ljetcjphysical lmaEery, Chicago, 1947- 
Tyard, Pontus do. Oeuvrest ed. Silvio F. Baridon: Solitaire Premier, 
Geneva, 1950. 
Vaassen, Jakob van. 'Dissertatio de vita et scriptin Antonii Goveanit, in 
Antonii Goveani Opera luridica, philoloý7ica, philo- 
soph cav Rotterdamv 1766- 
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Vasoli, Cesare. 'Retorica e dialectica in Pietro Rnmolt in Tes-tiunanistici, 
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Vauquelin de la Fresnaie, Jean. Los Diverges Po6aies (2 vols. ), ed. Julien 
Travers, Caen, 1B69. 
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Appendix 
56. n. I. I Sed tamen res intelligaturp sitque Categoriag homogeneorum 
descriptio per generalissima, subalterna, infima. Quae Categoriae 
definitio, nil aliud estt quam artis et scientiae vera methodo 
dispositae definitiot Ars enim, est rerum homogenearum per 
generalissima, subalterna, specialissima, comprehensio et ordinatiol. 
n. 3. I Genus, est multitude essentiarum similiump aut essentia multorum 
similist Et illa nimirum est idea Platonis, do qua disputationem 
hue reiecerame ut genere cognito, Platonis idea facilius cognosceretur. 
Etenim Platonis idea nil est aliud, quam genus hactenus a nobis 
definitum'. 
57. n. 2. 'At (inquam) vocabula haec omnia in vero at co=uni usu significationem 
communem at generalem habent, ut Grammatica possit at arso at soientiat 
at prudentiap at sapientia nominaris quanquam prudentiae nomen in 
rebus agendis saepius usurpaturs sapientiae in consiliis at 
deliberationibus... I 
n-4. I Omnis doctrina at omnis disciplina ratiocinativat ex antecedente 
fit cognitiones manifestum vero id consyderantibus in omnibus. 
Etenim mathematicae disciplinae hune in modum concludunturt at aliarum 
una, quaeque artiuml. 
58. n. 3. I artium amnium fines et institutiones separentur: usus tamen 
conjugatur: sicuti in homin= fundis, et agris fieri videmus a ut meus 
ager in tuum non incurrat, nee tuus incidat in meumt rerum tamen 
nostrarum vendendo, emendo, permutando usus communiceturl. 
59. n. l. I Artium distinctis temporibus distincte docemus, fructus tamen 
omnium paulatim ut maturescunt, ad usum eloquentiae at prudentiae 
convertimus ... unumque tandem elcquentiae et philosophiae generalem 
et communem usum ex multis; specialibus et praecipuis efficimus. In 
agricultura aunt segetes, aunt arbores, aunt vites, aunt armenta, 
pecudes, quae suum quaeque cultum separatim requirunt: relictis in 
agro, calamis fruments, domum comportamus: arboribus in horta relictis 
poma domum comportamus: pecoribus et armentis in pascuo relictis, 
lactis copiam et vellera, domum comportamust eorum omnium simul usum 
ad corpus pascendum, alendun, vestiendum coniungimus: Its, sit in 
animorum culturat variae aunt eius partes, variis modis exercendael. 
n. 2.1 0 vani et inanes labores meil Tot annos publice de artium 
liberalium distinctione dispatavi, tot libros ea de re conscripsi at 
publicavil. 
60. n. l. I Pinis enim doctrinae non est notitia rerum ipsi subiectarum, sed 
usus et exercitatiol. 
ii 
60. n. 2. I Sic humanae vitae artes docent suis praeceptis bene loquit bene 
diceret bene ratiocinari, bene numerare, bene metiri, et eiusmodi ex 
suo fine quidpiam. Theologia autem docet bene viverep id estv Dec 
bonorum omnium fonti congruenter et accommodate. Ethica siquidem 
paganor= Philosophia beat= hominis vitam caducis et infirmis 
humanae facultatis viribus fere comprehendit et terminavit, tanquam 
homo seipso contentus esset ad beate vivendump suaque natural doctrinal 
consuetudine beatitatem sibi per se posset acquireret ideoque humanae 
virtutis vel habitus, vel actio, vel voluptas, vel honor beatos 
efficeret'. 
n-3. 'Quid ergo quantas divinae sapientiaet et quam synceras imagines 
mathesis philosophis animis ostendit? Qua via proprius in hao 
mortalitatis illusionep ad immortalis naturae conditionem accedimus? l 
61. n. l. Mathesis liberatp seu potius hominem hao mundi universitate maiorem 
redditt ut eam, cuius vix millies millesimum punctum dici potuitt 
totam oculis ipsa multo grandioribus aspiciat. Hominem a coelesti 
possessione in ultimas mundi partes abiectum, et a patria extorremp 
exulemque miseramur? Mathesis in civitam, patriamque cooli 
haereditatem restituit'. 
n-3. I Quam coeleste, quamque-deorum proprium est, cum in tenebris caecus 
erres, in amplissimo lumine o=ia n=erare? l 
n-4- I Iudicium sequiturl pars artis maximao nobilissimaques hao virtute 
mens h=inum naturae suae celsitudinem praecipue agnoscits quamvis 
enim perexiguo corporis ergastulo vincta teneaturs seipsam tamen 
aestimationef iudicioque rerum solvit, liberatquel. 
n-5.1 Quare agite, ignem hune ab illa coelesti lampade demissum 
accendamus, vinculis liberemur... t 
62. n. l. I animos nostros ex quadam eius particula decussatost; and Ie caeli 
regione delapsual. 
n. 2. I cum ad monita, praeceptaque de vita, - et moribus dialectica 
pervenerit'. 
n-5. singulares ... a natura doteslo 
n-7- divinitus insitist. 
n. e. nostris animis inscriptal. 
n. g. naturaliter propensus est ad ratiocinanduml. 
63. n. l. I quae ratio aeterna in singularibus hominum mentibus divinitus 
insita est, atque impressal. 
iii 
63. n. 2. I artes, id eat, mentis dotes et virtuteal. 
n-4- 1 Theologia itaque est doctrina de Deo divinitus hominibus oblatal. 
64. n. 2. I amor optimi, maximique Dei, ille onim veritas omnio eapientiaque 
ost, ad quam studia hominum, et cogitationes omnes natura referunturt. 
n-3. I Artes verop ac doctrinae omnea quid nisi immensam rerum varietatem 
(quae ab optijno, maximoque Deo incrodibili sapientia conditae aunt, 
et effectae) intuendo, et admirando persequantur? Omnis igitur labor, 
industria, contentiot dignitas, honor literarum, doctrinarumque 
omnium ad s=mae illius bonitatis, et aeternae potentiae maiestatem 
laude, iustitia, pietate complectandam adhortatur!; Iradiorum illorum 
micantes igniculos' and lanimis nostris igniculos divinitus insitos'. 
65. n. 2. 'Sequitur altera Haturae significatio. Primum. insitum unicuique 
incompositum per so ipsuml; I Sequitur tortia significatio Naturaet 
forma et speciesp quam dicimus definiendo quid est'. 
n-3. I essentia rerum natura constantium'. 
67-n-1. 'Quid inquam haec mundi. principial nonne praepotentis Deip id est 
authoris, et parentis sui bonitatemy prudentiamf sapientiam in his 
umbris ostentant, et quanta significatione possunt, praedicant? l 
n. 2. I nee aliud inter naturam et artem interestt quam inter exemplar 
verumv et imitatam imaginem'. 
n-3. I Haec certa naturae observatio est: a qua nunquam discedere 
doctrinat sed tariquam deum sequi debet. Egregie enim munere suo 
perfuncta videbitur, si naturae prudentiam poterit imitarit. 
68. n. l. monitiones illas naturae praestantibus ingeniis insitas' and 
monitiones illas humanis ingeniis insitas, atque ingenitast. 
n. 3- 1 Rhetorica philosophiaque totat magna ex parte naturalis estt. 
n-4. I ut magis naturae liberalitatem erga homines admirere, agTestes, et 
imperitos vinitores, qui artem disserendi ne auditione quidem, 
eamaque ullam esse noverintp eosque de consequentis anni fertilitate, 
atque ubertate interroga, quanta vini copis, sit futura, turn ex eorum 
ingeniis veluti speculis imago naturae resultabit'. 
69. n. 3. I Nee aliud hic ars est, quam naturae imago et pictural. 
n-5- I ars dialectica, est imago naturalis dialecticael. 
70. n. l. I parentis naturae consilial (1543, p. 65v) and 'Dei OPtimi maximi 
consilial (1548, P-470). 
iv 
70. n. 2. I Dail id est authoris et parentis suit and I rerum omnium parentis 
Deil. 
n. 3. I Iquae ratio aeterna in singularibus hominum mentibus divinitus 
insita est, atque impressal. 
71. n. 2. I animos liberali ingenuaque eruditione praeditool. 
n. 3.1 homines patrio quodam sermone esse praeditos, quo non solum sensa 
mentis exprimerent, sed exelamando, aversando, co=unicando, 
eimulando, varios affectus varie promerentl. 
n-4- I Deus enim celeres ingeniorum motus ingeneravit nobiev qui sunt ad 
omnem cogitationem mentis, prudentiamque rationis explicandam, et 
orriandam uberesp et copiosit quos cum doctrinae cognitiop et 
assiduus meditationis labor confirmavit, praeclarum atque eximium 
eloquentiae munus existit'. 
72. n. l. I Quod haeo professio nullam habeat definitam regionem, cuius te=inis 
septa teneaturs sed in im-nenso rerum omniump atque arti= campo libere 
vagari, consistereque possit ... cum reliquis artibus scientiam et 
cognitionem rer= concesserit, sibi ornandae atque illuminandae 
orationis laudem vendicabit. 1 
n. 2. I Rhetoricae autem artis partes, naturae partibus respondent: quarum 
una versatur in laude verborum singulorum, altera coniunctorum', 
n-3. I Vulgus pol6tas nasci arbitratur et mentis furore ad egregia carmine, 
fundendum excitari. At impetus iste naturalis communis est omnium 
virtutum omniumque disciplinarum, in quibus excellet nemo, nisi qui 
naturae indole atque bonitate impellitur, vel potius rapieturl. 
73. n. 3. I Nascuntur in pratis herbae sua sponte: sed in aliis aliae 
foecundiores et uberiores. Sic existimandum est artium semina 
hominum mentibus a natura ingerari, sed in aliis alia abundantius'. 
n-4. I quanvis in aliis magis, in aliis minus naturales illae dotes 
eluceant'. 
74. n. 1.1 Natura nanque disserendi principium instituit, institutum doctrina 
propriis, et congruentibus consiliis instruit, instructum ab arte 
exereitatio in opus educit, atque absolvitl. 
n. 2. I ideoque simul atque natus homo est, ad rationis usum proprio quodam 
naturae studio praestantiore alius, atque ardentiore: alius tardiore, 
atque hebetiore rapiturl. 
n-3. I cum varia Sint nobis auditorum ingenial. 
V 
75. n. l. I Hi aunt tres libri ad omnis disciplinae fructump laudemque 
necessariis quorum primum aeternis characteribus in animis nostris 
Deus optimus, maximus imprimit. Secundum naturae diligeno obsevator 
imitatis notulis ad aeternarum illarum notarum exemplar effingitt 
tsrtium manus, linguaque (quantum, quamque copiosum volunt) 
ampleatunturl; I Naturalia autem. dialectica, id estp ingenium, ratio, 
mens, imago parentia omnium rerum Doi'; and I Omnium enim animae 
potentiarum et facultatum, nulla optabilior eat rational cuius ars 
eat logicat Caoterae artes faoiunt animal grammaticumt arithmaticum, 
geometricumi at logica facit logicum, id eat hominem'; I Dialecticamt 
id eat rationis naturalis artem, quamquam breviter et paucia annis in 
schola meditatam at exercitatemp tota vita tamen in rebus omnibus 
meditemur at exercemus'. 
76. n. l. I Nullum instrument=, nulla ars in seipso exercaturt gra=atica in 
poiitis, et oratoribus explicandis, in scribendo propriev et loquendo 
exercetur. Geometria non est invental ut se vel suas praeceptioneaq 
sed ut res omnes, longas, latas, altasp metireturl. 
n. 2. I Finis artium non est subtilitas, sed vera solidaque utilitas'. 
n-4- I scholarum dialecticarum fundamentum feci, omninoque parentem non 
solum Lcgicae, sed omnis disciplinae, verum naturalemque in veris 
et naturalibus exemplis usum statuil. 
77. n. 2. I Nec enim logicus est, qui logics, praecepta didicit'l I illa enim 
est scientia universalis'; I logicus estt qui logicam artem in 
erplicandis et retexendis poetarump oratorump philosophorumg 
argumento, enuntiatot syllogismo, methodo adhibuit: qui logicas 
eorum virtutes multa et assidua meditatione, scriptione, dictione 
observavit, excoluitt qui seipsum o=ibus laborum et studiorum 
generibus diu multumque in his exercuit'. 
78. n. l. I ille sudor est, quem immortales dii virtuti praeposuerunt, ills, 
est aspera, difficilis, ardua via, ad cuius summum cum perveneris, 
faciles tibi res succedant'. 
n. 2. I Nulla enim natura tam firma, constansque ests quin cognitione sui 
et virium suarum descriptione firmior et constantior: nulla tam 
languida, et abiecta: quin adiumento artis acrior, et alacrior 
effici possit'. 
79-n. l. I animos hominum immortales e fonte divinitatis delibatost. 
81. n. l. I non solum de praeceptis interroganturg sed difficillimo, genere 
exemplorum et explicandorum et fo=andor=, quid in arte valeantg 
tentantur et probanturt nee artificis nomine digni iudicantur, 
nisi difficillimum quodque et gravissimum artis, non dice 
praeceptum memoriter recitare, sed opus in promptu facere atque 
exhibere valeant'. 
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81-n-3. I Doctrinae disserendi proprium eat omnes res explicandi, atque 
interpretandi instrumentuml. 
88. n. l. I Nullius insignis authoris inventionem, dispositionemve suis 
praeceptis explicanti neo ideirco virtutes ejus vel assequi, vel 
imitari curant'. 
89. n. l. I Eandem rationem Brutinae quaestiones deinde consecutae aunts in 
quibus Ciceronis et virtutes, quao pueris essent imitandae, sine 
aimulatione laudavig et vitia, quae declinanda viderentur, sine 
dissimulatione notavi et reprehendil. 
n. 2. I Grammatica nobis ex observatione Cicaronis et Virgilii facts, estv 
et ad eos intelligendos est referendap ut eorum. similes efficiamur'. 
n-5. I providendum diligenter erito quem imitemur: cuius similes esse 
velimus'. 
n. 6. I artis usum in propositis exemplis cernamus, deinde similia his 
effingamust. 
n-7. I eorum similes efficeremus, quorum vestigia et exempla sectaremur 
et imitaremur'. 
90. n. l. I quam maxime ad veritatem, et similitudinis expressionem accommodate'. 
n. 2. I c= ex alienis virtutibus (ut accidit in sole ambulantibus) 
colorari nos sentiemus'. 
n-3. I licet res alias meditentur et agantp tamen interea imprudentes et 
inscientes coloranturs ita nos in disertis et eloquentibus 
authoribus, licet artificium tantum logicum de industria consectantes, 
attamen coniunctus et alligatus orationis ornatus, vel imprudentes 
sequetur'. 
n-4- I quaestionem liberam sumit, et industria propria explicabit, omnes 
inventionis artes excitabit'. 
91. n. l. 'Attamen ideae huius Caesarianae exemplar adhuc nemo (cuius quidem 
scripts, legerim) sibi ad imitandum proposuit, ne tu munus nostrum 
tanquam, tralatitium despicias'. 
n-3. I Opificum industriam in Porphyrio cum philosophorum nostrorum 
inertia comparavil. 
92. n. 2.1 Itaque de Ciceronis imitationey infinita fere volumina ab Italiap 
Gallis, Germanis conscripta quotidie legimusl. 
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93-n-1. I Graecae, inquamp literae Tullio externae fuerunt, familiares autem 
ot domesticaep Latinaes Prancis Graecae pariter ao Latinae 
peregrinae suntg Francicae vero populares et vernaculao: Graeoie 
igitur et Latinis literis Ciceronianus noster prius erudiaturt. 
n. 2. I Europae Christianae sola communis est haeo lingual. 
n-4- I ditare patriam# et illustrare'. 
n-5- I Sic Atticos Latine imitatus eat Cicerof sic Graecos et Latinos 
Francice imitari possumust. 
94. n. l. I nullam ease linguam tam inopem tamque barbaram, quam diligentia, 
ditari et excoli non possit. Itaque Ciceronianus nostert Francusp 
Italuso Hispanus, aut cuiusvis gentis alumnus, vestigia Ciceronis 
ingressusp do patria facundia, nunquam desperabit: Graeciae et 
Italiae opimioribus illis spoliis patriam. suam decorabit et 
amplificabits ornaments, ipse nova pariets Latine ot Graece 
deolamitabit initia saepiust quia linguae illae modo aunt uberiores, 
pluraque afferunt ornamenta similiter dicendil. 
n. 2. I satis se sapientes existimarunt, si hominis illius inventa non dico 
iudicio, et usu consequi, sed superstitiose admirari, et velut 
oracula dei cuiusdam maximis, et occultissimis ceremoniis nobis 
(agrestibus videlicet et prophanis) interpretari possent'. 
95. n. l. I nee assequi tant=, sed alicubi vincere ac superare contendimust. 
n-3. I conandum aliquid supra eost quos imitamurl. 
96. n. 2. I Quamobrem simma diligentia, ut Apelles Alexandrum picturus, omnes 
eius partes, parti=que proprietates intuereturl; I in naturae 
simillimam viam, rationemque concludett descriptaque disserentibus 
ad imitandum proponet'. 
97. n. l. I in naturae simillimam tabulamp imaginemque concludet'. 
n. 2. I ut hoc artificioso quasi speculo, naturs, formae suae dignitatem, 
perspicerej et si qua macula sit aspersa, delerep atque eluere 
possit'; I in qua pingenda, ut certius progrediamur, exemplar ipsum 
vivum ante oculos semper habeamus'; I at illic viva sunt omnia, hie 
picta duntaxat, et imitatal. 
n. 3. I artest quarum rerun tanquam tabulae sint et imagines'. 
98. n. l. I Ars enimp ars inquamg vel rectissimat vel mille clamoribus 
intelligentiae ac memoriae impressa, et infixa, tantum pictura est 
naturae et usual. 
99. n. 2. I Quis igitur artem, dialecticam scribit, statuat sibi ante oculos 
naturalis illius, et humanae rationis exemplar imitandum'. 
"I 
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99. n. 3. I genesis ad effeotionem similiump vel etiam praestantiorum oper= 
adhibenda est, ut docet Analyticus magisterl. 
n-4- quae-Maýv'l t retexit, et ad artis legem resolvit et expendit'. 
100. n. 2. Ia capite retexet opus universum, quaestionem ce=et'. 
n-3. I retexta quaedam ars eat'. 
n-5- I interpretatioll I analysis'. 
n. 6. I perspiciendael; I retexendael. 
n-7. I logicus estp qui logicam artem in explicandis st retexendis 
poetarump oratorum, philosophorump arg=entop enuntiato, syllogismot 
methodo adhibuit'. 
I per seips= et euo Ilarte nitendo conandoquep su= aliquid et 
proprium faciat'. 
n. 2.1 Ilaec exercitatiop Genesis a nobis appellatur, quia novum gignat 
opus artis et efficiat'. 
102. n. l. I agnoscere in spectatis exemplis artem, et agnitam imitaril. 
n-3. I Analysio denique a crassissimis maximeque o=positis descendat 
ad simplicial. 
104. n. 2. I Scribis enim, doctissime Leoviti, e magna illa Syderum conjunctionev 
unde et purioris religionis aureum saeculum brevi rediturum vaticinarist 
artes quoque plurimas, quae adhuc abditae latuerant, emersuras, 
resque maximas modico impendio perfectua absolutumque irio adeo 
solertia et expedita ingenia his temporibus existent'. 
n-3. I Faxit Deus optimus maximus ut haeo omnia ad ipsius gloriamt ad 
Ecolesiae et Reipublicae salutem referanturt. 
105. n. l. I Redeatur ad Apostolorum saeculum, Coena sic aftinistreturg ut ab 
illis administrata est, dissidii causes, nulls, superarits tempora 
religionis illa vere aurea fuerunt# nostra autem vix ferrea dicere 
possumus'. 
n-3. I Quae cum ita sint mathesis intelligitur esse non solum bellip sed 
pacis comes et administral. 
n-5. I sic a doctis hominibus castigati, et emendati poetae, historici, 
oratoresp georgicil iurisconsultip sacri etiam Vatest. 
106. n. l. I sed magna suavitate animi ac voluptatet pene una cum lacte nutricis 
hauriremus'. 
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106. n. 2. I At Bardorum nostrorum hymnos et poUmata ut intelligentia mentist 
ut vocis sonus a nature, tribuoreturp sic cum laetitia sine labors 
cantaremus'. 
107. n. 2.1 ut enim avium teneri foetus cum diecunt egredig et circumvolare 
nidosg matres auas in exemplum tuenturg deinde probatis viribus 
per se toto coelo liberius vaganturl; 1 nostro ingeniog et iudiciot. 
n-3. I ut cum omissa prioris imitationis consuetudineq studium adiunget 
ad aliquid suo iudicio co=entandumi at limandum. genus inducat 
dicendi, at singularep at suums ut ita sui authoris stylun, 
representett ut quamvis non sit omnino aimilisp tamen in 
dissimilitudine laudem mereaturf. 
108. n. l. I Dicuntur otiam Pythagorei numeroc)bm ffq'cti, imitationep 
philosophiam totam explicasSel; I ýti iýw vero sumpsit a 
Pytha, goreis, sed mutavit noment quia illi ýt4LJe-tv dicebant do 
numeris, quod. Plato ý&J&Eýtv- do ideis dixit'. 
109. n. 2. I His muneribus placarip his sacrificiis propitiarip hoc cultu colip 
hac adoratione adorare Deus cupits atque hi primarii aunt colores 
ad illam primi hominis Deo similis imaginem renovandam'. 
n. 3.1 Homo enim (quod tam saepe repeto) ereatus est ad imaginem Deig a 
qua per peccatum prolapsus iÜbetur eam recuperare. 3. Colosa. 10. 
Induistis nov= hominemp qui revocatur ad agnitionem iuxta imaginem 
eius, qui condidit illum. Aberrare igitur ab hae imagine peccare 
. ', r. Ivt-t%r - 
Et est, ei recte accipimus Too j ýt e' Tertullianus ait, ad imaginem Dei esse illost qui habent eosdem sensus 
et motusq quos habet dominus. Et philosophis quibusdam peccare est 
perfectae naturaa non congruenter et convenienter vivere. Itaque 
quoties ab illa perfecta natura discediturt disceditur ab imagine Dei; 
ideoque peccaturl. 
110. n. l. I coelestium imitatione conversionum cognatas h-umanae mentis 
conversiones, vagas et errantes, componit'. 
n. 2. naturae vires imiteturl. 
n-3- cuius in sermonibus naturalibus impressa quaedam non sit imago'. 
n-4- imago respondeat exemplaril. 
n-5. naturalis usut verae artis archetypust. 
n. 6. ad oratoriae veritatist et pulchritudinis, Ideam, similitudinemque 
descriptio artis dirigenda est, et specimen ipsum naturae ex optima 
quaque natura capienduml. 
113. n. l. I Usus artis exigit ut praecepta perspicue et succinte doceanturl. 
x 
114. n. l. I Neque tamen existimari volo, omnem disputationem vitiosam, quia 
nullum fere vocabulum sit non ambiguuml. 
n. 2. I nullus est in physicis decretis locus cui. non posait ad aliquem 
gratioris et humanioris illustrationis fructum poeta vel orator 
adiulfi. 1 . 
n. 3. I ex tanta praestantium authorum copia clariesimos quosque et 
philosophiae huiua affinee et propinquos adiungimus'. 
115. n. l. 10 coelestis sancte paterp sempiterni, beatissimique luminis 
princepst atque author qui (non modo chaos ac sempiternas eius 
tenebras mundo depulisti, sed etiam) perpetuis ignibus clarissimam 
illam mundi lampadem soley lunap caeterisque syderibus accendisk; 
(imo vero, qui. longe clariorem et illustriorem vultus tui lumen in 
animis nostris ad res omnes inveniendumt iudicand=, explanandum, 
illuminasti)t ne patiare diutius hominum mentes lumine illo tuo 
divino privatas (Aristotelicis tenebris) erraret. 
116. n. l. I pacem, so veniam peto, precorque ut imaginem divini, coelestisque 
luminia (quod in animis nostris inspirasti, atque accendisti) a 
migeris tenebris eripi, liberarique patiarel. 
n-3. I aeternia characteribus in animis nostris Deus optimust maximus 
imprimit. Secundum naturae diligens observator imitatis notulis ad 
aeternarum. illarum notarum exemplar effingitil I Naturalis autem 
dialecticap id estv ingeniumg ratiot mensp imago parentis omnium 
rerum Dei, lux denique beatae illius, et aeternae lucis aemula, 
hominis propria est, cum eoque nascitur'. 
n-4.1 0 miseram dialecticamt in quorum latronum manus incidisti? tu 
eras homini concessa, ut occults, investigares, illustrares obscura, 
at ecce prompts, occultas, obscuras illustrial. 
117. n. l. I Frustra enim rationis lumine a Deo, optimo donati, dotatique 
essemus, frustra luminis eius vim ac potestaem praeceptis interpretaremur! 
nisi exerceamust. 
n. 2. I Lumen hoc universumt generale, totum, nullis finibus terminatur, 
omnis, quae possunt ab hominibus intelligi, luminis huius auxilio 
cognuscuntur et intelliguntur. Hoc logicum, et dialecticum lumen 
homini cognatum et naturale: et cum de Logics, naturali moneop de I 
hominis naturali cognatoque lumine moneol. 
n-4- I ut tandem cum divini solis umbram quandam in his universalibus 
exemplis deprehenderimust operaque Deip 'divinorumque operum, 
ordinem, symmetriamp descriptionemp e mathematicisp logics. mente 
contemplati fuerimus, tun ad eum, ipsum clarissimum solem. 
contemplandum, vitaeque integritate imitandum, convertamurl. 
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118. n. l. I cuius non solum 1=ine colluceant, et illustrenturp sed calore, 
motuque excitenturp vivant, augeantury florescantf tandemque 
gratissimos hominip et honestie5imos fructua adferant'. 
n. 3. I Imo vero lux rationis luce solis longe clarior et illustrior. 
Lux solis mundum duntaxat istum corpore= illustrats lux rationis 
etiam supra mundum per illas supra mundanae infinitatis regionee 
pervagaturt neque mortalia tantum corpora, sed mentes aeternas 
et divinas intueturto 
Ilgen. l. I C= igitur hoc modo dialectics, animum ab hisce crassis sensuum 
umbris avocaverit# omnesque philosophiae regiones peragraveritt in 
eis suo quibusque ordine descriptis ideas illius sempiternae 
veritatis (quas in obscuris umbris occultas, et reconditas vix per 
involucra conspiciendi potestas fuit) clarissimas demonstrabit'. 
120. n. l. I huc artes omnes traducendae suntp et convertendae ut illum ipsum 
veritatis fulgorem cuius umbras, et imagines erant persecutae, 
summo pietatis ardore contemplenturt. 
n. 2. I sunt autem mentes hominum in formarum inversarum cognitionev 
tanquam noctuae caligantes in solis splendorel. 
121. n. l. I Memimi me quondam puerum in altissimis Arvernorum montibus rem 
mirabilem vidisse: Solis et diei serenitas summa erat: e supero 
illo et sublimi loco inferne patentes campos, arbores virentesp 
interfluentes rivosý summa. animi voluptate conspiciebams repente 
nubes in medic monte coorta, camporum, arborum, rivorum conspectum 
illum obscuritate sustulit, cum superne tamen sol clarissimu6 
illucesceret: Miratus vero sum montis altitudinem, cuius vertex, 
nubes et aeris tempestates superarets et spectaculo illo valde 
delectatus sum. Simile quippiam iam nostris animis concipi cupio, 
ut sint nobis omnes argumentorum, propositionum, syllogismorum, 
methodorum modi, veluti in campo, sic in opere proposito sole 
definitionum, partitionum, exemplorum aspectabiles et claris quod 
in Dialeatica nostra, ex Aristotelicae philosophiae et materia, et 
forma efficere contendimust tum si interveniat obscuritatis nubes 
aliquat attamen intelligemus istam obscuritatem Dialecticae non esse, 
sicuti neque illic camporum et arborump sed interpositarum nubiums 
quibus sublatis cum pristina, lux solis, quae adempta fuerat, 
redierit, clari et illustres aspiciantur: Etenim tota Logica, quae 
Analyticis continetur, per se facillima est et clarissima, sed 
nubibus variis difficilis et obscura redditur. Solem igitur 
inducamus et perpetuo comparemus: in illo summo claritatis vertice 
consistamust. 
123. n. l. I obscuritate dimotag eadem distincte docebimus et apertel. 
n. 2. I disserendo enim, et ratione utendo nihil tam perturbatumv quod non 
illustretur: nihil tam obscurum quod non declareturl. 
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123. n. 4. I Methodus, quod usus est, est lux universi illius ordinis, qua res 
ita dispositae docentur apertiusp ot facilius percipiuntur'. 
n. 6.1 Haeo prima sunt tum naturalisq tum artificioai iudicii lumina ex 
sese clara, perspieuaque. Nihil enim quiequam natura dedit humano 
iudicio clarius, et apertiusg quo probari possintt. 
124. n. 2. I quinetiam hao ratione facillime phantasias animo concipiett per 
quas imagines rerum absentium ita subiiciet animot ut cernere oculis, 
so praesentes habere videaturl. 
n. 3.1 Hoc aureum et eaeleste Dei c=ipotentis donum amemus et colamuss 
hoc lumen est o=ibus (quae toto caelo nitent) eideribus longe 
elarius, longe diviniust hoc lumine, peritorum, imperitorum, senumt 
virorum, mulierum, omnis denique aetatis et sezuum conelusiones 
confirmanturl. 
n-4- I non ad nugatorias do praeceptiunculis sophisticis altercationesp 
sed ad usum prudentiae, ad htimanitatis subsidiump ad vitae auxilium 
referamus'. 
125. n. 1.1 sapientiam dicere debuit suapte natura o=ium artium clarissima et 
illustrissima esse'; 1 illustriore argumentol. 
n. 2. I Nulla enim philosophiae sententia illustris fere est, cuius 
contradictionem aliquam in Aristotele non reperias'. 
n-3. I His igitur illustribus argumentis Christus utitur ad caecos 
hominum sensus illuminandum. 1 
n-4. I tam enim fuerit illud solidum, tam stabilep tam fixump tam prorsus 
i=utabile iudicium, ut facilius esse credam, soli lumen, quam 
homini sic affi=at= assensionem eriperel. 
n-5. I propter vocis et actionis 1=en et evidentiaml. 
126. n. l. I Obscuritas alia doctrinae est, alia doctoris. Potest enim rerum 
natura, quae praeceptis traditur sic occults. esse so recondita, ut 
facilis effici aegre possits potest contra doctoris esse culpa, 
neque perspicuo sermonis genere loquentisy neque distincta et facili 
via procedentiss Colores aliis sunt obscuriores vel illustriores: 
sed tamen sunt omnes certo situ certaque luce visibiles'. 
n-5- 1 sie ear= eingularem quamque institutionem minime o=ium 
scrupulosam scholasticis quaestionibus aut spinosamp sed popularem 
toto expositionis tractationisque eurau splendidam, et illustrem 
esse cupiol. 
127. n. 2. I non ut inde ulla religionis vel authoritas vel approbatio 
repetaturg sed ut planum sitt Christianam Theologiam non adeo 
abstrusam esseq vel ab hominum sensibus remotam, quin naturali 
quadam luce populis omnibus illucescat, hominesque ideo humanitas 
ipsa ad divina studia capessendum invitet, atque alliciat'. 
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127. n. 3. I Quapropter antiquam lucem novis eiusmodi tenebris longissime reiectis 
revocandam censeol; I Itaque qui primus hanc methodum ad Theologiae 
informationem attulerit, accendet lumen aingulare ad omnes Theologiae 
partes olare et perspicue pervidendum'. 
128. n. 2. I Optics, enim in visu nil nisi. geometria est in lucep umbrap colorev 
visus ipsius natura et facultate, veritate, hallucinations, e situ, 
motu, numerop quantitate, figura, seu visus ipse rectue seu speculorum 
reflexIone, seu diversorum densitate et raritatep mediorurn refractiones 
unde pictoribus non solum lumen. et umbra, sed medius inter utrumque 
splendor qui propterea tonus appellatur'. 
135. n. 2. t consummatam veritatem'. 
136. n. l. t rem dubiam, quasi fluxam, et inconstantem materiam'. 
139. n. l. I augendo enim, saepe res ipsa naturalem modum excedits neque tamen 
mendacio fallere vults ideoque ignoscitur orationit. 
n. 2. I cum in his rebus cura verborum deroget affectibus fidemp et 
ubicumque, are ostentatur, veritas abesse videaturl. 
140. n. l. I concio populi capit omnem splendorem orationis, verisimilitudine 
contenta est'. 
n. 2. I certas et firmas notas, et verisimiles coniecturas infinitast. 
n-3- I captiunculam aliquam sophistic='. 
142. n. 1.1 ad exemplar illud viventie in hamine veritatie (ne ab Apelle nostro 
recedamus). 
n. 2. I at illic viva sunt omniat hic picta duntaxat, et imitatal. 
n-3. I omniumque artium veritas prius in natura viguit, quam ulla 
praecepta cogitarenturl. 
n-5- I ad veritatem, et similitudinis expressionem accommodate'. 
n. 6. I ad oratoriae veritatis, et pulchritudinis Ideam, similitudinemquel. 
143. n. l. I earum vivum, et archetypum exemPlarl. 
n-3. I rem ante oculos constituat'. 
n. 6. I Illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae ponunt pene in conspectu 
animig quae cernere et videre non possumus'. 
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144. n. 3.1 Rhetoresý67COLLIAV- et ýtL`fAý6%v appellanty cum aliena dicta 
imitando repraesentamus'. 
n-4- I denique vivam quandum eloquentiae imaginem Apelles hie noster tibi 
repraesentare voluitt quo facilius praestantiam in dicendo hominum 
rhetoricas virtutes et intelligeres et intellectas imitando et 
commentando tibi comparares'. 
n-5- I vocis et gestus exempla (quae in scriptis libris mortua sunt) voce 
gestuque nos ipsi fingimuso et quantum licett exprimimus'. 
n. 6. I ut non solum discipulis bene dicendi artem ex pictis praeceptis 
ostendant, sed multo magis usum vivis exemplis aperiant'. 
146. n. l. iquoniam illis voluptatis, aut utilitatis certae studium, non 
veritatis explicandae proposit= erat'. 
n. 3.1 selige de tot viventibus hominum millibusq qui naturae solertiap 
iudicioque praestents quales Hamerus Nestorem eaepe atque Ulyssem 
fingitt; 'Pluto divitiarum deus fingitur a po; ätis apud inferos 
regnaret. 
147. n. 1.1 omnium etiam partium particulas ex eodem fonte naturae derivatas 
expresseritt nihil autem de auo co=iniscatur nihil fiiigatg nihil 
somniando mentiaturt. 
n. 2. I talem oratorem fingam et informabot qualis nunquam fuit'. 
n-3. I Facetiae latius in oratione fundunturi ut cum ridicule describuntur 
hominum mores, atque its, effinguntur, ut quales sint, intelliganturt. 
148. n. l. I Atquip inquamt tempus tanquam falcarius quidamp sua falce omnia 
demetens a poldtis fingitur- Sed metaphoris politicis illud est 
condonandums solidae et seriae acroasi non idem pe=ittendumt. 
n. 2. I Quapropter oratores et p6itae in rebus popularibus hanc, 
digressionis licentiam sibi permittunt: imo cum apte ad reficiendos 
audientium vel legentium animos fiat, laudis et virtutis loco ducunt. 
Ergo quod in accurato genere docendi vitiosum fueritg id aliquando 
fuerit in populari laudabile'. 
n. 3. I politae numeris cum sint astrictiores, reliquis tamen generibus 
dicendi licenter utuntur et liberel. 
149. n. 2. I Horum faciendorum apud nos in pogtis licentia maior est, ut non 
sol= cum patriae voces desint, verumetiam cum suppeditantp 
usurpenturl. 
n-3- I Ex his autem omnibus quaedam sunt licentia carminis quam solutae 
orationis liberiora ... quaedam ad utrumque dicendi genus promiscue 
pertinent'. 
xv 
149. n-4- I habent multas in poZmate phrases, quas oratio soluta repudiatt 
eoque audacius utuntu omnibus verborum singulorum, et coniunctorum 
ornamentis, quo maiorem sibi proponunt in scribendo cantust et 
aurium voluptatem'. 
n. 6. poýtae (ut in proverbio est) multa mentiuntut!. 
150. n. l. Scriptura non dicitt Omnis home athousp vel idolatral vel in Doi 
nomen blasphemus, vel homicidap vel adulterp vel appetens alienis 
sed sperte dicit Psalm. 116.11. Omnis home mendax. Et mendaoium 
homini. prima a serpents ad omnem nequitiam fenestra fuit. Atque 
haeo nimirum naturalis est hominum servitusp quam, philosophis modo 
quodam perceptam. diximus, Itaque cum primus homo verax logicus a 
Dec faotus esset, peccato suo in mendacem sophistam, degeneravitt 
et pro logics, sophisticam posteritati haereditatem reliquit'. 
n. 2 Neque verum est, oratorem mentiendi artificem esse, cum eloquentia 
tanquam. prophetia in sacris literis honoreturl. 
152. n. 2. I Nee enim confictam pro ingenio arbitriove aliquam militiae 
disciplinam. profitero: sed militam Caesaris ex ipsius rebus gestis 
excerptam definite et partite commemorol. 
n-3. I Itaque cum de his rebus cogitur tandem per vos aliquid sudire, ex 
terris novis confictas fabulas se putat audire: et cum dico artium, 
sicuti moralium virtutumv semina nostris animis a natura, insita et, 
ingenerats, esse, hominesque natura, esse Grammaticos, Oratoresp 
Philosophos, perinde dici putat, so si dicerem esse alatos, monopodas, 
hippocentauros'; and I philosophis et oratoribus, qui locis et 
imaginibus artem. quandam memoriae confinxerunt'. 
8 Virgilianis igitur et Cicernonianieg id est, humanis et popularibus 
exemplis, idem facientibus potius, quam illis abecedariis figmentis 
utar. Quorsum, inquit acousator? Nonne logioae artis usus, qui 
primo in fietis literarum exemplis demonstratus estg melius in Ethica 
et Physica Arist. doctrina demonstrabitur? '. 
n. 2. I Artificiosum, quod ab Apelle pictum, a Lysippo fict=, a Cyro 
aedificatump aut ab, aliquo artifice composit= sitq ut tabulae, 
statuae, aedificial porticust templa, armamentarial. 
154-n-l- I astrolgiam iam a nobis exoptatam non e fictis hypothesibusp sed 
ex ipsa astrorum veritate ac natura... I 
n. 2. I infami et probrosa fictionel. 
155. n. l. I Lex historiae vetat ne qua gratiae, ne qua simultatis in historia 
suspitio fit'. 
n. 2. I Facilitas et voluptas in iis oratoriis et pobticis fabulis longe 
maior erit'. 
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155. n-4. I fabula siquidem poiticat ut sapiential constat e rebus admirandis'. 
156. n. 2. poBtica fabula est, imo no poBtica quidemp a= verisimile nihil 
habeat'. 
n-3. chimericum agitatao mentis insomnium eat sine material sine formal 
sine examplot. 
n-4. I fanatico isto. odeliramentol. 
n-5 -I Quam enim multa f alsa et impia tradit Aristoteles.. qui hominis felicitatem et ab h=ine inchoari, et in homine terminari, oicut 
alia permulta tam nefarie, tamque impie fabulatur? l 
157. n. l. I fabulosa sunt, inventaque ad persuasionem vulgit ad usum leg=9 
ad humanae vitae utilitatem. Haeo aristoteleae theologiaef de 
numero deorum philosophia est'. 
n. 2.1 fabulosa et puerilia esse reliqual. 
n-3. I Mosem tanquam fabulatorem Aegyptium irrideril. 
n-4. Ia philosopho fabulam non oportuisse confirgi quoniam nullum 
fingendi genus, veri professoribus conveniret'. 
162. n. l. I At in logico Organo neminem logicae doctorem citavitp imo 
nominatim sese artis universae et inventae et perfectae authorem 
praedicavit'. 
n. 2. I inventores et authores'. 
n-3. I Plato (cuius ore loquitur Socrates) veterum invents, mirifice 
amplexatus diligenter exercuit, docuit etiam sapienterp et copiose 
auxit'. 
n-4- I Platonem secutus Aristoteles incredibili labors, at difiturno 
sagacis observationis studio non descriptas adhuc inventionist nee 
inventas ratiocinationis artes, tanquam abditas in OCCUltiB antris 
pretioso aurivenas indagavit, eruit, protulit: sed protulit tantum, 
numum non percussit'. 
163. n. l. I Cum multa praeclare (auditores) a maioribus nostris ad humanae 
vitae usum atque dignitatem sint inventa ac posteritati relictal. 
n. 2. I Circuli quidem quadraturam non invenitp sed cum quadraret lunulamp 
falso arbitratus est ex hae circulum quadraril; I multa(que) in 
Geometria repertal. 
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163-n. 3. I Quid igitur Euolides? quid in mathematicis invenit? Elementa, 
inquit Proclus, collegit, in iisque pleraque Eudoxi composuit, 
pleraque Theaeteti perfecitp aliaque a veteribus negligentius 
demonstratap demonstrationibus iis affirmavitt quae neque refelli, 
neque redargui possint'l and t expositio operis et exornatiol. 
164. n-4. I Unus eat Romae fluviust Tyberist ad varies usus acoommodatus, ad 
potandumv lavandum, irrigand=lpurgandum, restinguendumv vehendumt 
nee singuli rivuli ad singulas eiusmodi oommoditates dirimuntur, sed 
universum flumen sua natura tale eat, ut singulis usquequaque 
adhibeaturt ita eat inventionis doctrina per se tota communis ad 
usus omnium quaestionum'. 
167. n. 2. doctrina inveniendi argumenti, vel medii'. 
168. n. l. Hine ortae sunt otiosorum et inertium hominum quaestionesp quomodo 
differant et locus et argumentum: quasi arg=entum non esset ipse 
locusi et artis vocabula non significarent aliquando artem ipsam, 
aliquando res artibus propositas: ut nomen aliquando significet nomen, 
id est partem orationial aliquando rem ipsam illi parti propositam.: 
ut Cicero, Catos sic argumentum indicat aliquando artem argumenti, 
aliquando rem ipsam, quae arguit et probat. At vero quanto 
simplicius erat inventionem (si hoc nomine priorem Dialeoticae partem 
placet appellare) definire artem earum rerum, quae dici de quaestione 
possent? quae omnes quonism. probarent et arguerent ren dubiam, 
argumenta dicerentur: tum argumentorum genera describerenturs loci 
nullum nomen quasi proprium interponeretur'. 
n. 4.1 et quidem contenderent, non verbis tantum et argumentis, sed sanguine, 
eaede, civili prope discordia et seditionel. 
169. n. l. Y Inventio praestat argumentum, id est animam quaestioni caduca 
tanquam corpori: syllogismus argumentum cum quaestione, id est animam 
cUm Corpore coniungit et connectit'. 
n. 2. I Est autem id quo quaestio tractaturp atque exponitur argumentum 
nominatum: quod arguat, id est probet rem, ac demonstret: sic 
Virgilius, Degeneres animos timor arguit. Cuius inveniendi modi qui 
naturae sunt, eosdem artis esse necesse est. Itaque cum animis 
disputando naturaliter incidat in earum rerum de quibus agitur, 
caussas, effecta, subiecta, adiuncta, dissentanea, caeteraque ab illis 
orta, pars haeo artis iisdem vestigiis insistet, et quaestionis 
utramque partem maiorem, et minorem sic intueri iubebit: ut caussae, 
effecta, omniaque illa naturae consilia promanturl. 
n-3. I Atque simplicis argumenti principes sunt partess Caussae, eventay 
consentanea, dissentanea. Sed in caussis finis, efficiens, forma 
materia: in dissentaneis quoque contrariag repugnantial disparata: 
et in contrariis adversal privantial relata numerantur. Hae sunt 
itaque principes simplicis arg=enti formaet unde consequential 
Comparata, divisio, definitio. Genus enim speciei caussam, species 
generis effectum significato Caetera ex omnibus sigillatim sumi 
possunt. Coniunctum est in testimoniis deorum et hominum., atque in 
enunciationum pugnal. 
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170. n. l. I principes aliaep aliae a principibus ortaef; I Comparata sunt ea 
quae inter se conferenturp ideoque modo duplicio collatio enim aut 
est qualitatisp aut quantitatiss qualitas est habitua comparatarum 
rerum: quantitas visp at quasi potestas quaedam'; lut angelit its. 
homines ad rationis usum oreatil; 'homo dialectics, velut armatus'; 
I homo deus quidam estp quid min= si dialecticus? '; I homo orator 
estp our non at dialecticus? '; I bestiis inest quaedam vie dialecticae 
rationis, hominibus non inerit? '. 
171. n. 2. I ad inveniendam rei dubiae fidem'; I sed at ipso orationis genereg 
quod quo simpliciusp constantiust sanctius erits tanto plus habebit 
in docendo persuasionis, ac fideil. 
n-3. I Arg=entum est ratio probationem praestansg qua colligitur aliud per 
aliudt at quae quod est dubium, per id quod dubium non est confirmat'. 
172. n. l. I Hino omnis copia rerum, et supellex depromenda est. Quare quoniam 
in hac parte tantum boni estj magnus labor, magn= studiun est adhibendum 
ut inde rerum abundantiam quam amplissimam, et ad omnem disputationem 
promptissimam faoultatem hauriamus'. 
n. 2. I Imo reliquis etia-a philosophici temporis annis tanto copiosius at 
uberius exercetur, quanto rer=, quae loquendae, dicendae, disputandae 
aunt, maior est ubertas et copial. 
173. n. 3. I non abutor Platonisp vel Aristotelisp vel Isocratisp vel hominis 
cuiusquam opinione, vel authoritates caussas rerum su=as et primas 
ab imis fontibus repetol. 
174. n. l. I brevibusque monitis mirabiles sapientiae fontes aperuisse: unde 
Vulcanip Minervaeque artificiosam pariter cum igne sapientiam de 
coelo clepsisse dictus est'. 
n-3. I fontes omni= rerum investigandarum definitis spatiis notatosp 
ac descriptos ostendit constantissimas iudicandi leges instituil 
ut homin= nee diligentiam effugerep nee iudicium fallere quicquam 
possit'. 
175. n. 1.1 atque o=ino artium institutionem potius ex puris naturae fontibust 
quam ex turbidis opinion= rivulis haurirel. 
n. 2. I Theologia autpn docet bene vivere, id est, Deo bonor= omnium fonti 
congruenter et acco=odatel. 
n. 5.1 ut ex patefactis eloquentiae fontibus eadem pene promiscue hauriantl. 
n. 6. I apta rerum inventarum collocatiol. 
176. n. 6. I ad eandem naturae matris imitationem'. 
n-7- I argumenti nempe cum quaestione firma necessariaque collocatiol. 
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177. n. 2. I ordinem multor=, et variorum arg=entorum cohaerentium inter se, 
ot perpetua velut catena vinctorum'. 
178. n. l. I methodus est multorum et variorumq sed ad unum finem tendentium. 
propositorum dispositio: Nomen dispositionis huius fecimus methodumt 
licet methodus omnem doctrinam et disputationem significetp attamen 
proprie compendium viae significat'. 
n. 2. I sylvaque tot tantarumque rerum licet amplissima latissiiaquet 
tamen brevibus compendiariisque numerorum nOtis artificiose 
comprehenderatur's 
179. n. l. I Rex enim Euclidem aliquando interrogasse fertur, num qua a& 
Geometriam via magis compendiaria esset quam f-tOIYtL(ZV ab 
eo compositaei cui Euolides, Semitat (inquit)p o Rext ad Geometriam 
regia nulls, est. Quo responso videtur significasse viam elementorum 
a se compositorum esse latamp apertam, simplicem, directam et tanquam 
militarem, ideoque regiam essei semitam autem breviorem esse 
lubricam et anoipitemp neque ideo regiaml. 
n-3- I Optimus praeceptor viam facilem et brevem in docendo sequi 
debet'. 
183. n. 2. I Scribendip dicendique exercitatio superests una et eadem monitione 
compraehensat sed scriptio naturaq et tempore prior est: cuius non 
alia via est quam rhetores exercendae eloquentiae tradiderunt'. 
n-3. I quanvis vox ad docendum multo valentior sit scripturap linguaque 
sit manu disertiorp ut sapienter in Phaedro extremo Socrates 
disputat.... I 
184. n. l. I nulla enim orationis tantaiis est, ut vel mimimam tam beatae mentis 
partem possit adumbrare dicendol. 
186. n. 1.1 hactenus placuit ad istam tractationis methodique speciem tibi 
rudia quaedam doctrinae Christianae lineamenta dueere, quae tu polito 
limatoque iudicio polires et limares, vivisque coloribus exprimerest. 
n. 2. I humilia simmisse: mediocria temperates summa graviter exprimeres 
auclientium mentes omnibus modis tractare, conciliare, alienare, 
placare, commovere, excitarep remittere, quo velis impellers, unde 
velis deducerel. 
n-3. t Artes verot ac doctrinae o=es quid nisi immensam rerum varietatem 
(quae ab optimo, maximoque Deo incredibili sapientia conditae sunt 
et effectae) intuendo, et admirando persequuntur? '. 
187. n. l. lilac iucunda, varietate, et elegantia, poBtae saepep et historici 
relaxant animos legentium'. 
xx 
187. n. 3. I quod haso professio nullam habeat definitam regioner; pcuius terminis 
septa teneatur, sed in immenso rerum o=ium, atque artium campo 
libere vagari, consistereque possitt et sive do rebus divinis, sive 
de humanis dicat, sive de caelop sive de terrap sive do omni genere 
naturao, sive de moribus hominum ot institutis, sive ad multosp sive 
ad paucosl cum reliquis artibus scientiam et cognitionem rerum 
concesserit, sibi ornandae atque illuminandae orationis laudem 
vendicabit'. 
188. n. l. I Quod soli specieil non omni acciditg ut hominiq medicum esset Quod 
omni, non soli, ut homini bipedem esses Et soli et omni et aliquando, 
ut homini in senectute canescerei Quod soli, omni, semper, ut homini, 
natum esse ad risum'. 
189. n. l. Mittamus igitur profanas Aoy-, ýAzp.. 2ý- et 
loquamur verba sacrae SCripturae, utamur sermone Spiritus sancti. 
Verissimus enim est dootor sapientiae, clarissimus rhetor est 
eloquentiae, verbisque utitur ad idp quod a nobis intelligi necesse 
sit, perspicuisp significantibusy idoneis'. 
190. n. l. I Aptum est verborum continuatio, quae stylum habet ad id quod 
agimust accommodatum. Cum autem res oratori subiectae sint aut 
humiles, aut gravesp aut intermediaet oratio quae rebus explicandis 
adhibetur hano tripertitam varietatem sequatur necesse eats in qua 
et si differentia pro rerum momentisy et naturis accipiturv omnibus 
tamen dicendi generibus hoc commune est: ut ex patefactis 
eloquentiae fontibus eadem pene promiscue hauriant, sed alias 
contentius, et splendidius, alias remissius supradictis ornamentis 
utatur'. 
n. 2. I suamisse et dilucide'; I vehemenst plena, copiosa et ad 
tractandos animos instructal. 
n-3- I in omnibus at dictis at factis, in omnibus rerum quotidianarum at 
nulla arte comprehensarum consiliis ex humana earum rerum prudential. 
19i. n. l. 1 rhetorica possessionibus ornamentorum suorum contental. 
n. 2.1 aliqUAM 10cuPletem et ornatam eloquentiae domum ingresd magnificas 
eius opes constructas, ac reconditas interpretationia beneficio 
patefaciamus'. 
n-4. I hic campus, haec palaestra concessu omnium dabatur ad omnes 
oratoriae supellectilis opes explicandum et propalam. collocanduml. 
192. n. 3. I Forensis oratio non solum nervos at aculeos habet, sed accuratam, 
at ornatam verbor= 8upellectileml. 
193. n. 3. I inanem quqndem verbor= profluentiam in te despicimus'. 
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193. n. 4. I ut inde rer= abundantiam quara amplissimaml et ad omnem 
disputationem promptissimam facultatem hauri=usl. 
194-n-l- I non modo ad eublevandam inopiam et paupertatem sui sermonisp 
verumetiam ad locupletandam copiamp et augendamp dignitatem'. 
n. 4.8 Modifieatis etiam verbis frequentius utimur quam propriist idque 
partim inopia propriorumg partim elegmtia et ornatu modificatorumt. 
n-5- 1 ita porro verbis aptus et presaus est, ut neseias utrum res 
orationeg an verba sententiie illuntrenturl. 
195. n. 2.1 odioaa puerisq ignota populo, a co=uni senau remotag a Rhetoricae 
usu (quem retinere tamen volumus) ab h=anitatis usu (quem confirmare 
Dialeotioa cupimus) alienis3imatg 
n*4. I eorm magistrorum lingua illi iam domestica et familiaris est'. 
197. n. 3. I Jura igitur at leges duodecim tabulis Francico eermone Prancia 
describitol. 
n-4- I tanta est in verbis singulis proprietasp puritasp elegantias tantus 
in coniunctis ornatus, tam varia figurarum insignia, so lumina, tants. 
in voce iuounditas, in actione dignitas'. 
198. n. l. Singula per sep et separatim quam laudem quodve lumen adferantp 
coniuncta in perpetuitatet et continuatione orationis quantam in 
ordine aequabilitatem, in numeris suavitatem, in figuris venustatem 
habeantp diligentissime spectandasunt'. 
n. 2. I bene autem sonantia (ut caetera lumina) plus laudis habeantp quod 
eono et iucunditate deliniunt aures ad quarum uidicium accommodate 
fingenda est oratiol. 
n-3. I do 80lig ina3ýlum praeceptiuncularim spinis in schola (quasi 
dialectics, ad scholasticas de se duntaxat invents. sit) triennium 
ferO totum clamitants contemnunt podtas, removent oratoresp omnes 
eleg-antis et ornatae disciplinae homines respuunt: iisque 
philosophiam suam labefactari putant'. 
n-5. I do nostra disciplina quaeratur, ut falso crimine nos accusates 
esse constareto et si quid a nobis humanitus offensum esset, ut 
nobis non modo non repugnantibus, sod optantibus emendareturl. 
199. n. 2. I Itaque quod perspicue homines cum hominibus colloquunturp quod 
ornate ac splendide sensa mentis exprimunt... quod iure so legibus 
mores conformatos habent et in vita vitae societatem sanctam inter 
se tuentur, laudandae nobilisque disciplinae beneficium est'. 
I 
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200. n. l. I Nos enim huius artis et desoriptionem, et, illustrationem9et usum 
faxit tandem Deus optimus maximus, ut homines intelligant' quam 
differentem ab Aristoteleis ostendamust; 1 N08 (quod illustrationis 
eat) nullum in arte praeoeptum ponimus, quod perspicuie insignium 
hominum testimoniis, et exemplis non explicemus... 1; 1 Aristotelei 
praecipiunt ad perspicue docendumvexemplis opus esse non abscurisp, 
qualis sunt apud Chaerilums sed illustribus, qualia, sunt apud Homerum'. 
n. 2. Amo patriamp sicuti debeo, eiusque praeolaras laudes illustrari 
celebrarique maxime cupio. 
n. 3- Nos omnes locos definitionibus, partitionibus expositos, insignibus 
exemplis illustramus et ornamuss quibus et doctrine, facilior, et 
dootrinae usus promptior efficiturl. 
201. n. l. At Deus Aeterne Maximeg maximas tibi gratias debemus et habemust 
quod pro vix plumbeis illie veter= Grammaticorum rivulist aurea 
Ciceronis, Virgilii, Demosthenisp Homeri flumina nobis effuderist et 
singularem quandam gratiae tuae lucem nostris temporibus accenderis. 
Ma. iores et patres nostri, legibus suis id nobis optaveruntp quod tu 
donastis nobis in obscura nube indicaruntquod in clarissima luce 
collocastit philosophiae usum et fructum coniuncta, Grammaticorum 
elegantia nitidiorem facere volueruntf tu poRarum et oratorum 
gravissimis et ornatissimis exemplis uberriminn et absolutissimum 
dedistil. 
n. 2. declarat hodie innumerabilium hominum sine ullis praeceptis 
Rhetoricis graviter, et ornate loquentium famas qui ornamentis 
orationis mirabiliter excellunt'. 
202. n. l. t eoque audacius utuntur omnibus verborum singulorump et coniunctorum 
ornamentis quo maiorem sibi proponunt in scribendo cantusp et aurium 
voluptateml. 
n-3. pigmentis etiam quibusdam et lineamentis naturaliter aspersal. 
n-4- ad eloquentiam colorandam et roborandam'. 
n. 6. Su=a... laus eloquentiae est amplificare rem ornandot quod valet 
non solum ad augendum aliquid altius dicendo# verumetiam ad 
extenuandum atque abiiciendum'. 
n. 8. ad ornandam et amplificandam disputationem'. 
203. n. l. I Cum igitur doctrinas non solum ingenuas, sed regias dico, nihil 
amplificandi causa dico, sed earum nobilitatem vere ac simpliciter 
exprimol. 
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204. n. l. Quinetiam lumins. orationia (quae Graeci vocant 6' ýJW cun 
nimis belle, aut festive dicuntur nonnunquam ut puer lial at inepta 
repucliantur ... Et iterationes verborump quas in varia genera 
descripsimus, nonnunquam abeunt in -ca-u-roýoyl. "a7v I autp=oCIALay, 
c= immodice aut non opportune petunturt detrahuntque non solum 
sententiis pondus, sed etiam verbis ornatum, at decorem: ut enim 
quaedam mulieres inornatae dicuntur esseq quod nimium comptae# at 
calamistratae suntq sio in oratione nimium polita, at picta figurist 
infucata quaedamp et subodiosa vitia nasounturl. 
208. n. l. I Elocutio definienda fuit orationis a vulgari consuetudine ad 
elegantiorem quendam modum mutatiol. 
209. n. 3. I Allegoria eat inversio sermonisi cum aliud dicitur, aliud 
intelligendum eat'; I superior nonnunquam ex continuis translationibus 
gigniturf. 
214. n. l. I At id Aristoteles non exprimit, neo tropi nomen ullum speciale 
ponit, ut eius aetate videatur ars troporum nond= extitissel; 
I tametsi metaphora plerunque necessaria est, cum verbis propriia 
caremus, et metaphorat quae vera metaphora est, quodammodo quod 
significatur, notum facit per similitudinemi Et Aristoteles in 
Rhetoricis metaphoras inprimis celebravit, quae suaves, significantesp 
e propinquo sumptae essent eisque imaginem, amplitudinem orationis, 
facetiast subiectiones ante oculos, proverbia, superlationes subiicit'. 
n. 2. redundantiam haberel et loquaoitatem et insolentiam et affectationem'. 
n-3. I metaphora clarior est plerunque significatione proprial. 
2154, n. l. I Venio nunc ad elegantiam translationisp cum tam apte facta estg ut 
non irruisse in alienu[a locum, sed imigrasse in suum videaturl. 
n. 2. I Translata dico quae ex eo loco in quo propria erant, in eum in quo 
propria non suntg commutanturt; I ut nubes, ut ea quae gignuntur e 
terra, ut ea quae opera hominump et artificio fiuntt partim animatae, 
ut plantaep pecudesp homines. In utroque genere translationis ornatus 
spectatur. Nam Cicero nubeculam frontis dixit illudens Pisonems Et 
rusticorum sermo est ge=are vitesp id est oculos emittere'. 
216. n. l. I Et quae spectantur in artificiis hominum: qualia, aunt limaret 
fingere, pingere, formare, tingerep polirep sarcirep dissuere: unde 
summuntur ornatissimae, et suavissimae translationes, veritatem in 
disputatione limare, crimen fingere, omnibus artis coloribus 
pingere.... 1; 1 quae ita. aunt in promptu, ut vix arte, et. praeceptis 
egeanti ita, aunt excellentia, ut orationi clarissimum lumen 
adferant .... Quare perspicuum est nihil ease in rerum natura, cuius 
non in aliis rebus possumus uti, vocabulo... I 
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216. n. 2. I our pro aliis ponanturt similitudo non indicats ut sacrilegium pro 
sacrilego# temeritas, pro temerariol; I Quamobrem honos verborum 
singulorum, quatuor maxima existit ex rebusi si quod vocalitate 
iuoundum, novitate floridump vatustate grave at sanotum videaturt si 
denique translatum vel similitudinis rationep vel alio quovis modo in 
orational tanquam. luminosa. gemma splendescat'. 
217. n. l. I tropor= ge=as'. 
218-n-4- I Si exactam verborum scripturam potius quam sententiae analogiam 
sequaturle 
219. n. 2. I Quis igitur author?... Christus solus ... Quae materia? panis nempe 
at vin=t quibus analogia sacri mysterii praecipue comprehenditur. 
Ut anim corpora nostra confecto corporeis organis pane epotoque vino 
viribus recreata caducam vitam tuentur, sic animae nostrae Christi 
crucifixo corpora profusoque sanguine ab aeternae moitis gehenna per 
vivam fidem liberataeg aeternam vitam consequunturl. 
220. n. l. I et quidem panis et vinum mortalibus omnibus notissima alimentag ut 
inde metaphorae similitudo clarissima fieret'; I tropus geminus est, 
Metaphors, et Matonymial; I Signis igitur panis et vini obsignatur in 
animis ad sacram mensam. accedentium Christi corpus crucifixumg et 
sanguinem effusum in remissionem peocatorum nostroruml in liberationem 
aeternam salutemque vere credentium poenitentiumquel; I non proprie 
sed modificatel; I Quapropter videmus totum Coenae mysterium tropis 
refertum essel; I tropi clarissimil; I Et quidem eo mirabilius est, 
tropos novia theologis tam insolentes viderip c= Podtae atque 
oratores omnium genti=, si in locum unum conferanturp non sint cum 
Mose et Prophatis, cum Christo et Apostolis, troporum, non dico divina 
quadam maiestate, sed crebritate et frequentia conferendi. Veruntamen 
Evangelii tropis etiam tropos alios plerique Patres impensius 
aggregarunt, cum signs, Pro Bignatis rebus acciperent, Christum in 
Coena Domini videri corporis oculisp manibus attrectari, frangi, ore 
et dentibus mandi... I 
221. n. l. I Sacramentum est publics, fidei actio, sensili signo solennique ritu 
Ecclesiae suae a Deol ad Christi mortem co=emorand=, eiusque fruct= 
participandum institutal; I Sacramenti vero nomine interdum omnes 
exercendae pietatis caeremoniaeg ritusque, vel rei sacrae epiritualisque 
notae nominanturl; I rei sacrae visibile signuml; I Materies igitur 
terrestris et nostris oculis subiecta, est similitudo coelestis et 
divinae. Nam si Sacramenta (ait Augustinus, Sacramentum pro materia, 
illa, terrestri accipiens) quandum similitudinem earum rerum, quarum 
Sacramenta sunt, non haberent, utique Sacramenta non essent. In iis 
(ait idem) aliud videtur, aliud intelligiturl. 
n. 2. I in qualitate multo plus est luminis ad illustrandumi in quantitate 
plus roboris ad impellendum. Similitudines itaque spud philosophosp 
et omnes eos qui familiariterp populariter"que docere volunt, principem 
locum obtinent'; I itaque vere mihi dicturus videor, ut oculos in 
corporet its, similitudines in orationey partibus omnibus lumen afferre'. 
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222. n. l. I Ilino etiam aunt emplificationes eximiae, cum gradatim a minoribus 
itur ad maiora; '' Ex hoc porro comparationis genere Gingulareo 
quaedam sunt in pobtis et oratoribus amplificationes'. 
n. 2. I ne longe simile sit ductum... cavendum etiamp no sit deformis 
translatio .... no nimia maior... neve minor... neve anguatior ... et si 
durior esse Videbitur, mollienda est quadam praemunitionel. 
n-3.9.;, L ýtl-rýe, 4s- XF, YFLV JrOLTý'LL-JrNZ5, nugari, ot 
poUticas metaphoras loquil. 
223. n. l. I Ideae exemplares, -rief CL16'IA . 11 .7 tantum sunt, et pol5ticarum 
metaphorum co=ental. 
225. n. l. I illustris explanatiog qua res pene sub aspectum subiiciuntur. hoc 
schema cum rem ante oculca constituato in maximis affectibus 
dominaturs sitque saepe ex conglobatis effectis, aut ex cumulatis 
adiunctisq aut ex comparatione similium, pariump minorum, maiorum... ' 
227-n-1. I ficts. personarum inductio, per quam res cuiuscunque generis sintg 
vocem et sermonem possunt accipere. Haeo vel plena est, vel quodammodo 
muta. Plena cum tota fictio personae, et orationis repraesentatur: 
mutap cum obliquae allocutiones introduountur .... Hae iucunda varietatep 
et elegantia poý; tae saepe, et historici relaxant animos legentium: 
tantamque habent in fingendis alienis sermonibus rationem et dignitatis, 
et locorum, et temporum, et momentorum omnium'. 
228. n. 3. I quod valeý non solum ad augendum aliquid altius dicendot 
verumetiam ad extenuandum, atque abiiciendumt. 
n-4. I Interrogatio figurata non solum quaerit rem dubiamp sed ad odium, 
invidiam, misericordiam, I: aetitiamp spem, molestiam, omnesque animorum 
Commutationes convertiturt nihil enim est tam flexibile, neque quod 
tam facile sequatur quocunque ducas, quam interrogatiol. 
229. n. 2. I Atque its, se habet ratio ementiendae veritatial suavis autem, est, 
et saepe utilis iocus, cum ad condiendumt tum ad venuste conformandum 
sermonems quo rei alicuius deformitas irridetur non turpiterp nee 
insulse. Huius duo genera sunt facetiae, et dicacitas. Facetiae 
latius in oratione fundunturt ut cum ridicule describuntur hominum, 
mores$ atque its, effinguntur, ut quales sint, intelligantur. 
Dicacitas brevior est, et acutior'. 
230. n. l. I concentus ex apta pedum modulatione caussa suavitatis excogitatus'. 
240. n-3- I nativo quodam aurium sensul. 
n-5- I Rhetorica igitur prosa furatur a pobmate numerosam quandam 
voluptatem'. 
241. n. 2. I n=eruss quo uno nihil estalk9natiusnostris animis'. 
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241. n-5. I Numerus (quo nomine et rythmosp et metra significari volumus) est 
concentus ex apta pedum modulations caussa suavitatis excogitatus. 
Pars igitur numeri pes est, et eius dimensio certis spatiia temporum 
definite, ... Bunt autem duae formae numerosae continuationisp carmen, 
et oratio liberiorl quam Fabius vinctam nominat'. 
242. n. 2. I Pobticus est iste furor Marce Cicero, quo te potius in hano 
cogitationem impulsump quam firma ratione adductum sentiol. 
n-3. I Quid igitur gloriaris te tenerep quod ille non tenuerit? quam 
viam nobis aperis ad illius oratoris perfecti laudem, quam ille non 
viderit? Tum relaberis ad illum furorem politicum: Obiiois enim 
tibi neminem oratorem talem unquam fuisset qualem definierial. 
243. n. 1 t Logiea in hoc mercatorey videlicetg naturalie fuitt qualem Proolus 
in Cratisto postea commemorat fuisset qui eine artet solo naturae 
aeumine prompte problema quodvis diiudicaret. Vulgus poýietas na-gei 
arbitratur et mentis furore ad egregia carmina fundendum excitarit. 
n. 2. I At impetus iste naturalis communis est omnium virtutum omniumque 
disciplinarum, in quibus excellet nemop nisi qui, naturae indole atque 
bonitate impelleturt vel potius rapieturl. 
n-4. ' Poetica inquamp sunt ista miracula plena quidem puerilis admirationiso 
prudentiae vero ac veritatis inanial. 
244-n-1. I indocti cum hoc audiuntt magna delectationet et iuctmditate 
permoventurs at quid sit tam singulare, et divinum quod eos moveat, 
nesciunt'. 
n*2. I furor ille philosophicust. 
n. 6. I auditorem vere et constanter doceri malint, quam ulla cupiditate 
capi, aut vi infla=atae orationis impelli ac turbarit. 
n. 7. -rFAXtv. 2 C tanquam scelestos 9 furiososque appellari 
245. n. l. I Itaque cum universam quandam, et hominum propriam virtutem 
rationem esse iudicarem, qua deos immortales, et seipsos, caeteraque 
omnia cognovissents qua singulares sibi dotes ingenitas ad orandum, 
numerandump metiendum, canendum et reliquas artium laudes persequendum 
excitassent... ' 
245. n. 4- I Sed de caussis satist quarum cognitio tam naturalis est ut hominibus 
naturs, non viam ad earum cognitionem aperires sed violentam quandam 
impulsionem afferre videaturl. 
246. n. l. I Est igitur dialecticae rerum omnium explicandarum artificium atque 
instr=ent= propriuml. 
247. n. l. I 'Dialecticam, id est rationis naturalis artem, quanquam breviter et 
paucis annis in schola meditatam et exercitatamp tota vita tamen in 
rebus o=ibus meditemur et exercemus'. 
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247. n. 2. I Hano viam (qui docere volet) oequi debebit. quanquam poetaer et 
oratores ab ea saepe discedunt, sed delectandi, aliquando etiam 
fallendi gratial non docendil; and I utilitatiog et voluptatie gratis, 
multa sibi permittunt'. 
248. n. l. I Est enim logica, ars diaserendi, ideoque etiam docendi... Nam eiquid 
doceat grammaticuat rhetor, mathematicus, non suo, sed logici 
artificio docebitle 
n-2. I versus invenerunt, et concentus orationis suavitate deleatabilesp 
multitudine prope infinitosp varia dimensionum collocatione 
discrepantes'. 
249. n. 3. I Persuadere non est finis et perfecta sum aque laus oratoriss Quid 
its? quis, id in eventu fortuito, sit= estp quem ars sua vi praestare 
non potesti sed bene dicerel. 
250-n-1. I qui vero moveret et impellere vi orationis audientium animos 
cupiunts quantitatis comparationibus magis utunturt ita sunt oratores 
in maiorumv minorumg parium argumentis frequentiuss quia sibi viribus 
auferendum, tallendumque auditoris anim= proponunts nisi quieta 
docendi perspicuitate adduci posse videaturt. 
n-5- I o=ium artium, 
ýýticipeml. 
251. n-4- I Nulla hominis cuiusquam natura perfecta esse potest, nulls, arst 
quoniam naturam imitaturt perfects, esse potests nulla exercitatio 
perfecta esse potest: sic ut addi nihil possit, cum vita hominis tam 
brevis sit et incertal. 
